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Abstract 
The recent trend reflecting the erosion of the traditional boundaries between banking and other 
financial businesses by virtue of financial deregulation and liberalization has resulted in a more 
complex and dynamic risk-profile for banking institutions. One upshot of this transformation is, 
whilst promoting safe and sound banking still remains the overriding hank regulatory objective, 
the focal point shifts more and more to managerial function and responsibility, a subject 
traditionally more generally associated with the corporate-law domain but now being recognized 
as a core subject-matter for banking regulation and supervision. This text will analyze the 
subject of managerial function and responsibility in the context of United States banking 
institutions, specifically the national hank, the bank holding company and the financial holding 
company. 
The primary thesis to be presented and supported is in banking the governance order 
concerning the "control and direction" mechanism over managerial conduct can only be fully 
appreciated by not only looking into the economy specific dimension, as informed primarily by 
applicable corporate law standards addressed generally to and among the shareholder, the board 
and the senior management as they interact with the corporate entity, but also by investigating 
the industry specific dimension (in the instant case as to banking institutions), as reflected by 
required regulatory standards enshrined in statutes, regulations and other regulatory 
pronunciations addressed specifically to their industrial particularities and their derived 
implications on the society as whole. In the context of the United States, the governance order of 
banking institutions, as such, is placed in the applicable (i) state law corporate governance 
framework tinder the Delaware General Corporate Law and related Delaware case law and (ii) 
federal statutes and the prudential regulations and practices of federal banking regulators. 
As will be seen, these two regulatory strands that impact the U. S. hank governance order 
have separately evolved tinder separate statutory and regulatory frameworks with separate 
policy underpinnings. Traditionally, banks as corporate entities have been treated under general 
corporate governance principles developed under corporate statutes and case law. For lcdcral 
banking institutions, the federal regulators have generally deferred to the fiduciary standards 
under Delaware corporate law. The policy of the Delaware statute and case law directs corporate 
directors and officers towards maximizing corporate value fier the shareholders: the law 
recognizes that corporate management is engaged in business risk-taking and grants corporate 
management considerable leeway as to their good-faith decisions and activities, while placing 
constraints on grossly negligent, illegal, had taith and sell-dealing decisions and activities. The 
U. S. federal bank regulators' primarily are concerned with the "satcty and soundness" of' 
banking institutions and the stability of the U. S. banking system. In pursuing the prudential 
objective, the U. S. Congress and these bank regulators have externally imposed numerous 
regulatory requirements on bank management, backed by intensive supervision and vigorous 
enforcement. This text will argue that these federal banking laws and regulations have 
significantly intruded- in depth and in breadth- into the traditional state law domain of corporate 
governance of banking institutions, and, as a result of which, the ensuing contusion and 
inconsistence in governance standards to be addressed. This intrusion refers to a stand-alone 
bank, as well as a bank held by a corporate parent. 
An appreciation of this "push and pull" tension between these two bifurcated strands 
influencing the governance structure facing bank management is critical as management plans 
its prudent profit-seeking strategies. Whilst a needed, comprehensive reform able to bring about 
a set of uniform and industry-specific governance standards is outside the scope of this work, 
this text will consider possible ways to reconcile conflicts generated and will make some modest 
recommendations in this connection as conclusions thereof. 
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Introduction 
This text explores, from a legal and regulatory perspective, the control and direction 
mechanism over managerial conduct of US banking organizations. 
As a starting point, although at the international level the fruits of the ongoing 
standard convergence processes spearheaded by the Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision and other international agencies on banking regulation and supervision have 
been widely recognized and generally accepted by domestic banking regulators 
cross-jurisdiction as important reference points, at the domestic level these best-practice 
standards alone remain insufficient in shedding the full light oil the legal and regulatory 
forces actually directing and controlling the banking organizations and their 
management of an individual economy. First, in adapting these international best 
practices to their domestic contexts, individual economics' approaches are often also 
economy-specific, albeit among them certain common regulatory values or objectives 
being shared. As further elaborated in the main chapters, this distinctiveness, easily 
found in such crucial areas ranging from affiliation pattern to permissible banking 
activities, has led to discrete regulatory consequences over managerial conduct of 
banking organizations one jurisdiction from another. Second and tör current purposes 
a more compelling one, limitations of international regulatory standards rest also with 
another domestic factor. Apart from the bank regulator to which the hank management 
is held accountable to, as directed under the relevant domestic banking legislation, 
regulations and other regulatory pronunciations, the same management is also mandated 
to maximize the interest of the bank shareholder who exercises ownership rights and 
interacts with the bank corporate entity based on the corporate law of the jurisdiction 
where the bank is incorporated. The ownership right enjoyed by the shareholder is 
most noticeable for jurisdictions of Anglo-American legal tradition. 
It is therefore recognized only by sitting in a domestic context, where the hank 
regulatory and ownership dynamics have been carefully examined, would one be in a 
proper position to appreciating and evaluating the real face of the control and direction 
mechanism over managerial conduct. This research puts such regulatory and 
ownership interactions in the context of the United States - one that displays great 
governance dynamics over time when the significantly expanded bank regulatory 
stakeholder governance model interacting with the traditional shareholder governance 
model. 
For the benefit of clarity, it is worthy of some length here giving substance to 
certain crucial concepts used herein, as well as delineating the scope and limitations of 
this research. The two US governance models referred to in the previous paragraph 
should be understood as follows. 
The bank regulatory stakeholder governance model denotes the US federal banking 
regulatory, supervisory, examination and enforcement regime, particular the aspect 
where the US bank regulators utilizes their open-ended and open-textured "bank safety 
and soundness" rule-making and enforcement power controlling and directing the 
management of a stand-alone bank or that of a parent company exercising control over a 
bank subsidiary towards safe and sound management, so as to protect hank depositors 
and to sustain the safe and sound ongoing operation of a stand-alone bank or a hank 
subsidiary. In this respect, bank safety and soundness is identified as a fundamental 
statutory and regulatory notion that is an evolving concept largely shaped by the federal 
hank regulators and regulatory practice and that is essentially an umbrella term to take 
into consideration all prudential regulations and related supervisory, examination and 
enforcement practices. The stakeholder role the hank regulators assume in this 
capacity is functionally similar to the position a creditor or insurer takes in protecting its 
interests-exerting control over managerial decisions so as to limit bank risk-taking to, 
from the regulator's perspective, a satisfactory level. 
The shareholder governance model is referred mainly to the US state corporate-law 
system, represented by Delaware corporate statutes and Delaware common law, 
traditionally considered as the primary source governing the internal legal relationships 
among the shareholder, the director and the senior management, aimed at encouraging 
the bank management's risk-taking and directing them towards maximizing the bank 
shareholder's interests as opposed to those of other stakeholders as they interact with the 
bank corporate entity. On the US state corporate-law system, the approach adopted by 
Delaware corporate statutes and Delaware common law in formulating within the 
legal-entity boundary the concept of fiduciary duties (duty of good faith, loyalty and 
I 
care) owed by the bank management to the bank corporate entity and the hank 
shareholder as a whole, which as the bank safety and soundness concept also by nature 
poses as a set of open-ended and open-textured standards of conduct and review over 
every aspect of managerial conduct of banking organizations will be a focal discussion 
point. Predicated on the shareholder's limited liability privilege applying to the parent 
company, the parent-subsidiary relationships will also be considered. 
The above-stated therefore makes clear it is not intended to expose the füll 
control-and direction (i. e., governance) order governing the management of the US 
banking organizations. Such order may also include other regulatory (or stakeholder) 
elements, including consumer-protection, competition and, for large banking 
organizations, federal securities regulations. The author particularly recognizes that 
the disclosure-based compliance requirements deriving from traditional federal 
securities regulatory regime and the corporate governance requirements prescribed in 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Law of 2002 and its implementation regulations, as a critical 
compliance point for large or public US banking organizations, also directly or 
indirectly contribute to the bank management fashioning their business decisions. The 
current approach of focusing the stakeholder-shareholder dynamics on the regulatory 
requirements for safe-and-sound management co-relating to the managerial mandate of 
maximizing the shareholder's interests rests with the conviction it is in this area where 
the shareholder-stakeholder confrontation becomes most acute. 
On the bank regulatory stakeholder governance model, further clarifications might 
be helpful. The peculiar and complex regulatory matrix where US banking 
organizations ply their trade rests with the presence of both federal and state authorities 
(the dual banking system) and of a diffuse regulatory structure. The US banking 
regulatory system is sui generic. Over time it has developed into a diffuse structure 
that spreads regulatory authority across different governmental agencies. On the 
federal level, three primary federal banking agencies, the Office of Comptroller of the 
Currency ("OCC"), the Federal Reserve Board of Governors ("FRB") and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), have developed regulatory mandates 
sometimes distinct the other overlapping, in response to problems of the banking sector. 
Further regulatory overlaps have arisen as a result of the dual banking, the three primary 
I 
federal regulators co-existing with 50 state banking agencies and thus federal (or 
national) co-existing with state charters. This work concerns only the federal banking 
regulation. Discussion on federal banking regulation will focus on three types of 
federal banking organizations-national banks ("banks2") and, to a limited extent, bank 
holding companies ("BHC") and financial holding companies ("FH( . ") (collectively, 
"US banking organizations"). Since this work's primary focus is on the bank safety 
and soundness concept in relation to managerial conduct of the US banking 
organizations, a comprehensive treatment on the US federal hank regulatory system is 
not intended. The following therefore, by way of background, provides only a brief 
account on how these three types of banking organizations are being regulated and 
supervised under the US federal banking regulatory system. 
On national banks, the diffuse federal regulatory structure means, first and 
foremost, national banks fall under the supervision and regulation of the OCC, as the 
chartering authority and the primary regulator. 3 The OCC exercises control over the 
national bank's operations in a variety of areas, including issuing regulatory 
pronunciations of restricted or prohibited unsafe and unsound bank practice, -' regulating 
an increase or decrease in capitalization, ' payment of dividends, " change of names or 
place of business, 7 and the national bank's establishment of a new branch, 'an operating 
subsidiary9 or a financial subsidiary. 10 OC'C supervises activities of national banks and 
' For a useful historical account on developments of the US banking industry and the corresponding bank 
regulatory regime, see KFNNETH SPONG, BANKING REGULATION- ITS PURPOSES, 
IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS 15-33 (5th cd. 2000). 
2A "bank" is by statute defined either as (1) a federally insured bank under the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Act, 12 U. S. C. § 1813 (h) (I ); or (2) a national hank or state-chartered bank that (a) accepts demand 
deposits or deposits that depositors may withdraw by check or similar means für payment to third parties 
or others; and (b) makes commercial loans. 12 U. S. C. § 1841 (c) (1). Except tier otherwise dclined, 
throughout the work a bank shall mean a national bank. 
The OCC has primary regulatory authority over the activities of a national bank, whether it is owned by 
a bank holding company or is individually owned. 12 U. S. C. §§ 21 et . fey., 
93a. 
4 See the relevant discussion in chapter liour. 
See 12 U. S. C. §§ 57,59. 
See 12 U. S. C. § 60. 
See 12 U. S. C. § 30. 
" See 12 U. S. C. § 36 (c). 
" It is well settled that banks may own operating subsidiaries to perform activities (except deposit-taking) 
that could be performed within banks. 12 U. S. C. § 24 (Seventh), 93a ; 12 C. F. R. § 5.34. With certain 
4 
their subsidiaries' and is authorized by statute to examine them. '2 In addition, the 
OCC has a variety of administrative remedies, ranging from cease-and-desist orders, 
civil money penalties and removal and suspension, to enforce against national banks and 
their institution-affiliated parties (including the bank's directors and management) for, 
among other things, breaches of OCC-prescribed bank safety-and-soundness regulatory 
pronunciations. 13 To resolve troubled banks, the Comptroller may appoint a conservator 
or receiver for failed or failing national banks. Where the national hank is put into 
conservatorship, the conservator is normally the FDIC'4 and, in consultation with the 
FDIC, the hank will be subject to the OCC's examination and supervision. 
'' When the 
Comptroller appoints a receiver, the receiver will be the FDIC. 
Apart from OCC, as national banks are covered by deposit insurance, they are also 
exceptions, lcdcral banking laws and regulations that apply to operations of the parent hank also apply to 
operating subsidiaries. Operating subsidiaries of national banks are subject to supervision and 
examination by the OCC. On enl'orccinent, the OCC also has the authority to direct it national bank or its 
operating subsidiary to take remedial action whenever necessary for bank suety and soundness. See 12 
C. F. R. 5.34 (c)(3). 
10 The general powers that national banks may exercise are outlined in section x of the National Bank Act 
of I864: "... all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking; by 
discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, hills of exchange, and other evidences of debt; by 
receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and Nullion; by loaning money on personal 
security; by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes according to the provisions of this act... " 12 U. S. C. 
24. 
After the passage of the Granmn-Leach-Bliley of 1999, through "financial subsidiaries", national banks 
may conduct an even broader set of financial activities, provided, among others, the bank and any 
depository institution affiliates are well capitalized and well managed and also have received Community 
Reinvestment Act ratings (CRA ratings) of satisfactory or outstanding in their last examinations at the 
time the activity is first undertaken. 12 U. S. C. 1843 (i)(2), 2903 (c)( I ). These activities must be either 
that a bank can engage in directly or financial in nature or incidental to it financial activity. In general, 
financial subsidiaries of national banks can engage in any financial activity other than insurance and 
annuities underwriting, insurance company portfolio investments, real estate development and investment, 
and merchant banking (collectively "Financial-subsidiary Restricted Financial Activities"). It should he 
noted, nevertheless, Financial-subsidiary Restricted Financial Activities are permitted to be conducted by 
a national bank's other nonblank affiliates owned by it common holding company. Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 121 (a) (2) (amending the National Bank Act to add new R. S. § 5136 
(A)(a)(1), (a)(2)(A)-(a)(2)(B), (g)(3)), 13 Stat. 1338,1373,1377-78 (1999). 
" 12 U. S. C. § 24 (Seventh). 
12 12 U. S. C. § 48 1. 
" 12 U. S. C. § 1818. 
1' 12 U. S. ('. §§ 203,1821 (c)(2)(A)(i). 
0 12 U. S. C. § 204. 
16 12 U. S. ('. § 191,1821 (c)(2)(A)(ii). 
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subject to certain statutes of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and the regulations of the 
FDIC, who may conduct special examinations at national banks for insurance 
purposes. 17 National banks would automatically become members of the Federal 
Reserve System once a charter is granted. This status would then give Federal Reserve 
Board authority to promulgate regulations applying to all member banks, including 
national banks. ' 8 
Formation of a bank holding company or a financial holding company subjects 
national banks to an additional layer of regulation and supervision at the parent 
company level. A BHC is defined by statute as any company that: (1) directly or 
indirectly owns, controls, or has power to vote 25 percent or more of any class of the 
voting shares of a bank; (2) controls in any manner the election of a majority of the 
directors or trustees of a bank; or (3) exercises controlling influence over the 
management or policies of a bank. 19 The FRB has exclusive oversight authority over 
BHCs under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 and the 1970 amendment 
thereto. 20 In the Bank Holding Company Act, a general separation between banking 
and commerce is mandated. With their control over bank subsidiaries, BHCs may not 
own other types of companies except for companies engaged in banking or in managing 
or controlling banks and their authorized subsidiaries; companies that furnish services to 
the holding company's subsidiaries; and companies engaged in exempt nonblank 
activities. 21 Upon the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley of 1999, US Congress 
17 12 U. S. C. § 1820 (b)(3). All of the FDIC's examination powers extend to an insured national bank's 
institution's affiliates. See 12 U. S. C. § 1820 (b)(4). 
18 12 U. S. C. §§ 248(j), 321,324. Note whereas the FRB has regulatory oversight authority over national 
banks in their capacity as members of the Federal Reserve System, it generally defers to the Comptroller 
for purposes of primary supervision. 
19 See 12 U. S. C. § 1841(a)(1)-(a)(2). 
20 Codified at 12 U. S. C. §§ 1841-1849. 
21 See 12 U. S. C. §§ 1843 (a) (2), (c)(8). Before the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley of 1999, the 
most important exception was for subsidiaries engaged in activities that were "so closely related to 
banking as to be a proper incident thereto. " See 12 U. S. C. §§ 1843 (c)(8). Upon the passage of the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley of 1999, traditional bank holding companies may remain in operation, so long as 
they confine their activities to owning, controlling or managing banks and any other activities that are 
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created a new type of BHC known as a financial holding company that may engage in 
broader nonblank activities. After satisfying the necessary requirements, including all 
the depository institutions controlled by the holding companies being well-managed and 
well-capitalized, 22 FHCs may conduct any activity, in their own right or through 
financial subsidiaries, that is financial in nature or incidental to such financial activity, 
in addition to the same activities as BHCs. FHCs may also even expand into activities 
that are complementary to a financial activity, provided those activities do not pose a 
substantial risk to the safety and soundness of depository institutions or the financial 
system generally. 23 Each BHC and FHC must register with the FRB and file annual 
reports and the FRB regulates and supervises BHCs and FHCs through the process of 
approvals, rule-making and periodical examinations. 24 One critical aspect of the FRB's 
supervision and periodical examinations concerns the BHC or FHC regulatory 
obligation of serving as the financial and managerial source of strength for its bank 
subsidiary. 
It is against the above-summarized bank safety and soundness regulatory backdrop, 
the US banking organizations, as corporate entities, are incorporated under and subject 
also to the general state corporate laws (represented by Delaware law) as to their internal 
affairs. The resultant state of law and governance, as perceived by the US Supreme 
Court's 1997 seminal decision of Atherton v. FDIC, 25 is underscored by an implicit 
division of responsibilities. Atherton perceives, with certain marginal, background 
restraints concerning stakeholder protection, among other things, prohibited or restricted 
unsafe and unsound bank activities prescribed by banking statues, regulations and other 
"closely related to banking. " Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 102 (a) (amending 12 
U. S. C. § 1843 (c)(8)), 113 Stat. 1338,1341 (1999). 
22 See 12 U. S. C. § 1843 (j). 
23 See 12 U. S. C. §§ 1843 (k)(1), (k)(4)(F). 
24 See 12 U. S. C. §§ 1844 (a), (c). In this respect, the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley of 1999 
brought in an element of functional regulation, entrusting primary regulation of certain securities and 
insurance activities to the respective securities and insurance regulators, not the banking regulator. See 
the relevant discussion in chapter two. 
25 Atherton v. FDIC 117 S. Ct. 666 (1997); see also notes 198 to 217 and accompanying text of chapter 
three. 
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regulatory pronunciations, largely stopping at the border of the regulated comes the 
full-blown domain of state corporate law. Promoting optimal performance on 
efficiency or profitability as the primary policy underpinning, Atherton considers a state 
corporate law that goes all the way to the managerial core, which agenda is to maximize 
gains of the shareholder as a whole. Atherton considers that, to foster shareholder 
gains, the state law's initiative of promoting risk-taking formulates the standards of 
conduct and review applying to the bank management's conduct. Atherton also 
considers that the said profitability object is further achieved by the status of the bank 
shareholder - the only class of non-fixed claimants among corporate constituencies as 
the exclusive enforcer and ultimate beneficiary of various fiduciary duties owed by the 
management to the bank. 
The above-stated perception as to the current state of law and governance, as an 
official, explanatory account on the making of the governance structure prevalent in 
modern banking in the United States, is a primary subject matter this text will be 
addressed to. 
The author argues, this responsibility-divide statement, in particular those 
concerning marginal treatment over protecting interests of non-shareholder corporate 
stakeholders, which include the bank regulator's agenda of safe and sound banking, can 
only stand on one premise. That is, those externally imposed regulatory arrangements 
backed by supervisory and enforcement actions are, by nature and approach, regulation 
of institution, restraining from reaching deep into the traditional preserves of state 
corporate law of ownership and management. It is believed in the United States, the 
developments of federal bank safety and soundness regulation and supervision have 
proven this is not the case. 
A decade since the decision of Atherton, the author argues, the trend working to the 
opposite of the Atherton's premise has been set, first evidenced by the state law's 
defer-to-management review standards aimed at upholding the policy of 
shareholder-interest primacy being substantially compromised in the course of the bank 
regulator's safety and soundness pursuit. The same regulatory force has also intruded 
into, in depth and in breadth, other ownership and management elements as well as the 
prevalent disciplinary mode traditionally associated with the shareholder model of 
8 
corporate governance under state corporate law, notably on the limited liability privilege 
enjoyed by and the corporate separateness principle applying to a corporate parent, as 
well as on the market-based interest alignment mechanism. 
The governance regime over the US banking organizations is evolving from a 
shareholder towards a stakeholder model, with banking regulators as not only the key 
stakeholder but also the key monitor equipped with superior monitoring capability 
pursuing stability over profitability. The genuine current state of law, as argued by the 
author, is actually that the regulatory consideration for safe and sound management is 
not merely directly competing with the state corporate law's policy value of promoting 
risk-taking, but has installed a new internal interest hierarchy with the well-being of the 
deposit insurance fund and of the ongoing operation of banks topping the interest ladder. 
Drawing primarily on banking regulators' safety and soundness pronunciations 
publicized post-Atherton that were contained in enforcement orders and examination 
material, as well as regulatory and supervisory directions, the author in the main 
chapters will demonstrate the ubiquitous presence of the concept of unsafe and unsound 
bank management by indicating its various result-oriented and defer-to-regulator 
attributes. They range from those earmarked as deemed unsafe and unsound practices 
as a result of banks or bank managements' unsatisfactory performance identified in 
supervisory reports, through those restricted or prohibited risk appetites specified by the 
regulator as excessive often disregarding the institution's financial and managerial 
strength, to those simply unlawful activities, traditionally categorized as compliance 
now moving into safety and soundness topics. These regulatory, supervisory and 
enforcement pronunciations have enormous repercussions on managerial mindsets. 
Distilled from them, the objective reasonableness standard or the industry standard 
required of the bank management and established by the bank regulator represents a step 
further than even the hypothetical "reasonable person" standard that was categorically 
dismissed by the Delaware Chancery Court in its due care review for being too strict to 
sustain the corporate management's risk-taking enthusiasm for maximizing shareholder 
gains. Confusion and inconsistence on governance standards thus ensue. On one 
hand, in reviewing managerial conduct, the state court abstains from reviewing almost 
all substantive aspects of the bank management's disinterested and good-faith business 
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decisions in order not to give them an incentive at the margin to authorize less risky 
investment projects. The federal banking agency, on the other hand, more than often 
reviews the same disinterested and good-faith business decisions from a bank safety and 
soundness standpoint. A prominent example involves the bank agency's review over 
purchases of loans and participations in loans, where the OCC pronounced unsafe or 
unsound banking practice for a purchaser institution's failing to contain a "prudent" 
transfer arrangement in such transactions. 26 
In deriving their bank safety and soundness pronunciations, the author argues that 
the banking regulator therefore has actually injected a general loss avoidance 
psychology on the bank management. It is more so when one considers those 
formidable enforcement measures that could impose liabilities and force through 
corrections against even innocent safety and soundness violations. Overall, it is argued, 
the US banking organizations are in reality being directed to achieve dual corporate 
objectives, of profitability and of stability, translated respectively to two sets of 
sometimes diverging risk-taking strategic mindsets required of the same bank 
management. This push-and-pull phenomenon flowing from two often disparate 
sets of review standards over the same managerial conduct is thus a genuine presence. 
The consideration for banks' (or bank subsidiaries') safe and sound management 
also implicates at the holding company level with their corporate parents, which, under 
the operation of the "source of strength" and other regulatory doctrines, are obligated to 
serve as the ultimate financial and managerial source for their banking subsidiaries. 
This represents a major deviation from the state corporate law's attitude towards 
parent-subsidiary relationships, as reflected by the limited liability privilege enjoyed by 
corporate shareholders and the insistence on corporate separateness, where corporate 
subsidiaries doing parents' bidding is considered the norm of business. 
Furthermore, evidence also shows that, rooted in the concern pursuing efficiency or 
profitability at the potential cost of putting the bank "into play" might have endangered 
the banking system's stability, the banking regulator's intuitive suspicions towards 
vibrancy of the market for corporate control, as the most important disciplinary 
26 See note 17 and accompanying text of chapter four. 
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mechanism under the US shareholder model of corporate governance, have dampened 
the change-of-control transactions that were directed for the disciplinary purpose in the 
banking industry. Instead, it is the banking regulator, as argued by this author as 
monitor of comparative objectivity and proximity, who assumes a prominent oversight 
role. 
Sifting through the above-stated bifurcated governance strands, the bank safety and 
soundness regulatory or stakeholder strand and the shareholder-interest centred state 
corporate law strand, over the managerial conduct of United States banking 
organizations, this text is organized as follows. 
Chapter one will first explore the extent to which economy-specific domestic 
factors have implicated with the traditional bank regulatory model enshrined in the 
standard convergence process at the international value. By so doing, chapter one 
establishes the need to place the bank regulatory and ownership concerns in a domestic 
context, for the instant case the US context, so as to fully discern the governance force 
directing and controlling managerial conduct of banking organizations. 
In chapter two, evolving from well-capitalization to well-management, the shifting 
focus of the bank safety and soundness concept, as a regulatory objective, will be 
charted, examined and commented. Chapter two also establishes the statutory and 
judicial foundations mandating the banking regulator's adoption of their prominent 
regulatory and supervisory stance in relation to upholding bank safety and soundness as 
it is. 
Chapter three will then examine the US state corporate law (as informed by the 
Delaware law) in its application to the banking context. The focus will be on the triad 
of state corporate law's building blocks, i. e., shareholder-interest primacy, limited 
liability privilege and corporate separateness, as well as the law's review standards over 
managerial conduct. By which the author identifies, under the shareholder model of 
corporate governance, it is primarily through extralegal means, featuring the prominence 
of those monitors of objectivity and of private ordering over judicially enforced 
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constraints and mandatory rules, the bank management is required to strive for the bank 
shareholder's well-being, and their well-being only. 
In chapter four, by examining the extent to which the regulatory requirements for 
safe and sound management have impacted with the elements of the shareholder model 
of corporate governance as discussed in chapter three, the author presents the real state 
of current legal order concerning the control and direction mechanism facing bank 
management - one underscored by clashes between two bifurcated strands of 
governing forces and the resultant confusion. 
Some final remarks and modest suggestions provided in chapter five conclude this 
text. They identify the need for the US banking regulator to establishing clearer 
criteria when pursuing their bank safety and soundness agenda and suggest some 
possible approaches. Whereas a wholesale reform proposition being outside the scope 
of this text, it also indicates the desirability of an industry-specific construct of corporate 
governance. 
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CHAPTER ONE - 
Domestic Factors as Imperative Link to Internationally Converged 
Bank Safety-and-Soundness Regulatory Framework 
"Globalization does not mean necessarily `global order'. To a large extent, to date 
at least, it has meant global disorder - not a global system, but a global 
non-system. "' 
An appreciation of the ongoing standard convergence processes that have been 
happening at the international and regional levels concerning the construction of a bank 
regulatory framework predicated on promoting the banking organization's safe and 
sound status is methodologically essential to a study of banking law. The concise style 
in which these standard-setting works are often presented could facilitate one to quickly 
have a grip on some common denominators internationally agreed concerning the 
desirable shape to which domestic regulation and supervision over the banking industry 
should be led. It is nevertheless equally important for one to appreciate the inherent 
limitations international standards as such would entail - that they fall short on 
accounting for domestic particularities. The purposes of this chapter are therefore 
twofold: to outline the elements of the generally accepted bank regulatory framework as 
enshrined amidst the international and regional standard convergence processes; and to 
manifest that the regulatory consequences brought about by domestic implementation of 
such framework are economy-specific and often diverging one jurisdiction from another. 
This chapter first provides a theoretical overview concerning the special-status 
presumption that is traditionally associated with the banking industry and its 
corresponding regulation. In light of the Basle Committee's landmark document Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision of 1997 and the EU's convergence program, 
section two will outline some critical regulatory, supervisory and protective measures 
contained therein, which underpins an internationally accepted bank regulatory 
1 JOSEPH NORTON, FINANCIAL SECTOR LAW REFORM IN EMEGING ECONOMIES 6 (2000). 
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framework. 
In section three, to highlight the extensive extent various domestic factors and 
regulatory concerns have implicated with such framework, including its 
safety-and-soundness objective, its credit-risk based and risk-specific approach in 
structuring prudential restraints and arrangements, and its sector-specific division of 
supervisory responsibilities and point-in-time supervisory style, three subject matters 
will be covered. They are, first, New Zealand's particular banking landscape 
associated with pre-eminence of large and foreign banking organizations that has 
underpinned a bank regulatory model emphasizing competitive rather than prudential 
banking; second, the strength on financial and technologic innovation displayed by 
certain economies that has resulted in hybrid-risk financial products and demanded a 
regulatory response departing from the traditional risk-specific approach; and, finally, 
amidst the overriding liberalization process of cross-sector institutional integration and 
functional deregulation, the diverging domestic strategies on fusion model selection and 
fashioning of corresponding regulatory and supervisory responses. The chapter 
provides in section three some concluding observations. 
I. Banking Industry's Special Status: Foundation of Prudential Banking 
Regulation and Supervision 
The safety-and-soundness (or prudential) concern, 2 standing as a distinctive regulatory 
objective, 3 sets banking and its regulation apart from non-banking (both financial and 
2 Basel Committee regards safety and soundness safeguarding as the bank supervisor's overall task. Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, Introduction 
(1997). 
3 Conceptually, some commentators separate prudential regulation from systemic regulation, despite 
recognize both require "the regulation and supervision of institutions rather than of the functions they 
perform" and both share similar regulatory/supervisory approaches, such as capital requirements. This is 
because, as asserted, prudential regulation is about safety and soundness of financial institutions (aiming 
for customer protection while systemic concern does not necessarily arise); while systemic regulation 
involves purely systemic reasons (aiming for prevention of the effect of negative externality that "the 
social costs of the failure of an individual institution exceed the private costs"). See CHARLES 
GOODHART ET AL, FINANCIAL REGULATION: WHY, HOW AND WHERE NOW 5 (1998). 
In practice, however, these two breeds of regulation could be hardly separated. First it could be difficult to 
distinguish them and attribute to their respective prudential and systemic categories, given their similar, if 
not identical, regulatory/supervisory approaches. And second, the policy underpinnings justifying 
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non-financial) industries. This regulatory objective, aimed for steering banks on a 
stable course and holding them as a going concern, comes from the premise banks4 
have a special status, a status justifying governmental regulation and supervision ,5 as 
well as intervention and protection, to a prominent degree. While banks are considered 
as financially healthy, such status gives rise to the entry limit (the need for a bank 
license) and other prudential requirements. Compliance of which is monitored by 
supervisory agencies, and violation punished by civil, criminal and administrative 
sanction. The locus of holding them as a going concern also prompts various protective 
measures such as deposit-insurance regime and lender-of-last-result rescue as conducted 
by central banks for both troubled banks and their depositors. 
It is generally believed systemic concerns and the presence of government-funded 
deposit insurance arrangements that generate elevated moral hazard and the propensity 
of excessive risk-taking render banking industry special. It is also presumed in the 
banking industry the presence of market imperfection, flowing from particular fragilities 
of core banking and high leveraging of banks' capital structure. Additionally and in the 
political sense, there is the general public's demand for a safe banking system as these 
institutions hold household and corporate savings. These factors, collectively, lead to the 
general policy that banks should be subjected to extensive regulation, supervision and 
protection for they are regarded as "having `public' character or at least as having 
`public' attributes". 6 
This section investigates this bank special-status premise, including some classic 
prudential regulation over individual institutions could also be intertwined with the more profound 
systemic concerns that safety and soundness of each individual institution is the precondition of stability 
of the system as a whole. 
4 In this chapter, bank or depository institution denotes an undertaking whose core business is to receive 
deposits or other payable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account. See Art. 1 (1), 
Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (24 April 2001). 
5 Distinctions between banking regulation and supervision are frequented made by regulators and 
academics. The US Federal Reserve Board distinguishes regulation, which "entails making and issuing 
specific regulations and guidelines governing the structure and conduct of banking, under the authority of 
legislation, " from supervision, which "involves the monitoring, inspecting, and examining of banking 
organizations to assess their conditions and compliance with relevant laws and regulations. " See Federal 
Reserve Board, The Federal Reserve System-Purpose & Function 72 (8th ed. 1994); see also PATRICIA A. 
McCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL § 12.01 (2°d ed., 2000). 
6 See JOSEPH J. NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY STANDARDS 22 
(1995). 
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debate surrounding it. 
A. Special Fragilities of Core Banking 
Amongst modern banks' multiple functions? such as trading (notably on securities and 
derivatives) and other intermediary services including insurance, deposit-taking and 
lending (the core banking function) stands out for its perceived particular fragilities 
connected to being susceptible to "runs" by depositors which gives rise to the first 
reason why the banking industry is considered special. 
The core banking function, as a transformational service, is generally understood 
operates by pooling short-term demandable deposits to advance long-term loans to the 
needs of households and production firms. By manipulating and mismatching maturities, 
banks convert illiquid investments into liquid ones. 8 Maturity mismatch, combined with 
the perceived opaqueness of bank balance sheets, 9and the comparatively unmarketability 
of banking assets, 10 would then lead to a "fire sale" scenario, i. e., substantial 
diminishment in value of a bank's loan portfolio in liquidation than on an on-going 
basis, " when banks actually or allegedly run into troubles. To avoid being caught up in 
a fire sale, "rational" 12 depositors would then engage in deposit runs in the immediate 
7 For the UK's experiences concerning the banking sector deregulation and the formation of 
multifunctional banking, see Cranston, supra note 7, at 20-30. 
8 See Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of Banking: Before and After Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 25 Journal of 
Corporation Law, 691,695-696 (2000) (Macey contends by providing transformation services banks 
economize on transaction costs for depositors and borrowers, which is the dominant economic explanation 
for the persistence of banks. Other reasons why banks' deposit taking and loan-making business generate 
such economic effects include: (1) banks diversified portfolios reduce risks benefiting for both borrowers 
and depositors, (2) banks allow borrowers and depositors to exploit economies of scale due to the size of 
bank, and (3) banks benefits depositors by specializing in identifying and monitoring credit risks). 
9 Opaqueness of banks' balance sheet is connected to the characteristics of their core assets such as 
commercial loans. Contrasting to securities firms' assets, it was noted "traditional banking involves the 
acquisition of long-term non-marketable loans which are typically held on the bank's balance sheet until 
maturity. By contrast, investment firms experience rapid asset turnover as a result of their market making, 
underwriting and trading activities..... Furthermore, securities firms are evaluated on a liquidated basis 
and their accounting is mark-to-the-market, while banks are evaluated as going concerns and their 
accounting is often based on original cost". See Richard Dale, Regulating Investment Business in the 
Single Market, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 333,333-334 (1994). 
10 In general, this is due primarily to evaluating commercial loans being largely based on insiders' 
information that is difficult to be credibly reflected in a secondary market. 
11 Richard Dale & Simon Wolfe, The Structure of Financial Regulation, 6 Journal of Financial Regulation 
and Compliance, 326,328 (1998). 
12 Id. at 328-331(arguing, from the perspectives of depositors, running a financially healthy bank is a 
rational decision as opaqueness of bank assets (commercial loans primarily) renders the "fire sale" effect 
16 
aftermath of a signal, however speculative it might be, showing instability of their banks. 
As a result, even financially healthy banks can be brought down and be forced into 
bankruptcy, if large enough depositors demand repayment of their funds simultaneously. 
Such market imperfection and its derived potentially unpredictable financial losses thus 
gave justifications to regulatory safeguards to either reassure depositors (such as the 
mandatory deposit insurance scheme) or to buffer banks' unexpected losses (such as the 
regulatory capital requirement). 
There is longstanding debate regarding banks' balance sheets. For example, some 
argued financial statements of banks were much more informative than those of large 
non-financial firms for, among other things, intangible assets (such as patents, research 
and development, advertising, and customer goodwill), which often accounted for 
substantial amounts of non-financial firms' assets and were insignificant for banks, were 
not even reported as assets on non-financial firms' financial statements. 13 Moreover, 
non-financial firms' businesses are suggested being more unique and diversified than 
banks'. 14 
B. Systemic Concerns 
Another source of fragility associating with the banking industry rests with the systemic 
rather than the individual-institution level. The risk of systemic or industry-wide 
collapse of the banking system is understood to be closely related to the contagious 
effect for banks' interconnectedness with one another in inter-bank lending markets and 
through the payment system. 15 Besides, rather than real exposures, contagion was 
suggested also able to work its way through informational channel, 16 which could lead 
that a bank's loan portfolio is worth significantly less in liquidation than on a going concern basis). 
13 See e. g., GEORGE J. BENSTON, REGULATING FINANCIAL MARKETS: A CRIQUE AND SOME 
PROPOSALS 37-40 (1998). 
14 Id. 
15 Generally see Elena Carletti and Philipp Hartmann, Competition and Stability: What's Special About 
Banking?, Special Paper No. 140, (LSE Financial Market Group, 2002). (contending for the purpose of 
cushioning daily liquidity fluctuations and conducting large amounts of payment transfer, banks are 
closely linked to each other. Such a linkage might also simultaneously bring a large number of banks into 
trouble if macroeconomic deterioration severely impairs the viability of their correlated activities). 
16 For an extensive theoretic studies and empirical evidences on systemic risk, see Oliver De Bandt and 
Philipp Hartmann, Systemic Risk: A Survey, Working Paper No. 35 (European Central Bank, 2000) 
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to "contagious withdrawals when depositors are imperfectly informed about the type of 
shocks hitting banks (idiosyncratic or systemic) and about their physical exposures to 
each other (asymmetric information)". 17 Contagion spreading through the above two 
channels and happening at a wholesale scale then bring with it the concern that key 
macroeconomic functions performed by the banking system might be seriously 
hampered. 18 Traditionally, these functions embody banks acting as suppliers of credit to 
the economy; as the backup source of liquidity for all other institutions; and as the 
transmission belt for monetary policy. '9 
These far-reaching spill-over effects are not recognized by all. Insights into how 
they work in the real world, to what extent they could havoc a system-wide disruption 
and therefore justify corresponding regulatory and preventive measures, might be not 
sufficient enough. 20 Some commentators, for example, considered it an overstatement 
to have a mandatory deposit insurance scheme forestalling bank runs and safeguarding 
17 Id, at 2. 
18 For the effect of negative externality in association with systemic collapse, See C. W. Calomiris and B. 
Wilson, Bank Capital and Portfolio Management: The 1930s Capital Crunch and Scramble to Shed Risk, 
Working Paper No 6649, NBER, Cambridge, MA (1998) (providing a model applied to the capital crunch 
of the 1930s in the US, and concluding during the Depression banks often contracted the supply of credit 
rather than replaced capital for compensating capital losses as the latter was too expensive. Protective 
regulation therefore can insulate bank credit supply either by removing the constraint of low default risk 
on deposits or by replacing lost capital). 
19 The credit-supplier argument contends if bank failures cut across the industry, it would then lead to a 
reduction in money supply and contraction of credit. Credit crunch would in turn force other sectors of the 
economy into restraints of operation, thereby possibly inducing a full-scale recession. See PATRICIA A. 
McCOY, supra note 5 at §1.03 [4] (citing Daniel R. Fischel et al., The regulation of banks and bank 
holding companies, 73 Vanderbilt Law Review, 301,307-09 (1987)). 
The payment-system related argument upholds that banks fuel payment systems by providing reliable 
liquidity and thus transactions will be reassured only if banks, as underlying intermediaries, are insulted 
from insolvency. Id. (citing Stephen G. Cecchetti, The future of Financial Intermediation and Regulation: 
An Overview, 5 Current Issues in Economy and Finance 1 (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1999); 
Thomas M. Hoenig, Financial Modernization: Implications for the Safety Net, 49 Mercer Law Review, 
787,788-89 (1998); Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Deposit Insurance, the implicate Regulatory 
Contract, and the Mismatch in the Term Structure of Banks' Assets and Liabilities, 12 Yale Journal on 
Regulation 1,15 (1995)). 
The final classic argument associates banks with implementing monetary policies by stressing their 
transmission-belt role connected with the central bank's functions such as discount-window function, 
bank reserves and open-market operations. Id. 
20 As noted in a recent survey, despite a few investigations into cross-border banking crises have taken 
place, insights into payment system contagion remains scarce. Moreover, many empirical studies on 
banking contagion are puzzling because they "do not control for all the macroeconomic factors that might 
be behind the observation of joint bank failures in history". See Oliver De Bandt and Philipp Hartmann, 
Systemic Risk: A Survey, Working Paper No. 35,6 (European Central Bank, 2000). 
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the banking system for they believed empirical studies suggested damaging runs on 
banks by non-insured depositors had been rare. 21 The others argued that vulnerabilities 
due to fractional-reserve banking connecting to inter-bank exposure and payment system 
could be properly redressed by open market operations of a central bank that "has no 
regulatory powers or responsibilities". 22 
Amidst all these, one dimension to this debate is of practical interest. As stated by 
one leading commentator, "[t]he probability that the failure of a single bank will induce 
a systemic problem maybe low, but, if systemic failure were to occur, it could be serious 
and the costs could be high. Thus, regulation for preventing systemic problems may be 
viewed as an insurance premium against a low-probability occurrence". 23 These 
remarks are politically robust and likely in accord with what have been really perceived 
by policy makers and banking regulators, who might be more inclined to pay in advance 
such "premium" rather than risk public criticisms at a system being unregulated if a 
systemic event did happen. Consequently, it is likely systemic concerns will 
continuously play an integral part in the making of the banking industry's special status. 
C. Moral Hazard Problems Associating with Mandatory and 
Government-sponsored Deposit Insurance Arrangements 
Moral hazard was defined as "the tendency to maximize one's own utility to the 
detriment of others when one does not bear the full consequence or enjoy the full 
21 For empiric evidences generally see George G. Kaufman, Bank Contagion: A Review of the Theory and 
Evidence, 8 Journal of Financial Service Research, 123-150. Specifically, the studies on Chicago Bank 
panic back to early 1930s during the US's Great Depression suggested, despite not being safeguarded by 
deposit insurance, depositors did not run from solvent banks. Another case study on the crisis of 
Continental Illinois Bank in 1984 also revealed the similar result. See Charles W. Calomiris & Joseph R. 
Mason, 87 Contagion and Bank Failures During the Great Depression: The June 1932 Chicago Bank 
Panic, American Economic Review, 863-83 (1997) (for the case of Chicago Bank panic); also see 
GEORGE J. BENSTON, supra note 13, at 39 (for the case of Continental Illinois Bank). 
22 Benston moved forwards by indicating part of the root causes of the Asian Financial Crises starting in 
1997 is ".... government interference or direct participation in banking decisions, rather than poor 
oversight of decisions made by independent bankers who were attempting to maximize their shareholders' 
wealth, that resulted in banking insolvency". Id., at 33 & 43 (1998). 
23 CHARLES GOODHART ET AL, FINANCIAL REGULATION: WHY, HOW AND WHERE NOW 9 
(1998). 
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benefits of one's action because of uncertainty and incomplete or restricted contracts". 24 
In relation to moral hazard, the presence of a government-sponsored deposit insurance, 25 
as a protective mechanism aimed for retaining the confidence in the banking system26 
and insulating depositors, who are the major stakeholder in terms of providing funds 
making up most of the bank's capital base, from default risk at the expense of taxpayers 
was considered another characteristic of the banking industry. By insulating depositors, 
the system removes them from acting as a motivated class of monitors who would 
otherwise demand risk premium on their deposits for the bank's overly risky operation, 
and, as a result, could induce a risk-prone mindset on the bank management's 
risk-taking decisions. 27 The direct cause of hazard here therefore rests with the potential 
of an insured bank to operate in a risky fashion with the public bearing the risk and 
without real economic risk to its shareholders and management - that a 
government-provided, compulsory deposit insurance scheme "privatized the gains and 
socialized the losses. "28 This concern gives rise to particular capital requirements and 
heightened regulation over risky activities being considered necessary. 
In theory, distorting effects of this form of government subsidy are recognized by 
even those who rejected the bank special-status premise and thus denounced the 
corresponding preventive and protective measures. One leading expert, who was against 
24 See Richard Scott Carrell, A Partial Antidote to Perverse Incentives: The FDIC Improvement Act of 
1991,12 Annual Review of Banking Law, 318, at 319 (citing Y. Kotowitz, Moral Hazard, in 3 THE NEW 
PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 549(John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) ) 
25 A government-sponsored, mandatory deposit insurance scheme is an integral part of the safety net 
policy that include such other components as implicit protection of depositors (e. g., the too big to fail 
policy as applied in some cases to large banks), and the central bank's role as the lender of last resort and 
the backup of settlements in the payment systems. See Richard Dale, Deposit Insurance in Theory and 
Practice, 8 Financial Regulation and Compliance, 36,36-56 (2000); see also Benston, supra note 13, at 
44-47. 
26 But see Cranston, supra note 7, at 78 (arguing in the United Kingdom, deposit insurance is justified 
primarily as an investor-protection rather than institution-protection measure. ) 
27 While deposit insurance affecting perverse incentives remains the majority view, arguments against it 
run on the ground that unsophisticated depositors are in no position to be vigilant because of their 
incapability of monitoring banks however in the presence or absence of deposit insurance. This view is 
supported by two observations: first, only experts rather than ordinary depositors are able to interpret 
information related to financial health of a given bank; and second, as to management dishonesty, one of 
the major reasons for the insolvency of some banks, ordinary depositors are in no position to detecting it 
before it emerges to the surface. Id. at 79. 
28 See Hams Weinstein, Moral Hazard Deposit Insurance And Banking Regulation, 77 Cornell Law 
Review, 1099,1102 (1992). 
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the government-sponsored deposit insurance, for example, indicated, with the presence 
of deposit insurance, "banks can and do operate with much less capital than otherwise 
comparable companies [; consequently, ] regulatory intervention to insure that depository 
institutions hold and maintain sufficient capital to absorb almost all expected losses, 
therefore, is justified-indeed, necessary. "29 
D. Bank's Capital Structure, Leveraging, and Perverse Risk Propensity of Bank 
Shareholders and Management 
Elevated leveraging tendency, inherent in the particular capital structure of banks, is 
perceived as another attribute making up the banking industry's special status. This 
capital structure is featured by often over ninety percent of banks' overall liabilities 
coming from debt, mostly taking the form of deposits, while only below ten percent 
coming from shareholders' equity-a stark contrast to, in non-banking firms, where 
shareholders' equity in general covers 50 to 60 percent of the company's liabilities. 30 
Such an eccentric debt-equity ratio was indicated a source leading to the worsening of 
the conflict of interests between shareholders and depositors (and other debt-holders) in 
that in the banking industry the asset-substitution phenomenon tilts dramatically to the 
depositor's detriment as shareholders (the residue claimant) are much more inclined to 
take excessive risks. 31 
II. International and Regional Standard Convergence Processes and Resultant 
Traditional Bank Regulatory Model Aimed for Promoting Safe and Sound 
Banking 
A regulatory model generally embodies three elements. 32 The first is the policy 
29 See Benston, supra note 13, at 45. 
30 See McCOY, supra note 5 at §1.03[2] 
31 See Patricia A. McCoy, A Political Economy of the Business Judgement Rule in Banking: Implications 
for Corporate Law, 47 Case Western Reserve Law Review, 2-80 (arguing American courts curtailing 
business judgement rule in banking, as a reaction to the bank management's perverse tendency of 
engaging in overly risky lending practices that wiped out depositors and triggered banks runs, could date 
back to long before 1933 when the federal deposit insurance scheme was launched). 
32 For banking regulatory paradigms, generally see Taylor, supra note 32, at 794-796. 
While outside the scope of this study, institutional coordinations of banking supervision is relevant to the 
supervisory process under this bank regulatory model. Subject matters in this respect can include, for 
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objective, the second regulatory requirements, and the third implementing (supervisory) 
techniques. This section starts with looking into the traditional bank regulatory model, 
an end result of the standard convergence processes embroiling both international and 
regional bodies, and will be concluded by some observations concerning these 
processes' inherent limitations derived from their inability of reaching deep into some 
domestic particularities. 
A. International and Standard-based Convergence: Basle Committee's "Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision of 1997" 
From an international perspective, this sub-section outlines the traditional bank 
regulatory model predicated on the special status presumption as discussed in the 
previous chapter, as informed by the Basle Committee's "Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision of 1997" ("Core Principles"). 
1. Core Principles as Common Denominator 
The Core Principles 33 issued by the Basle's Committee in September 1997 is a 
landmark document. As one commentator rightfully put it, "... with this single document 
the Basel Committee has transformed itself from being a limited and selected 
co-operative forum to a global leader in the development of complete regulatory 
programmes for bank supervision". 34 Aimed for functioning as a reference book used 
globally by the community of banking regulators as to the required minimum standards 
of regulatory and supervisory arrangements, this paper's significance rests with its 
comprehensive coverage and broad participation. The Core Principles bears a number of 
example, the extent to which central banks' participation into banking supervision, and the relationship 
between the banking regulator and other financial regulators (the "mega v. multiple regulators" issue). For 
the central bank's functions vis-ä-vis those of prudential agencies, see Joseph J. Norton, Selective Bank 
Regulatory and Supervisory Trends Upon Entering 21St Century, Essays in International Financial & 
Economic Law, 34 The London Institute of International Banking, Finance and Development Law Ltd. 
5-8 (2001). For discussions of pros and cons and other topics associating with the institutional choice 
between mega and multiple regulators, generally see W. BLAIR & G. WALKER ET AL FINANCIAL 
REGULATION (1998); and M. BLAIR & G. WALKER ET AL GUIDE TO FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AND MARKETS ACT (2000). 
33 Basle Committee, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (September 1997). 
34 See GEORGE A. WALKER, INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION-LAW, POLICY AND 
PRACTICE 135 (2001). 
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unprecedented features from previous Basle Committee papers: 35 
It is the first Basle Committee paper that is comprehensive in its coverage of banking 
supervisory issues; 
It was prepared as a fully joint paper between G-10 and non-G-10 supervisors and consulted 
with supervisory authorities worldwide. It can thus be regarded as the first truly "global" 
supervisory product; 36 
The document has a more political content than any other previous Basle Committee 
document, especially in the section that explains that a country's supervisory arrangements 
will not be very effective unless certain conditions37 are in place. 
It is thus fair to say the principles set out under this Paper represent a road map endorsed 
by not just the most developed economies but also the rest of the international 
community, and they represent a set of common denominators meant to be of universal 
applicability. As a result, it is appropriate, for the current purpose, to adopt the 
framework under the Core Principles as the basis for discussion. 
2. Standards Concerning Regulatory Arrangements under Core Principles 
In substance, for an effective regulatory and supervisory system, the Core Principles set 
out a five-phase regulatory/supervisory "flow chart" whereby the minimum standards to 
be achieved in each phase are indicated. These phases are: (i) licensing requirements; (ii) 
prudential regulation; (iii) ongoing banking supervision; (iv) formal enforcement and 
liquidation mechanisms; (v) international cooperation on supervising cross-border 
35 See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Report on International Developments in Banking 
Supervision, Report No. 11, Chapter 2 (Oct. 1998). 
36 The Committee has worked closely with non-G 10 supervisory authorities in the process of developing 
the Core Principles. Apart from representatives from the Committee, the Core Principles has been drawn 
from the participation of representatives from Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Hon Kong, Mexico, 
Russia and Thailand. Nine other countries (Argentina, Brazil, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Poland and Singapore) were also closely associated with the work. See Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, (September 1997). 
37 The Core Principles set out five arrangements as the preconditions for effective banking supervision: (i) 
sound and sustainable macro-economic policies; (ii) a well-developed public infrastructure; (iii) effective 
market discipline; (iv) procedures for efficient resolution of problems in banks; and (v) mechanisms for 
providing an appropriate level of systemic protection (or public safety net). See Id., at Explanatory Note 
Sec. II. 
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banking; and (vi) deposit protection. Apart from these, in its Annexes, special references 
were made to the problems related to state-owned banks. 
a. Licensing Requirement 
At the initial stage, adequate licensing processes, underscored by clarity of licensing 
criteria and of permissible activities, can allow the licensing authority to effectively 
identify the institutions it is responsible for. 38 At a minimum, issuing licenses should 
involve an assessment of ownership structure, fitness and propriety of directors and 
senior management, operating plans and internal control, and financial condition, 
including capital adequacy. 39 Further, in case a foreign financial institution owns an 
applicant, prior consent of its home country supervisors must be obtained. 
Assessing ownership structure of a banking organization is a matter of enormous 
complexity and dynamics. One aspect of this assessment is concerning the controlling 
shareholder's character integrity and financial strength that "[t]he bank should not be 
used as a captive source of finance of its owners". 40 The other can be associated with a 
group-structure operation where the bank is part of a large organization. 41 The concern 
here is about the contagious effect that complex ownership and organizational structure 
could be a source of weakness as risks from the activities conducted by non-banking 
entities might transfer to the banking part and thus expose depositors and insurance 
funds to undue risks. Moreover, complex ownership and structure and the associated 
lack of management transparency might lead to ambiguity of individuals' 
responsibilities connecting to the bank's operation. 
b. Prudential Requirements 
The second phrase is regarding prudential requirements, which the Core Principles set 
out the minimum standards to be implemented through ongoing supervision and banking 
examinations. These minimum standards reflect the Committee's long-standing efforts 
of basing its prudential rules on the risk-based approach. Banking risks indicated by the 
38 See supra note 36, at Principle 2. 
39 Id. 
ao Id., at Explanatory Note, Section III. A. 
41 Id., at Explanatory Note, Section III. A. 
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Core Principles include credit risk, country and transfer risk, market risk, interest rate 
risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, legal riskand reputational risk. 
Credit risk is the risk of the failure of a counterparty to perform according to a 
contractual arrangement. This risk is inherent in lending, and also applied to other 
on-and off-balance sheet exposures such as guarantees, acceptances and securities 
42 investments. 
Country risk could arise in connection with the economic, social and political 
environments of a borrower's home country that may in turn affect the borrower's 
ability to repayment. There is a direct connection to such a risk when credit is extended 
to foreign governments. Moreover, managing country risk becomes essential under such 
a circumstance as lending to a foreign government is typically unsecured. One specific 
component of country risk is transfer risk, which could be detached from the borrower's 
financial standing and may arise due to unavailability of foreign currency when such a 
foreign currency, rather than a lender's local currency, is designated as legal tender. 43 
Market risk arises from fluctuation in market prices in banks' on-and off-balance 
sheet positions, trading activities in particular. Specific reference is sometimes made to 
one element of market risk, foreign exchange risk, the risk element inherent in banks' 
acting as market-makers role and taking open foreign exchange in currencies. 44 
Interest rate risk denotes the exposure of a bank's financial condition to adverse 
movements in interest rates. Such exposure would imply both on the bank earnings, the 
economic value of bank assets, liabilities, and off-balance sheet instruments. Managing 
interest rate risk is of particular importance in sophisticated financial markets where 
customers actively manage their interest rate exposure. 45 
Liquidity risk derives from the inability of a bank to accommodate decreases in 
liabilities (by increasing liabilities) or to fund increases in assets (by converting assets 
promptly). Combining with the classic arguments for the peculiar fragility of banking 
businesses, in an extreme case, shortage of liquidity could lead to the insolvency of a 
42 Id., Sec. IV. 
43 Id 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
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bank. 46 
Operational risk involves the breakdown by four causes: people, processes, systems 
and external factors. This leads to the definition made by the Committee in one of its 
recent papers that operational risk means "the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or 
failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events". 47 The Core 
Principles Paper indicates the most important species of operational risk involve 
breakdowns in internal controls and corporate governance. Such breakdowns can result 
in financial losses through error, fraud, or other staff failure of performing in a timely 
and ethical fashion. Other aspects of operational risk include, for example, major failure 
of information technology systems or major natural disasters with disruptive effects. 48 
Banks might be inflicted with financial losses by misjudging legal status of 
investment portfolio due to inadequate or incorrect legal advice. Another source of legal 
risk could come within legal or judicial system whereby existing laws fail to address 
legal issues involving a bank or are subject to subsequent change. 49 
Reputational risk is chiefly associated with damaging effects due to confidence loss 
of depositors, creditors and the general markets. Detrimental events leading to such a 
confidence crisis could include operational failure and compliance failure. 50 
To minimize these risks, a wide range of prudential requirements is advanced in the 
Core Principles based on the nature of risks. They can be basically divided into two 
groups: financial and non-financial requirements. Financial requirements include capital 
adequacy, 51 credit risk management, 52 market risk management, 53 and other risk 
46 Id. For further discussion of liquidity risk, see Thomas C. Baxter, Jr. & Joseph H. Sommer, Liquidity 
Crises, in A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE: A VIABLE APPROACH 45-70 
(J. B. Attanasio & J. J. Norton ed., 2001) 
47 See Basle Committee on banking Supervision, Working Paper on the Regulatory Treatment of 
Operational Risk (September 2001). 
The Core Principles Paper indicates the most important species of operational risk involve breakdowns in 
internal controls and corporate governance. Such breakdowns can result in financial losses through error, 
fraud, or other staff failure of performing in a timely and ethical fashion. Other aspects of operational risk 
include, for example, major failure of information technology systems or major natural disasters with 
disruptive effects. See Core Principles, Sec. IV. 
48 See supra note 36, at Explanatory Note, Section IV. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 See Id., Principle 6. 
52 These requirements embody establishment of adequate standards and processes regarding credit 
granting/monitoring, assessment of asset quality and provisions and reserve of loan loss, risk 
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management. 54 For non-financial aspects, the Core Principles pointed one crucial 
mechanism, i. e., internal controls, 55 which is of particular relevance to containing 
operational risk. 
3. Protective Measure: Deposit Protection 
In the Appendix of the Core Principles, a special reference was made to 
government-sponsored deposit insurance, which has emerged as a commonly practiced 
arrangement addressing banking risks. Deposit insurance, as a crucial part of financial 
safety net, is to increasing public confidence and hence reducing the probability of 
contagious effects that might spread and impact on the stability of the entire banking 
system. 
This risk-insulation mechanism, however, functions to the unintended effects of 
weakening small depositors' incentives of disciplining imprudent management, and of 
encouraging excessive risk-taking. In other words, to the extent deposit insurance 
safeguarding the system's stability, it is at the potential cost of impairing safety and 
soundness of institutions individually. 
One way to deal with this disincentive issue is to focus on the composition of 
concentration and large exposure and connected lending. See Id., Principle 7-10. 
53 Apart from requiring an adequate system in place for measuring, monitoring and controlling market 
risks, the Core Principles stressed on the need to imposing a specific capital charge on market risk 
exposures. This capital charge is recognized as crucial in strengthening the soundness and stability of 
financial markets. See Id., Principle 12. 
In fact, at the end of 1997, a new capital charge related to market risk has come into effect, which added 
another layer of regulatory capital requirement to the credit risk based Capital Accord of 1988. This 1997 
regime is based on both quantitative and qualitative standards; fulfilment of which would give banks the 
option of either using a standardised method or their own internal models in calculating the reguired 
regulatory capital. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Amendment to the Capital Accord to 
Incorporate Market Risks (January 1996); Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Supervisory 
Framework for the Use of "Backtesting" in Conjunction with the Internal Models Approach to Market 
Risk Capital Requirements (January 1996); and Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, An Internal 
Model-based Approach to Market Risk Capital Requirements (April 1995). 
54 This sphere deals with interest risk, liquidity management and operational risk. The Basle Committee's 
basis standing is, for adequately managing these risks, the presence of a comprehensive risk management 
process to identify, measure, monitor and control these risks is essential. In particular, board and senior 
management oversight mush play an appropriate role in this system. See Core Principles, Principle 13. 
55 See Core Principles, Principle 13-15 and accompanying Explanatory Notes. The Core Principles 
identified four key areas to be addresses by internal controls: "organisational structures (definitions of 
duties and responsibilities, discretionary limits for loan approval, and decision-making procedures); 
accounting procedures (reconciliation of accounts, control lists, periodic trial balances, etc. ); the `four 
eyes' principles (segregation of various functions, cross-checking, dual control of assets, double 
signatures, etc. ); and physical control over assets and investments. " 
27 
deposit insurance that governmental funds cover only up to a limit in percentage and/or 
amount of individual deposits. 56 Another way, and probably the one of more fundamental 
importance, is about the perception the supervisors should have in collaborating their 
safety-and-soundness supervisory mandates with the primary function of deposit 
insurance in addressing systemic risk. While the contagious effect in its connection with 
systemic risk is expected to be addressed by deposit insurance, banking supervisors are 
actually given more freedom, freedom to let unredeemable institutions fail. 57Only by the 
supervisors' willingness to let problematic individual institutions fail could then benefits 
of deposit insurance being fully reaped, and its downsides being adequately offset. 
4. Supervisory and Enforcement Standards under Core Principles 
a. Ongoing Supervision 
Banking supervision is devised for monitoring banks' compliance with prudential 
requirements. The Core Principles indicated an effective ongoing supervision should 
consist of both on-site and off-site supervision. 58 
Without the physical presence of the supervisor, by collecting, reviewing and 
analyzing basic financial statements and supporting schedules from submitted prudential 
reports and statistical returns, off-site supervision is for checking compliance to 
prudential requirements. 59 Moreover, financial information, as periodically reported by 
the supervised, is also expected to prompt supervisors' forward-looking thoughts that 
potential problems could be detected in the early stage and be reacted rapidly. 
60 One 
key point to success of off-site supervision is information must be generated on a solo as 
well as consolidated basis that can cover three sets of financial data: the ones of banks, 
of affiliated non-bank entities and of the group as a whole. 
61 
On-site supervision could be undertaken either by examination staff or by external 
auditors. To deliver a successful on-site examination, examiners must be capable of 
independently verifying the credibility of information being provided by banks in the 
56 See Core Principles, Appendix II. 
57 Id. 
58 See Core Principles, Principle 16. 
59 See Id., at Explanatory Note on Principle 19 & 20. 
60 Id. 
61 See Id., at Principle 18. 
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process of their off-site reports. 62 Further, the examiner should also be mandated to 
ensuring "adequate corporate governance" being in place. 63 
Supervisory practices must be coordinated with regular contact with bank 
management and complemented by credible maintenance of financial and accounting 
records and of financial disclosure. 64 
b. Formal Enforcement and Liquidation Measures 
Powerful enforcing tools would correct banks' failure to comply with prudential 
requirements, or at least reduce damages inflicted on depositors, other creditors and 
ultimately insurance funds. The presence of effective enforcement could also deter 
management failure. 
The Core Principles did not come to details the composition of effective 
enforcement mechanisms, but put forward a number of rules on which these 
mechanisms should be based. Enforcement instruments must be capable of delivering 
corrective measures in both a timely and graduated fashion. 65 Demanding a graduated 
approach with finely calibrated tools is crucial in the sense heavily weighted and 
over-stringent formal enforcement arrangements tend to defer supervisors from using 
them and, as a result, opt for other informal alternatives. 66 
Furthermore, supervisors should be equipped with the authority that goes beyond 
restricting or sanctioning existing violation to more proactively redirecting the way the 
institution in question is managed for the safety-and-soundness concern. These proactive 
measures include, among other things, withholding approvals for new activities and 
acquisitions, suspending dividend payment, restricting asset transfers, and replacing 
62 See Id., at Principle 19. 
63 See Id., at Explanatory Note on Principle 19 & 20. 
64 See Id., Principle 17 & 21. 
65 See Core Principles, Explanatory Note on Principle 22. 
66 For example, from 1940s to the late 1980s, American supervisors exhibited a strong tendency of 
deploying informal rather than formal instruments in their enforcement actions. This was largely due to, 
by then, more finely tuned enforcement tools either did not exist or were unduly cumbersome in operation. 
And the civil enforcement mechanisms at the supervisors' handy disposal such as license revocation and 
termination of deposit insurance were too dramatic that would have put institutions out of business 
straightaway. See McCOY, supra note 5, at §13.1. 
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senior management. 67 As an overarching principle, "all remedial actions [should] be 
addressed directive to the bank's board of directors since they have overall responsibility 
for the institution". 68 
For liquidation procedures, the Core Principles proposed a two-phase processes. 69 
In the extreme case where a problematic banking institution is judged no longer 
financially viable, the supervisor should intervene in having it taken over by or merged 
into a healthier institution. When such rescues proven to fail, the supervisor should have 
the authority to close or assist in the closing of such institution. 
c. Cross-border Banking 
In this part, the Core Principles reiterated the collaborating framework among home and 
host supervisors set out in the Basle Concorde and its successors. 70 From the 
perspective of host-country supervisors, this framework is aimed to ensuring the same 
set of minimum requirements applied to operations of both domestic banks and foreign 
establishments, i. e., foreign branches, joint ventures and subsidiaries of international 
banks. For internationally active banking organizations, the home-country supervisors 
should practice global consolidated supervision. A key component of consolidated 
supervision is establishing contact and information exchange with the various other 
supervisors involved, including host country supervisory authorities. 
B. Regional and Law-based Solution: EU's Convergence Program (Second 
Banking Directive and Its Supplements) 
On a global scale, the growing demands for cross-border financial services from 
multinational corporations have pushed financial institutions to equip themselves with 
the capability of providing in particular wholesale financial services across the national 
67 See Core Principles, Explanatory Note on Principle 22. 
68 Id. 
69 Id 
70 See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Principles for the Supervision of Banks' Foreign 
Establishments (the Concordat) (May 1983); Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Minimum 
Standards for the Supervision of International Banking Groups and Their Cross-border Establishments 
(July 1992); Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, The Supervision of Cross-border Banking 
(October 1996). 
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border. 71 Globalization of the delivery of financial services, denoting "the cross-border 
delivery of financial services to foreign residents; the penetration of foreign financial 
markets by branches and subsidiaries of multinational institutions; and transactions 
between banks and investment firms from different countries that give rise to 
inter jurisdictional counterparty risk", 72 is, nevertheless, primarily predicated on 
regional, as opposed to global, rules in terms of the capability of providing a reasonable 
degree of common regulatory and supervisory solutions that are law-based and binding. 
In this respect, the ongoing process of regulatory convergence under the EU's 
convergence program aimed for a regionally integrated market poses as a prominent 
example. 
The significance of the EU's program rests both with its derivative-based and thus 
legally binding approach placing the process of convergence on a solid ground73 and its 
adaptability in implementation that gives member states enough room for adapting to 
their respective domestic legal and regulatory systems where more than minor 
discrepancies might exist among one another. For other geographic blocks, the example 
set by the EU Program demonstrates the possibility of a new route- the one of straddling 
between "soft law" and "hard law"-74, which renders merits of both political practicality 
and substantive uniformity if regulatory convergence and market integration are 
something on their agendas. 
1. Three Building Blocks 
As the cornerstone of the Community's strategy for the integration of the banking sector, 
71 Paul S. Pilecki, A U. S. Legal Perspective on Global Consolidation in the Financial Services Industry, 
Materials on the University of London Lecture, unpublished materials on file with the author (22 May 
2001); also generally see Group of Ten, Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector, Ch. 1 (January 
2001). 
72 See Richard Dale, Regulating Investment Business in the Single Market, Bank of England Quarterly 
Bulletin, 333,335 (November 1994). 
73 Under European law, derivatives are binding only to the extent the result to be achieved, while the 
choice of implementing methods is left open to each Member State. EC Treaty, Art. 189. 
74 For the natures and possible complementation of soft and hard laws, see Mario Giovanoli, Reflections 
on International Financial Standards as "Soft Law", No. 37, Essays In 
international Financial & 
Economic Law (The London Institute of International Banking, Finance and Development Law Ltd. ) 
(2002). 
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the Second Banking directive, 75 adopted in December 1989, introduced three building 
blocks, i. e. mutual recognition, harmonization of minimum prudential standards, and 
home-country control, in the expectation of creating a single market in banking services. 
By adopting the mutual-recognition mechanism, based on the single license granted 
by the home-state authorities, community-wide banking operations, either taking the 
form of direct cross-border provision of services or through the establishment of local 
branches in the host state, 76 could be firmly assured. 
As the foundation for mutual recognition, harmonizing key prudential standards 
was initially and partly achieved by certain provisions in the Second Banking Directive 
on areas such as absolute minimum capital requirements for credit institutions, vetting 
requirements for their large shareholders and limitations on their participations in 
non-financial undertakings. 77 Subsequent adopted prudential directives related to 
risk-based regulatory capital requirements such as the Own Funds Directive78and the 
Solvency Ratio Directive, 79 and to large exposure restraints (the Large Exposure 
Directive), 80 and the adoption of the Deposit-Guarantee Directive, 81 further enhanced 
the common prudential and protective framework across the Community. 
The last prop upholding the EC convergence and integration Program comes from 
the establishment of the principle of home-country control, which places the primary 
responsibility for prudential supervision over credit institutions on their home countries 
that grant the single licenses in the first place. Along the similar vein, this is coupled 
with the adoption of the Deposit-Guarantee Directive in 1994 that provides the costs of 
bank failures, insofar as official deposit insurance is concerned, are to be borne by the 
home country that possesses the authority of entry permission and takes the 
75 Council Directive 89/646/EEC of 15.12. on the co-ordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and amending 
Directive 77/780/EEC, OJ L386/1 (the "Second Banking Directive"). 
76 Second Banking Directive, Arts. 6(1) and 18 (1). 
77 Id., Arts. 19-20. 
78 Council Directive 89/299/EEC of 17.4.89 on the own funds of credit institutions, OJ 1989 L124/16 (the 
"Own Funds Directive"). 
79 Council Directive 89/647/EEC of 18.12.89 on solvency ratio for credit institutions, OJ 1989 L386/14 
(the "Solvency Ration Directive"). 
80 Council Directive 92/121/EEC of 21.12.92 on the monitoring and control of large exposures of credit 
institutions, OJ 1993 L19/1 (the "Large Exposure Directive"). 
81 Council Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of Council of 30.5.94 on 
deposit-guarantee scheme, OJ 1994 L135/5 (the "Deposit Insurance Directive"). 
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responsibility of ongoing supervision. This combination is aimed to neutralizing 
perverse incentives of home states to competing to laxity that would have been the case 
if the costs of bank failure connecting with deposit insurance had been detached from 
supervisory failures. 82 
2. Universal-Bank Model 
Notably, the main thrust of the EU's prudential regulatory and supervisory framework 
was aimed to fitting in with a universal-bank type of functional fusion (conducted either 
directly by the bank or through a subsidiary) for which the single banking license 
granted by the home-country authority renders the institution freedom of conducting a 
wide range of financial activities beyond its traditional deposit-taking and lending 
(although excluding some important financial activities, especially insurance business) 
throughout the Community. 83 
To this end, two key directives were adopted. The Consolidation Supervision 
Directive 84 introducing a revised, although incomplete, framework for the consolidated 
supervision over banking groups was adopted in 1992. To complete this framework, the 
Capital Adequacy Directive, 85 applying both to investment firms and credit institutions, 
was adopted in 1993 and stipulated regulatory capital requirements covering market risk 
flowing primarily from the securities and foreign-exchange trading activities. Under 
which, a "trading-book" approach, i. e., securities activities conducted by these 
institutions are subject to a separate capital-adequacy regime from the one for the 
banking business, was employed. 
82 See Ross Cranston & Christos Hadjiemmanuil, Banking Integration in the European Community: The 
European Commission's Unfinished Agenda, in THE CHANGING WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A TRIBUTE TO THE LATE KENNETH R. SIMMONDS, 
345 (Joseph J. Norton, Mads Andenas & Mary Footer ed., 1998). 
83 See the Annex to the Second Banking Directive. 
84 Council Directive 92/30/EEC of 6.4.92 on the supervision of credit institutions on a consolidated basis, 
OJ 1992 LI10/52 (the "Consolidated Supervision Directive"). 
85 Council Directive 93/6/EEC of 15.3.93 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit 
institutions, OJ 1993 L141/1 (the "Capital Adequacy Directive"). 
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3. Proposed Directive for Financial Conglomerate Supervision 
Recently, the proposal for a Directive86 introducing supplementary supervision of 
financial conglomerates adds a new layer of supervisory convergence, and hence 
promises the prospect of closer market integration. In addition to the current sectoral 
supervision and basic consolidation supervisory framework under the Consolidation 
Supervision Directive, 87 the Proposed Directive demands a closer coordination among 
supervisory authorities of different sectors of the financial industry relating to the 
supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms. 
C. Interim Observations: Standardized Regulatory and Supervisory Approach 
and Limitations of Convergence Process Due to Presence of Domestic Factors 
In pursuing safe and sound banking, the international and regional experiences involving 
in the overall convergence process concerning standard-setting entail some common 
grounds. 88 Most evidently, some forms of prudential safeguards, aimed at curtailing the 
banking institution's perceived risk-prone operating strategy as well as providing a 
financial buffer upon realized losses, are shared by both. These preventive measures are 
met by those of a protective nature, not least the deposit insurance requirement 
considered necessary to forestall bank runs. Moreover, to achieve both regulatory and 
supervisory ends, a risk-based approach adopted by both is also clear. This is despite, at 
86 European Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings, and investment firms in a 
financial conglomerate and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 
92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the European 
Parliament and the Council (Brussels, 24 April 2001), COM (2001) 213 final, O. J., Eur. Comm. No. C 
213 E/07 (2001). 
87For the purpose of clarity, alongside several other Directives, the Council Directive 92/30/EEC of 6.3.92 
on the supervision of credit institutions on a consolidated basis was incorporated into Directive 
2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and 
pursuit of the business of credit institutions, O. J. Eur. Comm. No. L 126/1 (2000). 
88 The Basle Committee's position of viewing the banking industry (and regulation and supervision over 
it) a distinctive one from other financial and non-financial industries is endorsed by other prominent 
non-banking international bodies such as the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) 
whose primary mandate involves with standard-setting in the field of insurance regulation. In one 
important supervisory paper, the IAIS, for example, stated: "Because insurance companies are less 
vulnerable to risks of contagion than, for example, banks, and because they are more rarely a source of 
systemic risk to the wider financial system, insurance supervisors seek to ring fence an individual 
insurer. " See IAIS, Principles Applicable to the Supervision of International Insurers and Insurance 
Groups and Their Cross-Border Establishments, p. 3 (Sep., 1997). 
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least concerning the Core Principles, regulatory measures that have concrete contents, 
such as risk-based capital requirements (Principle 6), other ratio-based restraints (e. g., 
Principle 8 and 9 on loan loss provisions, reserves and large exposure restrictions), and 
loan policies (e. g., Principle 10 on arm's-length principle), are predominantly relating to 
credit risk. For other risks, the need of establishing "comprehensive risk management"-a 
much vague assertion-is indicated (Principle 13). 
On the supervisory side and in particular concerning cross-border banking, the need 
for not only supervisory coordination and cooperation but also for a clear division of 
supervisory responsibilities is confirmed by both. In addition, the Core Principles has 
indicated a standard supervisory circle. To monitor compliance with prudential 
requirements, supervisors are required to conduct effective on-site bank examinations, 
based mainly on the institutions' prudential returns, and off-site, primarily for checking 
credibility of returned data and assessing managerial quality (Principle 16-21), and in 
the event of any violation found, correct it with informal and formal enforcement actions 
(Principle 22). The outputs generated by examinations and enforcement actions could 
then be used for deciding the frequency of follow-up examinations and the degree of 
severity of subsequent sanctions. This seemingly perfect supervisory circle sits on a 
number of assumptions. First, it is assumed credit risk is the main type of bank risk and 
that probability of loan defaults can be usually assessed in advance. The institution's risk 
management is thus less expected by the regulator of monitoring credit risk on a 
real-time basis but rather conducted ex ante in that credit analysis and audit before loan 
extension are the primary procedures. 89 By the same token, it is also assumed as 
workable loan losses occurring later could be covered by setting aside loan provision, 
regulatory capital and other ratio-based provisions in advance. In addition, it can also be 
said, as contrast to the risk profile of a securities firm, which is characterized by 
short-tem but generally secured liabilities and liquid assets, the one of a bank is assumed 
relatively static. 90 
One could, however, also pinpoint some clear limitations embedded in these efforts. 
Concerning the EU's strategy in eradicating legal barriers, difficulties resulting from 
89 See Taylor, supra note 32, at 796-797. 
90 See Dale & Wolfe, Supra note 11, at 328. 
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discrepancies of national laws and regulations remain in such areas as bank insolvency 
law, consumer protection, business-conduct regulation and others. 91 At the EU level, 
some existing non-legal restraints as predicted will be also persistent in the future that 
will be even harder to be addressed than those legal discrepancies in the pursuit for an 
integrated market that is perfectly contestable. For example, addressed to retail banking, 
one leading commentator observed: "[b]ranch networks of existing dominant banks, 
their reputation for soundness, and switching costs for consumers-all create non-legal 
barriers to entry. Consequently, while European competition in wholesale banking will 
continue to be strong, and competition for medium-sized firms and wealthy individuals 
will grow, the likelihood is of only gradual changes in European retail banking". 92 
One difference between the EU program and the Core Principles is notable. That is, 
the EU program is actually one that goes beyond simply setting common standards as 
did the Core Principle. It has also confirmed "universal bank" as generally a regional 
pattern of function fusion among banking, securities and other financial businesses 
within the region. And, by the proposed directive for financial conglomerate supervision, 
it has started to address regulatory and supervisory particularities connecting to this 
particular pattern of multifunctional banking. By contrast, the failure of the Core 
Principles and after it other works accomplished by the Basle Committee and other 
international bodies in setting a generally favored pattern concerning function fusion, 
means, in terms of standardizing regulatory and supervisory treatments, far more 
restraints are in place at the international than the regional level. 
It is thus clear, insufficiencies or limitations of the ongoing international 
convergence process (and, to a less extent, the regional one) of establishing minimum 
standards for bank regulation and supervision rests with, by nature and approach, these 
processes' inherent inability to address domestic factors, to which the next chapter will 
turn. 
91 See Cranston & Hadjiemmanuil, supra note 81, at 341-384. 
92 See Cranston, supra note 7, at 434. 
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III. Domestic Dynamics Implicating with Traditional Bank Regulatory Model: 
Three Examples 
This section presents three examples on the domestic factor that was argued in the 
previous section as an imperative link to the ongoing standard convergence processes 
over the establishment of bank regulatory model. The first concerns the depth and 
strength on financial and technologic innovation as displayed by individual economies, a 
factor implicating with the traditional model's risk-specific and risk-based approach. 
The second concerns the global trend of individual economies engaging in institutional 
integration and functional deregulation for their financial sectors. It will note the 
common goal of effecting a regulatory structure able to ensure effective oversight over 
complex financial groups as perceived by individual economies have been met by 
diverging domestic strategies during the processes of reforming their respective 
regulatory, supervisory and protective arrangements. Lastly, this section will present the 
New Zealand's bank regulatory model, predicating on competitive as opposed to safe 
and sound banking, a regime fundamentally departing from the traditional regulatory 
approach. 
A. Depth and Strength in Financial Innovation 
The following provides a brief account how the depth and strength of particular 
economies' capability concerning financial innovation could implicate with the 
risk-specific and sector-based approach of bank regulation and supervision as enshrined 
under the traditional bank regulatory model. 
1. Risk Convergence and Functional Despecialization in Most Advanced 
Economies 
For those most advanced financial-center hosting economies, of the most discernable 
effects financial innovation has brought about upon their banking industries are the 
phenomenon of functional despecialization and the beginning of the risk convergence 
process between "bank risks" and those traditionally considered only to 
be borne by 
non-bank financial intermediaries. This aspect of observation 
is critical to the validity of 
the traditional regulatory model that is based on a risk-specific and risk-based approach, 
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not just in terms of regulation and supervision that should be conducted by the authority, 
but in term of the perception the manner risk management is being adopted by the bank 
institution. 
One pronounced feature of financial innovation relates to its ability of continuously 
creating exotic financial products (such as credit derivatives as the recent case) that 
could not be easily attributed to traditional contractual forms such as debt, equity, and 
insurance. 93 Such products with their hybrid risks have been increasingly blurring the 
risk boundary between banks and non-bank financial institutions. This in turn propels 
financial institutions, particularly those largest and most complex ones, away from their 
traditional sector-based risk management and into a more risk-adaptable one- the one of 
managing risks by unbundling certain types of risks resting with industry sector into 
components of common nature. 94 
Another source of risk convergence rests with the phenomenon of despecialization 
of the transformation service and other functions traditionally falling into the banking 
domain, and its ensuing effect of blurring the sector boundary. On the asset side of the 
balance sheet, such institutions as insurance companies, pension funds, and mutual 
funds in today's marketplace compete directly with commercial banks by providing 
borrowers with access to medium-to-long-term funds; on the liability side, they compete 
with commercial banks by accepting liquid funds from investors. 95 On a functional note, 
commercial banks also have to compete with other service providers on areas other than 
the transformation service. For example, by allowing investors to make redemptions by 
writing checks to third parties drawn on their mutual funds accounts, 
96 the service 
provided by the open-end money market mutual funds is rather similar to the one of 
commercial banks' checking accounts. 
2. Developments of Securitization in East Asia's Newly Industrialized Economies 
Geographically, financial innovation and its attendant effects are not simply being 
93 See Taylor, supra note 32, at 798. 
94 id 
95 Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of Banking 
Corporate Law, 691,693 (2000). 
96 Id, at 694. 
Before and After Gramm-Leach-Bliey, 25 Journal of 
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restricted to the most developed economies. For banks in other parts of the world such 
as South Korea and Taiwan, two newly industrialized economies in East Asia, such force 
is gradually gathering momentum and taking hold. 
The obvious example is the recent developments in securitization. By adopting the 
Asset Backed Securitization Act in 1998 (amended 2001) (in South Korea) and the 
Financial Asset Securitization Law in June 2002 (in Taiwan), these two economies took 
their first steps by eradicating major legal barriers to securitization transactions rooted in 
their civil-law tradition such as predicaments relating to the undesirable perfection of 
security, to the compulsory notice-giving to obligors, and to the insufficiency of security 
over the assets to be securitized. 97 
While for both economies securitization is still at its infancy, the potential enormity 
of this market promises in the years to come they will not be immune from the effects of 
risk convergence that have been reshaping the financial landscapes in the most 
developed economies. 98 These effects are twofold, both for banks and securities firms, 
that "... securities firms will increasingly be exposed to the type of risk that is typical of 
traditional banking business as their assets include, for example, mortgage-backed 
securities or securitized bank loans. Similarly, bank balance sheets-previously 
characterized by their stability-are now subject to much greater volatility because 
assets can be securitized and sold and trading activities account for a much larger share 
of profitability". 99 
B. Patterns of Affiliation and Functional Integration Chosen in Financial 
Deregulation 
Whilst relaxing affiliation restrictions of banks with financial or non-financial firms and 
97 Tim Lester and Mohammed Asaria, Securitization: Korea and Taiwan Follow Japanese 
Lead, 
International Financial Law Review, 22 (October 2002). 
98 Taiwan's Ministry of Finance approved the first asset-back securitization transaction in January 
2003. 
The basic structure of this transaction is outlined as follows. With Taiwan Industry 
Bank (TIB) as the 
originator, backed by the TIB's corporate mortgaged loans, which were then transferred 
to the Taiwan 
Land Bank (TLB), the trustee institution (a special purpose vehicle), senior and subordinate beneficiary 
certificates totalling over NT$ 36 billion were issued in February 
2003 for the purpose of private 
placement. As predicted by Taiwan's Ministry of Finance, the Taiwan's securitization market could soon 
be worth NT$1.6 trillion ($50 billion). Chinatimes (Taipei), 2 (28 
January 2003) (in Chinese). 
99 See Taylor, Supra note 32, at 799. 
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expanding commercial banks' functions beyond core banking are a global trend, 
domestically it has been met by multiple as opposed to a uniform affiliation models and 
patterns of functional deregulation, so has the corresponding regulatory and supervisory 
solutions in reacting to the boundary-blurring effect brought about by such functional 
and institutional integrations. Against the backdrop of a basically internationally 
converged bank regulatory framework, this aspect of consideration provides a good 
example as to such framework's limitations in failing to reach deep into domestic 
economic and societal particularities. 
This section will also explore the dramatic "model shopping" experience of Taiwan, 
as a newly industrialized East Asia economy, in her pursuit for the optimal pattern of 
financial sector integration, which, again, presents a stark contrast to, at the 
standard-setting level, an internationally converged framework. 
1. Initiatives of Individual Economies Engaging in Financial Deregulation 
Barings' debacle was suggested as a testament to the damaging force that could be 
unleashed by globalization, financial innovation and deregulation working 
interactively. 100 For an economy other than those most developed ones, the initiative of 
engaging in financial deregulation, featuring generally a functional and institutional 
framework of integration among different financial sectors, could be, however, a 
domestic policy addressed to its financial sector's absence of global operational bases 
and insufficiency of market depth and of innovative and technologic strength. For these 
economies' policymakers, financial deregulation is usually aimed for the resultant 
synergy expected to be drawn from such integration to somewhat mitigating the said 
100 On reviewing and examining the build-up of loss concealment masterminded by Nick Leeson, the 
chief trader and general manager of Baring Futures (Singapore) Ltd (BFS), who incurred massive losses 
on unauthorized derivative trading to BFS's parent company, Barings plc, and, ultimately, to its collapse 
in 1995, one leading commentator linked the Barings' debacle to these three factors: "In the area of 
globalisation, regulators in Singapore, Japan and the UK failed to coordinate their roles internationally, 
underlining the absence of any multilateral agreement on supervisory cooperation in securities markets. 
On the question of functional integration, there was no clear policy on (i) whether or to what extent 
Barings banking arm should fund its securities affiliates or (ii) how the principle of consolidated 
supervision should apply to the various parts of the group. And, finally, financial innovation lay at the 
heart of the Barings collapse, in so far as neither Barings top management nor regulators seem to have 
fully understood the nature of the derivatives arbitrage operations in Singapore that were supposed to be 
generating such large profits". See RICHARD DALE, RISK AND REGULATION IN GLOBAL 
SECURITIES MARKETS, 203 (1996). 
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weaknesses. This strikes a contrast to financial deregulation taking place in the most 
developed economies whose initiatives could be by nature adaptive-to the markets and 
technological developments. 
2. A Snapshot: Fusion Models in the UK, Japan and the US 
This section outlines the different corporate models concerning affiliation of banking 
and other financial services adopted in the UK, the US and Japan by attributing to three 
regulatory regimeslo1-the US Glass-Steagall model (in the pre-GLBA era), ' 02 the 
universal banking model (in much of the continental Europe)103 and the US firewall 
model (in the post-GLBA era). 104 
In the United Kingdom, the presence of certain restrictions on combining banking 
and securities before 1986 resulted primarily from the participation restrictions in the 
London Stock Market. In 1986, as a one-stop change, member securities firms were 
allowed to be acquired by banks following removal of the restriction rules of the London 
Stock Exchange on the ownership of firms of "jobbers" (market makers of stocks and 
shares) and stockbrokers. los 
In Japan, the restriction on banking-securities affiliation was removed by the 
Financial System Reform Law of 1993 that allowed commercial banks, trust banks and 
securities firms expanding into each other's core business by establishing separate 
101 Id., at 13-16. 
102 The US Glass-Steagall separation model in the pre-GLBA era, which separates commercial banking 
from investing banking by means of affiliation prohibition, was based on the idea that public deposits 
should not be exposed to risky securities transactions. Such an institutional segregation then lead to a 
regulatory regime that was conducted on the industry-specific basis. In the case of capital adequacy, for 
instance, two sets of rules are respectively applied to banking and securities business. Id., at 13-14. 
103 Under this model, mixed activities are grouped within the banking entity (so are their attendant risks) 
and subject to a single regulatory authority that applies a common capital adequate regime to the bank as a 
whole. Id. 
104 Under the GLBA, affiliations under a financial holding company are allowed as long as "firewalls" are 
in place. The function of a firewall is to restricting intra-group transactions and other connections for the 
purpose of preventing risks being transmitted from the non-banking to the banking unit. As far as capital 
adequacy is concerned, a financial holding company must maintain adequate regulatory capital, both on 
the subsidiary (sectoral) and on the parent-company basis. Id. see also MACEY ET AL, BANKING LAW 
AND REGULATION 441 (3rd ed. 2001). 
105 See William Blair, Liberalisation and the Universal Banking Model: Regulation and Deregulation in 
the United Kingdom, in INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION: 
CHANGE AND TRANFORMATION IN THE 1990 88-9 (Joseph. J. Norton et al. eds., 1994). 
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subsidiaries. ' 06 
In the US, through liberal interpretations of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, the US 
authorities empowered US banks to expand their business lines to securities through 
special-purpose affiliates. 107 This took place even before the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
of 1999 (GLBA) repealing Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act. 108Under the 
GLBA, if a bank holding company qualifies as a financial holding company, 109its 
permissible activities include the ones determined by the Federal Reserve Board to be (1) 
"financial in nature"; (2) "incidental to such financial activities"; or (3) "complementary 
to a financial activity" and posing no "substantial risk to the safety and soundness of 
depository institutions or the financial system generally. "' 10 
106 See Dale, supra note 99, at 4. 
107 Such a special-purpose affiliate is often referred as "section 20 subsidiaries", i. e., subsidiaries that 
have power to engage in securities business subject to the "application", both through the Federal 
Reserve's interpretations and the federal courts' rulings, of the Glass-Steagall Act. 
Glass-Steagall-section 20 forbade affiliations between banks and firms "engaged primarily" in the 
investment banking. The Federal Reserve's liberal interpretations regarding Section 20 since 1987 
(marked by the agencies permitting Bankers Trust Company's expanding into limited securities activities 
on the conditions of certain limits on gross revenue and market share), alongside the federal courts' 
subsequent endorsements in a series of cases represented a major policy shift away from the Congress's 
initial intent under the Glass-Steagall Act. Consequently, "as a result of the Federal Reserve's actions, 
prior to the passage of GLBA, a bank holding company could own an investment banking business that 
engaged in every conceivable aspect of the business of investment banking, subject only to the 
twenty-five percent gross revenue test and some modest `firewall' on interactions between the bank and 
its investment banking affiliate". See Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of Banking: Before and After 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 25 Journal of Corporation Law, 691, at 718(2000). 
108 The Glass-Steagall Act is composed of four sections (Sections 16,20,21 and 32) of the Banking Act 
of 1933, codified in 12 U. S. C. 24 (seventh), 377,378&78 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Section 16 prohibits 
banks from acquiring securities and from engaging in underwriting and dealing in securities; Section 20 
prohibited banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System from affiliating with organisations that 
are primarily engaged in underwriting or dealing in securities; Section 21 prohibits the receipt of deposits 
by securities companies; Section 32 Prohibited management interlocking between officers, directors or 
employees of a bank that is a member of the Federal Reserve System and a securities firm. 
The GLBA (Sec. 101 (b), GLBA, 113 Stat. At 1341 (1999)) repealed Section 20 and 32, but Section 16 
and 20 were retained. Therefore, running securities business directly and on a stand-alone basis by a 
commercial bank or a bank holding company is still prohibited, and vice versa. 
Besides, as Gruson indicated, "Section 20 is not completely dead". The operating standards of Section 
20 issued pre-GLBA, such as the 25 percent revenue limit, are still applied by the Federal Reserve to the 
Section 20 subsidiaries of bank holding companies that do not elect to become financial holding 
companies. See Michael Gruson, Foreign Banks and the Regulation of Financial Holding Companies, n 
12 & accompanying texts (2002) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (citing the Federal 
Reserve Board's release of 10 March 2000,65 Fed. Reg. 14440 (17 Mar. 2000)) 
109 Three substantive requirements are needed for a bank holding company qualifying as a financial 
holding company: being well-capitalized and well-managed and granted a CRA rating under the 
Community Reinvestment Act that is not less than satisfactory. 12 U. S. C. §§1843(I)(1)-(2), 2903 (c)(1). 
110 12 U. S. C. §§1843(k)(1) 
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3. Taiwan's Dramatic Model-shopping Experience in Financial Sector Integration 
For newly industrialized economies such as Taiwan, the pursuit for an optimal 
integration model is far from straightforward. Dramatic model shopping, starting from a 
universal-banking (in its narrow sense banking and securities are combined and 
conducted under a commercial-bank corporate entity), through a parent-subsidiary, to a 
financial-holding-company model, which takes place in as short as twelve years, ill 
highlights the level of confusion and complexities that could entail the process of 
financial deregulation. 
a. Credit-allocation Based Segregation and Universal-bank Model 
Before 1989, the year when Taiwan's banking sector was liberated and private banking 
introduced, credit allocation was the most prominent force directing the way state banks 
was regulated. For example, the Banking Law of 1975 distinguished among short-term, 
medium-term and long-term credit providers, with which commercial banks were 
empowered to providing short-term credits, saving banks and trust investment 
companies to medium-term and long-term credits, and specialized banks to credits 
demanded by specific non-financial industries. ' 12 
Credit-allocation based segregation had been statutorily retained until 2001 when 
the Banking Law removed the type of saving bank. ' 13 Nevertheless, while securities 
business was theoretically attributed to medium-to-long-term credit provision, this 
segregation had not really hindered upon commercial banks' securities engagement, not 
even at the outset. 
In fact, back to 1960s, while a commercial bank's business scope was not clearly 
spelt out statutorily, selected state banks had been already allowed to run securities 
business by setting up trust departments. With sate banks deployed as market makers, 
this policy was intended to promoting developments of the capital markets, which were 
111 This is the period from 1989, when private banking was introduced to the economy, to the passage of 
Financial Holding Company Act in December 2001. 
112 Da-In Lou, The Evolution of Banking Laws-The important agendas of the Banking Law Amendments, 
66 Taiwan Law Review, 75,76 (Dec. 2000)(in Chinese) (citing the General Statement of the Fourth 
Amendment to the Banking Law in 1968). 
113 See Art. 20, Banking Law (2001). 
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rather narrow back then. Article 25 of Banking Law of 1975 carried this strategy 
forward and provided a commercial bank's business capacity included saving and trust 
business based on "separate departments with separate capital, business and accounting 
arrangements". 114 As a result, before 1988, up to thirteen state banks were allowed to 
run the whole range of securities business-security dealings, underwriting and 
brokerages-via setting up trust departments. ' 15 
This long-lasting policy of merging securities into commercial banks' businesses 
subject to internal Chinese-wall type of departmental separation (a universal-banking 
structure) was vindicated by the Banking Law Amendment of 1989, which entrusted the 
Ministry of Finance wider discretion with regard to further extending commercial banks' 
business lines. " 6 
b. Parent-subsidiary Model 
A shift of policy preference towards the parent-subsidiary and away from the 
universal-banking model started in late 1980s. 
On one hand, since the adoption of "The Standards Governing The Establishment 
of Security Firms" in 1988, securities power that had been fully enjoyed by a 
commercial bank based on departmental segregation was restricted to one of two pairs 
of either securities dealings-brokerages or securities dealing-underwriting. ' '70n the 
other, according to a ruling issued by the Ministry of Finance in 1996, commercial 
banks' capacity of running non-banking financial businesses via subsidiaries was 
114See Jun-jen Chen, Studies on the Banks' Trust Departments (Financial Research Group eds., 1984 ) (in 
Chinese). 
115 WEN YUI WANG ET AL., STUDIES ON CROSS-SECTOR BUSINESSES OF BANKS 55,61 (2000) 
(in Chinese) 
116 Article 3,71,87,101 of the Banking Law of 1989 added that banks' business scope includes "other 
business that is approved by the Central Competent Authority". Furthermore, the adoption of a "universal 
banking" model was concluded during the National Financial Conference held on 23 July 1991 that drew 
on participation of regulators, bankers and academia. See, Ministry of Finance, The Suggestions and 
Enforcements of the National Financial Conference, 13 (1996) (in Chinese). 
117 This gave commercial banks competitive decline over their opponents of securities firms. Securities 
firms are permitted to run these three arms of securities business simultaneously and therefore able to 
offer more competitive fees to customers by setting cross-subsidy service fees. WENG YUI WANG, 
HOLDING COMPANY AND FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANY 158 (2001) (in Chinese). The 
administrative order issued on 3 August 2001 by the Ministry of Finance authorized by the Banking Law 
of 2001 maintains the same restriction. See Ministry of Finance, Guideline of Business Scope and Risk 
Management on Banks'Trust and Securities Business, Art. 4 (3 Aug. 2001) (in Chinese). 
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liberalized. Upon which the parent banks could embark on a wide range of financial 
activities (such as securities, insurance, credit card, bill securities, futures, lease finance, 
and trust), subject only to a gross-revenue cap of forty per cent of the bank's paid-in 
capital and to the requirements for adequate capital-related ratios. ' 18 
Of the most crucial implications this wave of liberalization brought upon was, in 
order to enjoy full-range securities businesses, a commercial bank could effectively 
escape from the pairing restriction imposed on its securities department by simply 
opting for setting up a securities subsidiary. This parent-subsidiary corporate structure 
and the range of its business scope were re-stated in the Banking Law of 2000.119 
c. Holding-company Model 
A further twist came in December 2001 when the Financial Holding Company Act 
(FHCA) was passed. 120 Article 36 of the FHCA provides: 
"the business of a Financial Holding Company shall be limited to investment in, and 
management of, its invested enterprise(s). A Financial Holding Company may invest in the 
following enterprise(s): banking enterprises; bills finance enterprises; credit card businesses; 
trust Enterprises; insurance enterprises; securities enterprises; futures enterprises; venture 
capital investment enterprises; foreign financial institutions which have been approved for 
investment by the Ministry of Finance; and other enterprises which the Ministry considers to 
be financially related. " 
The FHCA of 2001 introduces a new model, the holding-company model, regarding 
functional and institutional integration among banking and securities, extending to 
insurance and other more risky businesses such as merchant banking. Of the most 
118 On 22 March 1996 the Ministry of Finance as authorized by Article 74 of the Banking Law issued this 
order, entitled "The Regulation Governing Commercial Banks' Investment Amounts and Shareholding" 
(File Number: Tai-Tsi-Zon 85505042). 
119 The Article 74 of the Banking Law of 2000 basically restated the parent-subsidiary framework as 
adopted by the Ministry of Finance in 1996. Furthermore, Article 28 of the Banking Law of 2000 repealed 
the requirement of departmental segregation of core banking and securities/trust businesses under a 
universal-banking model. Nevertheless, while the "pairing" restriction on securities capacity remained, it 
is obvious the parent-subsidiary model would prevail should a commercial bank want to be involved in 
securities business. 
120 Financial Holding Company Act of 2001 (promulgated by the presidential decree on 9 July 2001). 
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discernable changes brought about by the FHCA is such activity as merchant banking, 
which before the FHCA were outside the boundary of a commercial-bank involved 
affiliation, is now inside the business projection of a financial holding company with 
which a commercial bank can be affiliated. This competitive edge, as widely perceived 
by the industry, coupled with various taxation concessions121 under the FHCA, and 
explicit encouragement coming from the authorities, lead to a new landscape in 
Taiwan's financial industries-- the one dominated by financial holding companies. 122 
4. Boundary Blurring Effect on Markets, Products and Risks Corresponding to 
Domestic Regulatory and Supervisory Responses 
a. Intra-group Risk Transfer as Exemplified by US Financial Holding Company's 
Expanded Power Concerning Merchant Banking under GLBA 
In today's marketplace, such cross jurisdiction phenomena displaying in individual 
economies as the gradual reduction of statutory barriers and limitations concerning 
cross-sector affiliation; commercial banks being no longer the commercial units 
monopolizing transformation service; the increased secondary-market trading of bank 
loans that has neutralized the concern of core banking being particularly fragile due to 
unmarketability of commercial loans; 123 and the developments of securitization 
transactions that have enabled bank loans to be transacted in the form of 
securities 124present as a strong testament to now a widely accepted effect the 
boundary-blurring effect that has been brought about by financial innovation and 
121 For example, Article 49 of the FHCA reads "[w]here a Financial Holding Company holds more than 
ninety percent (90%) of the outstanding issued shares of a domestic Subsidiary, such Financial Holding 
Company may, for the tax year in which its such shareholding in the Subsidiary has existed for the entire 
twelve (12) months of the tax year, elect to be the tax payer itself, and jointly declare and report 
profit-seeking enterprise income tax and the ten percent (10%) tax surcharge on surplus retained earnings 
of a profit-seeking enterprise in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Law.... " 
122 Until March 2003, as many as fourteen financial holding companies were licensed by Taiwan's 
Ministry of Finance and entered into the markets. 
http: //www. lawbank. com. tw/fnews/news. php? nid=7321.00&&type id=1 (Last visited: June 2002) 
123 See Richard Dale, The Structure of Financial Regulation, 6 Journal of Financial Regulation and 
Compliance, 326,333 (1998) (citing Edward Luce, Europe Warms to Secondary Loan Market, Financial 
Times, 4 August 1997, on the development of a secondary loan market in Europe). 
124 Id. (noting the enormous magnitude of assets which the US bank holding companies removed from 
their balance sheets through the sale of securitized assets). 
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deregulation on markets, products and risks. ' 25 
The boundary blurring effect described above has impacted the Core Principles' 
bank regulatory model most potently on the credit-risk based bank risk that is 
traditionally perceived as of a static and compartmentalized existence. In this respect, 
the US financial holding company's expanded merchant-banking power under the 
GLBA126 provides a good reference point as to how the bank risk has been transformed 
from a static and sector-restricted to a fluid and cross-sector existence by way of 
intra-group risk transfer,. 
The US financial holding company's newly acquired affiliation power is notable 
because the resultant intermingle between banking and commerce (i. e., a bank 
subsidiary co-exists with a non-financial subsidiary controlled by the same holding 
company) have rendered dubious the continuous vitality of the traditional 
compartmentalized regulatory and supervisory approach based upon the separation of 
bank risk from commercial-firm risk. This is despite, at least nominally, a firewall 
125 Other distinctive phenomena flowing from this effect were insightfully suggested as: "the decline in 
core deposits and proportionate increase in non-deposit liabilities; the disintermediation of highly rated 
corporate borrowers from banks to the capital markets (CP markets); the increased lending to smaller and 
potentially riskier firms and consumers; technological advancements that result in enhanced electronic 
product delivery; the significant increase in off-balance sheet (OBS) activities, particularly OTC 
derivatives activities and securitization techniques; the continuous search for fee-generating activities to 
expand and diversify income sources; the gradual reduction of statutory barriers and limitations to 
engaging in securities and insurance activities through deregulatory activism; the gradual inclusion of 
activities considered by the banking agencies to be as `incidental to' the business of banking or `closely 
related to banking so as to be a proper incident thereto; the sustained efforts to reduce operating costs and 
compete more efficiently; and the increased intra-banking industry and non-bank competition in the U. S. 
and global credit markets". Joseph J. Norton, Selective Bank Regulatory and Supervisory Trends Upon 
Entering the 215t Century, Essays in International Financial & Economic Law, No. 34,33-4 (The London 
Institute of International Banking, Finance and Development Law Ltd., 2001). 
126 Merchant banking denotes investments in the private equity market that are usually undertaken by 
professional investors in unregistered shares of private or public company. These investments are 
generally of less liquidity, high risk, and longer term than are equity investments on public listed 
companies. Private equity investments are more illiquid because potential buyers or sellers are not readily 
accessible to a secondary market; more risky because these investments are ordinarily made in risky 
companies such as start-ups and leveraged buy-outs; and less liquid because these equities are typically 
held for the intermediate to longer term in the hope of higher returns for higher risk. See Macey, supra 
note 103, at 449-452 (citing Gary Gensler, Testimony on Regulation of Merchant Banking Activities, 
Subcommittees on Securities and Financial Institutions, U. S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs (13 June 2000)) 
A financial holding company may exercise its merchant bank power to acquire ownership interests in any 
company that is engaged in activities that are not regarded as financial in nature, incidental or 
complementary thereto (i. e., such company as not being engaging in "any activity not otherwise 
authorized for the financial holding company under section 4 of the Banking Holding Company Act"). 12 
C. F. R. §. 225.170 (a). 
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arrangement separating bank from non-financial components of a financial holding 
company is maintained, 127 coupled with the presence of two sets of other traditional 
safeguarding-(1) restrictions on banks' transactions with non-bank affiliates, ' 28 and (2) 
capital charges for non-financial equity investments 129-against internal risk-transfer. 
All these measures being in place, as rightfully suggested, provide only "a semblance of 
restrictions" rather than real ones. ' 30 This is not only because, technically, these firewall 
and transaction restriction safeguarding can be easily circumvent, 131 but also due to, by 
nature and by function, this merchant banking power a financial holding company has 
been accorded "the purchase, acquisition or retention of any equity instrument 
(including common stock, preferred stock, partnership interests, interests in limited 
liability companies, trust certificates, and warrants and call options that give the holder 
the right to purchase an equity instrument), any equity feature of a debt instrument (such 
a warrant or call option), and any debt instrument that is convertible to equity"32 is 
assimilated with that of any other institutional investors in the stock markets-"to sell 
127 Under the GLBA, a financial holding company can acquire shares in any financial or non-financial 
company as far as such shares are held by a securities affiliate, an insurance company-affiliated 
investment adviser, or an affiliate of such entities-- but not by a depository institution (or a subsidiary of 
it). See 12 U. S. C. § 1843 (k) (4). Further restraints, such as prohibiting a financial holding company or its 
subsidiaries from operating or managing the portfolio company, are imposed on a financial holding 
company's merchant banking power that are aimed to preventing "strategic investments" and restricting 
its capability to "capital appreciation and ultimate resale after a reasonable period of time". See Robin 
Maxwell and Margaret Paulsen, Equity Investments by Financial Holding Companies, 16 Journal of 
International Banking Law, 131,131-7 (2001) (citing 12 U. S. C. § 1843 (k) (4) and 12 CFR §§. 
225.170-6. ) 
128 Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act impose significant limits on the size and terms of 
transactions between banks and their non-bank affiliates. These restraints are applied to any portfolio 
company that is held by a financial holding company under its merchant banking power 
(i. e., over fifteen 
per cent or more of its total equity capital is directly or indirectly controlled by a 
financial holding 
company) as such portfolio company is presumed to be an affiliate of the financial 
holding company's U. S. 
bank subsidiaries. 12 C. F. R. §§. 371 c, 371c-1; Robin Maxwell and Margaret Paulsen, 
Equity Investments 
by Financial Holding Companies, 16 Journal of International Banking Law, 131,134 (2001). 
129 See Federal Reserve Board, Final Capital Rules for Non-financial Equity Investments, SR 02-4, (4 
March 2002). 
130 See Macey, supra note 103, at 465. 
131 Considering the example: "A bank holding company could cause a bank to make a loan to an 
unaffiliated corporation-a transaction to which §§ 23 
A and 23 [B] [of the Federal Reserve Act] would 
seem to have no application. Bur in exchange for the 
loan the borrower might agree to provide a line of 
credit to a nonblank affiliate of the bank's parent holding company. 
" See Macey, supra note 103, at 480. 
132 See Federal Reserve Board, Final Capital Rules for Non-financial Equity Investments, SR 02-4, para. 
6 (4 March 2002). 
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their shares at just the right time". ' 33 
The co-existence of banking and commerce under the same corporate roof is thus a 
genuine existence, so is the concern of intra-group spreading of risk from the 
commercial to the group's banking component. This is particular true when one 
considers the aspect of the markets. Sometimes referred to as reputational contagion, it 
is contended so far as market participants consider a financial holding company as an 
integrated entity (and it is justifiable for them to so perceive, given identical brand 
recognition, similar management and consolidated financial reporting), the idea of 
separating risk to prevent risk from transferring to the banking component remains 
implausible. 134 
This is more so for those jurisdictions such as Taiwan moving further and allowing 
banks (or the banking component of a holding company) to acquire equity interests of 
non-financial companies (by which the organizational firewall is removed). 135 As one 
leading banker rightfully put it, "it is inconceivable that any major bank would walk 
away from any subsidiary [including non-financial subsidiaries directly or indirectly 
controlled by the financial holding company via its merchant banking power] of its 
holding company. If your name is on the door, all of your capital and assets are going to 
be behind it in the real world. Lawyers can say you have separation, but the 
marketplace... would not see it that way. " 136 
b. Disparate Domestic Regulatory and Supervisory Responses 
The above-mentioned blurring boundary effect-the fading of distinctions between 
banking, securities and insurance, in terms of products, risks, institutions and 
markets-that derived from the trend of functional fusion and expanded affiliation 
133 See Macey, supra note 103, at 465. 
134 Indrek Saapar & Farouk Soussa, Financial Consolidation And Conglomeration: Implications For the 
Financial Safety Net, in FINANCIAL STABILITY AND CENTRAL BANKS: SELECTED ISSUES FOR 
FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS AND MARKET DISCIPLINE 82 (Bank of England, May 2000). 
135 Chinatimes (in Chinese) (29 May 2003), available at: 
htt: //news. chinatimes. com/Chinatimes/newslist/newslist-content/0 3546 110507+112003052900165 00. h 
tml. (Last visit: 12 June 2003) (Taiwan's Administrative Yuan (Cabinet) is proposing to list merchant 
banking as commercial banks' permissible business subject to certain gross revenue cap). 
136 See Macey, supra note 103, at 462 (citing the remarks made by Walter Wriston, the former chairman 
of Citicorp). 
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embroiling individual jurisdictions' banking and other financial sectors has been dealt 
with by individual economies' disparate policy contemplations and regulatory as well as 
supervisory responses. One strand of thoughts ran to the bottom as to the need of yet 
still placing bank safety and soundness as a regulatory objective. It was predicted banks 
will be re-integrated into the economy as a whole because they are no longer special. 
Along with it went the proposition of removing the safety-and-soundness regulatory 
objective and its peripheral institutions that include regulatory, supervisory and 
safety-net arrangements. 137 On this basis, it was argued the failure of a large and global 
financial institution like Barings should be considered as "part of a natural process in a 
competitive environment" 138 as were other business enterprises rather than merely a 
supervisory failure. 
This audacious proposition is nevertheless against what the regulators have come to 
term with financial-conglomerate regulation and supervision, which, either at the EU 
level 139 or under the US GLBA regime, 140 is yet still sit on the bank 
safety-and-soundness philosophy underpinning their previous sector-based regulations. 
It is also equally notable some new and varying developments that have been 
introduced by individual economies, particularly on the supervisory side, approaching 
this regulatory objective with strategies setting a disparate tone from the traditional 
137 Peter J. Wallison, The Gramm-Leach-Bliey Act Eliminated The Separation of Banking And Commerce: 
How This Will Affect The Future of The Safety Net, 36 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Annual 
Conference On Banking Structure & Competition 34 (2000). 
138 See Taylor, supra note 32, at 799. 
139 For example, at the EU level, the proposed EU Directive on supervision of financial conglomerates 
adopts a "solo-plus" approach. The basis of supervision is founded on the supervision of individual groups 
by their respective sector regulators on a solo basis. This solo supervision of industrial entities is then 
supplemented by a general qualitative assessment of the group as a whole and, among others, by a 
quantitative group-wide assessment of the adequacy of regulatory capital. Michael Gruson, Supervision of 
Financial Holding Companies in Europe: The Proposed EU Directive on Supplementary Supervision of 
Financial Conglomerates, No. 42, Essays In International Financial & Economic Law, 26-7, (The London 
Institute of International Banking, Finance and Development Law Ltd. ) (2002). 
140 At the post-GLBA era in the US, retaining safety-and-soundness of the depository institution (as 
opposed to other components consisting of a bank or financial holding company) is yet still the supreme 
objective that should be achieved by bank-holding-company supervision. The Federal Reserve Board 
underlined this pursuit by asserting it "will seek to determine that [financial holding companies] FHCs are 
operated in a safe and sound manner so that their financial condition does not threaten the viability of 
affiliated depository institutions .... 
The purpose of FHC supervision is to identify and evaluate, on a 
consolidated or group-wide basis, the significant risks that exist in a diversified holding company in order 
to assess how these risks might affect the safety and soundness of depository subsidiaries". Board of 
Governors of The Federal Reserve System, Framework for Financial Holding Company Supervision, para. 
8, SR 00-13 (SUP) (15 August 2000). 
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entity-based (dividing supervisory responsibilities among agencies by institution type) 141 
and point-in-time approach. These varying responses as will be further elaborated next, 
addressing domestic realities yet the global topic of effecting a regulatory structure able 
to ensure effective and efficient oversight over complex financial groups, essentially 
reveal the limitations of the ongoing, international processes concerning constructing 
standardized regulatory and supervisory treatments. '42 In this light, it is indeed true: 
"Globalization does not mean necessarily `global order'. To a large extent, to date at 
least, it has meant global disorder-not a global system, but a global non-system. "143 
In the United States, the hybrid type of supervision over financial industries is 
highlighted by the GLBA blending a function-based 144 division of supervisory 
responsibilities (which divides them by activity or product or service) into the traditional 
sector or institution based one. 145 Being reflective of the presence of a de facto two-tier 
banking, 146 it can also be seen the already implemented and still evolving LCBOs 
141 In the United States, the traditional entity-based regulatory and supervisory structure concerning 
different sectors of the financial industry was premised on the existence of relatively clear distinctions 
between their business lines. The products offered and risks borne by each sector were considered 
relatively easy to categorize, so were institutions easily distinguished and categorized into those that took 
deposits (commercial banks), sold securities (investment banks), and offered insurance (insurance 
companies). Accordingly, the businesses of banking, securities, and insurance were supervised as if they 
were separate industries, conducted by separate agencies along the institutional line. See Heidi Mandanis 
Schooner & Michael Taylor, United Kingdom And United States Responses To The Regulatory Challenges 
Of Modern Financial Markets, 38 Tex. Int'l L. J. 317,317 (2003). 
142 This convergence process has been spearheaded by the Joint Forum, a cross-sector international body 
established in 1996 under the aegis of three primary sector based international agencies, i. e., Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision, the International Organization of Securities Commissions, and the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors. For the Joint Forum's works, see e. g., Joint Forum on 
Financial Conglomerates, Supervision Of Financial Conglomerates (1999) (providing guidelines 
concerning capital adequacy, fit and proper rule, and supervisory information sharing over financial 
groups. ) 
143 See Joseph Norton, supra note 1. 
144 Subject to some important exception such as fiduciary activities, the GLBA removed the bank's 
exemption from the definitions of brokers and dealers under Federal securities laws so as to subject them 
to the supervision of the SEC rather than Federal bank agencies if they engage in securities brokerage. 15 
U. S. C. § 78c(a)(4)&(5) (2000) (new definition of broker and dealer). 
145 The GLBA's supervisory regime is not totally function based, but a functional and institutional 
combination. See Eugene Katz, Securities Activities, Merchant Banking And Functional Regulation Under 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 56 Consummer Fin. L. Q. Rep. 182,189-90 (2002) (summarizing the 
relevant provisions and noting even after the GLBA, such securities or non-core banking activities as new 
hybrid products, third-party brokerage arrangements, certain permissible securities transactions, trust and 
fiduciary services, stock purchase plan services, private placements, and asset-backed transactions that 
commercial banks directly engage in may still not fall into the functional areas, but remain to be 
supervised by Federal bank agencies. ) 
146 "At one end are the dozen or so large complex banking organizations whose size is measured in the 
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program concerning supervising the largest most complex banking organizations 
("LCBOs"). The program's stress on the resident supervision with a designated 
supervisory team interacting with these organizations' top management on a continuous 
basis concerning in particular these bank groups' design and implementation of 
risk-management and internal-control suggests the fundamental weaknesses of the Core 
Principles' point-in-time manner as to resulting in a satisfactory supervisory circle that 
can genuinely reflect these LCBOs' risk level. 147 
Replacing the generic term "banking" with the neutral one of "authorized" or 
"regulated" activity 148 and "financial" or "banking" institutions with "authorized 
persons" or "EEA firms" or "exempt persons", 149 the UK's radical reform made against 
the Core Principles' traditional regulatory framework under the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (FSMA)'50 and the secondary legislation thereof underscores the 
extraordinary length the boundary blurring effect could drive a major economy into so 
deep a terrain as to effect an overhaul on not just her supervisory but also regulatory and 
protective arrangements that go well beyond the parameters set by the regional (EU's) 
hundreds of billions of dollars. Some have assets in the range of one trillion dollars. At the other end are 
thousands of community banks, which typically have less than one billion dollars in assets. " See Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, News Release, Remarks by Chairman Don Powell ABA Annual 
Convention New York, F. D. I. C. PR- 101-04,2004 (4 Oct. 2004) (WL 2231523 (F. D. I. C. )); see also Joseph 
Norton, Conjuring An Elite Corps of Banking Institutions Within a Public Private partnership, in 
CORPORATIONS, CAPITAL MARKETS, AND BUSINESS IN THE LAW 394 (Theodor Baums ed., 
2000) (arguing, at both the international level and in the US context, a dominant trend towards the 
formation of the "public-private partnership" between governments, "elite" banking organizations and 
bank authorities in that regulation and supervision over those global bank organizations featuring complex 
activities and cross-border organizational structures have been to separate them into their own class and 
"subtly shift the regulatory and supervisory framework towards more of a `functional self-regulatory' 
framework". ) 
147 See chapter two 
148 See CRANSTON, supra note 7, at 7 (noting, under Schedule 2 of the FSMA, accepting deposits and 
home mortgage lending stands alongside investment banking activities as one class of regulated or 
authorized activities. ) 
149 See E. P. ELLINGER, E. LOMNICKA & R. J. A. HOOLEY, MODERN BANKING LAW 3 (3rd., 2002) 
(Under the FSMA, financial institutions are categorized into "authorized persons" that are authorized and 
regulated by the Financial Services Authority (FSA), "EEA firms" operating in the UK under their "single 
European passport", which are authorized by other EEA Member State as their home regulator and subject 
to the FSA's regulation only insofar as they operate in the UK, and "exempt persons", which are outside 
the FSA's jurisdiction. For original sources, see the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated 
Activities) Order 2001, S. I. 2001, No. 544; the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Carrying on 
Regulated Activities by Way of Business) October 2001, S. I. 2001, No. 1177; and the Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000 (Exemption) Order 2001, S. I. 2001, No. 1201. ) 
150 Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8 (Eng. ), available at 
hgp: //www. hmso. aov. uk/acts/acts2000/20000008. htm (last visited 20 May 2004). 
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convergence program. Created under the FSMA and on the supervisory side, the single 
or mega regulator, i. e., the Financial Services Authority (FSA), is unique-not only as it 
is a nearly universal regulator of the UK's financial services industry, featuring a 
unification of the prudential oversight of banking, insurance, and other investment 
services, but also for its mandate of regulating business conduct (concerning the way 
financial products are marketed and sold), an unprecedented case for even those 
economies adopting integrated financial regulators before the UK. 151 On the regulatory 
side, while a single authorization regime for all regulated activities has been in place, the 
developing single sourcebook or rulebook approach for all types of financial service 
business that will fundamentally overthrow the traditional sector-based regulatory 
thinking is particularly noteworthy. 152 Finally, the FSMA establishes a single Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme, which, applying to banks, building societies, insurance 
companies, and securities and investment firms, unifies the previously separate 
protective schemes distinguishing between bank depositors, insurance policy holders 
and securities investors in the terms of coverage. 153 
C. Particularities of Domestic Regulatory Environments: The Case of New 
Zealand 
Absent on-site banking examinations and key prudential restraints such as exposure 
limits, New Zealand's bank regulatory model diverges from the approach of the Core 
Principles even at a quick glance. Reinforcing the bank management's incentive on 
pursuing efficiency, this model is aimed for building a competitive, efficient and 
profitable banking system, which, instead of regulatory oversight, is primarily to be 
achieved by strengthening market discipline on banks through comprehensive public 
151 Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael Taylor, United Kingdom And United States Responses To The 
Regulatory Challenges Of Modern Financial Markets, 38 Tex. Int'l L. J. 317,331, note 88 and 
accompanying text (2003) (discussing some Scandinavian countries' integrated systems predominantly 
focusing on prudential concerns. ) 
152 Id., at 330. 
153 Id., at 332, note 89 and accompanying text. (noting the Financial Services Compensation scheme 
replaced previous protective schemes that include the U. K. 's past deposit 
insurance arrangements, which 
provided for coverage up to a maximum of ninety percent of the first 
£20,000, the schemes under the 
Financial Services Act of 1986 to pay compensation to customers of securities and investment firms for 
losses due to fraud or misrepresentation and the Policyholders' Protection Scheme established by the 
Insurance Companies Act 1972 aimed for meeting the liabilities of insurance companies to their 
policyholders in the event of a firm's insolvent liquidation. ) 
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disclosure requirements. 
It can be argued this dramatic departure from the old wisdom rests with two 
domestic factors: the absence of a government-sponsored deposit insurance scheme and 
the country's peculiar banking landscape dominated by foreign large banking 
organizations of global presence. 
1. Novelties of New Zealand's Approach 
The regulatory, supervisory and protective measures comprising the New Zealand's 
regulatory framework are unique, featuring: 154 
-- The non-existence of depositor insurance and protecting depositors is not the 
mandate of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the country's responsible body 
for banking supervision; ' 55 
-- The absence of on-site banking examinations; and since 1996: 
-- The removal of some key prudential rules such as exposure limits (on lending 
and open foreign exchange transactions) and internal controls guidelines; 
-- The emphasis on the monitoring function of the markets: banks' quarterly 
disclosure statements, which are quarterly published and include a brief Key 
Information Summery and a General Disclosure Statement, are provided to the 
general public rather than privately to the banking supervisor; and 
-- The stressing on the managements' accountability: disclosure statements are 
made under the bank directors' attestations, and their falseness or misleading 
could subject bank directors to severe criminal and civil penalties. 
Overall, New Zealand's approach goes to the heart of the prudential objective of 
the traditional model rather than merely works on its techniques. Enhancing the 
154 This passage is based on Christian Hawkersby, New Zealand's Approach to Banking Supervision: An 
Emphasis on Market Incentives and Accountability, Paper for the conference on "Rule, Incentives and 
Sanctions: Enforcement in Financial Regulation", London School of Economics (26 May 2000) 
(Unpublished manuscript on file with the author). 
155 While the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has no prudential mandate on safeguarding individual banks' 
safety and soundness status, for maintaining systemic stability measures such as entry requirements, 
resolutions for bank failures and minimum capital requirements remain at the Bank's disposal. Id. 
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market's disciplinary function aimed for pursuing efficiency or profitability has evolved 
as a regulatory objective, rather than a regulatory complementary measure. 
2. New Zealand's Regulatory and Industrial Particularities 
Suffice it to say that the New Zealand's regulatory model has been derived from her 
own regulatory and industrial particularities rather than an experience of universal 
applicability. The regulator's confidence in maintaining a stable bank system while 
largely forgoing intensive regulatory oversight might be based on two domestic factors. 
First, the absence of a government-sponsored depositor insurance regime has 
provided a healthy environment promoting depositor monitoring. Second, the fact 
New Zealand's banking system is dominated by large foreign banking organizations of 
global presence 156 might have led to a free riding effect that the New Zealand's banking 
regulator (as the host supervisor) is able to reap the home supervisor's effort in 
conducting global consolidation supervision over their constituent banking 
organizations' foreign establishments. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
The overall objective of this chapter is not to provide a comprehensive investigation into, 
let alone solutions towards, the issues raised, but simply to deliver one fundamental 
message. The dynamics of an individual economy's domestic banking factors 
(including its particular industry profile, its strength on financial innovation and its 
strategy for implementing cross-sector institutional integration and functional 
deregulation) implicating with a basically internationally converged bank 
safety-and-soundness regulatory framework are more than often economy-specific-and 
should be addressed that way. An economic-specific approach focusing on the United 
States will therefore be adopted from next chapter onwards. 
156 According to Hawkesby, there is only one very small domestically owned bank in the New Zealand's 
banking system. Id. 
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CHAPTER TWO - 
From Well-Capitalization to Well-Management: an Evolutionary and 
Defer-to-Regulator Process of Discerning Bank Safety and Soundness 
Concept 
The phrase "safety and soundness" is an ever-ambiguous term under the US bank 
regulatory framework. This phrase is, it seems, among the least discussed in the 
banking-law literature in a systemic and historic manner, although, paradoxically, its 
practical importance could never be overestimated as prudential regulation and 
supervision, in their entirety, actually revolve around the idea of safeguarding the safety 
and soundness of depository institutions. 
The chapter reviews and analyzes the evolutionary process of the concept of bank 
safety and soundness in the United States. It also addresses the forces that have 
pushed this progression and those changing institutional and market conditions this 
evolution has mirrored. By which it characterizes bank safety and soundness as a 
fundamental statutory and regulatory notion that is an evolving concept largely 
shaped by the bank regulators and regulatory practice and that is essentially an 
umbrella term to take into consideration all prudential regulations and related 
supervisory, examination and enforcement practices. More specific discussion of 
the bank management's safety and soundness regulatory duties, particularly in their 
corresponding to the bank management's fiduciary duties under state corporate law, 
will be dealt with in chapter four and chapter five of this text. 
Traditional wisdom often associated primarily well capitalization, together with 
some well-rated financial indicators, with the concrete contents of safe and sound 
banking to the extent capital adequacy regime was regarded as "the single most 
important set of rules and proposals in both international and domestic banking law". 
1 
This chapter argues, while today capital adequacy level might still serve some important 
regulatory functions, the depository institution's safety and soundness can be better 
1 See Raj Phala, Equilibrium Theory, the FICAS, and International Banking Law, 38 Harv. Int'l L. J. 1,21 
(1997). 
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maintained and promoted by recognizing capital deficiency being simply a symptom of 
a given modern-day banking crisis, with root causes to the institution's ailment lying 
elsewhere - usually the recipe of macro-economy deterioration and various forms of 
mismanagement such as imprudent risk-taking, internal-controls failure, or simply 
outright fraud. An acceptance of "managerial" safety and soundness as the core value to 
be sustained by prudential banking regulation and supervision provides significant help 
in reviewing the existing regulatory regime, as well as informing the suitable shape of 
its future. 
It will first in section one indicate why safety and soundness consideration is 
crucially relevant in banking regulation by initiating discussion from three different 
but related angles. It will then in section two consider some early evidence that the 
management factor played a supplementary role underpinning the supervisor's 
capital-based safety-and- soundness decisions. 
Then in Section three particular attentions are given to two sets of important 
regulatory mechanisms developed under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act (FDICIA): the Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) and the 
agencies' rule-making authority and their implementations. The elements of safety 
and soundness in general and of "managerial" safety and soundness in particular 
are then distilled, analyzed and assessed. 
The developing program relating to supervision over large and complex banking 
organizations (LCBOs) is the focus of the next part of this chapter. The discussion 
in Section IV sketches the basic framework of the LCBOs program, and highlights, 
to safeguard safety and soundness of these complex LCBOs' banking components, 
regulatory emphasis is predominantly on control and system rather than on various 
financial indicators as before. 
The concluding section of this chapter will indicate yet another repositioning of the 
contents of the idea of safety and soundness is now taking place. 
As the ongoing 
LCBOs program keeps its momentum, the pursuit for safe and sound 
banking 
promises in the future the well-management element will absorb and re-define 
the 
well-capitalization one rather than these two run parallel as they 
do now. 
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I. Bearings of Safety and Soundness of Depository Institutions 
Promoting safety and soundness of banks2 has long been the core policy objective to be 
achieved by US banking regulators. This type of regulation is designed to minimize 
bank failures and to protect depositors or deposit insurance funds. A number of reasons 
justifies regulating a private industry in such a loss avoidance manner. They form the 
special-status hypothesis underlying prudential banking regulation and supervision, 
which has been detailed in chapter one and will not be repeated here. This section then 
turns to the concept's practical regulatory implications in three contexts. 
A. Primacy of Financial Conglomerate Regulation and Supervision 
The safety and soundness consideration in the US is not just the primacy for supervising 
a stand-alone bank, but also the focal point for supervising a bank or financial holding 
company (BHC or FHC). This pursuit was underscored by the Federal Reserve Board by 
asserting the Board "will seek to determine that FHCs are operated in a safe and sound 
manner so that their financial condition does not threaten the viability of affiliated 
depository institutions.... The purpose of FHC supervision is to identify and evaluate, on 
a consolidated or group-wide basis, the significant risks that exist in a diversified 
holding company in order to assess how these risks might affect the safety and 
soundness of depository subsidiaries". 3 
2 The term "bank" used here includes a subsidiary of a bank holding company. 
3 Board of Governors of The Federal Reserve System, Framework for Financial Holding Company 
Supervision, para. 8, SR 00-13 (SUP) (15 August 2000). In another supervisory letter and to the similar 
effect of the SR 00-13, the Federal Reserve Board noted "[a] key premise of GLBA [the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act] was that sections 23A and 23B [of the Federal Reserve Act] would limit the 
risk to depository institutions from these broader affiliations and eliminate the need for extensive prior 
review by the bank regulatory agencies". Board of Governors of The Federal Reserve System, Adoption of 
Regulation W Implementing Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, para. 2, SR 03-2 (9 Jan. 
2003). In the post-GLBA environment, regulators of particularly large and complex banking organizations 
have been focusing on a number of tasks, of which are "... reconciling the need for markets to function 
effectively while protecting the deposit insurance fund and the safety net", and "... finding the proper 
balance between the objectives of protecting the depository institution subsidiaries of increasingly 
complex organizations and not imposing an unduly duplicative or onerous regulatory burden on the 
nonblank entities that are part of the consolidated organizations". See Mark Olson, The 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and Corporate Misbehaviour-Coincidence or Contributor?, remarks at the 
American Law Institute conference on the implementation of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Washington, 
D. C., (6 Feb. 2003) (transcript available on 
http: //www federalreserve gov/boarddocs/speeches/2003/20030206/default. htm ) 
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The Federal Reserve Board's position of underpinning bank safety and soundness 
with BHC or FHC regulation is actually a mirror image of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(GLBA) of 1999 4 under which a BHC's subsidiary depository institution's 
well-capitalized and well-managed status serves as a prerequisite for the BHC to convert 
its charter to a FHC5 and therefore enjoy powers of extensive permissible activities the 
group as a whole. 6 The starting point of considering banking safety and soundness 
under a conglomerate structure concerns the managerial incentive. Economically, the 
management of those complex organizations was suggested has the incentive to 
exploiting governmental subsidy? made accessible to the group's banking component 
through transactions between a bank and its affiliates that work to the favour of the 
bank's affiliates (and thus of the group) yet at the expense of the bank. 8 To deal with 
this, a variety of measures placing qualitative and quantitative restraints on transactions 
as such is in place and they all direct to the same policy objective; that is, such operation 
is not allowed as long as it poses a substantial threat to bank safety and soundness. 9 
4 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-112 (1999). 
5 12 U. S. C. §§ 1843 (I) (1)-(2). By the same token, if a FHC's depository institution ceases being 
well-capitalized and well-managed, the FHC would face sanctions, taking the form of conduct or activity 
restrictions or even a compulsory divesture of the bank subsidiary it controlled. 12 U. S. C. § 1843 (m). 
6A FHC may engage in, either directly or through subsidiaries, activities that the Federal Reserve Board 
has determined to be "financial in nature"; "incidental to such financial activity"; or "complementary to a 
financial activity" and posing no "substantial risk to the safety and soundness of depository institutions or 
the financial system generally. " Id. § 1843 (K)(1). For an extensive list of these permissible activities, see 
Macey, supra note 6, at 436-37. 
7 Governmental subsidy enhances credit standings of banks through credit backing of payment system 
assurance and discount window accessibility. This results in banks' competitive advantage over non-banks 
in debt markets. It also enables them to taking deposits with lower costs with the reassurance of the 
government-sponsored deposit insurance scheme that largely insulates depositors from being exposed to 
banks' default risk upon insolvency. As a result, depositors are willing to accept low returns on their 
deposits by charging risk premium that is far below they would have otherwise done should the deposit 
insurance not exist. See PATRICIA A. McCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL §4.02 (2nd ed., 2000). 
8 It is largely settled under a group structure the banking component is susceptible to heightened risk of 
self-dealings and other forms of abuses with the parent's heightened incentive to exploiting its banking 
subsidiary's cheap source of funds to finance the group's activities by effecting affiliate loans on irregular 
terms. See e. g., Macey, supra note 6, at 472-73. 
9 In this area, sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act and the Regulation W, the implementing 
rule, are the primary legal sources. Regulation W was adopted by the Federal Reserve Board on 12 
December 2002 and made effective shortly after on 1 April 2003. The statute and rule regulate inter-group 
transactions that are directly or indirectly involved with a bank subsidiary and its affiliate. The sheer scale 
of complexity brought along with this facet of prudential regulation is demonstrable. They impose 
quantitative and qualitative restraints on not only transactions whereby banks extend credit to, or engage 
in certain other activities (relating to, inter alia, derivatives, intraday credit, credit card and loan purchase) 
with, an affiliate or a non-affiliate that benefit an affiliate of the bank; but also, to some extent, 
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B. Pivotal Reference Point to Functional and Institutional Division of Financial 
Conglomerates 
The safety-and-soundness consideration of depository institutions also formulates the 
functional and institutional division inside a financial conglomerate. In the build-up to 
the enactment of GLBA, with the general consensus of allowing further combination of 
banking, securities, insurance and other financial related activities under an umbrella 
financial holding company and expanding beyond the pre-GLBA's "closely related to 
banking" product line, 10 the consideration of preventing losses in a financial component 
from spreading to a banking component led to a firewall arrangement that the banking 
subsidiary of a financial holding company is inhibited from being, either directly or 
through a "financial" subsidiary, engaged in some of the most risky non-banking 
businesses (such as insurance underwriting, issuing annuities, merchant banking, and 
non-financial activity of real estate development). r1 Instead, these non-banking 
financial activities are only allowed to be conducted by the bank's non-bank affiliates 
owned by a common holding company. ' 2 
Most intriguingly, while safeguarding safety and soundness of depository 
institutions remained the pivotal point commonly shared by the Federal Reserve Board 
(concurred by the FDIC) and the Department of Treasury, they actually adopted 
diametrically opposite grounds in associating this concern with the banking subsidiary's 
nonbanking powers-comparing to the current state of law, one for a more liberal 
treatment, and the other a more stringent one. 13 Consequently, the final form of the 
transactions between an affiliate of a bank and a financial subsidiary of the bank. See Board of Governors 
of The Federal Reserve System, Supra note 3, para 6-16. 
10 See McCoy, supra note 7, at §4.01 
1 Except for these prohibited businesses, under the GLBA, financial subsidiaries of national banks are 
permitted to engage in activities that the Treasury finds incidental but not complementary to financial 
activities, provided the bank remains highly safe and sound (well-capitalized and well-managed). 12 
U. S. C. §§24a (a)(2)(A)-(B), 1843(K)(7)(B). 
12 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-112, § 121 (a)(2) (1999); 12 C. F. R. §§ 5.39 (e)-(f). 
13 By emphasizing depository institutions' safety and soundness could be further enhanced by providing 
their subsidiaries with more freedom in conducting non-banking activities, the Treasury argued that "[a] 
subsidiary's earnings accrue directly to the benefit of the benefit of the parent bank, and help diversify the 
bank's earnings. More importantly, if the bank ever gets into trouble, the bank's depositors and the FDIC 
have a claim on the bank's ownership interests in the subsidiary; that interest can be sold to replenish the 
bank's capital or reduce the FDIC's loss. " Richard Scott Carnell, Straining Out Gnats and Swallowing 
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firewall arrangement between a parent FHC's bank subsidiary and the bank's own 
subsidiary discussed here is virtually a compromise between the grounds of the Federal 
Reserve Board and the Department of Treasury. 
C. Safety-and-soundness Enforcement Actions 
The significance of safety-and-soundness consideration hinges also on unsafe and 
unsound banking practices could trigger almost every official enforcement proceeding14 
against depository institutions, their parent holding companies, other affiliates and all 
these institutions' "institution-affiliated parties", which include officers, directors, 
employees, controlling shareholders and even certain professionals, e. g., attorneys, 
appraisers and accountants who participate in those unsafe and unsound practices. 15 
Based on a finding that an institution or institution-affiliated party has engaged in an 
unsafe or unsound practice the appropriate federal banking agency may issue a cease 
and desist order against an institution requiring it to cease certain actions and/or take 
corrective measures, 16 remove an individual from a banking institution and permanently 
ban that individual from banking, 17 terminate the deposit insurance of an institution, ' 8 
Camels: The Question of Subsidy to Subsidiaries of Banks, 35 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Annual 
Conference on Bank Structure and Competition 561 (1999). 
On the contrary, Federal Reserve was against the idea of providing depository institutions' subsidiaries 
with such freedom. Based on exactly the same safety-and-soundness grounds, it contended "... the losses 
that would accompany riskier activities from time to time would fall on the insured bank's capital if the 
new activities were authorized in bank subsidiaries. Such losses at holding company affiliates would, of 
course, fall on the uninsured holding company ... The potential 
for loss and bank capital depletion is 
another reason for urging that the new activities be conducted in a holding company affiliate rather than in 
a banking subsidiary". Alan Greespan, Testimony On H. R. 10 and Financial Modernization, Subcommittee 
on Finance and Hazardous Materials, Committee on Commerce, U. S. House of Representative, 28 April 
1999. (See also Macey, supra note 6, at 496-500) 
14 Under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA), as substantially amended by the enactment of the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) (Pub. L. No. 101-73 
Stat. 183 (1989)), the "appropriate federal banking agencies" may use a large variety of administrative 
enforcement powers addressing abusive banking practices that are regarded as unsafe and unsound against 
institutions and their affiliated parties. These powers include cease and desist orders (including orders for 
restitution, reimbursement or indemnification), removal from the office, prohibition from participation 
in 
the banking business, for now or the future or both, and civil money penalties. See 12 U. S. C. § 1818(a)(2), 
(b)(1), (e)(1)(A) & (i)(2)(A). The only formal enforcement action that will not be triggered by unsafe and 
unsound banking practice is the first-tier civil money penalties. 
15 See 12 U. S. C. §1813(u)(1), (2), (3). 
16 12 U. S. C. § 1818(b) 
17 12 U. S. C. § 1818(e). 
18 12 U. S. C. § 1818(a). 
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or place that institution in receivership. ' 9 
The breath and depth of the supervisor's safety-and-soundness based enforcement 
actions are further broadened and enhanced by the "gap-filler" capacity2° as accorded 
by Congressional delegation21 and judicial deference22 to the banking agencies. This 
gap-filler capacity manifests itself outside the boundary where legislations or regulations 
have clearly prescribed certain banking practices as unsound and unsafe23 as, outside 
those practices particularly earmarked as unsafe and unsound, the institutions and their 
affiliated parties are subject to the agencies' general safety-and-soundness vetting on a 
case-by-case and fact-by-fact basis. Safety-and-soundness concern as a generic concept 
therefore fills legislative or regulatory deficiencies as a universal test examining every 
material aspect of banks and their affiliated parties' activities by deriving content 
through application to specific circumstances. From the supervisor's standpoint, this 
certainly enhances its supervisory latitude to deal especially with newly emerging 
banking activities with risks that could hardly be expected beforehand. 
19 12 U. S. C. § 1821(c)(5)(H) 
20 See Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Fiduciary Duties' Demanding Cousin: Bank Director Liability For 
Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices, 63 G. WL. Rev. 175,187-189 (1995); see also Howell E. Jackson, 
Reflections on Kaye, Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers to Improve the Regulation of Financial Institutions, 66 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 1019,1043 (1993). 
21 Section 132 of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991("FDICIA"), for 
example, mandates and actually obliges federal banking agencies to publish safety and soundness 
standards for federally insured depository institutions. 
22US Courts have long recognized safety/soundness judgement as a matter of Congressional delegation. 
They also acknowledge special expertise demanded of the banking agencies warrants a high degree of 
deference from the courts to the agency. See e. g., Independent Bankers Ass'n of American v. Heimann, 
613 F. 2d 1164,1169 (D. C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 823. ("Absent a clear congressional 
expression to the contrary, the Comptroller is entitled to accomplish his regulatory responsibilities over 
unsafe and unsound practices both by cease and desist proceedings and by rules defining and explicating 
the practices which in his discretion he finds threatening to a stable and effective national bank system". ); 
Also see Lawrence G. Baxter, The Rule of Too Much Law? The New Safety/Soundness Rulemaking 
Responsibilities of the Federal Banking Agencies, 47 Consumer Finance Law Quarterly Report, 210,211, 
note 21 (1993) (citing cases, inter alia, Franklin Sav. Ass'n v. Director of Thrift Supervision, 934 F. 2d 
1127,1145-46 (10th Cir. 1991); First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F. 2d 674, 
688-89 (5fl' Cir. 1991)). 
23 The US Congress has specified certain practices as unsound and unsafe, for instance, failing to 
maintain minimum regulatory capital, or failing to obtain an independent, outside auditor for any fiscal 
year (as applied to insured credit unions). See 12 U. S. C. s 1464(s)(3)(Supp. V 1993) and the Federal 
Credit Union Act (12 U. S. C. s 1782 (a)(6)(B) (Supp. V 1993)). 
In a similar piecemeal manner, some areas were also identified in the federal regulation as susceptible to 
being unsafe and unsound, e. g., brokered deposits, standby letters of credit, insider loans and transactions 
with securities affiliates. See 12 C. F. R. §§337.2-337.6, and 12 C. F. R. 208.8 (Federal Reserve), 563.39 (a) 
(OTS). 
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II. Discerning Managerial Safety and Soundness: Early Evidence 
Safety and soundness was suggested by a leading commentator as the concept reflecting 
collectively an acceptable level of liquidity and stability for the banking system, or 
individually a desirable level as to financial health and proper management of banking 
organizations. 24 It was also noted, in the similar vein, "... safety and soundness 
represents a single concept- centred on financial health but often with overtones of the 
sort of prudential management practices needed to keep a healthy bank healthy. , 25 In 
other words, these arguments uphold the idea of safety-and-soundness consists of two 
distinct prongs: the one of well capitalization and of well management. It could also be 
implied quality of management should be judged in its own right rather than by having 
recourse and being subject to banks' financial strength. 
These two attributes of the safety-and-soundness concept as weighed equally as 
accepted and operated in today's US is nevertheless an evolutionary result that mirrors 
the phase-by-phase progression of banking regulation and, more fundamentally, of 
evolution of banking business. In fact, some early evidence actually revealed to the 
opposite that prudential management requirements were subordinated or supplementary 
to well-capitalization requirements. 
A. Solvency Related Safety and Soundness Enforcement under the FISA 
The early face of safety-and-soundness in the US could only be attributed to legislative 
history as a clear definition was intentionally avoided. During the enactment of the 
Financial Institutions Supervisory and Insurance Act of 1966 (FISA) (authorizing 
federal banking agencies26 to issue, among others, cease-and-desist order based on 
24 See JOSEPH JUDE NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY STANDARDS, xxvii 
at Prelude (1995). This definition seemingly incorporates systemic concern as referred to as "stable 
banking system" into the idea of safety and soundness. Arguably this system related topic is more often 
and likely to be the one under systemic-risk regulation, which concerns primarily the externality effects of 
banking failures. Discussions under or relating to the phrase "safety and soundness" hereinafter, therefore, 
will focus on the individual-institution level only. 
25 See Macey, supra note 6, at 275. 
26 12 U. S. C. §1813 (q) (defining the appropriate Federal banking agency for specific types of regulated 
entities). Namely, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) is the regulator for national 
banks; 
the Federal Reserve System for state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System and all bank 
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unsafe/unsound banking practices against the institution or the management), 27the 
memorandum written by John Home, the former Chairman of the abolished Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board, considered safety-and-soundness "... has a central meaning 
which can and must be applied to constantly changing factual circumstances. Generally 
speaking, an `unsafe and unsound practice' embraces any action, or lack of action, 
which is contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent operation, the possible 
consequences of which, if continued, would be abnormal risk or loss or damage to an 
institution, its shareholders, or the agencies administering the insurance funds" 28 
(emphasis added). Home's memorandum marked Congress' first and, up until now, only 
attempt to define the term unsafe or unsound practice. 29 
By mainly targeting solvency related activities that entail abnormal risk or loss or 
damage, clearly the regulator was intended to neutralize the Congressional concern of 
the term "unsafe and unsound" being so vague as to hardly signaling what conducts 
would have fell in its spectrum. 30 With Congress accepting this boundary set by the 
holding companies; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for state banks that are not 
members of the Federal Reserve System; the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) (established in 1989 
replacing the Federal Home Loan Bank Board) for savings and loan associations, some savings banks, and 
those savings and loan holding companies that are not also bank holding companies; and the National 
Credit Union Administration (NCUA) for federally insured state credit unions. 
The enactment of the GLBA added a new class of entities to the Federal Reserve's regulatory/supervisory 
domain--the financial holding company (FHC), converted from the qualified bank holding company. It 
also added a new oversight role to the Federal Reserve Board--the umbrella supervisor focusing on 
consolidated or group-wide oversight of the BHA or FHA. The introduction of umbrella supervision, 
however, does not change the pre-GLBA regime as to the allocation of regulatory/supervisory mandates 
among primary federal regulators as the GLBA "is not viewed as an extension of more traditional-like 
supervision throughout an FHC.... The GLBA did not alter the role of the Federal Reserve, as holding 
company supervisor, vis-ä-vis the primary supervisors of FHC-associated bank and thrift subsidiaries 
because the Federal Reserve has traditionally relied to the fullest extent possible on those supervisors". 
See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Framework for Financial Holding Company 
Supervision, SR 100-13 (SUP), (15 Aug. 2000). 
27 Pub. L. No. 89-695,80 Stat. 1028 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U. S. C. ). FISA 
empowered the agencies to issue cease and desist orders on the basis of finding unsafe and unsound 
practices. See 12 U. S. C. s 183lp-1 (Supp. V 1993). 
28 See Financial Institutions Supervisory and Insurance Act of 1966: Hearing on S. 3158 and S. 3695 
Before the House Comm. On Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1966); 112 Cong. Rec. 26, 
474 (1966) (memorandum submitted by John Home, Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board). 
This account was subsequently cited by court as the authoritative definition of an unsafe and unsound 
practice. See, for example, Gulf Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F. 2d 259, 
264 (5'h Cir. July 1981, cert. Denied, 458 U. S. 1121 (1982)). 
29 Thomas Holzman, Unsafe Or Unsound Practices: Is The Current Judicial Interpretation Of The Term 
Unsafe Or Unsound?, 19 Annual Review Of Banking Law, 425,427 (2000) 
30 Banking Law Manual § 13.03 [1] 
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banking agencies, safety and soundness under the FISA was fashioned with 
Congressional delegation (to the agencies) as the law deliberately avoided providing an 
explicit definition. 31 
The FISA's legislative background was also reflected by judicial decisions. In 
general, American courts acknowledge the existence of a clear Congressional delegation. 
Nevertheless, sizable cases did set a condition to the extent the agency's safety and 
soundness construction and enforcement could not go beyond targeting 
financial-integrity related practices; that is, practices that do not otherwise pose risk to 
the insurance funds should not be labeled as unsafe and unsound practices. For example, 
the court tended to reject the agencies' enforcement actions based otherwise on such 
grounds as customer protection 32 or maintaining financial institutions' fair 
competition. 33 Nevertheless, some early cases might have kept the agencies some room 
for maneuver as the agencies' safety-and-soundness judgments were regarded as 
predictive in nature. In other words, a forward perspective was allowed that a potential 
threat (the one posing a medium-to-long-term rather than an upfront and actual danger 
to the institution's financial integrity) would have been enough to make the case. 34 
In the hindsight, clearly ensuring "well management" of depository institutions was 
hardly envisioned by American Congress with the enactment of FISA of 1966,35 nor 
was it a judicially recognized supervisory mandate. Instead, under the FISA, ensuring 
financial health of the depository institutions so as not to jeopardize the financial 
standing of the insurance funds was the one to be dealt with in the name of safety and 
soundness. In other words, unsafe and unsound practices relate only to the risk of bank 
31 The then Representative Wright Patman made the following remarks: "[t]he cease-and-desist powers 
and management removal powers are aimed specifically at actions impairing the safety or soundness of 
our insured financial institutions. These new flexible tools relate strictly to the insurance risk and to assure 
the public of sound banking facilities. " See 112 Cong. Rec. 26,474 (1966). 
32 Gulf Federal Savings & Loan Assn v. FHLBB, 651 F. 2d 259 (5`h Cir. July 1981), cert. denied, 458 
U. S. 1121 (1982). 
33 Otero Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 665 F. 2d 288 (10th Cir. 1981). 
34 See First Nat'l Bank of Lamarque v. Smith, 610 F. 2d 1258,1264-65 (5th Cir. 1980); Independent 
Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 613 F. 2d 1164,1168-69 (D. C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 823 
(1980); Groos Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller of the Currency, 573 F. 2d 889,896-97 (5`h Cir. 1978). 
35 However, it should be noted the FISA did introduce the concept of fiduciary duty in the specific context 
of removal and suspension powers of bank management. Federal Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, 
Pub. L. No. 89-695, §202,80 Sta. 1046 (adding new subsection 8 (e) (1) to the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Act of 1950). 
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insolvency. 
B. Managerial Safety and Soundness as a Supplement to Capital-based 
Supervision 
Safety-and-soundness consideration has been closely associated with capital-based 
supervision. Despite in the US it was not until 1983 (the passage of the International 
Lending Supervision Act (ILSA))36 legislatively failing to comply with risk-and-asset 
based capital requirements alone would have been considered as unsound and 
unsafe, 37 capital-based regulation took its root as early as the beginning of twentieth 
century where a capital/deposit liabilities ratio was in place. 38 In the early age of capital 
regulation, the management factor played a supplementary part in determining the 
overall safety-and-soundness level of depository institutions. In 1972, Charles Van Horn, 
the then Regional Administrator of National Banks for the Second Region, made the 
following remarks regarding the OCC's position in capital adequacy: 39 
In evaluating capital adequacy, the Comptroller's Office considers the following factors: 
the quality of management; liquidity of assets; the history of earnings and of retaining 
thereof, the quality and character of ownership; the burden of meeting occupancy expenses; 
potential volatility of the banks' deposit structure, the quality of operating procedures; and 
the bank's capacity to meet present and future financial needs of its trade area, considering 
36 Pub. L. No. 98-181, Title IX, 97 Stat. 1278 (30 Nov. 1983), 12 U. S. C. §3901., et seq., (Supp. IV 1986). 
37 The ILSA requires each federal banking agency to "cause banking institutions to achieve and maintain 
adequate capital by establishing minimum levels of capital for such banking institutions and by using such 
other methods as the ... agency 
deems appropriate". "The agency may treat failure to maintain such capital 
as an unsafe and unsound practice warranting such enforcement action as a cease-and-desist order against 
the bank and its directors and officers" See 12 U. S. C. §3907 
38 In the late 1930s, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) advanced a regime based on 
capital v. total-assets ratio. One of the first risk-asset based regime was introduced in the examination 
practice as launched in 1952 by the Federal Reserve District Bank of New York that broke risk assets into 
various categories and assigned different risk variables accordingly (reporting Form "ABC"). In 1956, this 
capital-analysis approach was endorsed and adopted by the Federal Reserve Board and capital-liquidity 
analysis was added as a new element to the original formula. See Norton, supra note 24, at 47 (citing G . 
A. 
FREEMAN, THE PROBLEMS OF ADEQUATE BANK CAPITAL 11 (1952), G. S. VOJTO, BANK 
CAPITAL ADEQUACY Annex I& I1(1973) 
39 Prior to the emergence of banking holding companies in the 1970s following the enactment of Bank 
Holding Company Act 1956, national banks rather than bank holding companies are the dominant 
business form of banking business. As a result, OCC, rather than the Board of the Federal Reserve System, 
was the primary supervisor of banking industry. See Norton, supra note 24, at 48-49 (citing from 
American Banker, 2 Aug. 1972) 
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the competition it faces.... 
Only after weighing capital adequacy and asset quality is management assigned a 
rating... (Emphasis Added) 
In judging the quality of management, we take into consideration the overall condition of 
the bank, its liquidity position, its earnings compared with banks of similar size, the 
adequacy of its credit files, the effectiveness of collection efforts, the quality and 
distribution of the investment account, the adequacy of internal controls, the efficiency of 
operations, provision for management succession, and the bank's service of the 
community. 
This account suggests, in 1970s, management regulation remained secondary to 
capital regulation. Firstly, the composition of managerial quality or criteria to judging its 
desirability substantially embodied ratio-based financial indicators such as liquidity and 
earnings position. Secondly, judging managerial quality would have been deferred until 
the institution's financial strength had been decided-- "only after weighing capital 
adequacy and asset quality is management assigned a rating". The major reason of 
incorporating the management factor into the supervisory processes was probably to 
more aptly and qualitatively judging the institution's financial strength (capital 
adequacy). 
Drawn from the OCC's approach, the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System 
(UFIRS) was later adopted under the auspices of the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examinations Council (FFIEC) in 1979, which introduced the CAMEL (and since 
January 1997 CAMELS)40rating system that is used by state and federal examiners in 
evaluating the safety and soundness of banks and thrifts, and the BOPEC (or 
BOPEC/F-M) system, 41the rating system used by the Federal Reserve Board inspecting 
40 61 Fed. Reg. 67.021,67,024-29 (1996); 63 Fed. Reg. 66,351 (1998); 62 Fed. Reg. 3,779 (1997); and 62 
Fed. Reg, 752 (1997). Under this system, the state and federal examiners require to look at six 
components in evaluating the safety and soundness of banks and thrifts. They are (1) Capital adequacy; 
(2) 
Asset quality; (3) Management capability; (4) Earnings quality and quantity; (5) Liquidity; and (6) 
Sensitivity to market risk. The sixth component, added in 1996, focuses on the degree to which changes in 
interest rates, foreign exchange rates, commodity prices and/or equity prices can adversely affect in 
institution's earnings or capital. The 1996 revisions also put increased emphasis on risk management 
processes in the other five components and sought to clarity the application of all six components. 
41 The BOPEC rating system contains five components: (1) Bank subsidiaries' condition; (2) Other 
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bank holding companies and their affiliates. 
III. Upholding Managerial Safety and Soundness-the FDICIA and Its 
Implementations 
A. Background 
Upon the enactment of International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, failing to comply 
with capital requirements has been regarded as an unsafe and unsound practice on which 
the agencies' enforcement actions could be derived. However, the fundamental problem 
with capital-based safety and soundness regulation rests upon capital could only be a 
lagging indicator of problems. 42 The inherent time lags in detecting insolvency is due, 
among other things, to the basis of calculating regulatory capital is on the institution's 
historic instead of current values, which is particularly unreliable in volatile economic 
periods when the value of a bank's assets can change dramatically. 43 
Consequently, capital deficiency could well be simply the symptom of an ailing 
institution with the root causes to its ailment lying elsewhere. As widely recognized, the 
root causes of a given modern-day banking crisis are largely associated with the recipe 
of macro-economy deterioration and various forms of mismanagement-excessive 
subsidiaries' condition; (3) Parent company's condition; (4) Earnings on a consolidated basis; and (5) 
Capital adequacy on a consolidated basis. In addition to these five individual components, each bank 
holding company was assigned a composite rating, which represented the overall financial and managerial 
strength of the institution. For more background accounts of the BOPEC system, see Satish Kini, New 
Bank Holding Company Rating System Revises The Focus Of The Federal Reserve's Supervisory 
Practices, 121 Banking L. J. 784,185-87 (2004); see also Federal Reserve Board, Bank Holding Company 
Supervision Manual, §§4070.0-4070.1. 
Since 1 January 2005, the BOPEC has been replaced by the Federal Reserve Board with a new rating 
system, i. e., RFI/C(D), standing for Risk management, Financial condition, Impact, Composite, and 
Depository institutions, and replaced the BOPEC system. 
42 See Richard Scott Carnell, A Partial Antidote To Perverse Incentives: The FDIC Improvement Act of 
1991,12 Annual Review of Banking Law, 317,348-351 (1993) (noting the cases of forty-six large 
commercial banks failing between 1986-1990 in the USA that, despite only gradual declination of their 
book-value capital had been detected during the second and third years before these institutions' closure, 
these institutions were in fact economically insolvent throughout that time span). 
43 David A. Skeel, Jr., The Law and Finance of Bank and Insurance Insolvency Regulation, 76 Texas Law 
Review, 723,740 (1998) (note 72 and the accompanying text). 
It was also noted there are "seven sins" residing in the 1988 Capital Adequacy Accord set out by the Basle 
Committee-inaccurately micromanaging banking risks; inadequacy of the composition of regulatory 
capital; lacking any empirical justification in establishing the 8 percent capital ratio; falsely presuming 
equity other than debt better cushions banks' risks; failing to level the playing field among nations; 
ignoring the risk-reduction effects by diversification when measuring risk-based assets; and being too 
rigid to cope complexities of modern banking. See Heath Price Tarbert, Are International Capital 
Adequacy Rules Adequate? 148 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1771,1799-1800 (2000). 
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risk-taking, internal-controls failure, or simply outright fraud. 44 
In the US, dealing with mismanagement related problems was brought to the 
forefront of banking supervision in the wake of the 1980s banking crises45 that involve 
both savings and loan (S & L) and commercial bank industries. 460ne of the most critical 
legislations passed in the aftermath of the crises is the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA). 47 The FDICIA introduces two sets of 
mechanisms to controlling mismanagement of banking institutions. The first is the 
Prompt-corrective-action system that integrates the management factor into the revised 
capital regulation. The Act also accords the agencies with a rule-making mandate 
whereby a set of safety and soundness guidelines, whose locus is on the institutions' 
internal control and monitoring mechanisms, were published. 
The FDICIA's approach is unique as it is not just set against the institution (as do 
capital rules) but also directs towards the management, the persons taking charge of the 
institution. It is proactive in the sense the agencies are legally demanded to promptly 
detecting and correcting managerial flaws and replacing them with adequate and prudent 
practices. All these supervisory reactions are primarily triggered by unsatisfactory 
results of on-site safety and soundness examinations, and tied to a trip-wire system of 
capital classification. 
`4One leading commentator noted the root causes leading to the failures of five high-profile international 
banks as- 
"Hersatt failed because of fraudulent bookkeeping concealing exposed foreign exchange positions; 
Franklin National, because of a volatile wholesale deposit base and excessive speculation in foreign 
exchange markets; the Secondary Banking Crisis, because of the decline in the UK property market and a 
large wholesale deposit base for the unsupervised "fringe banks; " Ambrosiano from excessive concealed 
loss on foreign loans (which as a result did lead to a capital deficiency and insolvency) and serious gaps in 
prompt and effective international cooperation among the relevant national supervisory authorities; 
Continental Illinos, from imprudent international and energy lending practices and a volatile wholesale 
deposit base; and BCCI, from the outright worldwide fraud. " See Norton, supra note 24, at 32. 
45 The linkage between mismanagement and bank failures was obvious in this period. According to an 
OCC review (on the causes of national bank failures between 1979 and 1987), deficiencies in 
management were a contributing factor in 89% of the failures. Moreover, in 81% of these failures, loan 
policies were simply ignored or failed banks had no loan policies at all. See MICHAEL K. ONG, 
INTERAL CREDIT RISK MODEL- CAPITAL ALLOCATION AND PERFORMANCE MEASURE 12 
(1999). 
46 See Lawrence G. Baxter, Administrative And Judicial Review of Prompt Corrective Action Decisions by 
Federal Banking Regulators, 7 Administrative Law Journal of the American University, 505, note 2 and 
accompanied text (1993) (noting the magnitude of S &L and bank failures were so massive as to deplete 
and prompt an extensive recapitalization of the Federal Deposit Insurance Funds). 
47 FDICIA § 131 (a) (adding FDI Act §38,12 U. S. C. § 1831 o (Supp. IV 1992)). 
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B. Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) System 
As an attempt for the agencies stepping in at the first sight when problems emerge, 
FDICA provided the federal banking regulators must "take prompt corrective action 
[PCA] to resolve the problems of federally-insured depository institutions 
The PCA system, although widely recognized as a capital-based system, works 
actually two-way interactively for the criteria determining the level of activity 
restrictions and supervisory interventions are also drawn from non-capital factors, 
primarily the management factor. While unsatisfactory capital level would lead to 
gradually severe activity restraints and enhanced supervisory interventions, 
unsatisfactory management would lower the otherwise higher classified capital level and 
direct to the same result. Consequently, both unsatisfactory capital level and 
unsatisfactory managerial performance would invite more stringent regulatory measures, 
whose main targets are the incumbent top management, the corporate policies they make, 
and the corporate practices they are involved. 
1. Capital Classifications 
The FDICIA adopts three indicators, i. e., the total risk-based capital ratio, the Tier 1 
risk-based capital ratio and the leverage ratio, 49 to classify the first four categories 
(well-capitalized, adequately capitalized, undercapitalized, significant undercapitalized). 
Institutions are considered critically undercapitalized where their ratio of tangible equity 
so to total assets is less than 2 percent. 
2. Implications of PCA Classifications 
The main thrust of the PCA regime is the mandate given to the banking agency to 
exercise supervisory powers by making entrepreneurial-type decisions well before an 
5 institution is technically insolvent and subject to conservatorship or receivership. 1 PCA 
48 Id. (adding FDI Act §38 (a) (2), 12 U. S. C. §1831o (a) (2)). 
49 12 C. F. R. §§ 6.4 (a), 208.43 (a), 303.200 (a)(2), 325.103 (a), 565.4 (a). For definitions of those 
indicators, see 12 C. F. R. §§ 6.2 (d), (i), (k), 208.41 (c), (h), (j), 326.2 (k), (u), (w), 565.2 (c), (h), (j). 
50 12 U. S. C. § 1831o(c)(3)(B). 
51 See Lawrence Baxter, Fiduciary Issues in Federal Banking Regulation, 56 Law and Contemporary 
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classifications could positively impact on depository institutions that well-capitalized 
institutions would enjoy more business freedom and less stringent on-site 
examinations. 52 The capital categories, however, are mainly used for deciding activity 
restrictions and supervisory actions of increasing intensity as the institutions move from 
well capitalized downwards to critically undercapitalized categories. While some 
restrictions apply to all institutions, such as the restriction on capital distribution or 
management payment, 53 the majority of them apply only to the undercapitalized 
institutions. 
All undercapitalized institutions have to submit an acceptable capital restoration 
plan. 54Their activities are further restricted by limits on asset growth55 and the need to 
obtain prior regulatory approval for acquisitions, branching, and new lines of 
businesses. 56 Even at this early stage of capital deterioration, regulators may appoint a 
conservator or receiver for an undercapitalized institution that: (1) has no reasonable 
prospects of becoming adequately capitalized; (2) fails to submit a timely and acceptable 
capital restoration plan; or (3) materially fails to implement a restoration plan. 57 This 
early-closure capability suggests the need for the regulator to employing 
forward-looking strategy to the effect unredeemable institutions, i. e., institutions as 
objectively unsound or subjectively less compliance-minded, could be solved before 
their franchise value eroding further, thereby reducing the costs of deposit insurance 
funds. 58 
For significantly undercapitalized institutions, additional safeguards would be 
Problems 7,11, note 18 and accompanying text (1993). 
52 Well-capitalized institutions are permitted to accept brokered deposits. If these institutions are also 
well-managed and below a certain size, they are subject to less frequent on-site examinations. See 
FDICIA §131 (a) (amending FDI Act §29 (a), 12 U. S. C. §1831f (a) (Supp. IV 1992)); See also FDIC, 
Unsafe and Unsound Banking Practices, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,933-01 (1992) (implementing, as 12 C. F. R. 
§337, FDICIA §301) 
53 For example, all institutions, however satisfactory their capital level, are not allowed to make capital 
distribution (such as dividend payment or stock redemption) or management payment if, as a result, the 
institution would be undercapitalised. 12 U. S. C. §1831o (b)(2)(B); 12 U. S. C. §1831o (d)(1)(A); and 12 
U. S. C. §1831o (d)(2). Therefore, for undercapitalized institutions, capital distribution and management 
payment as such are not allowed to be made at all. 
54 12 U. S. C. §18310 (e)(2) 
55 12 U. S. C. §1831o (e)(3) 
56 12 U. S. C. §1831o (e)(4) 
57 12 U. S. C. § 1821 (c)(5)(k) 
58 See Carnell, supra note 42, at 341. 
71 
imposed. These include some mandatory measures that the agency must normally apply: 
sale of stock or subordinated debt or merger/acquisition for recapitalization; 59 
deprivation of the sister-bank exemption (under section 23 A of the Federal Reserve 
Act), 60 hence imposing a set of fully-fledged arm's length safeguards, i. e., 
percentage-of-capital restrictions, collateral requirement, and prohibition against 
acquiring low-quality assets; and restrictions on interest rates on deposits. 61 In addition 
to these mandatory measures, the appropriate federal banking agency has some other 
safeguards at their discretion. 62 
For a critically undercapitalized institution, which is likely already economically 
insolvent, albeit some marginal regulatory capital being maintained, the PCA system 
works for two policy objectives: protection of deposit insurance funds (by curtailing 
subordinated debtholders' claims); 63 and preparation for an orderly closure (the PCA 
provisions essentially assume such institution as already insolvent to counteract 
regulatory forbearance of continuously holding such institution as a going-concern). 64 
3. Non-capital Criteria of the PCA System 
Most notable, the FDICIA also factors non-capital criteria into the PCA's tripwire capital 
59 12 U. S. C. § 1831 o (f)(2)(A)(i), (iii). 
60 12 U. S. C. §371c (a)(1), (3), (c)(2), (d)(1). 
61 12 U. S. C. §1831f (e), (f)(2)(C)(i). 
62 The agency may further restrict the institution from transactions with affiliates, asset growth, engaging 
in overly risky activities, or accepting deposits from correspondent institutions. It can also demand such 
institution reducing its total assets, holding a new board election or employing new executive officers, or 
divesting its investments. More stringent restrictions could be further applied to the senior executive 
officer of such institution by the need to secure the agency's prior written approval before any bonus can 
be paid to or any rate of compensation increased for such officer. The agency at this stage could also 
deploy its far-reaching power to the upward effect of requiring the institution's parent bank holding 
company to obtain the Federal Reserve Board's approval before making any capital distribution, or even 
of requiring divestiture of affiliates of such institution. 12 U. S. C. §1831o (f)(2); 12 U. S. C. §1831o 
(f)(4)(A). 
63 Upon 60 days since being judged as critically undercapitalised, the institution is generally prohibited 
from making any payment of principal or interest to any subordinated debtholder. A grandfathering 
exemption is applied that subordinated debt outstanding on 15 July 1991, and is not extended or otherwise 
renegotiated after that date, is exempt from the general prohibition until 15 July 1996.12 U. S. C. §18310 
(h)(2)(A); § 1831 o(h)(2)(C). 
64 Upon the institution being judged as critically undercapitalised, within ninety days the agency must 
either appoint a conservator or receiver for the institution, or, upon the FDIC's concurrence, take 
alternative actions (after documenting why such alternatives would better achieve the purpose of section 
38). A determination to take alternative action would expire after 90 days, unless renewed, the agency 
must then appoint a conservator or receiver. 12 U. S. C. §1831o (h)(3)(A), 1831o(h)(3)(B). See also See 
Carnell, supra note 42, at 346-348. 
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classifications. The impacts of this treatment on bank management are enormous as they 
are now facing the regulator's safety and soundness challenges in the ordinary course of 
the bank's operation. Namely, banking agency is legally mandated to supplant the bank 
management's position and make entrepreneurial-type decisions for a bank whose 
financial standing is not only far from distressing but actually relatively sound. 
For example, an originally adequately capitalized bank that receives an 
unsatisfactory M (management) rating due to inappropriate internal controls and fails to 
mend it would be reclassified as an under-capitalized institution. As a result, such bank 
would not be allowed to distributing any dividend to shareholders, nor to paying any 
extra bonus and compensation exceeding the level offered at the point of the finding of 
internal control insufficiency to its senior executive officer. 65In other words, under the 
PCA system, theoretically bank management could no longer take coverage under a 
"satisfactory" regulatory capital level while the institution's managerial strength is 
indicated actually otherwise. More broadly, given the banking industry as being highly 
protected with immense public interests at stake, this is also yet another example that 
when a clash of interests happens between the shareholders pursuing wealth 
maximization and the regulators sustaining safety and soundness, the latter will prevail. 
And, in order to implement this prevailing goal, the banking regulator can go so far as to 
"reach deep into traditional preserves of bank management and ownership". 66 
C. Safety and Soundness Examinations and the PCA's Non-Capital Criteria 
Under the PCA, a depository institution would be downgraded to the next lower 
capital-classified category if the institution fails to meet safety and soundness standards 
or receives an unsatisfactory rating (or less) in its latest on-site safety-and-soundness 
examination report67 (and has not corrected the deficiency) for any of the four 
non-capital elements (asset quality, management, earnings, and liquidity) of the CAMEL 
65 12 U. S. C. A. §1831o(f)(4)(A). 
66 See Baxter, supra note 21, at 210. 
67 According to section 111 of the FDICIA, each appropriate federal banking and thrift agencies 
has to 
conduct a full scope, on-site examination for ensuing safety and soundness of 
federally insured depository 
institutions under their supervision at least once during each twelve month period. See Federal 
Reserve 
System, The Federal Reserve System's Definition of a Full Scope, On-site Examination for Safety and 
Soundness, SR 94-12 (FIS), para 1&5 (24 February 1994). 
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rating. 68 Nevertheless, it would be misleading by taking the statutory word at face value 
as these four non-capital factors actually carry different weight. From the examiner's 
viewpoint, sound management of the institution has reached the forefront as a matter of 
safe and sound banking. 
On 20 December 1996, the Federal Reserve Board adopted the revision of the 
Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System (UFIRS), which came into force on 1 
January 1997. Of the major measures this new system brought on board is a reference 
requirement to the quality of the management factor when examiners assign composite 
ratings to other three components that "... the descriptions [of composite and component 
rating] accompanying each component... [should] reflect in the rating management's 
ability to identify, measure, monitor, and control risks". 69 
The techniques used in conducting on-site safety-and-soundness examinations also 
reveal the predominant position of the management component in today's banking 
examination. In this respect, there is an obvious shift of emphasis, moving away from 
targeting portfolio towards management. As manifested by the Federal Reserve Board, 
historically heavily relied "transaction testing procedures" in safety-and-soundness 
examinations that were conducted by reviewing, among other things, a high proportion 
of commercial and industrial and commercial real estate loans in order to evaluate the 
adequacy of the credit administration process and to assess the quality of loans, have 
been regarded as insufficient to keep abreast with banking organizations' ability to 
swiftly reposition their portfolio risk exposures. 70 As a result, to the extent the 
examiners could be reassured that the examined institution is under sound management, 
i. e., sound internal risk management and internal controls, additional transaction testing 
68 12 U. S. C. §1818 (b)(8), 1831o(g). 
69 See Federal Reserve Board System, Uniform Financial Rating System, SR 96-38 (SUP), para 5 (27 
December 1996). 
Another earlier SR letter from the Federal Reserve Board was to the same effect that "the 
definition [of a 
full-scope, on-site safety and soundness examination] emphasizes assessing management's performance 
as regards internal controls and compliance with laws and regulations. " See Federal 
Reserve System, The 
Federal Reserve System's Definition of a Full Scope, On-site Examination for Safety and Soundness, SR 
94-12 (FIS), para 5 (24 February 1994). 
70 See Federal Reserve System, Risk focused Safety and Soundness Examinations and Inspections, SR 
94-14 (SUP), para 7-9 (24 May 1996). 
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would be substantially reduced. " 
D. Safety and Soundness Standards 
1. Safety and Soundness Rule-Making and the PCA Connection 
As a reaction to the widespread phenomena of mismanagement directly leading to the 
bank and thrift crisis of 1980s, section 39 ("section 39") of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act72 was added by section 132 of the FDICIA73 that instructed each 
federal banking agency to prescribe certain safety and soundness standards by regulation 
or guideline, 74 applying across the board to all federally insured depository institutions. 
In contrast with the traditional regulatory approach emphasizing transaction-based, and 
mostly one-formula-for-all restraints such as lending limits, 75 this section 39 regime 
stressed the need of, institution-based, an appropriate level of internal risk-management 
strength, as revealed by the three types of standards the regulator was mandated (and 
statutorily demanded) to prescribe: 76 (1) operational and managerial standards; 77 (2) 
standards regarding asset quality, earnings, and stock valuation "that the agency 
determines to be appropriate"; and (3) compensation standards. 7g 79 
71 See Federal Reserve System, Risk focused Safety and Soundness Examinations and Inspections, SR 
94-14 (SUP), para. 9 (24 May 1996). 
72 12 U. S. C. 183lp-1. 
73 Pub. L. No. 102-242,105 Stat. 2236 (1991). 
74 Codified as amended at 12 U. S. C. A. §1831p-1. This clause was amended by the Riegle Community 
Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 to apply solely to federally insured banks and 
thrifts, exempting holding companies of these depository institutions and allowing the agencies' 
prescriptions taking a looser form of guideline rather than regulation. See Pub. L. No. 103-325,108 Sta. 
2160 (1994) 
75 See McCOY, supra note 7, at §6.04. 
76 For general background, see Paul A. Schott, FDICIA-mandated Safety and Soundness Standards Pose 
Compliance Burden, 16 Banking Policy Report 6 (1995). 
77 Section 39 (a) requires the agencies to establish standards relating to: (1) internal controls, information 
systems and internal audit systems according to section 36 of the FDI Act (12 U. S. C. 1831m); (2) loan 
documentation; (3) credit underwriting; (4) interest rate exposure; (5) asset growth; and (6) compensation, 
fees, and benefits, according to subsection (c) of section 39. See 12 U. S. C. § 1831p-1(a). 
78 See 12 U. S. C. § 1831p-1 (b). Based on the latter discretionary phrase, the agencies declined to set any 
guideline regulating stock valuation. See 61 Fed. Reg. 43,948 (1996); 60 Fed. Reg. 35,674,35,677 (1995). 
79 The agencies are required to prescribe standards prohibiting as an unsafe and unsound practice any 
employment contract, compensation or benefit agreement, perquisite, stock option plan, post-employment 
benefit, or other compensatory arrangement that (1) would provide any executive officer, employment, 
director, or principal shareholder of the institution with excessive compensation, fees or benefits; or (2) 
could lead to material financial loss to the institution. Furthermore, when compensation is considered 
excessive (and thus unsafe and unsound) is a matter to be specified by the agencies. See 12 U. S. C. § 
75 
In connection with the PCA regime, Section 39 violation can create some 
immediate effects. In the event an agency determines that an institution fails to meet any 
one of the section 39 agency-made standards, the agency may immediately pursue the 
PCA mechanism against the institution at question. The agency may demand the 
institution to submit an acceptable plan in a timely manner to achieve compliance with 
the standard; 80 if the institution fails to do so or fail to demonstrate satisfactory 
implementation, the agency then must issue an order requiring the institution to correct 
the deficiency. 8' Until the deficiency has been corrected, the regulator is again obliged 
to impose a prompt corrective order restricting asset growth, requiring infusion of 
capital or otherwise order action that will better ensure the institution's safety and 
soundness. 82 
Apart from the enforcement connection, the section 39 regime could be linked to 
the PCA in their evolving the managerial element of the regulatory idea of safe and 
sound banking. To the extent certain managerial indicators that were incorporated, 
alongside those of capital ones, into the PCA regime's early intervention mechanism had 
provided some clues that the managerial side of bank safety and soundness 
consideration was indeed present and recognized, the section 39 
regimes-approximating to some core managerial functions without even mentioning 
the capital side of consideration-offered a definitive testament to this observation. 
Ultimately, the underlying policy consideration shared by both could well be the belief 
that banking safety and soundness can be better protected should the regulators be 
capable of "identifying and addressing problems at insured depository institutions before 
capital becomes impaired". 83 
1831p-1 (c). 
80 12 U. S. C. § 1831p-1(e)(1). 
81 12 U. S. C. § 1831p-1(e)(2); 12 C. F. R. §§ 30.4(d), 206.303 (d), 308.303 (d), 570.3 (d). 
82 Id. 12 C. F. R. §§30.4 (d), 163.303 (d), 308.303 (d), 570.3 (d). In the case a section 39 prompt corrective 
order is not complied by the institution, apart from activity restriction, the agencies can also opt 
for 
imposing monetary penalties against the institution and any "institution-affiliated party" that 
includes 
bank management. 
83 C. F. R. § 364.101 App. B. vi. 
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2. Safety and Soundness Guidelines 
In compliance with this statutory requirement, federal banking regulators jointly 
published their final safety and soundness guidelines on 10 July 1995, entitled 
"Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safety and Soundness" (the 
"Guidelines"). 84 
a. Compensation Standard 
The Guidelines are rather loose in substance. The only area the Guidelines explicitly and 
substantively refer to as unsafe and unsound is regarding the level of compensation paid 
to management or principal shareholders. While compensation leading to a material loss 
to an institution clearly constitutes an unsafe and unsound practice, 85 the Guidelines 
works to the same effect as does section 39 and prescribed "excessive"86 compensation 
alone that does not endanger the institution's solvency or its adequate regulatory capital 
level will also be considered as an unsafe and unsound practice. 87 By clear statutory and 
regulatory pronunciations, an unsafe and unsound banking practice could therefore (to 
say the very least in this compensation area) totally detach itself from the capital side of 
consideration. This inference -a crucial pointer in conceptualizing the bank safety and 
soundness idea - will be revisited later in this chapter. 
b. Operational and Managerial Standards 
For the Guidelines' other managerial and operational areas, one can hardly detect any 
explicit unsafe-and-unsound parameter such as "excessive" (albeit even this adjective is 
far less than concrete) as used in the compensation part but only some principles or 
policy objectives to be followed or achieved when the institution is building up and 
84 12 C. F. R. § 364.101 App. B. 
85 Id., at III. B. 
86 Compensation will be considered excessive if amounts paid to the services are unreasonable or 
disproportionate. A number of factors are to be considered, and the institution's financial condition is only 
one of them. The others are: (A) the combined value of all cash and noncash benefits provided to the 
individual; (B) the compensation history of the individual and other individuals with comparable expertise 
at the institutions; (C) comparable compensation practices at comparable institutions, 
based upon such 
factors as asset size, geographic location, and the complexity of the loan portfolio or other assets; (D) 
for 
postemployment benefits, the projected total cost and benefit to the institution; 
(E) any connection 
between the individual and any fraudulent act or omission, breach of trust or fiduciary duty, or insider 
abuse with regard to the institution" 12 U. S. C. §1831p-1(c)(2)(A)-(F); and 60 Fed. 
Reg. 35,674, Appendix 
III (1995) (Codified in 12 C. F. R. § 364.101 App. B. III. A. ) 
87 See supra note 84, at III. A. 
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maintaining their own various control and monitoring systems. The standards regarding 
"internal controls and information systems", for example, are set out as (A) establishing 
clear lines of authority and responsibility for monitoring adherence to established 
policies; (B) effective risk assessment; (C) timely and accurate financial, operational and 
regulatory report; (D) adequate procedures to safeguard and manage assets; and (E) 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 88 This formula is repeatedly used in 
the areas of internal audit system; 89 loan documentation; 90 credit underwriting; 9' 
interest rate exposure; 92 and asset growth. 93 Methods for achieving those objectives are 
then left to each institution's cost-benefit analysis, self-tailoring to fit in with the size of 
the institution and the nature, scope and risk of its activities. 94 
88 12 C. F. R. § 364.101 App. B. II. A. 
89 A prudent internal audit system consists of the following elements: adequate monitoring of the system 
of internal controls through an internal audit function; independence and objectivity; qualified persons; 
adequate testing and review of information systems; adequate documentation of tests and findings and any 
corrective actions; verification and review of management actions to address material weakness; and 
review by the institution's audit committee or board of directors of the effectiveness of the internal audit 
systems. 12 C. F. R. § 364.101 App. B. II. B. 
90 Loan documentation practices are expected to attain the following objectives: enable the institution to 
make an informed lending decision and to assess risk on an ongoing basis; identify the purpose of a loan 
and the source of repayment, assess the ability of the borrower to repay the indebtedness in a timely 
manner; ensure that any claim against a borrower is legally enforceable; demonstrate appropriate 
administration and monitoring of a loan; and take account of the size and complexity of a loan. 12 C. F. R. 
§ 364.101 App. B. II. C. 
91 Prudent credit-underwriting look into the following aspects: commensurate with the types, terms of 
loans and conditions under which they will be made; consider the nature of the markets in which loans 
will be made; provide for consideration, prior to credit commitment, of the borrower's overall financial 
condition and resources, the financial responsibility of any guarantor, the nature and value of any 
underlying collateral, and the borrower's character and willingness to repay as agreed; establish a system 
of independent, ongoing credit review and appropriate communication to management and to the board of 
directors; take adequate account of concentration of credit risk; and are appropriate to the size of the 
institution and the nature and scope of its activities. 12 C. F. R. § 364.101 App. B. II. D. 
92 The objective demanded is periodic reporting with adequate information along the chain of command 
to top management and the board for their assessment as to the the level of risk. 12 C. F. R. § 364.101 App. 
B. II. E. 
93 A prudent strategy regarding asset growth should consider: the source, volatility and use of the funds 
that support asset growth; any increase in credit risk or interest rate risk as a result of growth; and the 
effect of growth on the institution's capital. 12 C. F. R. § 364.101 App. B. II. F. 
94 Except for the compensation part where parameters of safety and soundness are to some extent 
indicated by the federal regulators, every other part of the Guidelines contains the sentence "[a]n 
institution should have ... systems that are appropriate to the size of 
the institution and the nature, scope 
and risk of its activities... ", or the like to the same effect. 
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E. Interim Observations and Comments: 
1. Balance Striking 
The Guidelines are a set of enabling rather than binding rules. Federal agencies can 
decide whether or not to take a Guidelines violation as an unsound and unsafe banking 
practice95 and, if they do, the PCA and a variety of enforcement mechanisms would be 
at their disposal against the institution or any institution-affiliated party. As explicitly 
stated by the agencies, the converse is also true; compliance with the guidelines does not 
prevent the agencies otherwise deciding the institution or any institution-affiliated 
party's engagement with an unsafe and unsound practice. 96 The Guidelines provides no 
"safe harbour" arrangement that would allow institutions to submit their internal control 
and monitoring plans to the regulator's approval and therefore enjoy immunity. It 
therefore entails various undesirable effects, those commonplaces flowing from 
ambiguity of regulation. For one thing, even with the publishing of the Guidelines, 
bankers will still have to pay close attention to the regulators' safety and soundness 
pronunciations embedded in individual enforcement actions or other forms of regulatory 
paper that are issued on an ad hoc basis if they are to keep abreast with the regulator's 
pace as to the permissible scope of banking activity. In this regard, the passage of the 
Guidelines renders little in terms of alleviating compliance burdens and risks on 
bankers. 97 
This general approach that emphasized objectives or general criteria as opposed to 
any definitive substance except, perhaps, in the area of compensation was, however, 
originated from the industry's strong recommendation. Moreover, regulators' attempt to 
strike a balance--illuminating only the core value and framework pertaining to sound 
management under the overall safety and soundness regulation while leaving room for 
(hence preserving) the private sector's innovation in developing techniques of risk 
management - is no doubt based on a right conviction of the need 
for private-sector 
95 12 C. F. R. § 364.101 App. B. III. 
96 Id 
97 Both before and after the passage of the Guidelines, the persistence of enormous safety and soundness 
based enforcement discretion placed in the hands of the banking agency 
is the primary source of this 
compliance risk that "innocent violations" can lead to government 
interventions or other severe legal 
consequences. McCOY, supra note 7, at § 6.02[2] 
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regulatory complements. 98 Uncertainty is probably the cost that must be paid if this 
formula is to be followed. 
Nonetheless, the complementary formula provided in the Guidelines that delegates 
the concrete substance of an institution's internal risk management to its own 
"cost-benefit" analyses entails one major problem. Nowhere do the Guidelines compel 
the banking organization considering regulatory concerns when conducting cost-benefit 
analysis. Considering the profit-seeking (or cost-saving) tendency of any given private 
enterprise, weighing in the costs of such externalities as the potential loss to the deposit 
insurance fund can be therefore very much an option to be "rationally" excluded by the 
institution's management in the process of deliberation. From a safe and sound 
perspective, a self-tailored version of an institution's control or information or other 
such mechanisms concerning internal risk management can be much likely a diluted one, 
comparing to what expected by the banking agency. 99 
2. Managerial Element of Safety and Soundness as Independent 
Safety-and-soundness Prong alongside Financial Element 
One virtue of the section 39 Guidelines was suggested as the effect of shifting prudential 
regulation "from ad hoc supervision to generalized standards". 
100 Despite these 
98 A regulatory regime encouraging innovation is indispensable to enhancing the ability of the regulated 
to promptly reacting to the ever-changing risks in today's marketplace. One good example of financial 
innovation in this regulatory sense is the wide-ranging development of financial derivatives permeating in 
some of the most developed economies in recent years that has tremendously contributed to risk 
dispersion. By demonstrating the great resilience American financial institutions exhibited in responding 
to the boom-and-bust telecom sector, Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of Federal Reserve Board, noted as 
follow: 
"One prominent example is the response of financial markets to a burgeoning and then deflating 
telecom sector. Worldwide borrowing by telecom firms in all currencies amounted to a trillion US 
dollars 
during the years 1998 to 2001.... At the time, the financing of these investments [made by the telecom 
firms] was widely seen as prudent because the telecom borrowers had very high valuations 
in equity 
markets that could facilitate a stock issuance, if needed, to take down bank loans and other 
debts. In the 
event, of course, prices of telecom stocks collapsed, and many firms went bankrupt. 
In decades past, such 
a sequence would have been a recipe for creating severe distress in the wider 
financial system. However, a 
significant amount of exposure to telecom debt had been laid off through instruments that mitigate credit 
risk, such as credit default swaps, collateralised debt obligations, and credit-link notes. 
Taken together, 
these instruments appear to have significantly reduced telecom loan concentrations and the associated 
stress on banks and other financial institutions. " See Alan Greenspan, 
Speech Delivered at Lancaster 
House, London on 25 September 2002, TIMES (London), 27 September 2002, at 30 2w. 
99 McCOY, supra note 7, at § 6.02 [1]. 
100 See Baxter, supra note 21, at 218. 
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regulator-pronounced standards are by no means definitive, they did indeed provide 
some essential clues as to the elements of bank safety and soundness. It is worthy noting 
again the crucial importance of the regulator's stance when interpreting the "safety and 
soundness" idea, a regulatory term deliberately left ambiguous by Congress: "Absent a 
clear congressional expression to the contrary, the Comptroller [the regulator of national 
banks] is entitled to accomplish his regulatory responsibilities over unsafe and unsound 
practices both by cease and desist proceedings and by rules defining and explicating the 
practices which in his discretion he finds threatening to a stable and effective national 
bank system". 101 On this basis and as enshrined in the Guidelines the clear detachment 
of management from financials, safe and sound banking should be indicated not only by 
a reference to an institution's sound financial condition (such as adequate regulatory 
capital level) but also by independently relating to its sound managerial strength. This 
proposition could be also supported by the PCA regime's factoring non-capital criteria 
into the foundation that derives proactive supervisory actions. 
As a result, while an unsafe and unsound banking practice is referred commonly by 
regulators and courts as "[a]ny conduct that is contrary to generally accepted standards 
for prudent bank operations and that, if continued, might result in abnormal risk or loss 
or damage to the bank", 102 such conduct should not be limited to one that would have "a 
101 Independent Bankers Ass'n of American v. Heimann, 613 F. 2d 1164,1169 (D. C. Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 823; see also Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defence Council, Inc., 467 
U. S. 837,843 (1984) (ruling judicial deference is rendered to any reasonable agency interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute where the agency has primary administrative responsibility for the statute); First State 
Bank v. FDIC, 770 F. 2d 81,82 (adopting the arbitrary and capricious standard) (6`h cir. 1985); Sunshine 
State Bank v. FDIC, 783 F. 2d 1580,1582-84 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating the agency's judgments in 
appropriateness of classifying loans are entitled to significant deference given the expertise of bank 
examiners). 
Absent explicit Congressional expressions, the court defers to the regulator not only in terms of statutory 
interpretations but also factual findings in the process of enforcement actions. A judicial review reversing 
an enforcement order issued by the banking agency on the safety and soundness ground, therefore, 
happens only when the court finds either the enforcement action is not supported by substantial evidence 
or it is otherwise arbitrary and capricious. 5 U. S. C. § 706 (2)(E) (providing findings of fact must be 
respected unless they are "unsupported by substantial evidence"); 5 U. S. C. § 706 (2)(A) (providing the 
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse discretion" as the judicial review standard). 
102 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, THE DIRECTOR'S BOOK, THE ROLE 
OF A NATIONAL BANK DIRECTOR 64 (1987). A number of cases stated to the same effect, "conduct 
deemed contrary to accepted standards of banking operations which might result in abnormal risk or loss 
to a banking institution or shareholder". see e. g., First Nat'l Bank of Eden v. Department of the Treasure, 
OCC, 568 F. 2d 610,611 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Northwest Nat'l Bank v. United States, 917 F. 
2d 1111,1115 (8`h Cir. 1990). 
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reasonably direct effect on an [institution's] financial soundness"' 03 or "threaten the 
financial integrity of the [institution]" 104 as suggested by some earlier cases and 
commentators. 105 The "direct financial effect" addition obviously runs counter to the 
position of the Guidelines and the statements expressed by federal banking regulators in 
numerous explanatory letters or enforcement orders published or issued under 
Congressional delegation and judicial deference. 106 This line of thought is hardly 
sustainable also because of a more fundamental reason. The financial effect restraint is 
against the underlying policy on which the FDICIA regime was established-the policy 
of enabling supervisors to step up early rather than late, to identify and deal with 
problems before the institution's financial standing becomes impaired. 107 FDICIA, as a 
regime directly responding to the late 1980s' thrift crisis, therefore represents a shift on 
regulatory and supervisory emphases- from saving the industry to "changing the way it 
conducted business". 108 
103 See Gulf Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F. 2d, 259,264 (5`h Cir. 1981), 
cert. denied, 458 U. S. 1121 (1982). 
104 See Id. at 267. 
105 See e. g., Heidi M. Schooner, Refocusing Regulatory Limitations On Banks' Compensation Practices, 
37 B. C. L. Rev., text accompanying note 45-50 (1996); and Heidi M. Schooner, Fiduciary Duties' 
Demanding Cousin: Bank Director Liability For Unsafe and Unsound Banking Practices, 63 George 
Washington Law Review, 177,202 (1995); see also Holzman, supra note 29, at 427 (noting the disparity 
of opinions held by circuit courts over if or not an adverse financial effect (as opposed to a potential risk) 
is a prerequisite to constitute an adverse banking practice). 
106 Without any reference to financial loss, the Federal Reserve Board has reiterated ideas such as 
"[s]erious lapses or deficiencies in internal controls, including inadequate separation of duties, can 
constitute an unsafe and unsound practice... " and "[a]n institution's failure to establish a management 
structure that adequately identifies, measures, monitors, and controls the risks involved in 
its various 
products and lines of business has long been considered unsafe and unsound conduct". See Board of 
Governors of The Federal Reserve System, Rating the Adequacy of Risk Management Processes and 
Internal Controls at State Member Banks and Bank Holding Companies, para 7& para 1 of Attachment. 
SR 95-51 (SUP) (14 Nov. 1995). 
107 See, inter alia, Laura Pringle, Safety And Soundness Standards and Bank Officer 
And Director 
Responsibility, 27 Oklahoma City University Law Review, 1017,1020-2 (2002). 
The idea that the presence of a direct financial effect on the institution as a prerequisite for constituting an 
unsafe and unsound practice can be also rejected on the ground of the FIRREA 
based enforcement actions. 
It can be argued while the statutory language provides a removal order needs not only a 
finding of unsafe 
and unsound practice but the "resultant effect", i. e., the bank has suffered or will probably suffer 
substantial financial loss, a cease and desist order as provided by law needs nothing 
further than an unsafe 
and unsound practice. Evidently, the wording structure of the 
law indicates a direct financial effect, as a 
resultant effect, was not intended by the lawmaker as an indispensable component of an unsafe and 
unsound banking practice. See Holzman, supra note 29, at 434-35 
(note 50-2 and accompanying text). 
108 See James Pitts & Eric Bloom, FDIC/RTC Suits Against Bank And Thrift Officers And Directors- Why 
Now, What's Left, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 2087,2087 (1995) (delineating the failures of relying on market 
forces, and, subsequently, of resulting to the bail-out strategy by recapitalizing the 
deposit insurance fund, 
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Messages the Guidelines sent to the banking industry is clear and appropriate to the 
Congressional intent. As interpreted by this author, they could be boiled down to the 
following: a banking practice, regardless of its direct financial bearing, is unsafe and 
unsound if such conduct runs counter to generally accepted prudent banking practice 
and demonstrates the institution's substantial financial or managerial weaknesses that, if 
continued, would potentially pose the institution to undue financial or non-financial 
risk. 109 For the current purpose, it is enough to establish this managerial aspect of safety 
and soundness consideration, whose concrete substance will be further elaborated 
elsewhere in this volume (particularly in chapter four). 
3. Examining the PCA System 
a. Capital-Management Incompatibilities 
We then turn to the PCA system and its two-prong safety and soundness measures. What 
comes from the PCA mismanagement-focused supervisory interventions that are 
predicated on and pegged to capital classifications and reclassifications is a 
presumption-managerial degeneration could be drawn parallel to capital erosion; hence, 
same degree of intensity and same types of supervisory interventions and activity 
restrictions are applied to both. In other words, implications of a CAMELS examination 
that assigns the management factor an unsatisfactory rating are just, by nature and 
degree, the same when an institution's regulatory capital drops to the next undesirable 
level, as far as the PCA regime's effects are concerned. The success of the PCA system, 
therefore, largely rests with the appropriateness of this management-capital tying in that 
if or not this arrangement can genuinely and timely indicate the institution's financial as 
well as managerial safety-and-soundness status. 
to restore the thrift industry's profitability following the industry's deregulation in the late 1970s and early 
1980). 
109 This proposition was reflected by some post-FDICIA judicial decisions. For example, in Greene 
County Bank v. FDIC, the court categorically rejected the idea that unsafe or unsound practices are 
"limited to practices having a reasonably direct effect on the [b]ank's financial soundness, a situation not 
present in this case", and, therefore, "[p]roof of misconduct alone entitles the FDIC to invoke its broad 
cease and desist enforcement powers". Green County Bank v. FDIC, 92 F. 3d 633,636 (8th Cir. 1996); see 
also Simpson v. OTS, 29 F. 3d 1418,1425 (9t" Cir. 1994); but see Johnson v. OTS, 81 F. 3d 195,204 (D. C. 
Cir. 1996) (stating risk or threat to the "financial integrity" or "financial stability" of the institution as a 
prerequisite of an unsafe and unsound banking practice. ). 
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We have justifiable doubts about this management-capital tying arrangement. First 
and foremost, such intrinsic limits capital signaling being associated with in particular as 
a lagging indicator of mismanagement give strong support to the argument that the 
degree of capital degeneration might not coincide with that of managerial deterioration. 
Consequently, by tying two connected but different regulatory concerns together the 
PCA regime runs the risk of failing the legislative initiative of early intervention for 
problematic banks. While an institution's capital classification remains adequately 
capitalized, unsound managerial practices could have well taken place and could have 
been serious enough to have negative repercussions on the institution in the long run. 
Further, whereas tackling mismanagement concerns primarily with addressing lax 
internal controls and system failures, curing capital shortage is basically something to do 
with fund injection or asset reduction. Qualitatively, they therefore should be responded 
differently. 110 
The above arguments give rise to the general need of a detached system, and a 
particular one of such system for those economies short of mature financial 
infrastructures able to producing credible assessments on their banks' capital strength, 
which would then worsen the initial lagging problem of the inadequacy of regulatory 
capital level reflecting managerial strength. Taking the case of Taiwan, an East Asia's 
newly industrialized economy, for example, fundamental weaknesses embedding in 
accounting 111 and the auditing system"2 were frequently cited as primary culprits 
undermining credibility of the regulatory capital level as recorded in the bank's book. As 
pointed out by one leading commentator, strengthened regulatory capital and other 
ratio-based financial indicators "are meaningless if accounting systems and auditing 
110 GEORGE WALKER, INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION-LAW, POLICY AND 
PRACTICE 584 (2001) (commenting the Basle Committee's proposed capital charge on operational risk: 
"To the extent that operational risk is more concerned with procedural, process and systems failure it is 
arguably more an aspect of internal controls and should be treated on that basis and not through the 
imposition of additional flat capital charges". ) 
111 As standardized accounting and reporting systems are yet to be established in Taiwan, consistence and 
credibility of financial data and on which of calculation of capital adequacy ratio are open to question. 
See 
Nai-Pin In, Examinations and Suggestions of Financial regulation System, 27 Taipei Bank Monthly, 2,17 
(1997) (in Chinese). 
112 According to one Taiwan's leading accounting scholar, Professor Di-Wang Chang, combination of 
auditing and advising businesses as currently pursued by external auditors 
in Taiwan renders illusory 
independent and credible auditing results. This is exacerbated by regulation over auditing profession 
has 
long taken the norm of self-regulation. See Daily Economics (Taipei), at 4 (28 April 2002) (in Chinese). 
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procedures permit banks to misrepresent the quality of their loan portfolios, the quality 
of their earnings, or the quality of their capital". ' 13 
Admittedly, the fact supervisors could detach themselves from the PCA's capital 
classification and deploy a range of safety and soundness based enforcement actions 
addressing mismanagement to some extent offsets drawbacks flowing from the 
management-capital incompatibility. It is however still imperative the difficulties of 
fully mapping managerial strength to the institution's capital classification (and 
reclassification) are appreciated. Such appreciation can be a good reference point for 
future reforms on early intervention systems such as the PCA. 
b. Detecting Top-down Dishonesty as PCA's Functional Limit and Need for 
Complements 
Successful on-site examinations are inextricably linked to effective implementation of 
the PCA, as an early intervention system. On-site banking examinations remain vital and 
irreplaceable for the banking agency to test the credibility of management's statements, 
to review the adequacy of internal controls, and to verify solvency. All these first-hand 
information provides the groundwork on which the judgment of whether a prompt 
corrective action should be taken is made. Functional limits of on-site examinations are 
therefore vitally important as they largely represent the limits of the PCA itself. 
A successful on-site examination is predicated on examiners' ability to rely on the 
senior management's assertions because their resources are too limited to verify every 
fact. 114 Banking frauds directly plotted by or involved with bank directors or senior 
management are therefore extremely hard to be detected during the process of on-site 
banking examinations. Daiwa debacle provides a good example in this regard. 
115 
113 CHARLES GOODHART ET AL, FINANCIAL REGULATION-WHY, HOW AND WHERE NOW? 
106 (1998). 
114See McCOY, supra note 7, at §12.04 [1]. 
115 Toshihide Iguchi, a trader at the New York state-chartered branch of Daiwa Bank (the 19th largest bank 
in the world as of 1995) lost $ 1.1 billion from trading US treasures at its New York branch between 1984 
and 1995, and theses losses were concealed through liquidations of securities held in the 
bank's custody 
accounts and falsification of its custody record. It transpired in 1992 and 1993 Daiwa management 
falsely 
assured Federal Reserve Board examiners that trading and custody had been split whereas they 
both were 
under the control of Iguchi. Further, when management discovered the loss 
in July 1995, they did not 
promptly report them to US regulators, who finally found the losses on 18 September 
1995. In October 
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Curtailing this "top-down" type of dishonesty is thus the very task the PCA-type 
regulatory efforts must be complemented by other screening mechanisms. While the 
powerful safety and soundness formal enforcement measures would certainly effect 
some level of deterrence, in the post-Enron era reinforcing internal checks-and-balances 
by strengthening functions of independent directors and audit committee is the direction 
being pursued although the effectiveness of these reforms itself remains unclear. 
IV. Managerial Safety-and-soundness and LCBOs Supervision 
A. Background 
The past two decades witness a sea change in banking industry in the US brought about 
by market transformation, financial deregulation and innovation and their attendant 
effect-asset consolidation. 
Nowadays financial activities conducted by the US banking organizations have 
extended far beyond traditional deposit-taking and lending. Of the most noticeable 
developments is the exponential growth in derivatives transaction with the ten largest 
banking institutions accounting for nearly 95 percent the notional amount of derivatives 
contracts entered into in the markets. 116 More generally, total assets of non-bank 
subsidiaries (such as securities arms) of the largest fifty banking organizations now 
account for nearly a quarter of the groups' overall consolidated assets. 117 
As the result of a long-term trend of consolidation, the largest most complex 
banking organizations (LCBOs) now occupy the pinnacle of the US's banking landscape. 
In the space of ten years (from 1989 to 1999), the number of independent banking 
organizations (organized with or without a holding company) in the US dropped from 
1995, Daiwa announced further losses of approximately $ 97 millions as a result of trading activities. 
Consequently, Daiwa's US banking operations were terminated by consent orders effective 2 February 
1996 despite Daiwa had abundant capital to absorb all these losses; Daiwa entered into a plea bargain to 
the effect it pled guilty and was fined $ 340 million; Iguchi received a four year prison sentence and a& 
2.6 million fine. The executive and former executives of Daiwa were ordered by a Japanese court 
in 
September 2000 to pay $ 775 million to the bank for the losses caused by the mismanagement of the New 
York branch. The facts were summarized from HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: LAW 
AND REGULATION 83-84 (2004). 
116 Lisa M. Deferrari & David E. Palmer, Supervision of Large Complex Banking Organizations, Federal 
Reserve Bulletin, 47,47-8 (February 2001). 
117 Id. 
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9,500 to 6,800,118 while the share of total banking assets owned by the largest U. S. 
banking organizations rose from 55 percent in 1989 to 74 percent in 1999, with the ten 
largest increasing from 26 to 49 percent. ' 19 
B. Risk-focused Supervising for LCBOs 
With no single factor qualifies or disqualifies an organization from being considered an 
LCBO, the following fifteen business features single out those banking organizations 
with most drastic change in their risk profiles and subject them under the LCBO 
supervision program, which was officially established in 1999 by the Federal Reserve 
Board. 
These criteria are: total assets; size of off-balance-sheet exposure; activity in 
derivative markets; trading assts and trading revenue, foreign assets and foreign deposits; 
funding from market sources (non-deposit); securities borrowed and securities lent; 
incomes from fiduciary activity; mutual fund sales and mutual fund fee income; revenue 
earned in mortgage markets; assets under management; activity in payment systems; 
involvement in securities settlements; geographic scope of operations; and merchant 
banking activities and proprietary investments. 120 
For those banking organizations characterized as LCBOs, the following table 
demonstrates how differently banking supervision and examination are being conducted 
over an LCBO from a traditional banking organization. 
Table 1.1121 
Comparison of Traditional Bank Examinations with Risk-Focused Supervision for 
LCBOs 
118 See Stephen A. Rhoades, Bank Mergers and Banking Structure in the United States, 1980-1998, Staff 
Studies 174 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, August 2000). 
19 See Deferrari & Palmer, supra note 116, at 47-8. 
120 Id., at 50. 
121Id., at51. 
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Traditional Banking Examinations Risk-focused LCBOs 
Supervision 
Supervisory process is focused on a single Supervisory process is continuous and is 
point in time and is rarely continuous more tuned to market development. 
unless there is a crisis. 
Significant emphasis is placed on Institutions are assigned designated 
valuation of assets. 
Dialogue with management is mostly 
related to examination findings unless 
Supervisory teams. The teams are 
supplemented with specialists, who may 
be drawn from across the Federal Reserve 
System. 
Focus is on risk-management processes 
and control systems. 
there is a crisis. 
There is more frequent communication 
with senior management. 
Supervisory process includes more 
interaction with line management of 
business activities and risks. 
Programs includes business line and 
functional reviews that incorporate 
identification of best practices. 
All these changes were made to correspond with the LCBOs' business that involves 
complex transfers of risk such as complex securitization or other secondary credit 
activities. The core of this new approach is the "[g]reater emphasis on the organization's 
management processes and core proficiencies for identifying, measuring, monitoring 
and controlling key risks, including credit, market, and operational risks, and less 
88 
emphasis on traditional `point-in-time' balance sheets assessments". 122 
Despite emphasizing internal risk management and controls obviously falls into the 
established "procedure prudence" mode re-confirmed in the 1995 the Safety and 
Soundness Guidelines, the task here has proven something different from before. For 
one thing, identifying the industry's "best practice" is now an extraordinarily important 
step in the process of formulating regulatory rules. Admittedly, commonly recognized 
best practices always carry certain weight in terms of safety and soundness regulation 
even for non-LCBO banking organizations. Elevating industry practices to such a height 
as "identification of best practices" being one crucial source of deriving regulatory rules 
is nevertheless rare, if ever. Furthermore, given a kind of communicator role expected to 
be played by federal agencies, it is safe to say a dramatic change is now underway as to 
the approach these organizations are "supervised". 
These novelties reflect the regulators have recognized the management of a mega 
organization simply have better grasp as to complex and transferable risks inherent in 
those diversified business their institution involves with, and, consequently, stand in a 
better position to manage these risks than they do. The same can be said for the 
supervisory side where the regulators have to work in partnership with LCBOs' 
management rather than direct their way as before to achieve regulatory goals. One 
consequence effected by these changes might be a consummation of a de facto 
self regulation regime applied specifically to these "elite" organizations. 123 If this is the 
case, it will guarantee a split between LCBOs and non-LCBO banking organizations in 
terms of regulatory contents and supervisory style. 124 
122 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Risk focused Supervision of Large Complex 
Banking Organizations, SR 99-15 (SUP), para. 13 (23 June 1999). 
123 Joseph J. Norton, Conjuring an Elite Corps of Banking Institutions Within a Public-Private 
Partnership, in CORPORATIONS, CAPITAL MARKETS, AND BUSINESS IN THE LAW 394 (Theodor 
Baums ed. al., 2000) (noting "a dominant trend in international bank regulation and supervision over the 
past several years has been to separate (de facto) elite banks into their own class for purposes of regulation 
and supervision and subtly shift the regulatory and supervisory framework towards more of a "functional 
self-regulatory" framework. ") 
124 Differentiating supervisory treatments towards banking organizations of different level of 
sophistication has been adopted in practice. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Revisions to Banking Holding Company Supervision Procedures for Organizations with Total 
Consolidated Assets of $5 Billion or Less, SR 02-1, para 5& 10 (9 Jan. 2002) (noting assessing the 
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While the LCBO program is still growing, one aspect of the LCBO regulation is 
clear; that is, LCBOs' board directors and senior management will be rendered much 
more autonomy and much less restraints as to risk-taking than their non-LCBOs' 
banking counterparts. ' 2' In this respect, while the regulators have been relaxing external 
restraints on the LCBO managements' discretion and autonomy in making business 
judgments, whether internal governance mechanisms traditionally formulated under the 
corporate-law regime could function commensurate to the regulators' safety and 
soundness consideration will become vital. In addition, an adequate disclosure system 
and effective enforcement of such a system will be also compelling to provide a basis 
for at least an ex post check. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
Evolution of the concept of managerial safety-and-soundness in the United States 
encapsulates the transformation of banking industry and its supervision. As the 
pendulum has swung away from the era where predominantly deposit-taking and 
lending was the business banks engaged in, credit risk they had to deal with, and well 
capitalization could have been equated with safe and sound banking, it does not 
necessarily declare a gradual phase-out of the capital regime but certainly promise yet 
another repositioning of the contents of the safety and soundness consideration. 
It begins to be seen the well-management component is being repositioned and 
absorbing and defining the well-capitalization requirement rather than these two will 
still run parallel as they are now. 126 Of the most prominent example of this repositioning 
financial condition of a banking holding company with total consolidated assets of $1 billion or less can 
be conducted off-site and, as a principle, only a management rating and a composite rating are required to 
be assigned; by contrast, a complete holding company rating is required to be assigned to a company with 
total consolidated assets of between $ 1-5 billion). 
125 See Norton, supra note 128, at 394 (noting "[t]his `risk-based supervision' framework essentially 
redirects responsibility and accountability for the design, development and implementation of 
risk-management and internal-control process to the elite banks themselves, subject to purported oversight 
of and imposition of general parameters and standards set forth by the authorities. ") 
126 The dual safety-and-soundness demands for FHCs to ensuring their subsidiary depository institutions' 
well-management and well-capitalization are one of the focal points of the current FHC prudential 
regulation. See 12 C. F. R. sec 225.83 (A FHC must notify the Federal Reserve Board in writing within 15 
days of becoming aware that any depository institution it controls has ceased to be well capitalized or well 
managed. Until the Federal Reserve Board determines the FHC has corrected its depository institution's 
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is regarding capital adequacy assessments of the LCBOs. In one supervisory letter, by 
dismissing simple ratios (including risk-based capital ratios) and "traditional rules of 
thumb" as insufficient in assessing the overall capital adequacy of large banking 
organizations, the Federal Reserve Board emphasized the imperativeness of these 
institutions' "internal capital management processes" in relation to their capital 
strength. 127 The quality of these processes as for the present reflected by the examiners 
in the institution's management ratings is to be in the future repositioned as an integral 
part of the institution's ratings for capital adequacy. 128 
In other words, the ongoing developments of prudential banking regulation and 
supervision in the US and at the international level129 have proven safe and sound 
banking are of shifting substance - from ratio-based indicators taking predominant 
weight, through managerial quality and integrity (indicated by the strength of internal 
risk-management, internal control and other control mechanisms) supplementing such 
indicators, to the management factor defining including risk-based capital and other 
ratios and standing out as a set of absolute determinants to which the regulator's 
attention has turned. Recognizing such objective shift is clearly indispensable to deliver 
satisfactory results for American banking regulators whose constituencies are now 
permeated with those large, complex banking organizations taking firm hold of financial 
industries across the board (banking, securities, insurance and others). The same case 
financial or managerial weaknesses, limitations or conditions on the conduct or activities of the FHC or 
any of its affiliates, including suspension of share or control acquisition of other company, might be 
imposed. Persistent failures to bring the depository institution back to both financial and managerial safety 
and soundness might result in a mandatory divestiture of the depository institution at question. ). 
127 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Assessing Capital Adequacy in Relation to Risk at 
Large Banking Organizations and Others with Complex Risk Profiles, SR 99-18, para. 1&3 (1 July 
1999). 
128 Id para. 9-10. 
129 There have been efforts put in to rehabilitate the 1988 Basel Capital Accord to address, among others, 
the one-size-fits-all formula of deciding required regulatory capital level. In June 1999, the Basel 
Committee issued a consultative paper (entitled "A New Capital Adequacy Framework") introducing a 
new capital adequacy framework to replace the 1988 Accord. The proposed new framework ("Basel II 
Program") consists of three pillars: regulatory capital, supervisory review and market discipline. Among 
the measures to be probably introduced and implemented when the work is finalized in both international 
and domestic levels is adopting a more risk sensitive system based on bank's internal ratings and credit 
risk modelling for regulatory capital purpose. For more background information concerning the Basel II 
Program, see, inter alia, Heidi M. Schooner & Michael Taylor, Convergence And Competition: The 
Case 
Of Bank Regulation In Britain And The United States, 20 Michigan Journal Of International Law, 596, 
642-3 (1999). 
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can also be made for regulators coming from economies with no clear presence of such 
mega banking organizations, yet with financial liberalization and institutional 
integration continuously taking swift pace, presenting the same nature (not the same 
scale) of task as their US counterparts now face - to tackle complex "bank risk" that 
can no longer be reduced to a set of threshold ratios and addressed by the financial 
cushion they imply. 
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CHAPTER THREE - 
Managerial Conduct of US Banking Organizations under Shareholder 
Model of Corporate Governance 
"Where review of board functioning is involved, courts leave behind as a relevant point of 
reference the decisions of the hypothetical `reasonable person', who typically supplies the 
test for negligence liability. It is doubtful that we want business men and women to be 
encouraged to make decisions as hypothetical persons of ordinary judgment and prudent 
might.... If those in charge of the corporation are to be adjudged personally liable for 
losses on the basis of a substantive judgment based upon what persons of ordinary or 
average judgment and average risk assessment talent regard as `prudent' `sensible' or even 
`rational', such persons will have a strong incentive at the margin to authorize less risky 
investment projects. "' 
As discussed in chapter two, the regulatory concept of safe and sound management has 
emerged as an independent component of the overall regulatory objective of bank safety 
and soundness. Whist the discussion concerning the substance fleshing in this regulatory 
concept and how it is being promoted by the banking regulator will be deferred to next 
chapter, this chapter will first try to locate standards governing the conduct of bank 
management under a different matrix. This chapter sets forth the current legal and 
regulatory state of the shareholder model of corporate governance as primarily informed 
by state corporate law concerning the bank management's functions. The particular 
jurisdiction the current chapter will focus on is Delaware, which is not only the leading 
corporate-law state in the United States, 2 but also the only state whose corporate 
governance procedures were designated by the banking agency as the rules that could be 
elected by any national bank in its bylaw to follow, wherever the state the bank's main 
3 
office is located or the bank's holding company is incorporated. 
1 In re Caremark Intern. Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A. 2d 959,968, at note 
16 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
2 Delaware is the state of incorporation of more than 40 percent of the companies listed 
in on the New 
York Stock Exchange and more than half of Fortune 500 companies. See Cammon Turner, 
Shareholders 
vs. the World: Revolon Duties and State Constituency Statutes, 
8 Business Law Today 32,34 (1999). 
3 OCC, Final Interpretative Rulings, 61 FR 4849-03,1996 WL 50254 (F. R. ) (codified in 12 C. F. R. Part. 
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This chapter notes that the current shareholder model of corporate governance (as 
informed by Delaware corporate law) controls and directs the conduct of bank 
management towards refraining from at the margin to authorize less risky investment 
projects so as to foster ownership rights, whereas certain background restraints informed 
by external regulations indicate the boundary of such profit pursuit and address 
stakeholder considerations. The regulatory objective for bank safety and soundness, as 
any class of stakeholder considerations in this matrix, is therefore posed no more than a 
topic of compliance rather than itself a corporate objective, and is by design supposed to 
take up a marginal place. 
This chapter is organized as follows to pinpoint this shareholder model of corporate 
governance. Section one will first provide a theoretical review over the contracterian 
concept of corporation, depicting tensions amongst corporate constituencies and the 
state corporate law's shareholder-oriented solution, whereby minimizing managerial 
agency costs, encouraging risk-taking and upholding entity separateness are indicated as 
three policy objectives to be advanced by the US shareholder model of corporate 
governance. 
Section two first sets forth the general framework of the Delaware's fiduciary duty 
system, a set of open-ended and open-textured standards of conduct and review 
controlling and directing managerial conduct towards advancing the said triad of policy 
objectives. The section also covers the fiduciary law's application in particular 
areas - insolvency, change-of-control transactions and the constituency statute - 
whereby the status of various corporate stakeholders in relation to the shareholder will 
be examined and analyzed. 
Section three devotes to the build-up to the US Supreme Court's 1997 seminal 
decision of Atherton v. FDIC, which confirms the applicability of the shareholder model 
of corporate governance as informed by state corporate laws in the banking context. 
This chapter is concluded by section four, which will provide some observations over 
the extensive implications of the Atherton decision, whose reasoning will 
be also 
critically examined. 
7, Subpart A., § 7.2000) 
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I. Policy Attributes of Shareholder-model of Corporate Governance 
The term "corporate governance" is essentially an idea of "direction and control". 4 
Under Anglo-American legal tradition, this direction-and-control mechanism is 
generally devised to work under a shareholder model - the board of directors is to be 
responsible for directing the company's affairs through its monitoring and 
decision-making functions and made accountable to and controlled by the shareholders. 5 
The primary participants of corporate affairs are therefore the shareholder, the 
management and the board of directors. 6 For modern-day corporations, while such 
new developments as the emergence of institutional shareholders have apparently made 
them different from before, 7 the underlying philosophy of upholding shareholder 
4 The Committee On The Financial Aspects Of Corporate Governance (Cadbury Committee), Report Of 
The Committee On The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury Report), 2.5 (Gee 
Ltd , 1992) ("Corporate governance is the system by which businesses are directed and controlled"); The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") provided a broader definition that 
corporate governance is "a set of relationships between a company's management, its board, its 
shareholders, and other stakeholders". OECD, OECD Principles Of Corporate Governance, SG/CG (99) 5, 
at Preamble (1999). While the "direction and control" theme remains the same, it was suggested different 
methodologies are deployed by economists, lawyers, policy makers and other groups of this interest. See 
Jeswald W. Salacuse, Corporate Governance In The New Century, 25 Company Lawyer, 69,70 (2004) 
(noting while lawyers and policy makers primarily focus on formal rules and institutions of corporate 
governance, economists often employ a wider view and their works touch upon "the informal practices 
that evolve in the absence of formal rule"); see also Edward Adams & John Matheson, A Statutory Model 
for Corporate Constituency Concerns, Emory Law Journal, 1085,1085 (2000) ("Corporate governance 
involves a system of contractual and fiduciary duties that influence directors and officers to make 
decisions consistent with defined obligations"); For the economists' approach, see e. g., Andrei Shleifer & 
Robert Vishnu, A Survey of Corporate Governance, LII The Journal of Finance 737,737 ("Corporate 
Governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting 
a return on their investment"). 
5 The directors, "whether or not they have executive responsibilities, have a monitoring role and are 
responsible for ensuring that the necessary controls over the activities of their companies are in 
place-and working". Report Of The Committee On The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 
(Cadbury Report), 1.8 (Gee Ltd., 1992). The shareholders are vested with the power of appointing 
directors, and control them through auditors, other monitoring mechanisms, and through laws and 
regulations working to their aide for this control purpose. Id. at 2.5. Robert Monks, Equity Culture at Risk: 
the threat to Anglo-American Prosperity, 11 corporate governance, 164,169 (2003) (noting, in a 
normative sense, corporate governance is a process of effective accountability of management to 
informed 
and active owners). 
6 See, e. g., ROBERT A. G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
1 (1995). 
(Defining corporate governance as relationships among various participants 
in determining the direction 
and performance of corporations, and the primary participants are shareholders, management and 
the 
board of directors); 
7 See e. g., Melvyn Westlake, Corporate Governance-Time To 
Clear Up, The Banker, 16,16-7 (June 2002) 
(pinpointing one of the trends concerning global corporate governance reform 
is pressing institutional 
shareholders into playing a larger role in the oversight of corporate governance standards. 
) 
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interests still guides the formulation of corporate law, one primary source of corporate 
governance. This section will outline some characteristics of the US shareholder 
model of corporate governance, by which the policy objects underpinning these 
arrangements will be identified and pinpointed. 
A. Starting Point: Disentangling Human Relationships and Contracterianism 
Theory of Corporation 
Under traditional Anglo-American corporate law, dealing with the issue "to whom the 
management owes corporate-law duties" seems curiously redundant as the standard 
formulation of the director's corporate-law duties is generally stated not in terms of 
benefiting the shareholders or other corporate constituencies, but of benefiting the 
corporation. 8 As a matter of law, one modem version of this formulation points at the 
corporation's "long-term wealth". In the United States, this is particularly true in the 
takeover or the insolvency situation. In the insolvency context, for example, the 
Delaware Chancery Court's famous dictum in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N. V. v. 
Pathe Communications Corp. reads "where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of 
insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers 
[shareholders], but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise... to exercise judgment in an 
informed, good faith effort to maximize the corporation's long-term wealth creating 
capacity. "9 The dictum implies the interest of the corporation, i. e., the "long-term 
wealth creating capacity", may not at all times coincide with that of its shareholders. 
The idea of promoting welfare or "wealth-creating capacity" of a corporate-form 
8 With respect to English law, See PAUL DAVIES, GOWER'S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN 
COMPANY 
LAW 599 (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 1997) (noting directors' fiduciary duties are owed to the company and 
to the company alone; citing Percival v. Wright [1902] 2. Ch. 421 and Bell v. 
Lever Bros. [1932] A. C. 161, 
H. L. in their applying this formulation to even the parent-subsidiary context where the company's shares 
were totally owned by its holding parent); L. S. SEALY, CASES 
AND MATERIALS IN COMPANY LAW 
259 (Read Elsevier, 2001). 
The traditional view in the US, to a less extent, worked to the same effect. 
See e. g., Bawden v. Taylor, 254 
IL1.464,467,98 N. E. 941,942 (1912). 
9 See Credit Lyonnais, supra note 9, at *34; see also ALI, PRINCIPLES 
OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNACE 4.01(A), stating "... [a] director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform 
the 
director's functions in good faith... ". 
96 
fiction, a reminiscent of the entity theory line of thinking, 10 however, renders much 
confusion on closer examination. The source of this confusion was forcefully 
articulated by John Parkinson as: "A requirement to benefit an artificial entity, as an end 
in itself, would be irrational and futile, since a non-real entity is incapable of 
experiencing well-being", 11 and, therefore, "... [it is] impossible to assign any definite 
content to a duty framed in terms of benefiting the enterprise as such". '2(Emphasis 
included) Thus, interests of the corporation can be made sense only after they have 
been put into the context of the ultimate beneficiaries who enjoy such interests. The 
corporation is then no more than a collection of human relationships, 13 or a "nexus of 
contracts", i. e., a collection of explicit and implicit contracts which allows management, 
shareholders and various other kinds of self-interested corporate constituencies 14 to 
contract freely concerning their relationship to, and rights against, the corporate 
10 The idea that the nature of a corporation, as a juristic person, is largely the same as a natural person as 
advanced by entity theorists used to have a prominent place in the US to the extent corporations have even 
been accorded some constitutional protections previously applied only to natural persons. Ann E. 
Conaway, Re-examining The Fiduciary Paradigm at Corporate Insolvency and Dissolution: Defining 
Directors' Duties to Creditors, 20 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, note 9 and accompanying text (1995) (citing First 
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765,784 (1978) (corporation is protected by a First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43,76 (1906) (corporation is insulated 
from unreasonable searches and seizures)). Today it is the contracterianism theory taking the central stage 
structuring corporate law. Entity theory lost its prominence because it is considered fails to provide a set 
of realistic explanations that is commensurate to the way modern corporations operate. Addressing 
corporate law issues from the standpoint that a corporation by law is an entity, independent from its 
capital-contributing shareholders, capable of having entitlements and bearing obligations misses the point 
because by fact it is shareholders, employees, lenders and other corporate constituencies rather than the 
company reaping the interests and bearing the brunt out of the company's operation. 
11 JOHN PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPOSIBILITY-ISSUES IN THE THEORY 
OF COMPANY LAW 76 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994). 
12 Id.. 
13 Lawrence Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N. Y. U. L. Rev., 1165,1165 
(1990) 
14 Corporate constituencies embody the shareholders and other stakeholders. In today's marketplace, 
corporate stakeholders represent a wide range of constituencies other than shareholders that pursue 
disparate agendas and are differently affected by and interested in operation of a company. While the 
shareholders seek maximizing returns of the company's stocks; the suppliers aim at having steady sales to 
the company; the customers want the company provide high quality goods with reasonable prices; the 
banking institutions, who extended loans to the company, seek to exert influence in the company's 
financial safety to ensure its ability to make repayment; the labor unions, who represent the company's 
employees, target goals such as high salaries and social security. There can be many other 
interest groups 
indirectly related to the company pursuing broader targets such as environmental sustainability. 
See Leo 
Schuster, The Shareholder Value and Stakeholder Discussion: An International Overview, in 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MANAGEMENT IN BANKS 3-4 (LEO SCHUSTER ed., 2000). 
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fiction. 15 
One attendant product of the contracterian perception of corporation is 
corporate-law rules governing the corporation's activities tend to be devised or viewed 
as enabling. It was argued the function of corporate law is to provide a set of standard 
rules concerning the activities of corporate constituencies to economize on contracting 
costs that would have otherwise arisen in the absence of such standard rules. 16 A 
prominent example in this is the duty of care as owed by directors to the company, 
which from a contracterian perspective functions as a set of standard contractual terms. 
In other words, due care is among others enabling rather than rules of mandatory or 
regulatory character and they can be replaced by terms better suited to the perceived 
needs of the parties concerned. In the US, this is exactly what happened after 
Delaware's seminal case Smith v. Van Gorkom 17 that the majority of state corporate 
statutes, with their "contract out" clauses, allowed corporations to eliminate or alleviate 
directors' due care liability by adopting exculpatory provisions in the certificates of 
incorporation. 18 
This contracterian model is not unassailable. It was contested from the angle of 
the inherent contractual incompleteness arising out of information asymmetries and 
transaction costs. 19 Further, commentators contended its ignorance of the negative 
15 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305,311 (1976); David Millton, Personifying the 
Corporate Body, 2 Graven Images, 116,123 (The corporation is considered... "nothing more than an 
arena in which suppliers of capital, labour, services, materials, and other necessary contributions come 
together to pursue their own interests through bargain and exchange. "). For other selective sources, see 
e. g., Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 407 
(1989); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
(1991). 
16 See William Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev., 1395, 
1340 (1993) (noting "[t]he essence of the corporate form may ... 
be seen... as the identification of 
structures or processes by which (1) persons will be designated to make certain sorts of discretionary 
judgments, and (2) those so designated will be monitored. Thus, in the dominant view, a corporation may 
be said most fundamentally to be a contractual governance structure. ") 
17 See infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
18 See e. g., Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8 sec. 102 (b) (Supp. 1986). Despite corporation law statutes in America 
are primarily enabling, these statutes inevitably stipulate some non-waivable terms in the corporate charter, 
such as annual meetings to elect directors, stockholder access to books and records, and stockholders' 
rights to amend the corporation by-laws. See William Allen, Contracts and Communities 
in Corporation 
Law, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev., 1395,1340, note 18 and the accompanying text (1993). 
19 See e. g., Alan Schwartz, Legal Contract Theories and Incomplete Contracts, 
in CONTRACT 
ECONOMICS 76-80 (Lars Wenn & Hans Wijkander eds., 1992). 
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externality effect to the extent many individuals who are not direct parties to, but 
affected by, the corporate contracts are left aside. 20 Finally, the contractual idea of 
corporation is not so much a precise legal conception as a metaphorical use of business 
dynamics. Despite all these incompleteness, it is however true the corporation's claim 
to being should rest upon the interests of the constituencies that constitute it. The idea 
that the interests of particular constituencies of the corporation could be submerged 
before those of the corporation is against the commercial reality that a modern-day 
corporation operates on corporate constituencies interacting with one another, nothing 
more and nothing less. The contractual perception of corporation21 is therefore 
rightfully considered as a theory comparatively capable of providing realistic 
explanations that are commensurate to modern corporations' operation22 and will be 
followed in this chapter as a basis for discussion. 
20 See generally Kose John et al., Cross-Border Liability of Multinational Enterprises, Border Taxes, and 
Capital Structure, Fin. Mgmt., at 56 (winter 1991). This criticism is advanced from an inclusive and 
communitarian ground, which argue the "fulfilment of the true needs of society's members" as the 
fundamental justification of corporate activities. See Michael Bradley et al., The Purposes and 
Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62 
Law and Contemporary Problems, 10,43 (1999). For in-depth theoretical analyses of the communitarian 
school of corporate governance, see Parkinson, supra note 11, at 260-303. 
21 Ronald Coase was the first to articulate the insightful view that firms exist to minimize the costs of 
trading in markets, and this is done by the firm functioning as a nexus of contracts that governs trade 
among the contracting parties. To this end, Coase noted the key role played by the "entrepreneur", the 
provider of capital and the firm's residual claimer, who organizes the firm, directs its affair and holds the 
exclusive power to dissolve it. See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386,392 (1937). 
For a modern public company, the most obvious difference from the Coase's entrepreneur-centred firm is 
the absence of an entrepreneur. Coase's observations are believed still valid nonetheless as functions used 
to be performed by the entrepreneur are now respectively shared by the management and the shareholders. 
See, e. g., William J. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of The Firm: Critical Perspectives from 
History, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1989); Ronald Daniels, Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can 
Contractarianism Be Compassionate?, 43 U. Toronto L. J. 315 (1993); Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. 
Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 5 (1983). 
22 The pre-eminence of the contracterianism view was stated by the former Chancellor of the Delaware 
Chancery Court, William Allen, to the extent "[o]ne of the marks of a truly dominant intellectual paradigm 
is the difficulty people have in even imaging any alternative view. " See Allen, supra note 18, at 
1441; 
Michael Bradley et al., The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: 
Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62 Law and Contemporary Problems, 10,41 (1999) (noting 
"[t]he contractarian ideology has clearly dominated the discourse in the worlds of 
law, economics, and 
management... ". ); see Conaway, supra note 10, at note 9 and accompanying text 
(noting increasingly, 
corporate theory has moved away from the entity theory and in the 
direction of a contractarian model of 
governance). 
99 
B. US Corporate-law's Guiding Principles Governing Conflicts of Interests among 
Corporate Constituencies: Minimizing Managerial Agency Costs, Encouraging 
Risk-taking and Entity Separateness 
Against the backdrop of various corporate constituencies with their competing agendas 
interacting with the corporate entity, this section articulates, largely evolving along the 
corporation's entity boundary, the two policy objectives of US shareholder model of 
corporate governance: minimizing managerial agency costs and encouraging risk-taking. 
1. Vertical and Horizontal Tensions 
From a contracterian perspective, there are two main strands of relationships working 
within or connected to a nexus-of-contracts corporation-the one between the 
management (those controlling the corporation) and the shareholders (those contributing 
equity capital to the corporation); and the one between the shareholder (as the sole class 
of residual claimers) and various other constituencies including employees, lenders and 
many others (as a collection of fixed claimers). The former was suggested by 
commentators as a vertical relationship and the latter horizontal. 23 Tensions existing 
respectively inside the vertical and horizontal relationships are the primary reasons why 
including fiduciary duties various corporate governance mechanisms are needed to 
direct and control managerial conduct. Dealing with the vertical tension remains the 
focal point both of corporate and securities laws for long, particularly in the post-Enron 
era, calls for an even closer scrutiny over effectiveness and efficacies of the traditional 
disclosure-based securities law and the enabling corporate-law rules, focusing on public 
traded companies' corporate governance, 
shareholder-management conflicts of interests. 
have brought fresh attentions to 
As to the horizontal tension, whereas 
the shareholder-stakeholder debate that bears a long intellectual pedigree24 is still 
23 See Mitchell, supra note 13, at 1170-171; see also Lawrence Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical 
Framework for Enhancing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 Tex. L. 579,603-7 (1992). 
24 See e. g., A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049,1060-63,1074 
(1931) (arguing that corporate powers are held in trust for only the shareholders); But see E. Merrick 
Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145,1152-62 (1932) (arguing 
that corporate managers are trustees for employers, consumers, and the general public); see also Edward 
Adams & John Matheson, A Statutory Model for Corporate Constituency Concerns, Emory Law Journal, 
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ongoing, under current US corporate law it has been largely settled by dramatically 
tilting towards the shareholder's side. 
2. Dealing with Vertical Tensions: Minimizing Managerial Agency Costs 
It is commonly agreed that the design of the shareholder mode of Anglo-American 
corporate governance is premised on the Berle-and-Means hypothesis 25 of the 
separation of ownership from control, 26 which leads to the tension between the 
shareholders and the management. 
This premise came from the observation of inability and lack of incentive of the 
widely spread shareholders with their small shareholdings to exercise control over the 
increasingly large and complex corporation-the absence of block shareholders leads to 
the operational dominance of corporate managers. 27 Consequently, a typical agency 
problem was deemed necessary to be dealt with to tempt the entrenched management, as 
the agents of the shareholders, out of their self-interest propensity and to act in the best 
interest of their principals. 28 In other words, one primary objective of corporate 
governance under this management-shareholder tension is to "facilitate the development 
of a corporate structure that allows management the discretion to utilize its expertise on 
behalf of shareholders, but at the same time establish safeguards in situations in which 
management might utilize that discretion to favour itself at the expense of 
shareholders". 29 This is to be achieved, among other things, by a set of enabling and 
1085,1091-94 (2000) (noting the prominent shareholder/stakeholder debate by Professor Adolf Berle and 
Merrick Dodd in the 1930s); 
25 This hypothesis was originated from the 1932 classic work "The Modem Corporation And Property" 
by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means. ADOLF BERLE, JR. AND GARDNER MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (Macmillan, New York:, 1932) 
26 Comparatively stronger minority shareholder protection against the majority under the UK and US 
corporate and securities laws is believed to be one crucial factor furthering this dispersed shareholding 
structure. Shareholders are encouraged to take small shareholdings because they know they are generally 
safe from the expropriation of majority shareholders. See e. g., Simon Deakin, Squaring The Circle? 
Shareholder Value and Corporate Social Responsibility in The UK, 70 George Washington Law Review, 
976,978-80 (2002) (noting protection accorded to minority shareholders in a hostile takeover under the 
UK's City Code on Takeovers boosts their incentive to take small stakes). 
27 See John Farrar, The New Financial Architecture And Effective Corporate Governance, in A NEW 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE: A VIABLE APPROACH? 205 (J. B. Attanasio & J. 
J. Norton eds., 2001). 
28 Jeswald W. Salacuse, Corporate Governance In The New Century, 25 Company Lawyer, 69,71 (2004). 
29 See ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNACE, introductory note to Part VI. 
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procedure-oriented liability rules, by interest alignment practice including such 
incentive-enhanced arrangements as stock options in the managements' compensation 
packages, by strong product, managerial labour and corporate control markets and by 
internal and external vetting over corporate management. 
3. Dealing with Horizontal Tensions: Pursuing Allocation Efficiency through 
Promoting Risk-taking 
Another justification for this shareholder mode of corporate governance entails one 
fundamental prop of capitalism - that is, unleashing the individuals' self-interest nature 
will lead to the optimal allocation of society's resources. 30 The limited liability 
privilege enjoyed by the shareholders of publicly traded corporations is partly devised to 
this end. Shareholders are not personally liable for debts of the corporation but are only 
obligated to contribute capital as much as the initial purchase price for their shares to the 
corporation. 31 With this privilege, the shareholders are the only residual claimers 
(bearing limited downside losses yet enjoying theoretically unlimited upside gains) of 
corporate constituents and therefore the only group that has the incentive to promote the 
company's risk-taking for their potential maximized interests by monitoring the 
management's decision-making. 32 For creditors (including various fixed claimers), it 
was suggested they have no incentive to take risk to increase the value of the 
corporation beyond the point where repayments of their claims can be assured because 
taking such risk can be only harmful if failed and for the best irrelevant if succeeded as 
all realized profits will then go to the shareholders. 
In short, here the risk-aversion tendency connecting with the nature of creditors' 
claims is considered undesirable a factor that, if upheld, would have chilled managerial 
innovation and risk taking. 33 This possible chilling effect was considered would have 
fundamentally worked against the utility of the modern corporation that "largely comes 
30 See e. g., Michael Bradley et al., The Purposes and Accountability of the 
Corporation in Contemporary 
Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62 Law and Contemporary Problems, 10,37-8 (1999). 
31 See e. g., Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, sec 152 (1983). 
32 See e. g., John Matheson, Corporate Governance At The Millennium: 
The Decline of The Poison Pill 
Anti-takeover Defence, 22 Hamline Law Review, 703,708 (1999). 
33 See e. g., Baird & Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its 
Proper Domain, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 829, 
833-4 (1985) (providing theoretical discussion of the risk-averse tendency of creditors). 
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from its ability to allow diversified investors to accept greater investment risk". 34 The 
tension arisen from the different views as to the optimal risk level to be taken by the 
corporation is therefore resolved by dramatically tilting to the side of the shareholders. 
The directors are made accountable exclusively to the collective interests of the 
shareholders, and, for at least disbursed, passive shareholders of publicly traded 
corporations, such interests are primarily represented by short-term share price surge. 35 
Implications of this approach manifest in two fronts. First, it directly implicates 
with formulation of statutory and common-law rules governing the internal structure and 
internal operation of the corporation's decision-making processes. These rules are 
guided by the policy objective of encouraging risk taking so as to take advantage of 
emerging business opportunities and to broaden new business frontiers. Upholding 
such entrepreneurial spirit is an explicit and essential judicial guidance. In Re 
Caremark, the former Delaware Chancellor Allen's reasoning went to such lengths, 
when laying down the adequate standard of judicial reviews over directors' disinterested 
business decisions, as: 
"Where review of board functioning is involved, courts leave behind as a relevant point of 
reference the decisions of the hypothetical `reasonable person', who typically supplies the 
test for negligence liability. It is doubtful that we want business men and women to be 
encouraged to make decisions as hypothetical persons of ordinary judgment and prudent 
might.... If those in charge of the corporation are to be adjudged personally liable for 
losses on the basis of a substantive judgment based upon what an persons of ordinary or 
average judgment and average risk assessment talent regard as `prudent' `sensible' or even 
`rational', such persons will have a strong incentive at the margin to authorize less risky 
investment projects. , 36 
Second, it addresses the classic wealth-transfer conflict between the shareholders 
and including creditors other fixed claimers by not mediating the competing 
interests of 
34 See Caremark, supra note 1, at 968 (note 16). 
35 See Emma Enriquez, Honour Thy Shareholders At All Costs? Towards A Better Understanding 
Of The 
Fiduciary Duties Of Directors Of Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries, 32 Sw. U. L. Rev. 
97,114, note 141 and 
accompanying text (2004). 
36 See Caremark, supra note 35. 
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the two camps but siding with the shareholders to the detriment of the fixed claimers. 37 
By excessive dividend distribution made to shareholders, by raising business risk, by 
taking up additional debt, wealth transfer occurs, taking the bondholders' situation for 
example, by increasing the value of equity and bringing down the market value of the 
firm's outstanding debt. 38 This is further prompted by the establishment of such 
incentive alignment instruments as stock option that the management who are best at 
shifting risk from the shareholders onto including creditors other corporate 
constituencies are rewarded the most. 
4. Entity Separateness 
It is important to note the entity boundary has largely been the scope within which the 
above-mentioned two strands of corporate-law guiding principles have been evolving 
under the US shareholder governance model. The principle of entity separateness has 
been strongly guarded even after the emergence of corporate groups, 39 where as a 
matter of commercial reality a holding company holding controlling interests in its 
operating subsidiaries would operate the group as one single integrated commercial unit 
fostering the parent's interest or the group's interest as a whole rather than that of the 
individual corporate entities making up the group. 40 Against this group-based operation 
mode, the law's extension of shareholder limited-liability privilege, originally designed 
to protect individuals who were solely investors and unable to control the management, 
37 See e. g., See Mitchell, supra note 13, at 1213-228 (discussing this shareholder/creditor conflict and 
arguing the need for extra-contractual protection for the bondholders). 
38 See Peter Sigfrid & Judy Day, Who Needs Merger Covenants? An Analysis of The Effects of Takeover 
Covenants Within a Corporate Governance Perspective, 16 Journal of International Banking Law, 12,13 
(2001) (noting these practice as the three main categories the management can accomplish wealth transfer 
from fixed claimers to shareholders). 
39 See e. g., Tom Hadden, Regulating Corporate Groups: An International Perspective, in CORPORATE 
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY 345-6 (Oxford U. Press, Joseph Mc Cahery ed. al., 1994) (noting 
the background of the emergence of corporate groups in the United States: the formation of corporate 
groups was initiated in New Jersey in 1888; further developing in the middle of the twentieth century 
through the process of internationalization of USA based corporate groups; and the dominance of 
conglomerate groups since 1970s led by the "expansion by acquisitions" takeover wave. ). 
40 See Enriquez, supra note 35, at note 6 and the accompanying text (citing PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, 
THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT, AND OTHER COMMON LAW 
PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 
xxxi (Little, Brown and Company 1987) that "each corporation is a separate legal entity with its own legal 
rights and duties, even when owned by another corporation and collectively engaged with it and other 
affiliated corporations in the conduct of fragmented portions of a single integrated business". ). 
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to those corporate parents who themselves deeply involved in conducting the groups' 
business and whose ultimate individual shareholders were already protected by limited 
liability, 41 has therefore been cited by some leading commentators as a major source 
leading to various types of corporate-form abuses42 and to the unjust detriment of 
corporate stakeholders and therefore posed as a matter to be reformed. 
The reformist's proposals, such as the argument for establishing "enterprise 
liability" and disregarding entity boundary, 43 have however met the court and the laws' 
consistent reluctance to "piercing the corporate veil"44 and restricting unlimited liability 
reach to the corporate parent to only those abusive practices intended to "evade an 
existing obligation"45 or presenting "a form of moral culpability". 46 For current 
purposes, the lenient treatment associated with the corporate parent-shareholder's 
liability status could thus serve as yet another vindication point that stakeholder 
protection is by design not to be addressed under the US shareholder governance model, 
as reflected in the ambit of US corporate law. Promoting shareholder gains then acts as 
the single yardstick against which managerial performance is to be measured and 
corporate value fostered. 
41 See Phillip Blumberg, The American Law of Corporate Groups, in CORPORATE CONTROL AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 308 (Oxford U. Press, Joseph Mc Cahery ed. al., 1994) 
42 See e. g., Tom Hadden, Regulating Corporate Groups: An International Perspective, in CORPORATE 
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY 358-64 (Oxford U. Press, Joseph Mc Cahery ed. al., 1994) 
(identifying a number of areas where potential and actual abuses associating with using the 
corporate-group form most likely occur: manipulation of control holdings, misleading accounts, 
oppression of minority interests, avoidance of liability, avoidance of taxation, and avoidance of 
competition regulation). 
43 See also Blumberg, supra note 41, at 307-8 (arguing for "enterprise liability" and the need to 
disregarding entity boundary); also see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited 
Shareholder Liability For Corporate Torts, 100 Yale L. J. 1879 (1991) (arguing for unlimited shareholder 
liability for corporate torts). 
44 By the same token, another possibility of penetrating the entity boundary by means of establishing 
subsidiary-to-parent "fraudulent conveyances" is also subject to strict conditions under the Uniform 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act, or the Bankruptcy Code in the US. See JONATHAN MACEY ET AL, BANDING LAW AND 
REGULATION 753 (3d ed. 2001). 
45 Robert Thompson, Piercing The Veil Within Corporate Groups: Corporate Shareholders As Mere 
Investors, 13 Connecticut Journal of International Law, 379,395 (1999) 
46 Id. 
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II. Managerial Conduct and Multiple Facets of Fiduciary Duties under Delaware 
Corporate Law 
The board of directors and senior management stand at the core of a corporation's 
operation in their performing decision-making and oversight functions. 47 Parameters 
by which their performance is reviewed therefore indicate the desirable pattern of 
corporate activities to be led to. From a legal and regulatory perspective, one such 
parameter under the US shareholder model of corporate governance is obviously the 
open-ended and open-textured fiduciary duty owed by the management to the company. 
Fiduciary duties owed by directors and corporate officers48 (collectively "management") 
47 By law the board has a residual mandate that it could "[a]ct as to all other corporate matters not 
requiring shareholder approval". See ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance, § 3.02 cmt. f. 
Over time it has nevertheless become clear a large publicly traded corporation can not be directly 
managed by its board, given complexities of such corporation's affairs and the board's limited investment 
of time and its lack of expertise compared to professionally qualified management. Rather, it is more 
appropriate to rest the first-line managerial responsibility concerning in particular decision-making with 
the senior executive and the chain of commands under him. As a result, whereas the board still performs 
certain important management or decision-making functions, such as reviewing or approving the 
corporation's financial objectives, major corporate plans and actions, major changes in and choice of the 
appropriate auditing and accounting principles and practices in the preparation of financial statements, the 
general division between the board's general oversight function (over the management) and the 
professional manger's decision-making and other managerial functions (including active supervision or 
day-to-day scrutiny over the corporation's affairs) is present in a modern-day large company where the 
board's primary functions are to "[s]elect, regularly evaluate, fix the compensation of, and, where 
appropriate, replace the principal senior executives, ... 
[and oversee] the conduct of the corporation's 
business to evaluate whether the business is being properly managed. " ALI, Principles of Corporate 
Governance, § 3.02(a)(1)-(2); see also Sarah Worthington, The Duty to Monitor: A Modern View of the 
Director's Duty of Care, in PERSPECTIVE ON COMPANY: 2 194-7 (Fiona Macmillan Patfield ed., 
1997). 
The general oversight duty owed by the board and the senior management in terms of installing certain 
control mechanisms (e. g., information, internal-control and compliance systems) was the focal point of 
the Caremark decision. The derivative suit in the Caremark involved claims that the members of 
Caremark International, Inc. ("Caremark") breached their fiduciary duty of care to Caremark in 
connection with alleged violations by Caremark employees of laws regulations governing 
health care 
providers, which ultimately led to a payment of approximately $ 250 million to 
be made by the Caremark 
as the case finally settled. Where there was no fraud or other knowingly violation at the 
board level and 
there was obvious laxity or failures of Caremark's compliance program, the 
issues were: first, whether the 
board's oversight duties include establishing internal control and information systems; and second, 
if so, 
to what extent the board's should be liable for failure to establish such systems. 
See Caremark, supra note 
1, at 960-61. By stating that satisfaction of the board's supervisory and monitoring role rested with 
relevant and timely information, the court was affirmative on the 
first issue. Id., at 970. However, the 
board was only liable for failing to establish such control systems to the extent sustained and systemic 
failures had been found so as to demonstrate the existence of bad-faith. 
48 See ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance, § 4.01 cmt. a (noting it is well settled through case 
law 
and statutory provisions in at least 18 states, the officers will 
be held to the same duty of care standards as 
directors. ) 
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to companies are regulated by state common law in the United States. 49 This section 
examines Delaware's statutory law (the Delaware General Corporation Law) as well as 
its common law, two major legal sources informing the state's fiduciary duty law, over 
their evolving the many facets of this open-ended concept in the course of fostering the 
three guiding principles - minimizing agency Costs, encouraging risk-taking and 
upholding entity separateness - of the US shareholder model of corporate governance. 
By demonstrating the Delaware court's review modes and standards over the 
management's fulfilling fiduciary duties as well as the Delaware General Corporation 
Law's exculpation provision, this section will demonstrate on a practical note the largely 
irrelevance of the due care duty in terms of managerial liability exposure. The 
Delaware jurisprudence shies away from directing the management not to have an 
"incentive at the margin to authorize less risky investment projects"50 in order to 
correspond to the shareholder's risk-prone, residual-claimer mindset. The focal point 
of Delaware's fiduciary duty system then rests with the scrutiny over disloyal, 
49 The duty of care owed by directors and corporate officers to the corporation is considered of different 
natures across the Atlantic. In the United States, it is generally regarded as one category of the fiduciary 
duty owed by the directors to the corporation under their stewardship-the common usage of fiduciary 
duty of care and of loyalty. See e. g., Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: 
Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 Vand. L. Rev., 1485,1510 (1993) (noting "[w]hen a 
company is financially healthy, directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its 
shareholders. ") 
Under English Law, by contrast, the duty of care as such is not considered a duty of fiduciary nature as 
fiduciary duties are suggested "prescriptive in nature, and do not encompass the positive duties laid on 
those described as fiduciaries". See R. C. Nolan, The Proper Purpose Doctrine and Company Directors, in 
THE REALM OF COMPANY LAW 2 note 2 (Barry Rider ed., Kluwer Law international, 1998) (noting 
"[w]hile it is correct to describe a director as a fiduciary ... not all the 
duties which affect him are fiduciary 
duties. For example, duties of care and skill are laid on company directors, yet such duties are not 
fiduciary duties"; citing cases, inter alia, Breen v Williams (1996) CLR 71, noted (1997) 113 LQR 220); 
See also Sarah Worthington, The Duty to Monitor: A Modern View of the Director's 
Duty of Care, in 
PERSPECTIVE ON COMPANY: 2 185 (Fiona Macmillan Patfield ed., 1997) (noting fiduciary duties are 
independent of "any more general and wide-ranging `duty of care, whether equitable or tortious'). 
The American version will be used in the following discussion with respect particularly to the application 
of the "business judgment rule". 
50 See Caremark, supra note 1, at 967 (note 16). It is worthy of recording 
in its entirety the relevant 
passage of In re Caremark, which representatively articulated the 
Delaware Court's longstanding position 
that the deferential court review and the aggressive risk-taking incentive it created on part of the corporate 
management would yield macroeconomic benefits: "The corporate 
form gets its utility in large part from 
its ability to allow diversified investors to accept greater 
investment risk. If those in charge of the 
corporation are to be adjudged personally liable 
for losses on the basis of a substantive judgment based 
upon what persons of ordinary or average 
judgment and average risk assessment talent regard as `prudent' 
`sensible' or even `rational', such persons will have a strong 
incentive at the margin to authorize less risky 
investment projects. " Id. 
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self-interest managerial conduct and that of intentional dereliction that can be equated 
with a good-faith breach. 
A. General Fiduciary Duty Framework under Delaware Corporate Law - 
Disparity of Standards of Conduct and of Review 
Traditionally, managerial fiduciary duty is conceptualized under Delaware jurisprudence 
in primarily two types of cases : 51 duty of loyalty claims entailing directors' self-interest, 
primarily pecuniary interest (fiduciary duty of loyalty) and claims involving corporate 
management did not act with required care (fiduciary duty of care). In June 2006, by 
affirming in its entirety the Delaware Court of Chancery's decision in the high-profile 
Disney litigation, the Supreme Court of Delaware's seminal decision pinpoints the 
categories of managerial conduct that may result in a breach of a third type of fiduciary 
duties, which has been historically an uncharted territory-the fiduciary duty of good 
faith. 
1. Aspirational Standards of Conduct 
The conceptualization of the duties of loyalties, care and good faith as reflected in 
Delaware common law represents the aspirational dimension of standards of conduct 
expected of the corporate management. 
The duty of loyalty, in essence, "mandates that the best interest of the corporation 
and its shareholders take [] precedence over any interest possessed by a director, officer 
or controlling shareholder and not shared by the stockholders generally. "52 And the 
classic example that implicates the duty of loyalty is therefore when a fiduciary either 
appears on both sides of a transaction or receives a personal benefit not shared by all 
shareholders. 53 
As to the duty of care, case law authorities setting common law duty of care 
standard can date back to at least the early 1800s. One of the early leading cases, 
51 See William Allen et. al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in 
Delaware 
Corporate Law, 56 Business Lawyer 1287,1290-1 (2001). 
52 Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A. 2d 619,624 (Del. 1984) 
53 Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A. 2d 1366,1375 (Del. 
1993) 
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Percy v. Millaudon, 54was decided in 1829 and held that directors were required to use 
the same care and diligence that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under 
similar circumstances. 55 Nowadays, this "ordinarily prudent person" or "conduct of 
reasonableness"standard largely holds true as the standard of conduct required of 
corporate directors in performing monitoring and decision-making functions. 56 
The duty to act in good faith, which meaning and contours previously observed by 
the Delaware Court of Chancery as "[s]hrouded in the fog of """ hazy jurisprudence"57, is 
affirmed as an independent type of fiduciary duty by Supreme Court of Delaware's 
seminal decision In re Walt Disney Co. derivative Litigation in June 2006.58 
Categorized as an intermediate type of fiduciary misconduct between "conduct 
motivated by substantive bad intent" and "conduct resulting from gross negligence", 59 
the concept of "intentional dereliction of duty", "a conscious disregard for one's 
responsibilities"60 is now at the heart of deciding whether corporate fiduciaries have 
acted in good faith. A director's conscious disregard for his duty of good faith, as 
suggested by the court, manifests "where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose 
other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary 
acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary 
intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act. , 61 
In short, the conceptualization of fiduciary duties suggests that the "conduct of 
sa 8 Mart. (n. s. ) 68 (La. 1829). 
ss Id. At 74-75,78. 
56 See e. g., ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance, 4.01 (a) ("A director or officer has a duty to the 
corporation to perform the director's or officer's functions... with the care that an ordinarily prudent person 
would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances"). 
Insofar as the board's duty to exercise due care in making a business decision is concerned, for example, a 
decision made by an "ordinarily prudent person" means the one flowing from a reasonable 
decision-making process and of reasonable quality in substance. See Melvin Eisenberg, The Divergence of 
Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 Fordham L. 
Rev. 437,441 (1993); 
see also William T. Allen et al, Realigning the Standard of Review of Director 
Due Care With Delaware 
Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny As a Standard of Review Problem, 
96 Nw. U. L. 
Rev., 449,452 (2002) (noting the normative standard of conduct is "reasonableness"). 
57 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation 907 A. 2d 693,755 (DeI. Ch., 
2005). 
58 
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation 907 A. 2d 
27 (Del., 2006). 
59 Id., at 67. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
109 
reasonableness" requirement62 appears to suggest a seemingly negligence standard of 
conduct in relation to managerial decision-making and oversight functions, akin to the 
objective reasonableness due care in tort law. This aspirational aspect of fiduciary 
duties however remains incomplete an observation. One has to read it into both the 
court review context and the context of statutory law to fully comprehend the fashion in 
which it functions as a control-and-direction mechanism over managerial conduct. The 
court review context concerns primarily the judicial exercise of the business judgment 
rule, while the enactment of the exculpation provision (section 102 (b) (7)) of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL") impacts tremendously on the reach of 
the duty of care. 
2. Business Judgment Rule and Divergence between Standards of Conduct and of 
Review 
The business judgment rule is not a substantive rule of law, but instead a rebuttable 
presumption. When reviewing a fiduciary duty claim, the Delaware court presumes the 
defendant-director had met three prerequisites underpinning the rule, and employs a 
"rationality" review standard should the plaintiff fail to rebut the presumption. The 
three prerequisites are, in making a business decision, the director had acted in good 
faith; been disinterested; and employed a decision-making process that had him 
informed. 63 If all these prerequisites fail to be rebutted, then the directors' honest, 
informed business decision will be protected by the business judgment rule with a 
"rationality" reviewing test employed, 64 which "as a practical matter, is that the 
decision is not reviewed". 65 
If these prerequisites are successfully rebutted on the ground of self-dealing, i. e., 
the director having a personal interest in the transaction at question that is adverse to the 
62 See, e. g., Allen et al, supra note 56, at 452 (noting the normative standard of conduct 
is 
"reasonableness"). 
63 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A. 2d 805,812 (Del. 1984); See also in re Walt Disney Co. Derivative 
Litigation 907 
A. 2d 693,746-47 (DeI. Ch., 2005). 
64 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A. 2d 858,872 (Del. 1985); See also Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A. 2d 805,812 
(Del. 1984). Accord, e. g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A. 2d 244,264 (Del. 2000). For the current purpose, an 
irrational act is "one that is so blatantly imprudent that 
it is inexplicable, in the sense that no 
well-motivated and minimally informed person could 
have made it". Allen et al, supra note 56, at 452. 
65 Id., at 457. 
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shareholders, the "absolute fairness test" applies. The director then will be imposed 
the burden of showing that the transaction is entirely fair, both as to the decision-making 
process and the transaction price. As to rebuttal on the ill-informed ground, the 
plaintiff-shareholder will first establish the decision had not been made on an informed 
basis (an element established since the Delaware Supreme Court's seminal decision of 
Smith v. Van Gorkom in 1985)66and, second, such defective decision-making procedure 
came out of "gross negligence", a review standard observed by some leading 
commentators as "akin to the reckless standard employed in other [non corporate-law] 
contexts". 67 
It should be noted the business judgment rule applies only to the extent where there 
is a director-made or authorized decision. 68 By decision the applicable scope of the 
business judgment rule however does not restrict to only those risk-taking or economic 
corporate decisions where a third party is usually involved; a decision on such internal 
procedures, programs and systems as "not to establish a written compliance program, 
but instead to delegate to an appropriate officer" is also within its range. 69 Thus, as a 
matter of law, only those inactions that are "unconsidered"70 would fall outside the 
66 The element of "being informed" as one prerequisite qualifying the application of the business 
judgment rule as the review standard was firmly established by the Delaware Supreme Court's watershed 
decision of Smith v. Van Gorkom in 1985, the year when "the duty of care emerged in Delaware as an 
independently enforceable obligation". See Allen et. al., supra note 51, at 1290. 
In Van Gorkom, outside directors who had approved, out of good faith, a sale of the corporation (a merger 
deal) at a fifty percent premium over the stock market price were held to have breached their duty of care 
by the Delaware Supreme Court for their decision was considered gross negligent. See Smith v. Van 
Gorkom. 488 A. 2d 858,893 (Del. 1985). The gross negligence came not from the decision's substance 
but derived from the matter of process-the outside directors were held liable for having reached their 
decision too hastily as the right information had not been obtained and the right questions not asked. The 
court decided the board had failed "(i) to require an independent valuation of the corporation or, 
alternatively, a reliable post-signing `market check; ' (ii) to negotiate an adequate "no shop" clause that 
would enable the board to consider a higher offer and give the board a reasonable basis to terminate the 
agreement; and (iii) to resist the CEO's domination of the decisionmaking process leading to the sale of 
the company. " See Allen et. al., supra note 51, at 1300-01 (summarizing Smith v. Van Gorkom. 488 A. 2d 
858,870-93 (Del. 1985)). 
67 See Allen et al, supra note 56, at 453, note 18-9 and accompanying text ("In the corporate context, 
gross negligence means `reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the whole body of 
stockholders' or actions which are `without the bounds of reason' ", citing from Tomczak v. Morton 
Thiokol, Inc., No. 7861,95 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 327 (Del. Ch., 1990)). 
68 Charles Hansen, The Duty of Care, The Business Judgment Rule, And The American Law Institute 
Corporate Governance Project, 48 Business Lawyer 1355,1355 (1993). 
69 ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance, cmt. (a)(1)-(a)(2). 
70 See Caremark, supra note 1, at 968 (using the phrase "unconsidered inaction" to refer to cases 
implicating with the liability for failure to monitor). 
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coverage of the business judgment rule. 
The above summations of the manner in which the Delaware court conducts their 
fiduciary duty reviews suggest a distinction between the standard of deferential judicial 
reviews and the standard of an aspirational or rhetorical ordinary-negligence duty - 
referred by some leading legal scholars as the divergence between the "standard of 
conduct" and "standard of review". 71 Whereas the former aspirational or rhetorical goal 
is addressed to directors, the latter setting forth review criteria is addressed to courts. 72 
One version of this analytical framework is now contained in the Model Business 
Corporation Act. 73 
This divergence is arguably even greater than the negligence vis-a-vis 
gross-negligence gap in the decision-making context where the alleged misconduct falls 
into an unconsidered inaction context. As enshrined in In Re Caremark, "only a 
sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight - such as an utter 
failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists - will 
71 MELVIN EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 544-49 (8TH ED. 2000); Melvin Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct 
and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 437,437 (1993) ("A standard of conduct 
states how an actor should conduct a given activity or play a given role. A standard of review states the 
test a court should apply when it reviews an actor's conduct to determine whether to impose liability or 
grant injunctive relief. "); see also Allen et al, supra note 56, at 449 (discussing policies underlying this 
approach and applying this framework to reviewing several Delaware cases regarding directors' duty of 
care); but see Stephen Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule As Abstention Doctrine, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 
83,89 (2004) (arguing the operation of the business judgment rule constitutes an abstention doctrine as 
opposed to conceptually any standard of liability, however lenient such standard might be, and it 
establishes a presumption against judicial review of duty of care claims). 
72 Allen et al, supra note 56, at 451. 
73 MBCA 8.30 requires the directors to act in good faith and in a manner the director reasonably believes 
to be in the corporation's best interest. Model Bus. Corp. Act 8.30 (a)(2002). Conduct falling short of 
those sec 8.30 requirements can only result in liability to the extent it violates the liability standards stated 
in MBCA 8.31. Id. 8.31 cmt. Namely, liability can be imposed where the director acted in bad faith, did 
not reasonably believe the action to be in the corporation's best interest, was not informed to the extent the 
director reasonably believed appropriate under the circumstances, was interested in the transaction, was 
not independent, engaged in self dealing, or failed to exercise oversight over a sustained period. Id. 8.31 
(a)(2). 
This divergence was noted in at least one federal case in early 1990s. See Joy v. North, 692 F. 2d 880,885 
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U. S. 1051 (1983) ("While it is often stated that corporate directors and 
officers will be liable for negligence in carrying out their corporate duties, all seem agreed that such a 
statement is misleading... Whereas an automobile driver who makes a mistake 
in judgment... will likely be 
called upon to respond in damages, a corporate officer who makes a mistake 
in judgment... will rarely, if 
ever, be found liable for damages suffered by the corporation"); See also 
Charles Hansen, The Duty of 
Care, The Business Judgment Rule, And The American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 48 
Business Lawyer 1355, note 15 and accompanying text (1993). 
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establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability". 74 The In Re 
Caremark standard stretching so far as to require an establishment of the 
defendant-director's "lack of good faith" (that is, bad faith) before liability imposition 
suggests outside the decision-making context a blurred boundary between due care and 
good faith (or loyalty) reviews. 
3. Managerial Due Care Duty under Exculpation Statute 
The Delaware system's refraining from second-guessing disinterested and good-faith 
managerial conduct manifests not only in court reviews but also in statute. Delaware's 
quick response to the Van Gorkom decision by enacting the director exculpation statute 
(section 102 (b) (7)75of DGCL) has substantially reversed the potentially enormous 
liability impact76 emanating from the process due care requirement established since 
Van Gorkom. Section 102 (b)(7) of the DGCL allows Delaware corporations to include 
in their certificates of incorporation a provision limiting or eliminating the monetary 
liability of their directors for breaching fiduciary duty, subject to the statute's explicitly 
prohibiting exculpation for duty of loyalty violations, for transactions deriving an 
improper personal benefit, and for actions not taken in good faith. The Delaware's 
move was followed by the vast majority of states, which adopted the similar version of 
liability exculpation as Section 102 (b) (7). 77 
The practical effect of the enactment of Section 102 (b) (7) as shown by a survey is, 
of one hundred of the largest American corporations, only seven did not have such 
protection for their directors. 78 In other words, corporate directors in the United States 
74 See Caremark, supra note 1, at 966; See also Charles Hansen, The Duty of Care, The Business 
Judgment Rule, And The American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 48 Business Lawyer 
1355,1358 (1993) (detaching the "good faith" concern from due care discussion but noting "express 
abandonment of duty or patterns of exacerbated neglect amounting to an abandonment of duty" as the 
basis of due care violations). 
75 Del. Code Ann. Tit. 6, § 102 (b) (7) (2003). 
76 The case of Van Gorkom was finally settled for $ 23 million, and the directors sustained 
in person for 
damage a total of $ 13 million, which was the amount beyond the coverage of the 
D&0 insurance. See 
John Reed & Matt Neiderman, "Good Faith " and the Ability of Directors to Assert §102 (B) (7) of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law as a Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and 
Similar Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29 Del. J. Corp. L. 111,113 (2004). 
77 See Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. §2.02, Statutory Comparison, note 6, at 2-31(comparing more than 
40 
states that have exculpation provisions). 
78 Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 477,497, 
App. a (1999) 
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are now largely immune from the gross negligence liability pertaining to the 
process-centred due care requirements. With the adoption of the exculpation statute, 
the remaining relevance of the due care duty is therefore limited to its acting as the basis 
for rescinding or enjoining a transaction, subject to the same deferential process-oriented 
judicial review as applied to liability review. 79 
4. Intentional Dereliction and Disloyalty Cases as Fiduciary Duty Claims of 
Practical Relevance 
The Delaware court's review over directors' disinterested and good-faith activities is 
highly deferential to the extent, as noted by one authority, "the pre-Van Gorkom case 
law reflected a judicial aversion to reviewing directors action for any purpose other than 
identifying (and remedying) breaches of the duty of loyalty". 80 
In fact, even after the 1985 Van Gorkom decision, the substance or quality of a 
managerial decision is still off limits to the court's review; instead, it is the process due 
care concept8' emerging as the core of the due care review -a director will only be 
personal liable for, out of gross-negligence, being ill-informed during decision-making 
processes which incur losses on the corporation entrusted to him. With this 
process-oriented review mode being subsequently rendered largely irrelevant upon the 
enactment of the exculpation statute in Delaware (and followed by other states) and a 
vast majority of Delaware companies' adoption of it, so has due care duty become 
irrelevant in term of the management's liability exposure. 
On a practical note, the recent high-profile decision of re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litigation 82 is then instrumental. By explicitly linking deliberate 
indifference83 in performing managerial functions to a breach of good faith duty, which 
(comparing fortune 500 companies' articles of incorporation that include exculpatory provisions limiting 
the director's monetary liability). 
79 Allen et al, supra note 56, at 451, note 10 and accompanying text (arguing 
for the same reason of 
promoting beneficial risk-taking, the same review standard should be adopted 
in the context of rescinding 
or enjoining a transaction as should in the liability context). 
8° Allen et at, supra note 56, at 450. 
81 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A. 2d 244,264 (Del. 2000). See also Lynn 
A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure. An 
Economic and Behavioral Defence of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 
96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 675,675 (2002) 
82 825 A. 2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
83 The court concluded the alleged facts had been successful 
in giving rise to a reason to doubt business 
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falls outside the protection of Section 102 (b) (7), the Delaware judiciary indicates that 
intentional abdication of managerial function has emerged as a primary type of 
misconduct implicating with managerial fiduciary liability exposure. Specifically, the 
projection of these intentional dereliction claims might at least cover two subsets of 
misconduct demonstrating a good-faith breach: first, the Re Caremark type of sustained 
and systemic failures concerning establishing internal controls or procedures; second, 
the intentional violation of applicable positive law and regulations. 84 
Overall, intentional dereliction good-faith violations, alongside self-interest loyalty 
breaches, would then become the focal point implicating with managerial fiduciary-duty 
liability under Delaware law. 
B. Shareholders as Enforcers and Ultimate Beneficiaries of Managerial Conduct 
The shareholder's general exclusive beneficiary status in connection with managerial 
conduct is manifest under Delaware law. 85 Shareholders' dominance over other 
corporate constituencies is further enhanced by being the exclusive enforcer of fiduciary 
judgment protection by stating "... the facts alleged in the new complaint suggest that the defendant 
directors consciously and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities, adopting a `we don't care about 
the risks' attitude concerning a material corporate decision. " (Emphasis included) Id. at 289. 
84 See E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the Professional 
Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. Corp. L. 441,447 (2003) (noting that intentional violations of law 
implicate good faith by stating that "the utter failure to follow the minimum expectations of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, or the NYSE or NASDAQ Rules """ might ".. raise a good faith issue") 
85 Delaware's jurisprudence holds firm the primacy of shareholder interst in connection with the 
management's decision-making and oversight functions. Among the rare exceptions where other corporate 
constituencies' interests might override that of the shareholder concerns the board's deliberation over a 
hostile takeover threat. The shareholder's exclusive duty-recipient status was clearly supported by the 
Delaware courts. For example, the Former Chancellor William Allen in a 1986 case stated: "[i]t is the 
obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-term interests of the corporation's 
shareholders; that they may sometimes do so `at the expense' of others. . . 
does not for that reason 
constituting a breach of duty. " See Katz v Oak Indus, Inc., 508 A 2d 873,879 (Del Ch 
1986); see also 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A. 2d 173,182 (Del. 1986) (to the same effect of 
Katz); Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A. 2d 34,43 (Del. 1993) ("the directors 
owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders. 
") (quoting Mills 
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A. 2d 1261,1280 (Del. 1989) (citations omitted); 
Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A. 2d 805,811 (Del. 1984) (directors owe "fundamental fiduciary obligations to the 
corporation and its shareholders") (footnote and citations omitted); 
Guth v. Loft, 5 A. 2d 503,510 (Del. 
1939) ("Corporate officers and directors... stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and 
its 
shareholders. "). 
The takeover exception might occur in connection with directors' 
defensive measures towards a hostile 
takeover and the deciding factor considered can be the "impact 
[of the takeover] on `constituencies' other 
than shareholders ... perhaps even 
the community generally". See Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum 
Co, 493 
A 2d 946,955 (Del 1985).; 
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duties. The description of fiduciary duties being owed to the corporation was 
suggested as "go[ing] no more to the procedures for enforcement and the nature of the 
remedy than to the identification of their ultimate beneficiaries". 86 
C. Managerial Functions in Change-of-control Context and Corresponding 
Judicial Review 
Delaware courts' disparate responses in reviewing transactions of mergers and 
acquisitions or transactions involving tender offers (hereinafter "change-of-control 
deals") are a typical exercise of how the triad of the intertwined policy concerns 
embedding Delaware corporate law - promoting shareholder interests to boost 
risk-taking, minimizing the managerial agency cost and maintaining corporate 
separateness - is considered and realized. For our current purposes, 
change-of-control deals are instrumental for at least two reasons. 
First, the lion share of fiduciary duty claims takes place in the change-of control 
setting. , 
Based on data of all suits filed in 1999 and 2000 in the Delaware Chancery 
Court, a study suggested approximately 80 percent of the fiduciary duty claims are class 
actions against public companies challenging director conduct in mergers and 
acquisitions. 87 
Second, the diversity of judicial reviews in the change-of-control setting 
concerning fiduciary duty claims provides a wealth of sources for legal and policy 
analyses. This diversity comes from certain inherent tensions in the change-of-control 
context. Where there are different kinds of change-of-control deals, different levels 
and natures of built-in tensions among various corporate constituencies arise, met by 
judicial reviews predicating on disparate review parameters. For one thing, the 
incumbent management's stake of continuously holding on to office might clash with 
88 
the stockholders' interests of simply securing the best tender price on offer. For 
86 See Mitchell, supra note 13, at note 73 and accompanying text (citing cases regarding the shareholders' 
procedural standings as to bringing derivative actions on behalf of the corporation and appraisal 
proceeding). 
87 Robert Thompson & Randall Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-oriented 
Class Actions, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 133,137 (2004). 
88 This category of cases differs from the traditional one of 
breaching duty of loyalty, which primarily 
involved self-interest transactions from which the directors 
derived personal financial interests. In a 
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another, even absent dispersed shareholding and thus entrenched management, the 
shareholder interest could still directly compete with that of stakeholders such as the 
employee in a change-of-control deal context the former might be willing to sell out 
the company to the highest bidder; the latter might tend to reject the deal to avoid job 
losses. Furthermore, the judicial considerations of upholding the principle of entity 
separateness might add an extra twist to tension scenarios in the parent-subsidiary 
context of a change-of-control deal. 
The above-stated tension scenarios corresponding to selective leading Delaware 
judicial decisions will be discussed and analyzed below. It is found in various tension 
scenarios the court decisions are meant to direct managerial conduct to exclusively 
fostering the interest of the shareholder, not that of those non-shareholder stakeholders. 
And the court in generally honors the corporate separateness principle during review, 
notwithstanding this approach might actually work against the commercial reality. 
1. Judicial Reviews over Tensions Deriving from Entrenched Management 
Absent a parent-subsidiary or a controlling-minority shareholder context, even though 
Delaware courts generally recognize that managerial decisions made in the 
change-of-control context would more likely involve self-dealings or conflicts of 
interests and hence more likely pose greater risk of agency costs than otherwise, 89 the 
court's normally deferential standard of review would generally apply to such deals 
should the court have been convinced the deal at question was negotiated on an arm's 
length basis. 90 
Against this backdrop, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, the celebrated case 
decided by the Delaware Supreme Court in mid 1980s, is instrumental in that it shows 
the possibility of an enhanced fiduciary duty in the change-of-control context by 
recognizing "there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the 
change-of-control case, the director has no direct pecuniary 
interest but an entrenchment interest-"an 
interest in protecting their existing control of the corporation". See Allen et al, supra note 
51, at 1290. 
89 Robert Thompson & Randall Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-oriented 
Class Actions, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 133,145 (2004). 
90 The business judgment rule, including the standards by which director conduct 
is judged, is applicable 
in the context of a takeover. Pogostin v. Rice, 480 
A. 2d 619,627 (Del., 1984). 
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threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred". 91 
In Unocal, the court reviewed tactics adopted by the board intended to purchasing 
shares with corporate funds (a self-tender offer by corporation for its own shares) 
against a hostile deal of two-tier "front loaded" cash tender offer launched by a minority 
shareholder. Whereas such defensive measure was considered not universally 
disallowed, the Unocal court noted "... the inherent danger in the purchase of shares with 
corporate funds to remove a threat to... " control and, under such circumstances, "[t]he 
directors are of necessity confronted with a conflict of interest... " to secure their 
remaining in office by deploying corporate funds. 92 As a result, despite the court's 
findings the defensive tactics had been effected by an independent board acting good 
faith, an intermediate review standard (of the intensity between the deferential business 
judgment rule and the entire fairness principle) was adopted: in order to sustain 
defensive measures over a judicial-review challenge, the board was required to prove 
the existence of a threat to the corporate policy and effectiveness and that the defensive 
93 tactic was a proportional response to that threat. 
2. Judicial Reviews over Tensions between Shareholders and Stakeholders 
In Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 94 the Delaware Supreme Court 
affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision which found the directors of Revlon, Inc. 
(Revlon) had breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty to the shareholder by entering into 
transactions that effectively ended an active auction for Revlon, and consequently 
enjoined three defensive measures accorded to one bidder by the board against another, 
i. e., a lock-up option, a no-shop provision and a promise of payment of $ 25 million 
91 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A. 2d 946,954 (Del. 1985). 
92 Id., at 955. 
93 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 954-5. 
The Unocal Court allowed a defendant director initiating defensive tactics against a 
hostile takeover on 
the ground of the interests of "corporate enterprise" (acting as a proof of reasonableness of 
the adopted 
defensive tactics) whereby the shareholder interest was not a controlling factor 
but included alongside the 
ones of other constituencies. See Id. At 955-6. The implication of this 
"corporate enterprise" approach 
should nevertheless not to be overstated. Given its unenforceability, 
it would be more accurately depicted 
as a stance of preserving the board's business discretion as opposed 
to protecting non-shareholder 
stakeholders. 
94 Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A. 
2d 173 (Del. 1985) 
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cancellation fee. 95 
Revlon was the case dealing with the tension between stockholders and other 
stakeholders. In the change-of-control context, the shareholder-stakeholder tension 
becomes imminent when the break-up of a company is inevitable, following a high 
bidding price that would almost guarantee stockholders to be tempted to tender their 
shares. While the stockholders are happy to accept the premium price on offer, the 
company's ultimate break-up and sold-out upon the deal's consummation might see such 
stakeholders as the employee loses their jobs. 96 In Revlon, imminence of this tension 
in the face of an active hostile bidding contest for corporate control happened when 
Pantry Pride (one of the bidders in question) increased its offer to $ 50 per share, and 
upon which, as directed by the Court, "[t]he directors' role changed from defenders of 
the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the 
stockholders at a sale of the company. , 97 Ultimately, it was decided the Revlon board 
had breached its duty of loyalty to the shareholders by deciding not to sell the company 
to the highest bidder. 98 
The Revlon duty was expanded by the Delaware Supreme Court in Paramount 
Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. that brought back the application of the test 
to well ahead of the corporation's inevitable break-up to include simply "a sale of 
control". 99 
3. Judicial Reviews in Parent-subsidiary Context and Entity Separateness 
Subsidiary directors' fiduciary duty is one extremely troublesome topic of American 
9s Id, at 176 
96 See e. g., Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in 
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988). 
97 Id, at 182. 
98 Id. 
99 The Court noted: "There are few events that have a more significant impact on the stockholders than a 
sale of control or a corporate break-up. Each event represents a fundamental 
(and perhaps irrevocable) 
change in the nature of the corporate enterprise from a practical standpoint. 
It is the significance of each 
of these events that justifies: (a) focusing on the directors' obligation to seek the 
best value reasonably 
available to the stockholders; and (b) requiring a close scrutiny of 
board action which could be contrary to 
the stockholders' interests. " See Paramount Communications Inc. v. 
QVC Network Inc., 637 A. 2d 34, 
47-8 (1993). 
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corporate law. 100 The root cause at the heart of this difficulty is that the 
domination-accountability mismatch normally embedding the management-shareholder 
relationships on which the Unocal rule was premised simply does not exist in 
parent-subsidiary transactions. The parent with its block shareholding as the 
subsidiary's majority shareholder (or in simply a sole-shareholder capacity) is fully 
equipped to control the subsidiary's management if it chooses so. The 
parent-subsidiary tension therefore lies elsewhere. 
Comparing to the minority shareholder's predicament in a change-of-control 
transaction where the majority block-holder may force through an offer with a 
below-market price to have the minority shareholder tender their shares in order to 
wholly own the company, 101 the subsidiary's minority shareholder in a merger deal 
would suffer just the same from inferior bargaining power against the parent's offer. 102 
Whereas in case law it is well established that the majority owes fiduciary duty to the 
corporation's minority shareholder when in relation to the corporation it controls the 
majority stands on both sides of the transaction, 103 the problem is much more complex 
in the parent-subsidiary setting as, unlike the ordinary majority-minority shareholder 
tension that goes on under the same corporate roof, here at least two legal entities are 
involved. 
In Delaware, the review standard of a transaction between the parent and its 
subsidiary was addressed by the Delaware Supreme Court's seminal decision, 
Weinberger v. UOP, 104 re-confirmed and reinforced by the same court's several 
100 Eric Gouvin, Resolving The Subsidiary Director's Dilemma, 47 Hastings L. J. 287,289 (1996) (noting 
"[e]ven the American Law Institute has trouble determining to whom corporate directors owe their 
fiduciary duty. The drafters of the Principles of Corporate Governance changed the term `duty of 
loyalty' 
to `duty of fair dealing' precisely because determining the beneficiary of the 
duty of loyalty is so fraught 
with uncertainty", and citing A. L. I., Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and 
Recommendations, 
Part V, introductory note a, at 264 (Proposed Draft, Mar. 31,1992). 
101 Id. 
102 See Id., at 290 (illustrating the divergence of interests between the parent 
(as the majority shareholder) 
and the subsidiary's minority shareholder that, under a group structure, would give 
the parent incentive to 
command over its subsidiaries deals that are detrimental to one particular subsidiary's 
minority 
shareholders but beneficial to the group as a whole, e. g., an overly risky 
loan commanded by the parent to 
be made by its bank subsidiary to its another subsidiary that is nearly 
bankrupt. ) 
103 See e. g., Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc., 
638 A. 2d 1110,1111 (Del., 1994). 
104 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A. 2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
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following decisions. 105 Of the primary issues106 in Weinberger was to whom the 
fiduciary duty were owed by the directors holding dual directorships at both parent and 
subsidiary companies' boards. Putting in context, it involves two directors holding the 
parent-subsidiary dual directorships failed to disclose to the subsidiary's board 
information regarding a feasibility study made by them exclusively for the interest of the 
parent's proposed merger with the subsidiary. 107 The court decided the two directors 
breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty to the subsidiary as the disclosure to the 
subsidiary board was wholly flawed and thus failed to pass the strict "entire fairness" 
judicial challenge. 108 The fact they held dual directorships simply put them on the two 
sides of the transaction in question, invited the application of the stringent entire fairness 
review and provided no safe harbor for such divided loyalties. '09 Weinberger court 
then fashioned its ruling along the entity line and decided "... individuals who act in a 
dual capacity as directors of two corporations, one of whom is parent and the other 
subsidiary, owe the same duty of good management to both corporations". ' lo It further 
noted in this context the duty is to be performed and reviewed judicially "in light of 
what is best for both companies"' 11 -a review standard hardly sheds any light on its 
substance. ' 12 
105 See e. g., Kahn, supra note 103, at 1120-21 (noting the burden of proving entire fairness shifted to the 
plaintiff-shareholder in an interested merger transaction upon the approval of an independent, informed 
committee that had the freedom to negotiate at arm's length); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A. 2d 85,97 
(Del. 2001) ( "The decision in Weinberger continues to be the seminal pronouncement by this Court 
regarding the entire fairness standard of judicial review. "). 
106 Since the subsidiary at question was not wholly owned by its parent, Weinberger also addressed the 
fiduciary duty owed by the majority shareholder to the minority shareholder. The court restated the entire 
fairness review test as applied to the fiduciary duty owed by the parent (the majority shareholder of the 
subsidiary) to the minority shareholder of the subsidiary. And it found the directors (taking the 
parent/subsidiary dual directorship) withholding information did result in the subsidiary's minority 
shareholder losing over $ 17,000,000 by not being able to secure a better deal with the parent. 
See 
Weinberger, supra note 104, at 714. 
107 Id., at 708 & 711. 
108 Weinberger Court opined the concept of fairness has two fundamental aspects, 
i. e., fair dealing and 
fair price. While "[a]ll aspects of the issue must be examined as a whole since the question 
is one of entire 
fairness", in the absence of a fraudulent transaction, the court noted, the price may 
be the predominant 
consideration outweighing other factors of the merger. See Id, at 711; see also 
Kahn, supra note 103, at 
1115 ("[a] controlling or dominating shareholder standing on 
both sides of a transaction, as in a 
parent-subsidiary context, bears the burden of proving its entire fairness". 
) 
109 Id, at 710. 
110 Id. 
"' Id. 711 
112 One may try to justify the Weinberger approach of requiring the subsidiary 
director to pledge their 
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What makes the Weinberger formula more puzzling is its application to 
wholly-owned subsidiary directors' fiduciary duty. What if in Weinberger the 
subsidiary in question was wholly owned by a single shareholder and by withholding 
information from the subsidiary board, actually none of the shareholder interest could 
have possibly been hurt, but, on the contrary, such practice would have only facilitated 
the shareholder - the parent - entering into and consummating the deal. Under this 
hypothetical situation, could the requirement for undivided loyalty pledged to the 
subsidiary (as opposed to the sole shareholder) still be realistic and reasonable for the 
subsidiary director who was appointed by the parent and whose job, in reality, might be 
no more than doing the bidding of the parent? ' 13 
Delaware Supreme Court has at least in one case (Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. 
Panhandle Eastern Corp. ) explicitly ruled out the ordinarily prevalent formula : "... in a 
parent and wholly-owed subsidiary context, the director of the subsidiary are obliged 
only to manage the affairs of the subsidiary in the best interests of the parent and its 
shareholders". 114 The Anadarko decision is a logical adjustment to the judiciary's 
ordinary formula working along the entity-boundary. This approach is coherent with 
the current system's core value of safeguarding shareholder interests, and shareholder 
interests only. 
It is for practical reason as well, as observed by Gouvin: 
"They [directors of the wholly owned subsidiary] understand that ultimate control of the 
corporation rests with the shareholders, who can either sell their shares to other investors 
loyalty to the subsidiary as opposed to the majority shareholder by resorting to presumably the cause of 
safeguarding the minority against the majority shareholder's abuse, a cause seemingly coherent with the 
Delaware courts' longstanding position. On closer examination, however, it can be argued minority 
shareholder protection could be more appropriately addressed by having recourse to the parent (the 
majority shareholder) rather than the subsidiary director as the source of the "domination-accountability" 
tension is between the majority-parent and the minority shareholder rather than between the minority 
shareholder and the subsidiary directors. 
113 The subsidiary director's dilemma under current law was aptly put by one commentator as: "[c]ase 
law leaves subsidiary directors wondering whether their duty runs primarily to the parent corporation as 
shareholder, to the subsidiary corporation itself as an entity, or even to other constituencies such as 
creditors, regulators, employees, and communities. " See Gouvin, supra note 100, at 289. 
114 545 A. 2d 1171,1174 (Del. 1988). 
To whom the wholly-owned subsidiary's director owes his fiduciary duty is certainly not a settled issue 
in 
the United States. See, e. g., Enriquez, supra note 35, at 97 ("... directors of a wholly-owned subsidiary 
owe the corporation fiduciary duties, just as they would any other corporation. ", cited 
from First Am. 
Corp. v. Al-Nahyan 17 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D. D. C. 1998)). 
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or vote different directors into office. The directors also understand that the shareholders 
are the only group that can sue the board on behalf of the corporation. This centralization 
of power in the shareholders focuses director attention on shareholder interests to the 
exclusion of other interests. " "s 
Consequently, before any fundamental change being made to the current 
shareholder-centered corporate law environments, the shareholder's excusive legal 
standing of enforcing fiduciary duty claims and the corporate representative system for 
example, the reality is that the wholly-owned subsidiary's director can only have the 
incentive to work towards the interest of the subsidiary's parent, as the sole shareholder, 
not that of the company, notwithstanding the law may require an undivided loyalty. 
D. Stakeholder Protection 
In terms of stakeholder (as opposed to shareholder) protection, corporate management 
are under an established duty to refrain from knowingly causing or permitting the 
corporation to violate the law or regulation that is aimed at protecting stakeholders. "6 
If they did breach the duty and, consequently, financial damages had been inflicted on 
the corporation (e. g., taking the form of penalties against the corporation imposed by a 
governmental agency), they could be sued by the shareholders on behalf of the 
corporation for fiduciary duty violations. Other than this deliberate violation of 
stakeholder law or regulation, stakeholder protection is largely not a corporate-law 
agenda standing in its own right but simply the one relegated to the overall consideration 
for promoting shareholders' profits. 
1. Stakeholder Protection in General: Derivative Approach under Corporate Law 
For stakeholders such as employees or creditors who stand outside the 
insolvency 
context, efforts to promote their interests by resorting to the corporate management's 
11$ See Gouvin, supra note 100, at 303. 
116 See Charles Hansen, The Duty of Care, The Business Judgment Rule, 
And The American Law Institute 
Corporate Governance Project, 48 Business Lawyer 1355, note 107 and accompanying text 
(1993) (citing 
Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 38 N. Y. S. 2d 270,272-73 
(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1942); Abrams v. Allen, 74 N. 
E. 2d 305,306 (N. Y. 1947); Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffle, 409 f. 2d 1277,1283-86 
(10th Cir. 1969)). 
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duty owed to the "company" will be much likely nothing but a futile operation. This 
observation holds true notwithstanding some reform proposals seemingly display a more 
inclusive approach. Although addressed to the UK's context, the "enlightened 
shareholder value" approach included in the UK's recent company law reform provides 
a good reference point to the "constituency clause" adopted by American state corporate 
statutes. 
The term enlightened shareholder value was used in the Final Report117 published 
in July 2001 by the Steering Group, the body leading the UK's Company Law Review 
launched since March 1998.118 As declared by the government, this value will set the 
tone in implementing changes recommended by the Company Law Review to the 
current law. 119 As far as directors' duties are concerned, one draft statutory statement 
in the Final Report provides120 that "a director of a company must in any given case (a) 
act in the way he decides, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of 
the company for the benefit of its members as a whole...; and (b) in deciding what 
would be most likely to promote the success, take account in good faith of all the 
material factors that it is practicable in the circumstances for him to identify"(emphases 
added). It follows immediately in the explanatory note that "the material factors" to be 
taken into account for the purpose of "promoting the benefit of its members as a whole" 
when directors discharge duties include business relationships (such as those with 
employees, suppliers and customers), impacts on the communities and environments and 
reputation of the company. 121 With the key-phrase "success of the company for the 
benefit of its members as a whole", obviously the lip service provided here will not alter 
the current duty framework, which place stakeholder interests (if considered at all) 
117 See Steering Group, Modern Company Law For A Competitive Economy: Final Report (July 2001). 
This Report was reacted with its proposed reform framework generally endorsed by the 
Government in a 
White Paper in July 2002. See Government White Paper, Modernising Company Law, Cm5533,16 July 
2002. 
118 In March 1998, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) launched a fundamental review of 
English company law whose aim is to "develop a simple, modern, efficient and cost effective 
framework 
for carrying out business activity in Britain for the twenty-first century". 
For more background 
information of the Company Law Review, see the DTI website http: 
//www. dti. gov. uk/cld/review. htm. 
119 The DTI expressly declared the concept of enlightened shareholder value as a core value 
to the 
company law reform. See http'//www dti. gov uk/cld/re view tmtm. 
120 Steering Group, Final Report, Section 2, Sch. 2, Annex C. 
l21 Steering Group, Final Report, notes to Section 2, Sch. 2, Annex C. 
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subordinated to that of the shareholder rather than they are enforceable and valid in their 
own right. 122 
The English "enlightened shareholder value" approach with respect to concerns 
over non-shareholder corporate constituencies is comparable to the constituency clause 
incorporated into more than half of state corporate laws back to 1980s in the US. For 
one thing, they are all permissive rather than mandatory in nature. An Indiana Clause, 
for example, provides: "In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board 
of directors, committees of the board, individual directors and individual officers may, in 
considering the best interests of the corporation, consider the effects of any action upon 
employees, suppliers and customers of the corporation, communities in which offices or 
other establishments of the corporation are located and all other pertinent factors". 123 
Noticeably, this seemingly broad coverage concerning stakeholder interests was 
qualified by the ALI that "directors may take into account the interests of other 
constituencies but only as and to the extent that the directors are acting in the best 
interests, long as well as short term, of shareholders and the corporations. " 124 
Moreover, in Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes 125 where the Supreme Court of 
Delaware for the first time addressed the extent to which the management, in the 
takeover context, may consider the impact on constituencies other than shareholders, 126 
the court decided whereas a concern for various corporate constituencies was proper 
when addressing a takeover threat, "that principle is limited by the requirement that 
there be some rationally related benefit accruing to the stockholders". 
127 As a result, the 
net effect of these enabling constituency clauses is no more and less than the proposed 
enlightened shareholder value, working to the similar effects of diluting the 
shareholders' power on one hand and restating the boards' broad business discretion 
122 See e. g., Lilian Miles, Company Stakeholderss, 24 The Company Lawyer 56,57-8 
(2003). 
123 ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE, Note 6 to Sec. 2.01 (citing this Illinois clause from III. Ann. 
Sta. ch. 32, sec. 8.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989)) 
124 Id. (citing from Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential 
for Confusion, 
45 Bus. Law. 2253,2269 (1990)). 
125 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 
A. 2d 173 (Del. 1985). 
126 See id. at 176. 
127 See id. At 182. The passage is "[a] lthough such [stakeholder] considerations may 
be permissible, 
there are fundamental limitations upon that prerogative. 
A board may have regard for various 
constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related 
benefits accruing to 
the shareholders". 
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under the traditional business judgment rule on the other. 128 "The statutes are a shield for managers, not a sword for... other non-shareholder groups". ' 29 
One extra caveat warrants mentioning here is that Delaware never adopts 
constituency statute. Apart from the management's knowingly violating the positive 
law and regulations addressing stakeholder protection leading to the corporation's losses 
(for example, taking the form of the labor agency's penalty assessment on the 
corporation for breaching the minimum wage protection accorded to the employee), 
which upon the Disney decision has been confirmed as a sub-set of the bad-faith breach, 
the slim likelihood that stakeholder protection can somehow be covered by the 
management in discharging their fiduciary duties could therefore come only from a 
reference to the "long-term" interests of the shareholders. In other words, in real world 
these permissive "good-cause" rules can give only very little, if any, impetus in guiding 
the behaviors of corporate management beyond philanthropic activities that have 
secured the shareholder's endorsement. 
2. Creditor Protection under Insolvency Exception 
One of the rare situations under which there is a possibility the Delaware corporate law 
and the court might put the interests of stakeholders ahead of those of shareholders is 
insolvency. 130 Some Delaware courts go further back that while the company's 
128 See Eric Wills Orts, A North American Legal Perspective on Stakeholder Management Theory, in 
PERSPECTIVE ON COMPANY: 2 176 (Fiona Macmillan Patfield ed., 1997 ). 129 See Brett McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee Governance, 30 Wm. Mitchell 
L. Rev. 1227,1231 (2004). McDonnell noted today the constituency statutes have very little use in the 
courtroom: "Few court cases have even mentioned constituency statutes, and the statutes do not seem to 
have been decisive for the outcome in cases that do mention such statutes". One reason constituency 
statutes do not make a visible impact in court was suggested to be if "... an action is defensible only by 
reference to groups other than shareholders is not likely to help the corporation's share price" See Id. At 
1232; see also Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False Fears, 19 
Ann. Surv. Am. L. 85 (1999). 
130 An insolvency situation can be legally indicated differently. It can be "the inability of a corporation to 
pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of business. " See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40 
(c)(2). The U. S. Bankruptcy Code adopts a different standard and defines insolvency as "a financial 
condition such that the sum of such entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property at a fair 
valuation. " See 11 U. S. C. § 101 (32)(A). 
It was suggested the Delaware Chancery Court routinely chooses to use the "inability to repayment" 
formulation of the Model Business Corporation Act as it better reflects the dynamics of corporate business. 
See Gary Marsh, The Many Faces of Directors' Fiduciary Duties, 22 American Bankruptcy Institute 
Journal 14,15 (2003). This view is supported by cases such as Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 
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financial situation is "in the vicinity of insolvency""' or "approaches insolvency"132 
the directors might owe some forms of fiduciary duties to the creditors. Conversely 
speaking, one basic rule is that director of a solvent company does not owe fiduciary 
duties to the company's creditor, 133 and, rather, it is by way of contractual arrangements 
for creditors to protect their interests. 134 
The rationale underpinning this insolvency exception is, in essence, because while 
the shareholders' capital become depleted, creditors become residual risk bearers whose 
recovery is dependent on the business decisions of directors and management. 135 The 
following examines in case law, apart from the management's duties in relation to 
protecting creditors' contractual and priority rights, the extent to which the court extends 
an affirmative and general claim to the creditors. The findings are, while as indicated 
by the Delaware Chancery Court's Credit Lyonnais decision, the management could be 
under a duty to mediate among the interests of the shareholder and the creditor when the 
corporation approaches insolvency but remain solvent, the court failed to establish more 
substantive standards to flesh in such duty. The end result might be, in practice, the 
same defer-to-management formula as used in ordinary, solvent situations would be 
applied to insolvency or near insolvency. This ambiguity is compounded by the 
A. 2d 784,787 (Del. Ch. 1992) (concluding that the fiduciary duty to creditors arises upon insolvency in 
fact). 
131 See e. g., Credit Lyonnais, supra note 9, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30,1991) (holding a directorial duty to 
creditors arises where a corporation is "operating in the vicinity of insolvency" that he has "an obligation 
to the community of interest that sustained the corporation, to exercise judgment in an informed, good 
faith effort to maximize the corporation's long-term wealth creating capacity". ) 
132 Robert Millner, What Does It Mean For Directors of Financially Troubled Corporations to Have 
Fiduciary Duties To Creditors? 9 Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice 201,206 (2000) ("[I]t is 
universally agreed that when a corporation approaches insolvency or actually becomes insolvent, 
directors' fiduciary duties expand to include general creditors", cited from In re Kingston Square 
Associations, 214 B. R. 713,735 (Bankr. S. D. N. Y. 1997)). 
133 See Id., at 205-6. The American case law is rather explicit on this point. See, e. g., Simons v Cogan 549 
A. 2d 300,304 (Del. 1988) (holding holders of convertible debentures are not owed fiduciary duties, and 
"before a fiduciary arises, an existing property right or equitable interest supporting such a duty must 
exist"). 
134 See PHILIP WOOD, INTERNATIONAL LOANS, BONDS AND SECURITIES REGULATION 122 
(1995, Sweet & Maxwell) (noting some standard risk-control covenants in a loan agreement, e. g., 
negative pledge, pan passu clause and anti-disposal clause, working to the creditor's favour by putting in 
place certain restraints over the debtor's assets to assure their repayment capability); See also Ann Stilson, 
Reexamining the Fiduciary Paradigm at Corporate Insolvency and Dissolution: Defining Directors' 
Duties to Creditors, 20 Del. J. Corp. L. 1 (1995) (noting the creditors may negotiate contractual 
safeguards to reduce risk of the debtors' breach. They may negotiate a security 
interest, seek limited proxy 
rights, or even negotiate representation on the debtor's board for the term of their contract). 
135 See Millner, supra note 132, at 206-8. 
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disparate judicial rulings regarding to whom the management of insolvent corporations 
owe such duty. 
a. Duty to Protecting Creditors' Contractual and Priority Rights 
Under insolvency circumstances, some courts considered the corporate management, as 
trustees, were obliged to managing the insolvent corporation for the corporate creditor, 
as beneficiaries' 36 The trustee-beneficiary relationship naturally leads to the loyalty 
demand that directors are disallowed to engaging in self-dealings, criminal or fraudulent 
acts, or otherwise put their interests ahead of creditors. 137 The extent to which 
fiduciary duties owed by the management to creditors in insolvency might be 
comparable to another prescriptive obligation refraining the management from 
transferring assets for the benefit of insiders and shareholders, and from making 
preferential payments to the detriment of the corporation's creditor. Namely, the duty 
as such is simply aimed at protecting creditors' existing contractual and priority rights in 
insolvency, rather than proactively fostering their interests. 
In Ben Franklin, this point was explicitly made by the court: "... [C]reditors have a 
right to expect that directors will not divert, dissipate or unduly risk assets necessary to 
satisfy their claims. This is the appropriate scope of a duty that exists only to protect the 
contractual and priority rights of creditors. "138 
b. Credit Lyonnais Affirmative Duty to Mediate and its Limitations 
The broadest possible scope of fiduciary duties that might be enjoyed by the creditor 
was presented by the groundbreaking yet controversial Delaware decision of Credit 
136 A leading case to this effect is Bovay v. H. M. Byllesby & Co. where the Delaware 
Supreme Court's 
dicta read: "An insolvent corporation is civilly dead in the sense that its property may 
be administered in 
equity as a trust fund for the benefit of creditors. " See Bovay v. H. M. Byllesby 
& Co., 38 A. 2d 808 (Del. 
1944); See also Gary Marsh, The Many Faces of Directors' Fiduciary 
Duties, 22 American Bankruptcy 
Institute Journal 14,16 (2003). 
137 These insider misconduct cases most likely arise where a "triple insider", a 
dominant shareholder, who 
was also a director and CEO of a failing corporation, is involved. 
See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295,60 S. 
Ct. 238,84 L. Ed. 281 (1939). 
138 In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc., 225 B. R. 655 
(Bankr. N. D. Ill. 1998), aff'd in relevant part, 
1999 WL 982963 (N. D. 111.1999). 
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Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N. V. v. Pathe Communications Corp. 1'9 The court noted 
"the potential differing interests between the corporation and its 98% shareholder", 140 
and then set out the dictum "at least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of 
insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but 
owes its duty to the corporate enterprise. " 141 This duty was explained as "... an 
obligation to the community of interest that sustained the corporation, to exercise 
judgment in an informed, good faith effort to maximize the corporation's long-term 
wealth creating capacity". 142 In footnote 55 of the decision, the court further 
emphasized: 
"[t]he possibility of insolvency can do curious things to incentives, exposing creditors to 
risks of opportunistic behaviour and creating complexities for directors... [D]irectors who 
are capable of conceiving of the corporation as a legal and economic entity. . . will 
recognize that in managing the business affairs of a solvent corporation in the vicinity of 
insolvency, circumstances may arise when the right (both the efficient and the fair) course 
to follow for the corporation may diverge from the choice that the stockholders (or the 
creditors, or the employees, or any single group interested in the corporation) would make 
if given the opportunity to act". 
143 
139 Credit Lyonnais, supra note 9, at *34. In Credit Lyonnais, the creditor bank entered into the Voting 
Right Agreements and the Voting Trust Agreement to obtain control of the financially distressed 
corporation at question. The creditor bank subsequently exercised the contractual right and vetoed the 
shareholders' proposal of selling certain corporate assets to repay the creditor bank in order to regain 
control. Id, at** 1138. The court's holding to the plaintiff's favour was therefore partly based on 
contractual ground. Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Credit Lyonnais, supra note 9, WL 277613 at ** 1157. 
143 Id., at *34 (note 55). One hypothetical was posed by the court in note 55 of the decision to 
demonstrate how to reach the corporation's "long-term wealth creating capacity", an idea by itself hard to 
be apprehended. The essence of this approach is actually a spirit of reconciliation by which the disparate 
risk appetites possessed by creditors and shareholders and others (employees for example) who consist of 
the "community of interest" are settled in the middle grounds. And as a result, the ruling here should be 
explained as no more than a managerial duty to mediate. 
The hypothetical is: 
"Consider, for example, a solvent corporation having a single asset, a judgment 
for $51 million against a 
solvent debtor. The judgment is on appeal and thus subject to modification or reversal. 
Assume that the 
only liabilities of the company are to bondholders in the amount of 
$12 million. Assume that the array of 
probable outcomes of the appeal is as follows: 
Expected Value 
25% chance of affirmance ($51mm) $12.75 
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The dicta of the Credit Lyonnais actually did not directly address the scope to 
which the management owed fiduciary duties to the creditor, but represented an attempt 
to resolve the matter of competing interests between the shareholder and various fixed 
claimers that becomes acute when a corporation operates with modest equity value yet 
remains solvent. The above quoted strikingly advanced a new approach applying to 
the management performing functions as demanded by law when the corporation 
operates in the vicinity of insolvency; that is an affirmative duty to mediate interests of 
not just shareholders and creditors but also employees and other stakeholder groups with 
interests relating to the corporation, in order to "maximize the corporation's long-term 
wealth creating capacity". 144 This marks a fundamental disparity from the traditional 
policy that, upon insolvency, prescriptive-nature fiduciary duties owed to the creditors 
are simply for protecting their existing priority and contractual rights. 145 
70% chance of modification ($4mm) $2.8 
5% chance of reversal ($0) 0 
Expected Value of Judgment on Appeal $15.55 
Thus, the best evaluation is that the current value of the equity is $3.55 million. ($15.55 million expected 
value of judgment on appeal--$12 million liability to bondholders). Now assume an offer to settle at 
$12.5 million (also consider one at $17.5 million). By what standard do the directors of the company 
evaluate the fairness of these offers? The creditors of this solvent company would be in favor of 
accepting either a $12.5 million offer or a $17.5 million offer. In either event they will avoid the 75% risk 
of insolvency and default. The stockholders, however, will plainly be opposed to acceptance of a $12.5 
million settlement (under which they get practically nothing). More importantly, they very well may be 
opposed to acceptance of the $17.5 million offer under which the residual value of the corporation would 
increase from $3.5 to $5.5 million. This is so because the litigation alternative, with its 25% probability 
of a $39 million outcome to them ($51 million - $12 million = $39 million) has an expected value to the 
residual risk bearer of $9.75 million ($39 million x 25% chance of affirmance), substantially greater than 
the $5.5 million available to them in the settlement. While in fact the stockholders' preference would 
reflect their appetite for risk, it is possible (and with diversified shareholders 
likely) that shareholders 
would prefer rejection of both settlement offers. 
But if we consider the community of interests that the corporation represents 
it seems apparent that one 
should in this hypothetical accept the best settlement offer available providing 
it is greater than $15.55 
million, and one below that amount should be rejected. " 
144 Employing the phrase "maximize the corporation's long-term wealth creating capacity" 
to illuminating 
the court's true intention of imposing a mediator-like 
duty on directors, i. e., the one of reconciling all 
concerned corporate constituencies' interests, is arguably 
inadequate as seemingly the entity-theory 
assertion suggested the company can somehow enjoy certain 
forms of well-being. A contracterian 
expression of a mediator-like role expected of (or a 
duty to mediate imposed upon) the director while the 
corporation is in or near insolvency would be a clearer and more adequate one. 
145 One commentator suggested Credit Lyonnais added nothing 
to the then existed as the court was aimed 
to protect the creditors' contractual rights. 
See Lin, supra note 49, at 1523 ("Arguably,... the creditor 
contracted for the director's duty to maximize the 
long-term profitability of the firm instead of 
shareholder wealth, and the court merely enforced 
the parties' agreement"). This comment can not be 
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The dramatic departure from the contractual treatments afforded to creditors of 
solvency-remote corporations placing employees and creditors and other fixed claimers 
outside the fiduciary-duty context146 has come under attacks. First, at what point in 
time a corporation is considered as having entered the "vicinity of insolvency" and 
thereby its management are obligated to take into all corporate constituencies' interests 
into account in making decisions remains unknown. 147 Second, even restrictively 
applying to the "vicinity of insolvency" occasion, the shareholders' plight is not yet 
hopeless and it can be argued they have a right to demand management to try their best 
to salvage their fortunes. 148 Credit Lyonnais failed to justify why on the occasion 
when the management are needed the most by the shareholder, they are allowed to forgo 
their duty. Third, that the directors are required to mediate interests of all parties 
concerned means the management have to pledge loyalty to all competing 
constituencies. 149 This is hardly attainable theoretically as well as practically. 
Collectively, the Credit Lyonnais legal reasoning entails one fundamental weakness. 
If this was a sustainable way to settle the shareholder-creditor conflicts existing almost 
throughout the entire corporate life, why only until the corporation has reached "the 
vicinity of insolvency" would a conciliatory task start to replace the one focusing on 
maximizing the shareholder's interest - how about deploying such condition as 
"substantial deterioration of financial condition" indicating the corporation's perilous 
financial strength as a trigger. Credit Lyonnais failed to fully justify the demarcation 
point it set. 
c. Duty Recipients in Insolvency: Competing Judicial Rulings 
Another difficult issue intertwined with the duty contents discussed above is, upon 
sustained as the dicta constructed by the court were clearly advanced 
from the corporate law rather than 
the contract law ground. 
146 Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A. 2d 873,879 (Del. 
Ch. 1986) ("[T]he relationship between a 
corporation and the holders of its debt securities, even convertible 
debt securities, is contractual in 
nature .... 
The terms of the contractual relationship agreed to and not 
broad concepts such as fairness 
define the corporation's obligation to its bondholders. 
") 
147 Robert Millner, What Does It Mean For Directors of Financially 
Troubled Corporations to Have 
Fiduciary Duties To Creditors? 9 Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice 
201,220. 
148 Robert Morris, Directors' Duties in Nearly Insolvent Corporations: 
A Comment on Credit Lyonnais, 
19 J. Corp. L. 61,67 (1993). 
'49Id., at 67-8. 
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insolvency, whether a director has a duty running to both creditors and shareholders, or 
such duty works to the exclusion of shareholders, or, as Credit Lyonnais suggests, a 
director has a duty to consider all corporate constituencies concerned. The following 
discussion indicates the disparate stances judicially adopted regarding duty recipients in 
or near corporate insolvency have effected a considerable level of confusion concerning 
the desirable risk appetite expected of the management. The author argues the 
creditors (that is, all sorts of fixed claimers) as opposed to the shareholder should be 
made the exclusive duty recipients if they are to be protected at all. This is based on both, 
theoretically, the creditor's residual-claimer status and, practically, the benefit of a clear 
corporate objective when it is needed the most. 
The majority cases opined the management of an insolvent corporation owes a duel 
obligation - an obligation to creditors as well as to shareholders 150 - they "stand as 
trustees of corporate properties for the benefit of creditors first and stockholders 
second". 151 Also, there are cases embracing the pluralist theory of Credit Lyonnais that 
the management is required to "... serve the interests of the corporate enterprise, 
encompassing all its constituent groups, without preference to any. That duty, therefore, 
require directors to take creditor interests into account, but not necessarily to give those 
interests priority". 152 Occasionally, courts adopted the narrowest view that upon 
insolvency the management owes a duty to "act solely for the financial benefit of the 
creditors in all matters". 153 
The three disparate attitudes have a direct bearing on one of the most difficult and 
vital choices the directors have to make in or near insolvency: liquidating the 
loss-making corporation to preserve the creditors' prospective assets or aggressively 
150 Robert Millner, What Does It Mean For Directors of Financially Troubled Corporations to Have 
Fiduciary Duties To Creditors? 9 Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice 201,216. 
Ist Bank Leumi-Le-Israel, B. M., Philadelphia Branch v. Sunbelt Industries, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 556,559 
(S. D. Ga. 1980); see also Millner, supra note 132, at 216; Askanase v. Fatjo, 130 F. 
3d 657,663,48 Fed. R. 
Evid. Serv. 543,40 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 218 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Mortgageamerica Corp., 714 F. 2d 1266, 
1267-1271 (5th Cir. 1983); Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Shaheen, 660 F. 2d 506,512 (2d Cir. 1981). 
152 In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc., 225 B. R. 655 (Bankr. 
N. D. Ill. 1998), aff'd in relevant part, 
1999 WL 982963 (N. D. Ill. 1999); See also Ed Peters Jewelry Co., Inc. v. C&J Jewelry Co., Inc., 
124 F. sd 
252,176 (15t Cir. 1997) 
153 See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Polonitza, 1990 WL 114740 
(N. D. Ill. 1990); also see In re 
Hoffman Associates, Inc., 194 B. R. 943,964 (Bankr. D. S. C. 1995) ("when the Debtor 
becomes insolvent, 
the fiduciary duty owed by [the defendant] as a director of the 
Debtor, shifted from the shareholders to all 
of the creditors of the Debtor.... ") (applying South 
Carolina law). 
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taking risk (likely an immense one) to resurrect the corporation and avert insolvency. 
Whereas the shareholder might endorse a highly risky transaction that might increase the 
value of the equity and avert insolvency, however slim the chances, the creditors might 
tend to oppose this type of business propositions as the risk of reducing the corporation's 
left, humble, net present value to their ultimate detriment is imminent. ' 54 
If the management of an insolvent corporation owed fiduciary duties exclusively to 
the creditor, then they could have had a duty to liquidate the corporation if the 
corporation in question was continuously making substantial losses after insolvency. 
Here, the clear yardstick of fiduciary duties is preserving corporate assets to maximize 
creditor returns, provided of course the scope of fiduciary duties is not restricted to 
protecting creditors' contractual and priority rights. Applying the same scenario to the 
other two sets of dicta, the results are nevertheless not so straightforward. Where there 
are dual (the majority view) or multiple (the Credit Lyonnais theory) possible divergent 
interests to be taken into account, the management and the court would face a crisis as 
their yardstick against which fiduciary duties are understood and assessed will become 
lost - to whom the directors pledge their loyalty; what criteria a balancing decision 
ought to meet. 155 
154 A corporation's shareholders and creditors could be diametrically opposed in conditions approaching 
insolvency. The source of all possible conflicts of interest comes from their competing preferences as to 
the appropriate level of risk to be taken by the corporation. See Lin, supra note 49, at 1489-93 (discussing 
the two groups' race for investments recovery and their different incentives to liquidate as opposed to 
resurrect the corporation). 
155 Courts split on this issue. See In re Logue Mechanical Contracting Corp., 106 B. R. 436,440 (holding 
the directors had violated their fiduciary duty to the corporation by not to proceeding to liquidation in a 
timely manner where a reasonable person using ordinary care and diligence would have done so to 
maximize the return to the creditors); but see In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc., 225 B. R. 655 (Bankr. 
N. D. Ill. 1998), aff'd in relevant part, 1999 WL 982963 (N. D. 111.1999) (Contents of directors' fiduciaries 
do not contain "... a duty to liquidate and pay creditors when the corporation is near insolvency, provided 
that in the directors' informed, good faith judgment there is an alternative"'). 
The problem here of balancing dual or multiple interests is exactly the same as what happens to 
stakeholder proposals that uphold a pluralist approach to include all concerned corporate constituencies' 
interests into directors' day-to-day fiduciary duty undertakings. See Philip Goldenberg, IALS Company 
Law Lecture-Shareholders v stakeholders: the Bogus Argument, 19 The Company Lawyer, 34,36 (1998) 
(commenting from the aspect of corporate representation system: "The absence of multiple representation 
no doubt reflects fears that increased complexity of decision-making, and confusion over corporate 
objective, would seriously detract from the wealth-creating capacity of the company. "); D. Sullivan & D. 
Conlon, Crisis and Transition in Corporate Governance Paradigms: The Role of The Chancery Court of 
Delaware, 31 Law & Society Rev., 713 (1997); S. Leader, Private Property and Corporate Governance 
Part I. " Defining the Issues, in PERSPECTIVE ON COMPANY: 2,85 (Fiona 
Macmillan Patfield ed., 
1997). 
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Some commentators believed creditors should not be the exclusive fiduciary duty 
recipients upon the corporation's insolvency as by which it might "preclude 
rehabilitation of the enterprise and restoration of positive net worth and cash flow. "156 
It was asserted only upon the going concern value of the corporation clearly no longer 
exists, so do the management's fiduciary duties to shareholders. 157 This line of 
arguments may not make its case. To start with, the connection between creditors' 
involvements, upon insolvency, in imposing contractual restraints or even setting up the 
corporation's rehabilitation plan and the perceived hindrance to the corporation's 
regaining financial wellbeing may not be firmly established. Further, ascertaining the 
absolute non-existence of going concern value is an extremely hard task, if possible at 
all. Rather, it could be used as an excuse by shareholders to unduly prolong the life of an 
insolvent company. 
One aspect of inquiry may provide a useful response to dealing with this instead. 
If the contracterian theory that residual claimers stand a better position to monitor the 
directors, hence to be the exclusive duty recipients, holds true, when the corporation 
operates on negative equity value, the shareholder-model of corporate governance will 
then lose its policy underpinnings. As a result, at least theoretically the creditors 
instead of the shareholders should be the exclusive duty recipients and their entitlements 
should be complete. By adopting this approach, the management will not be imposed 
an upfront obligation to liquidate or arrange an orderly sale of the corporation upon 
insolvency, they should instead adopt the creditor's conservative risk as opposed to the 
shareholder's, in managing the insolvent corporation. And it is on this yardstick the 
business judgment rule operates and accord the management with protection. 
Rehabilitations would not be precluded because these efforts can also potentially benefit 
creditors by offering the prospect of restoration to positive net worth 
if, of course, 
through the lens of the creditor the risk involved in potential rehabilitations 
is 
considered tolerable. 
156 Millner, supra note 132, at 217. 
157 Id., note 24 and accompanying text. See also Harvey 
R. Miller, Corporate Governance in Chapter 11: 
The Fiduciary Relationship Between Directors and Stockholders of Solvent and 
Insolvent Corporation, 
Seton Hall L. Rev. 1467,1493-4. (1993) (stressing preservation of going concern value as one of policy 
objectives of Bankruptcy Code). 
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E. Interim Summations and Observations: 
Fiduciary duty law in Delaware is predominantly one addressing self-dealings158 and 
bad-faith managerial misconducts. The extensive extent to which the court exhibits its 
reluctance or even abstention from substantively reviewing corporate management 
performing their oversight and decision-making functions absent self-dealing or bad 
faith and the enactment of the exculpation statute reflect the central policy of promoting 
risk-taking. Reaching out from this point, the following sets out this section's final 
comments and observations on the US shareholder model of corporate governance. 
1. Monitors of Objectivity over Proximity 
The Delaware system of fiduciary law reveals its preference of leaving the central 
governance task of monitoring the executive's conduct to, as categorized by some 
leading commentators recently, ls9 those monitors of "objectivity" (such as hostile 
acquirers, investment banking analysts, credit agencies, accounting firms and other 
capital-market agencies) over those of "proximity" (such as corporate directors and 
substantial shareholders). In this regard, ensuring effective disclosure to enhance 
credibility of corporate information is thus not only a securities regulation agenda, but 
also a corporate-law one. ' 60 This position is further revealed by the Delaware court's 
158 Self-dealing here is used in its broad sense that includes transactions directly extracting private 
benefits at the expense of the corporation's shareholders and other transactions and activities particularly 
in the change-of-control context where the director's entrenched position is at stake. 
159 It was suggested a trade-ff exists that a monitor can not possess both proximity and objectivity. See 
Arnoud W. A. Boot & Jonathan R. Macey, Monitoring Corporate Performance: The Role Of Objectivity, 
Proximity, And Adaptability In Corporate Governance, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 356,368-70 (2004) (basing on 
the public choice theory and the "foot-in-the-door" phenomenon derived from psychological research, 
arguing objectivity requires distance between management and monitor). 
A monitor belonging to the group of proximity (e. g., a directors or a substantial shareholder) has timely 
information about the corporation and can monitor it on a real-time basis, but this monitor risks capture by 
the incumbent management because of proximity "when the ostensible monitor loses its independence and 
adopts the perspective of the management team being supervised". See Jonathan R. Macey, Effective 
Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, And Enron, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 394,400 (2004). By contrast, a 
monitor who belongs to the group of objectivity (e. g., hostile acquirers, investment banking analysts, 
credit agencies, accounting firms and other capital-market agencies) does not have readily accessible 
information of the corporation and can only monitor ex post. Such outsider monitor 
is however supposed 
to be more objective and less at risk of capture by the incumbent management. See 
Id at 401. 
160 See e. g., Lewis v. Vogelstein 699 A. 2d 327,330 (Del. Ch., 1997) 
("a misdisclosure may make 
available a remedy, even if the shareholder vote was not required to authorize the transaction and the 
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unusual sensitivity towards managerial activities in the change-of-control context as 
evidenced by the impositions of the Revlon and Unocal standards. The court's scrutiny 
over the management to keep the hostile take-over devices sharp and to ensure 
anti-take-over measures not to be used to shield management from accountability is a 
startling contrast to the defer-to-director manner of review that has been consciously 
used under ordinary circumstances. 
This monitoring mode might be underpinned by some perceived inherently 
functional weaknesses associated with monitors of proximity. The presence of a 
unitary board in the US, for example, where non-executive or independent board 
members and senior executives are jointly liable for the performance of the corporation, 
is considered leads to a combination of monitoring and managerial functions, which in 
turn renders highly questionable the non-executive or independent board member's 
effectiveness in monitoring. 161 Also, the monitoring utility of direct shareholder 
involvement, as another class of such monitors, is frustrated as frequently argued by the 
presence of a dispersed share holding structure. '62 
Alternatively, the U. S. corporate finance pattern that is mainly conducted through 
equity and bond issues in the exchanges rather than through the banking system gives 
rise to a robust array of outside, market forces monitoring managerial performance. 
The market for corporate control was suggested as the "cornerstone of U. S. corporate 
governance". 163 As a dominant monitoring force under the US shareholder model of 
corporate governance, the market-based mechanism is then expected to aligning the 
management's corporate strategies with the market's risk-prone expectations - as 
expressed by capital market specialists, market makers and day traders in their ultimate 
transaction can substantively satisfy a fairness test". ); See also Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off The 
Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director's Fiduciary Duty Of Disclosure, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1087 (1996). 
161 Mahmoud Ezzamel & Robert Watson, Wearing Two Hats: The Conflicting Control And Management 
Roles Of Non-executive Directors, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 64-5 (Kevin Keasey & Steve 
Thompson eds., Oxford U. Press, 1997); Rita Esen, Managing And Monitoring: The 
Dual Role Of 
Non-executive Directors On U. K. And U. S. Boards, 11 International Company & Commercial L. Rev. 202, 
206 (2000); Boot & Macey, supra note 159, at 369. 
162 See e. g., Jonathan R. Macey, Effective Capital Markets, Corporate 
Disclosure, And Enron, 89 Cornell 
L. Rev. 394,402 (2004); but see Bengt Holmström & Jean Tirole, Market Liquidity and 
Performance 
Monitoring, 101 J. Pol. Econ. 678,707-08 (1993) (arguing cross holdings and pyramidal structures could 
give rise to disproportional voting rights with limited capital commitment and 
therefore the widely 
accepted link between dispersed ownership and lack of control 
is not as inextricable as thought). 
163 Id., at 407. 
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concern over stock price performance. 
164 
2. Private Ordering Over Judicially Enforced Constraints and Mandatory Rules 
Another notable message sent out by the Delaware's mode of conduct review over 
corporate management is its position of maintaining a contracterian corporation -a 
corporation controlled and directed by private ordering subject to minimum 
interruptions of mandatory legal rules and court interventions. In this regard, the 
court's reluctance of dictating specifics over corporate directors' risk taking is also 
reflected in the approach adopted by the court when occasionally attempting to promote 
certain corporate practices. For instance, although the Delaware court has long been 
intended to provide corporations with an incentive to comprise their boards with a 
majority of independent directors, 165 the effort was made in an implicit way by ruling 
that an approval of a self-interested transaction by a special committee consisting 
entirely of independent directors would give rise to certain liability-insulation effects. 166 
By the same token, the similar liability-insulation approach as opposed to mandatory 
rulings was also adopted by the court when promoting significant but non-controlling 
shareholdings in order to deploy substantial shareholders' incentives to police 
managerial behaviours. 167 
As opposed to mandatory treatments, pursuing extralegal routes (such as a stock 
option plan) to align the management's self-interested economic incentives with 
interests of the shareholder is therefore settled to be a prevalent governance approach 
under the US shareholder model of corporate governance. 
' 68 
164 Leo Schuster, The Shareholder Value and Stakeholder Discussion: An International Overview, in 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MANAGEMENT IN BANKS 4 (Leo Schuster ed., 2000); see also Lawrence 
E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act And The Reinvention Of Corporate Governance? 48 Vill. L. Rev. 
1189,1209 (2003) (noting market specialists, market makers and day traders are directed 
by "the simple 
laws of supply and demand (and therefore market psychology) rather than 
by corporate fundamentals"). 
165 See William Chandler III & Leo Strine, Jr., The New Federalism Of The American Corporate 
Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents Of One Small State, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
953, 
977 (2003). 
166 See e. g., Kahn, supra note 103, at 1117 (finding that, 
in a judicial review based on the entire fairness 
standard that involves an interested merger between a parent and 
its subsidiary, an approval of the 
transaction by an independent committee of informed disinterested 
directors shifts the burden of proof on 
the issue of fairness to the shareholder plaintiff). 
167 See Chandler III & Strine, Jr., supra note 165, at note 95 and accompanying text. 
168 See Melvyn Westlake, Corporate Governance-Time To Clear Up, The 
Banker, 16,19 (June 2002) 
137 
3. Implicit functional Divide: Corporate Law as Shareholder Law; External 
Regulations as Stakeholder Laws 
In either In Re Caremark or Unocal, traces of the court's attempts to somehow having 
regards to stakeholder protection while upholding the shareholder interest are clear. 
These attempts are nonetheless unpromising. Given the dividing loyalty problem, the 
overwhelming effects emanating from incentive alignment arrangements and market 
expectations based on shareholder gains and the exclusivity of shareholder 
representative rights on board, the extent to which the shareholder gains have been 
fostered will still remain the predominant parameter measuring performance of the 
corporate management of in particular large, public corporations. Even under the 
exception of insolvency where a corporate director is to some extent obligated to take 
creditors' interests into account when running the corporation's affairs, the contents of 
such duty as running to the creditors remains judicially unsettled. 
Cumulatively, although the strong stance of Dodge v. Ford Michigan by the 
Supreme Court of Michigan in 1919 that "business corporation is organized and carried 
on primarily for the profit of the stockholders, and it is not within the lawful powers of a 
board of directors to shape or conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely 
(noting about 70 percent of US executive pay is in the form of stock options); Charles Elson & Robert 
Thompson, Van Gorkom 's Legacy: The Limits Of Judicially Enforced Constraints And The Promise Of 
Proprietary Incentives, 96 Nw. U. L. rev. 579,581, note 14 (2002) ("I share the sense of many 
commentators that the law has played a relatively minor role in the evolution of board structure and 
behavior; markets and other social forces are far more important. Indeed I suggest leaving the matter of 
board independence and accountability largely to these extralegal incentives. ", cited from Donald C. 
Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Laws, Norms and Unintended Consequences of 
Independence and Accountability, 89 Geo. L. J. 797,800 (2000)); Chandler III & Strine, Jr., supra note 
165, at 978 (arguing the need for corporate law to accommodate the corporate diversity: "[Mandatory] 
[r]estraints that might be useful and workable when applied to the largest fifty companies in America 
might be ill-suited to smaller public companies. "). 
Effective as of 1 July 2001, subject to certain requirements and limitations, the General Corporation Law 
of Delaware grants the board more freedom to delegate to officers the power to grant stock options. DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (c) (2003). For the board of director choosing not to delegate this power out but 
instead deciding the issuance of stock options by itself through a resolution adoption, the General 
Corporation Law of Delaware explicitly provides the board with a safe harbour regarding the decision to 
issuance and the sufficiency of such a decision: "In the absence of actual fraud 
in the transaction, the 
judgment of the directors as to the consideration for the issuance of such rights or options and the 
sufficiency thereof shall be conclusive. " Id. tit. 8, § 157 (b). 
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incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting others"169 
might no longer appear in a Delaware court's decision nowadays, the US corporations in 
practice actually operate towards the same ultimate corporate objective as they did 
nearly 100 years ago. Further, the court's tendency of vigilantly protecting corporate 
separateness in conjunction with the application of limited liability to even corporate 
parents has left handling of negative externalities related or stakeholder protection issues 
outside the realm of corporate law. Collectively, an implicit functional divide of 
corporate law and external regulations is formed - "[t]raditional [fiduciary law] 
doctrine protects only the interests of actors inside the corporation, and looks to those 
actors to define their own interests. The regulations, by contrast, follow from outside 
ethical instructions as to appropriate conduct inside corporations. "170 
This ring-fence approach in terms of stakeholder protection - that under Delaware 
fiduciary law only knowingly violating the positive law and regulations addressing 
stakeholder protection leading to the corporation's losses might the management be held 
accountable - strongly reflects the traditional private-law vis-a-vis public-regulation 
differentiation, where the corporate law is considered of contractual and private nature 
and devised towards fostering the corporate member's profit-maximization pursuit; 
stakeholder interests are then protected by ethical, mandatory instructions contained in 
various external public regulations serving simply as a background constraint. 171 
169 170 N. W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
170 William W. Bratton, Jr., Public values, Private Business, and US Corporate Fiduciary law, in 
CORPORATE CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY 27 (Joseph McCahery et al ed., Oxford U. Press, 
1993) (noting "[t]raditional [fiduciary law] doctrine protects only the interests of actors inside the 
corporation, and looks to those actors to define their own interests. The regulations, by contrast, follow 
from outside ethical instructions as to appropriate conduct inside corporations. ") 
171 See Jonathan Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making the Shareholders the 
Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 Stetsen Law Review 23,42-3 (arguing against 
the need to expanding directors' fiduciary duties to include local communities by asserting the wider 
issue 
of social responsibility should be addressed by political means); In another article, Professor 
Macey 
championed this political means as: "... [I]nvestors, capital markets, and society generally will 
be better 
off if policy makers take an enabling approach to corporate law. Under this approach, the corporate 
form 
can continue to serve its traditional role as a remarkably powerful device 
for financing complex, 
capital-intensive business ventures in advanced societies that enjoy reasonably 
broad distributions of 
wealth. " See Jonathan Macey, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: 
A Contractual Perspective, 18 
Journal of Corporation Law 185,211 (1993); Daniel Fischei, The Corporate 
Governance Movement, 35 
Vanderbilt Law Review, 1259,1273-4 (1982) ("[b]ecause the corporation is a particular type of firm 
formed by individuals acting voluntarily and for their mutual benefit, 
it can far more reasonably be 
viewed as the product of private contract than as a creature of the state".. 
). 
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III. Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance in Banking Context 
This section discusses the current state of law in its construction of standards of conduct 
applying in particular to the bank management. It first investigates the unique 
regulatory environment facing the industry which engenders some initial doubts over the 
applicability of the state corporate law's standards in the banking context. It then 
follows the enactment of 12 U. S. C. Section 1821 (k), which seemingly sets a uniform 
standard of conduct for bank management. The section concludes by exploring the US 
Supreme Court's 1997 seminal case of Atherton v. FDIC, which firmly put the standard 
of conduct applicable to the bank management in the framework of the traditional state 
corporate law's shareholder model of corporate governance. 
A. Initial Doubts over Applying State-law Standards of Conduct and Review to 
Bank Management 
At the aspirational level, it has long been recognized that the management of US 
banking organizations as their industrial counterparts should exercise ordinary care and 
prudence in managing the institution entrusted to them. 172 Progressive judicial 
pronouncements giving flesh to this aspirational framework then led to a wide range of 
specific functions expected of bank management, concerning, among others, instituting 
loan underwriting procedures, monitoring loan portfolio, being informed about bank 
affairs and supervising management and instituting audits. 173 
The applicable standard of review over these aspirational managerial functions is 
nevertheless not as straightforward in the banking context because of certain unique 
regulatory arrangements. Moreover, whereas enforcing fiduciary duties under ordinary 
circumstances is the preserve of shareholder rights, in the banking context it is virtually 
an extension of the banking regulator's enforcement muscle with the FDIC 
in its 
receiver capacity playing a key role of recovering losses inflicted on 
federal insurance 
funds following managerial failures. 
172 Briggs v. Spaulding 141 U. S. 132,165-66 (1891); see also 
PATRICIA A. McCOY, BANKING LAW 
MANUAL § 14.04 [2] (2"d ed., 2000) 
173 See McCOY, supra note 172, at § 14.04[2] (citing relevant 
fiduciary duty cases in the banking 
context. ) 
140 
Against this backdrop, this section charts the evolution of applying the 
state-corporate-law based standards of conduct applying to bank management, starting 
from the banking regulator's stance of incorporating the concept of safe and sound 
banking into the substance of the bank management's fiduciary duties, through the 
passage of the 12 U. S. C. Section 1821 (k) setting gross negligence as a national floor 
standard of review over the bank management's conduct and thus pre-empting the state 
corporate law's exculpation statute, to the US Supreme Court's decision on Atherton 
putting the standards of conduct and review applicable to the bank management's 
performing functions largely back to the traditional shareholder model of corporate 
governance model as reflected under the state corporate law. 
1. Dual Banking System, Governmental Subsidies and Public-interest Concerns 
Applying corporate governance standards set by state corporate law, including those 
associated with the management's fiduciary duties, to the bank management is 
inherently complex in the United States. 
To start with, a bank has to be chartered or licensed and is not free to simply pick 
among over 50 states the state of incorporation to run its business. Further, in the United 
States, the bank management's functions are performed against a peculiar dual-banking 
regulatory environment that renders doubtful the applicability of state-law corporate 
governance standards to federally chartered banks. The doubt over such applicability 
comes also from the presence of government subsidies 174 taking such form as a 
government-sponsored deposit insurance regime175 protecting the banking industry, 
which in turn make public interests constantly at stake relative to managerial conduct. 
Ira When it is considered healthy, a depository institution is subsidized by the federal government with a 
government-sponsored, compulsory deposit insurance scheme since the inception of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") in 1933 to forestall depositors' runs on the bank. When it fails, the 
federal government assists in resolution procedures under the "least cost principle", mandated to venturing 
taxpayers' funds to institute, among other things, "purchase and assumption" transactions to allow the 
failed institution to remain in operation, albeit usually under a different name. For an in-depth discussion 
on governmental involvements and subsidy concerning failed institutions' resolutions, see MACEY, supra 
note 44, at 740-47. 
175 The federal deposit insurance covers retailed depositors of, however state or federally chartered, and 
depositors are protected up to $10,000 of every individual account once the bank failed. 
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2. Fiduciary Duty Claims as Banking Regulator's De Facto Enforcement Tool 
Administered by FDIC 
The above-mentioned unique regulatory environment has led to a crucial banking 
characteristic in fiduciary duty claims: the shareholder's position as duty enforcer is 
marginalized in the banking context. Instead, it is the FDIC as receiver that plays the 
central role bringing on behalf of the failed bank suits alleging fiduciary duty violations 
against the failed institution's former bank management to recover losses of the Deposit 
Insurance Fund ("the Fund") sustained through failure resolution processes. ' 76 In other 
words, in the banking context fiducially duty claims functionally serve as yet another set 
of enforcement tools, vigorously pursued by the banking agency (the FDIC) normally 
only after the bank failed and moved into receivership. 
This public-interest attribute sets enforcing fiduciary duties in the banking context 
apart from in non-banking where fiduciary duty suits perceived as purely of private 
nature are brought by the shareholder normally during the corporation's ordinary course 
of business. Apart from timing and claimant, fiduciary duty cases differ between 
banks and non-banks also in the subject matter over which the dispute occurred. 
Whereas the change-of-control case makes up the lion share of fiduciary duty claims for 
industrial corporations, suits brought by the FDIC as a result of the bank management's 
disinterested conduct center on their association with ordinary businesses, in particular 
their involvements with lending decisions. 177 This is probably because the strict bank 
176 When an insured depository institution fails, as receiver the FDIC would step into the institution's 
shoes and succeed to all the rights, titles and privileges of it (including the institution's legal claims such 
as the one against its former management on fiduciary grounds). Procedurally at this point, the FDIC 
would have taken over the existing derivative claims. Further, although legally the shareholders are 
entitled to institute fiduciary duty claims in the name of the bank against bank directors even while it 
remains financially healthy, they would tend not to do so as the risk the institution might fail accordingly 
would outweigh the benefit of such actions. See MACEY, supra note 44, at 699 (2001). 
177 See Martin Lowy & Peter Lowy, Needed: A Standard Of Care For Bank, Thrift Officers And Directors, 
15 Banking Policy Report, 1,1 (1996). Improper lending was specifically singled out by the FDIC in a 
1992 statement characterizing its claims against bank directors "... where directors 
failed to establish 
proper underwriting policies and to monitor adherence thereto, or approved 
loans that they knew or had 
reason to know were improperly underwritten, or, in the case of outside 
directors, where the board failed 
to heed warnings from regulators or professional advisors, or where officers either 
failed to adhere to such 
policies or otherwise engaged in improper extensions of credit. Examples of 
improper underwriting have 
included lending to a borrower without obtaining adequate financial 
information, where the collateral was 
obviously inadequate, or where the borrower clearly lacked the ability 
to pay". See FDIC, Statement 
Concerning The Responsibilities Of Bank Directors And Officers 3 (FDIC News Release PR-166-92,4 
Dec. 1992). 
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change-of-control regulation acting as an ex ante screening has rendered far less space 
for managerial discretion, hence less disputes. 
Public-interest traces of FDIC-brought fiduciary duty claims can be detected even 
in the investigative phase before the suit was filed. The FDIC as receiver, ordinarily a 
private capacity, is explicitly authorized by law to issue "administrative subpoenas"178 
for such broad purposes as causation assessment and cost-effective analysis. ' 79 The 
permissible targets that might be included in this type of subpoenas are also extensive, 
covering not only the relevant bank management but also their associated family 
members and business entities. ' 80 As evidenced by the general defer-to-FDIC 
tendency associated with the manner in which the court reviews enforceability of such 
procedures, the need for swiftly recouping losses of the Deposit Insurance Fund or other 
damages on taxpayers obviously outweighs other considerations. '81 
Judicial treatments over affirmative defenses also reveal the fiduciary duty claim's 
public nature in the banking context. Under normal receivership circumstances, a 
defendant corporate management is allowed to use an affirmative defense to alleviate his 
liability in connection with a fiduciary duty claim if he can substantiate that the 
receiver's actions have contributed to the corporation's ultimate losses. In the banking 
context, however, the availability of such defense is generally rejected as long as such 
defense is predicated on the FDIC's negligence or other misconducts associated with the 
FDIC its acting as receiver. The court created a spate of rationales 
182 to reject an 
178 12 U. S. C. § 1818 (n). 
179 12 U. S. C. § 1821 (d)(2)(I)(i). 
180 See e. g., FDIC v. Garner ET AL, 126 F. 3d, 1138,1143-46 (9th Cir. 1997); also see 
Bank Brief, 
Enforcement Of FDIC's Subpoenas Against Former Bank Directors Family Members Upheld By Ninth 
Circuit, 115 Banking L. J. 295,295-7 (1998). 
181 When the bank director is the target of the subpoena that is issued on the ground of investigating 
relevance of his conducts in connection with the bank's losses, the court 
indicated "[w]e defer to the 
agency's appraisal of relevancy which must be accepted so long as 
it is not obviously wrong". See In re 
Mc Vane, 44 F. 3d 1127,1135 (2d Cir. 1995). In the event the subpoena issued to the bank director 
is solely 
for the basis of determining cost-effectiveness in an action against the 
bank director, the review standard 
is only marginally higher that the court would give "due weight ... 
to the specific reasonable inferences 
that the [FDIC] might draw from the information available to 
it in light of its experience investigating 
other failed institutions. " Id. at 1140. 
Whenever the bank director's family member instead of the director 
himself is subpoenaed for providing 
materials for the FDIC's investigation, the court would 
then substantially raise the bar and the FDIC 
might be demanded to make some showing of the need 
for the information beyond mere relevance to 
substantiate the issuance of the subpoena. Id, at 
1138. 
182 One commentator categorized rejected affirmative 
defenses in 1990s linking to the FDIC's conduct in 
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affirmative defense that alleges the FDIC's post-receivership, negligent conduct (that is, 
alleged negligent conduct occurring upon FDIC taking on the role of operator or 
assuming control of the institution's assets) in order not to relieve the defendant bank 
management's pre-receivership fiduciary duty violations. 183 Although differing on 
grounds, these rationales are common in their merging together the FDIC's regulator 
and receiver capacities rather than breaking them apart as in a typical "dual capacity" 
description. 184 One court even characterized the FDIC's receiver capacity by analogy 
with its regulatory role that "the FDIC's regulatory oversight of banks is intended only 
to protect depositors, the insurance fund, and the public... Likewise, FDIC's actions as 
receiver for failed banks are undertaken only to fulfil its mandate to stabilize the 
banking system by protecting depositors and creditors of the failed bank and the public 
generally". 
185 
3. Banking Agencies' Construction of Bank Management's Fiduciary Duties on 
Pluralist and Safety-and-soundness Grounds 
The overriding public interest of swiftly recovering taxpayers' money that was spent on 
the bail-out or the resolution process led to enforcement of fiduciary duty de facto 
functioning as a segment of the bank agencies' extensive enforcement muscle. Outside 
enforcement, it also raises a more fundamental and substantive issue - fiduciary duties 
its receiver capacity as including contributory and comparative negligence, failure to mitigate damages, 
waiver, estoppel, ratification, acquiescence and approval, consent, assumption of risk, laches, unclean 
hands, setoff and recoupment, lack of ripeness, duress, lack of causation, intervening and supervening 
causes, and reliance on banking regulators. See McCOY, supra note 172, at § 14.04 [2]. 
193 See Id. (citing, inter alia, Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation v. Roy, civil No. 
JFM-87-1227,1988 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 6840 (D. Md. 28 June 1988) (the "no duty" doctrine); Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation v. Burdette, 718 F. Supp. 649 (E. D. Tenn. 1989) (rejecting 
affirmative defenses on the public-interest ground in swift asset recovery); FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F. 3d 
1424 
(7th Cir. 1993) (rejecting affirmative defenses on the ground the court should refrain from second-guessing 
the agency's discretionary functions. ) ). See also United States v. Gaubert, 499 
U. S. 315,331-34 (1991) 
(ruling the banking agency's discretionary acts concerning day-to-day management of 
banking affairs 
after taking over the bank's previous management's decision-making 
function, inclusive of hiring 
consultants, placing the bank's subsidiaries into bankruptcy, and mediating salary 
disputes, were protected 
and within Federal tort Claims Act's discretionary function exception, 
because these acts were based on 
public policy considerations as other policy-making or planning acts. 
). 
184 The FDIC's "dual capacity" - the capacity of acting as 
both regulator and receiver for the same bank 
depending on its condition - is a widely used 
description. See e. g., FDIC v. White 828 F. Supp. 304,306 
(D. N. J. 1993). 
185 FDIC v. Isham, 782 F. Supp. 524,531 (D. Colo. 1992). 
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that do not merely correspond to the general well-being of the shareholder as a whole, 
but is more in tune with the public interests this type of suits is ultimately meant to 
serve. 
In this connection, at the height of the banking crises in early 1990s, the banking 
regulator advanced the idea of directing the construct of fiduciary duties owed by the 
bank management to the institution away from the traditional state corporate law's locus 
of encouraging risk-taking and maximizing shareholder interests. The regulator 
considered in the banking context this traditional approach could not be justified, given 
the public interest involved, and the bank management's propensity of taking overly 
excessive risks that corresponds to the industry's collective underperformance in 
weathering deteriorating macro-economies and in handling the ensuing risks. 186 
In a 1992 enforcement action related to the infamous collapse of Lincoln Savings 
And Loan Association, for example, the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") explicitly 
stated bank directors and officers owed "... fiduciary duties to the institution's 
shareholders, depositors, and the federal insurance fund and ... the 
fiduciary duties of 
such person include the responsibility for the safety and soundness of the insured 
depository institution, which, in turn, precludes transactions that pose an undue risk of 
loss to the depositors and/or the federal insurance fund". 187 By the same token, the 
FDIC in 1992 also stated that "where the [bank] director or officer... participated in a 
safety and soundness violation" would likely trigger the FDIC's fiduciary duty claim. ' 88 
B. Standards of Conduct of Bank Management upon Enactment of 12 U. S. C. 
Section 1821 (k) 
The enactment of 12 U. S. C. Section 1821 (k) in 1989, which sets a "national" standard 
of conduct for the bank management concerning their undertakings of corporate affairs, 
represents a deviation from the traditional state-law based diffuse treatment. With the 
186 Harris Weinstein, Advising Corporate Directors After The Savings And Loan Disaster, 48 Bus. Law, 
1499,1501 (1993). 
187 Office of Thrift Supervision, In the Matter of Peter M Fishbein 
ET AL, Former Outside Counsel Of 
Lincoln Savings And Loan Association, Irvine California, Order to Cease and Desist For 
Affirmative 
Relief (1992 WL 560945 (0. T. S. ) ). 
188 See FDIC, Statement Concerning The Responsibilities Of Bank Directors And 
Officers 3 (FDIC News 
Release PR-166-92,4 Dec. 1992). 
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benefit of hindsight, however, the passage of the 1821 (k) paradoxically marked the 
beginning of the end of an era of the banking regulator's pluralist, safety-and-soundness 
approach, with a view to override the state law's standards. 189 
1. Legislative Background: New Ammunition to Longstanding Debate 
Confusion over the applicability of the state corporate law's generally 
defer-to-management standards of conduct and review to the banking context had 
existed long before Section 1821 (k) was enacted. Over around one hundred years ago, 
the U. S. Supreme Court indicated in Briggs v. Spaulding a simple-negligence like 
standard of care required of the national bank's management. 190 Whereas the Briggs 
was cited by some as an authoritative source of federal common law, 191 others 
contended "virtually all" of the federal courts held the bank management accountable 
for due care violations on gross negligence (or stricter) ground. '92 With its vague 
wording, in particular its "savings clause", the enactment of 12 U. S. C. Section 1821 (k) 
of the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA") 
provided fresh ammunitions to this old debate. 
FIRREA's Section 1821 (k) prescribes a seemingly "national" standard for bank 
189 See e. g., Stacey Kern, Atherton v. FDIC: The Final Word On Bank Officer And Director Liability? 2 
North Carolina Banking Institute, 149,164 (1998) (noting the Atherton Court brushed aside the 
suggestion that federal agency regulations could determine the standard of care for bank officers and 
directors). 
190 "[D]irectors must exercise ordinary care and prudence in the administration of the affairs of a bank, 
and [] this includes something more than officiating as figureheads. They are entitled under the law to 
commit the banking business, as defined, to their duly-authorized officers, but this does not absolve them 
from the duty of reasonable supervision, nor ought they to be permitted to be shielded from liability 
because of want of wrongdoing, if that ignorance is the result of gross inattention.... " Briggs v. Spaulding, 
141 U. S. 132,165-66 (quoted in Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Munday, 297 Ill. 555,131 N. E. 103,105 
(1921)) 
191 See e. g., FDIC v. Bierman 2 F. 3d 1424,1432 (7d Cir. 1992) (noting the parties did not dispute over 
the applicability of the Briggs standard of care applying to bank directors). Based on the Briggs standard, 
the Bierman court decided "a reasonably prudent director" would not have approved the loans at question 
and it would impose liability for transactions "that were unreasonable at the time that they were made". Id, 
at 1434. 
For judicial rulings over bank directors' standard of care pre-Atherton, also see Douglas Austin & Sidney 
Weinstein, Bank Officer And Director Liability Under FIRREA: The Need For A National Standard Of 
Gross Negligence, 111 Banking L. J. 67,67 (1994) (arguing a majority of courts upheld a simple 
negligence standard). 
192 See Ronald Stevens & Bruce Nielson, The Standard Of Care For Director And Officers Of Federally 
Chartered Depository Institutions: It's Gross Negligence Regardless Of Whether Section 1821 (k) 
Preempts Federal Common Law, 13 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 169,172 (1994). 
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management and on which FIRREA conferred the FDIC a federal cause of action for 
damages incurred upon failed institutions. 193 12 U. S. C. 1821 (k) provides: "A 
director or officer of [a federally insured depository institution] may be held personally 
liable for monetary damages in any civil action by, on behalf of, or at the request or 
direction of the [FDIC], which action is prosecuted wholly or partially for the benefit of 
the [FDIC]... for gross negligence [or] similar conduct ... that demonstrates a greater 
disregard of a duty of care (than gross negligence).... Nothing in this paragraph shall 
impair or affect any right of the [RTC] under other applicable law. " (Emphasis added. ) 
2.1821 (k): A Preemptive, Nation-wide "Gross Negligence" Standard, or Not? 
On face of it, Section 1821 (k) appears to have established a national (federal) and 
uniform gross negligence standard of conduct on bank management-as apposed to the 
diffuse state corporate law based treatment with individual states' standards possibly 
higher or lower than gross negligence. The above-quoted savings clause of the 1821 
(k), however, seems to permit any standard of liability as long as other federal and state 
sources of law have provided for it. 
Besides the statute language itself, concerns over the widely dividing rulings of 
several federal circuit courts on how to adequately positioning the 1821 (k) in 
193 Under the FIRREA and as a matter of law, the FDIC's entitlements in the receivership procedure 
against former bank directors are of a derivative nature that "the [FDIC] shall, ... by operation of law, 
succeed to--all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the insured depository institution.... " See 12 U. S. C. 
§ 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (1988 ed,, Supp. IV). The FIRREA nevertheless explicitly relaxes or even eliminates 
some obstacles that would have been in place should the claim be brought by the shareholder as apposed 
to by the FDIC. See O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct., 2048,2053 (1994) (citing 12 U. S. C. § 
1821(d)(14) (1988 ed., Supp. IV) (extending statute of limitations beyond period that might exist under 
state law); §§ 1821(e)(1), (3) (precluding state-law claims against the FDIC under certain contracts it is 
authorized to repudiate); § 1821(k) (permitting claims against directors and officers for gross negligence, 
regardless of whether state law would require greater culpability); § 1821(d)(9) (excluding certain 
state-law claims against FDIC based on oral agreements by the S& L). ) 
The FIRREA was enacted as a response to massive failures of S& Ls and commercial banks in 1980s. 
See Ronald Stevens & Bruce Nielson, The Standard Of Care For Director And Officers Of Federally 
Chartered Depository Institutions: It's Gross Negligence Regardless Of Whether Section 1821 (k) 
Preempts Federal Common Law, 13 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 169,170, note 3&4 and accompanying texts 
(1994) (noting approximately 940 banks failed or required government assistance between 1985 and 1989, 
and, only in 1985,669 out of over 3,200 thrifts in the United States failed. cited from John O'Keefe, The 
Texas Banking Crisis: Causes and Consequences 1980-1989,3 FDIC Banking Rev. 2 (Winter 1990), and 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTION REFORM, RECOVERY AND 
ENFORCEMENT, ORIGINS AND CAUSES OF THE S&L DEBACLE: A BLUEPRINT FOR 
REFORM, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 4 (July 1993) ) 
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connection with other sources of law were equally noticeable. These rulings posted 
different views on the existence of the superceding or preemptive effect of the 1821 (k) 
standard over other federal common law or state corporate law standards. 194 The issue 
also concerned, if the state law standards were not to be superceded, whether they 
should be applied to federally-chartered, state-incorporated banks. 19' 
To complete this puzzle, the banking-regulator proposed standards of conduct 
formulated on safety-and-soundness grounds added another layer of complication. The 
end result was extreme volatile litigation consequences to be expected of a defendant 
bank management, depending on which court took charge of the trial adopting which 
source of law. '96 
In 1997, the U. S. Supreme Court tried to solve this puzzle with the seminal case of 
Atherton v. FDIC. 197 
C. Atherton v. FDIC: General and Preferential Applicability of State-law 
Corporate Governance Standards; 1821 (k)'s "Gross-negligence" as Floor and 
Substitute Standard 
Atherton involves claims against the former directors of City Federal Savings Bank 
("City Federal"), a federally chartered and insured savings and loan ("S&L"). While 
194 See Steven Ramirez, The Chaos Of 12 U. S. C. Section 1821 (k). Congressional Subsidizing Of 
negligent Bank Directors And Officers, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 625,628-629, note 10 and accompanying text 
(citing conflicting cases: some courts had held 1821 (k) superseded pre-existing federal common law and 
preempted state law, e. g., RTC v. Camhi, 861 F. Supp. 1121,1128-29 (D. Conn. 1994); RTC v. O'Bear, 
Overholser, Smith & Huffer, 840 F. Supp. 1270,1275 (N. D. Ind. 1993); FDIC v. Swager, 773 F. Supp. 
1244,1248 (D. Minn. 1991); others ruled 1821(k) preempted neither federal nor state law, e. g., RTC v. 
Cityfed Fin. Corp., 57 F. 3d 1231,1243- 47 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub nom.; RTC v. Gladstone, 895 
F. Supp. 356,366 (D. Mass. 1995); RTC v. Fiala, 870 F. Supp. 962,967 (E. D. Mo. 1994); RTC v. Gibson, 
829 F. Supp. 1110,1117-1120 (W. D. Mo. 1993); RTC v. Gershman, 829 F. Supp. 1095,1100 (E. D. Mo. 
1993); RTC v. Hess, 820 F. Supp. 1359,1364 (D. Utah 1993); FDIC v. Nihiser, 799 F. Supp. 904,907 
(C. D. Ill. 1992); FDIC v. Black, 777 F. Supp. 919,922 (W. D. Okla. 1991)). 
195 See Id. (some courts had held even a federally-chartered thrift or bank might give rise to state claims, 
citing cases, e. g., RTC v. Williams, 887 F. Supp. 1415,1419 (D. Kan. 1995); RTC v. Rahn, 854 F. Supp. 
480,485 (W. D. Mich. 1994); FDIC v. Barham, 794 F. Supp. 187,191 (W. D. La. 1991), affd, 995 F. 2d 
600 (5th Cir. 1993)). 
Of course, the other way around was at issue as well-that is, whether federal common law could be 
applied to a state-chartered, federally insured bank if it survived the 1821 (k). See Id. at 673-5. 
196 See e. g., Douglas Austin & Sidney Weinstein, Bank Officer And Director Liability Under FIRREA: 
The Need For A National Standard Of Gross Negligence, 111 Banking L. J. 67,82 (1994) (arguing the 
need for a nation-wide, uniform standard to not to have bank directors expose to so great an uncertainty 
and risk that was unrealistic and unacceptable). 
197 Atherton v. FDIC 117 S. Ct. 666 (1997). 
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entailing no self-interest or fraud allegation, the former directors of City Federal were 
accused of, beginning in 1985, approving large, risky construction loans without taking 
reasonable steps to secure sufficient collateral to assure repayment; without verifying 
financial information provided by the borrowers; without obtaining an adequate 
appraisal of the proposed collateral; and without following its own lending policies and 
procedures. 198 The loans resulted in $100 million in losses and subsequently led City 
Federal to its failure. 199 The RTC then stepped in, paying off City Federal's depositors 
and bearing losses resulting from a deficit in City Federal's assets. As an effort to 
recoup losses, the government claimed these bank directors' actions amounted to gross 
negligence (based on 1821 (k)), simple negligence (on federal common law) and 
breaches of fiduciary duty (on state law) and brought director liability claims in the 
bank's name. 200 
The district court agreed the defendant's defence on the 1821 (k) ground that the 
statute intended to pre-empt actions based on less seriously culpable conduct and 
dismissed all but the gross negligence allegations, but on appeal the Third Circuit 
reversed. 201 The ruling the Supreme Court was about to make therefore entailed a loss 
allocation judgment - either the negligent bank directors of the 
failed institution or the 
taxpayers (the Fund) have to bear the losses at question. 
The court approached this from two fronts dealing with the interactions of three 
possible sources of law pronouncing bank directors' standards of conduct: the 
federal 
"gross negligence" statute of 1821 (k); the "simple negligence" federal common 
law 
under the Briggs; and state corporate law such as the defer-to-management 
Delaware 
corporate law. 
It first examined the current state of law and indicated that neither 
federal (national) 
banking statutes nor regulations duly promulgated under them 
had "set forth general 
corporate governance standards" 
202 contradicting those under state corporate 
law, 
although the court admitted some of them 
did specify certain banks' corporate powers 
198 RTC v. Cityfed Fin. Corp., 57 F. 3d 1231,1249 
(3d Cir. 1995). 
199 Id. at 1237. 
200 Atherton, supra note 197, at 667. 
201 Id. 
202 Id., at 672. 
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(such as the requirement for minimum regulatory capital) while the others regulate their 
activities (such as the restriction on concentrated loans). The absence of general 
federal (national) corporate governance standards created from the regulatory side then 
gave rise to the court's "federal common law" analyses. Concurring to a previous US 
Supreme Court's banking decision, 203 the court ruled the once existing federal common 
law standard under the Briggs did not survive the Supreme Court's later decisions. 204 
Second, the court decided there was also no need to fashion new federal common 
law rules on this due care standard issue. It decided the arguments raised by the FDIC 
failed to convince the Court that "... the use of state law will create a significant conflict 
with, or threat to, some federal policy or interest" 205 -a standard consistently 
illuminated by the US Supreme Court as one invoking its judicial creation function. 
The Court rejected the FDIC's "uniformity" argument that was based upon the allegedly 
disturbing effect emanating from "[s]uperimposing state standards of fiduciary 
responsibility over standards developed by a federal chartering authority...... " 206 
Further, the FDIC's argument for a judge-made federal common law on the federal 
interest ground was rejected for a fiduciary duty claim's "private" nature that would not 
be changed when the suit was brought by the FDIC-- "... [when filing a fiduciary duty 
claim], the FDIC is acting only as a receiver of a failed institution; it is not pursuing the 
Government's interest as a bank insurer". 207 
Consequently, the court decided that state corporate laws with their due care 
prescriptions were applicable to both federally and state chartered banks' directors so 
long as the state standards were no less lenient than that under Section 1821 (k). In 
other words, state due care standards would take precedence over the Section 1821 
203 O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct., 2048,2051 (1994) (on the suit brought by the FDIC (as a 
receiver in the name of a bank under receivership) based on alleged state causes of action for professional 
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, ruling "State law governs the imputation of corporate officers' 
knowledge to a corporation that is asserting causes of action created by state law. There is no federal 
general common law"). 
204 Atherton, supra note 197, at 670 (concluding Briggs did not survive Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 
64,78,58 S. Ct. 817,822,82 L. Ed. 1188. ) 
205 Id. (citing Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 86 S. Ct. 1301,1304, (1966)). 
206 Id, at 669. 
207 Id, at 673. 
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(k)-the latter with its gross negligence "floor" standard served only as a substitute. 208 
The bearings of the Section 1821 (k) on the conduct standards applying to bank directors 
therefore prove to be much limited than thought. Of which the most likely is on the 
exculpatory statute. 209 For a state such as Delaware allowing corporate directors to be 
immune from due care liability altogether by way of exculpation statute, Section 1821 (k) 
pre-empts the exculpation statute, while leaves intact other portions of the Delaware 
common law and statutory law. 
It is also obvious that the Atherton court stood by the traditional vein of 
thoughts - the non-shareholder corporate stakeholder's consideration and protection is 
a matter to be basically addressed outside the realm of corporate law. In this regard, 
the Atherton court refused to make an exception out of the banking industry. 
IV. Concluding Observations and Comments 
The U. S. Supreme Court's decision in Atherton reveals its refusal to deferring to the 
agency's explanations concerning Section 1821 (k) and, more generally, to their 
public-interest, safety-and-soundness pronunciations of incorporating a pluralist and 
stakeholder approach into formulating corporate governance standards. By doing so 
whether the US Supreme Court has, as asserted by some commentators, 210 invited more 
explicit Congressional authority to validate the agency's stakeholder stance remains 
unclear. The Supreme Court's endorsement of the applicability in the banking context 
of the shareholder model of corporate governance as primarily informed by state 
corporate laws in their pursuit for maximizing shareholder gains while leaving sideline 
other corporate stakeholders is nevertheless rather clear. Drawing on this stance, the 
following sets forth this chapter's concluding observations and comments. 
208 Id, at 674 & 675. 
209 See e. g., Cindy Schipani, Should Bank Directors Fear FIRREA: The 
FDIC's Enforcement Of The 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery And Enforcement Act, 17 Journal of Corporate Law, 739,761-2, 
note 196 and accompanying text (1992). 
210 See e. g., Stacey Kern, Atherton v. FDIC: The Final Word On Bank 
Officer And Director Liability? 2 
North Carolina Banking Institute, 149,164, note 151 and accompanying text (1998). 
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A. A Critique over Atherton's Rejection of Pluralist Approach to Corporate 
Governance Standards in Banking Context 
The Atherton's formulation of corporate governance standards in the banking standards 
is not unassailable. The court's stance of considering a fiduciary duty claim brought by 
the FDIC on behalf of the bank purely a private suit reflected its ignorance of in reality 
the claim's many non-private regulatory attributes, including such claims' primary 
public-interest purpose for recovering taxpayers' losses caused by corrupt or 
incompetent bank management. Atherton therefore officially closed the chapter at 
which the banking regulator had sometimes succeeded in the past forcing through their 
stakeholder considerations by setting the bank management's standards of conduct 
addressed to the realm of corporate law, yet for regulatory purposes. In other words, 
under Atherton, the nature and substance regarding the bank management's required 
standards of conduct as considered primarily informed by state corporate law have been 
largely settled to be no different from the industrial management. 
The Atherton decision in refraining from exercising its judicial creation function 
associated with resolving conflicts between federal and state laws was based on one 
critical assumption -that at the federal (or national) level, federal banking statutes and 
their derived regulations as well as the federal banking regulator's regulatory 
pronunciations had failed to "set forth general corporate governance standards" relative 
to those under state corporate laws over relationships among bank directors, officers, 
shareholders and other stakeholders. This assumption deserves further investigation. 
Whilst it is obvious inconsistent with the federal bank regulatory arrangement that the 
applicability of state corporate law's "corporate governance procedures" must 
be 
qualified by the requirement for "safe and sound banking", 
211 the full extent of this 
investigation will be further developed in the next chapter. It will 
demonstrate the 
reasoning of Atherton loses sight of the reality that the 
longstanding bank 
safety-and-soundness principle based regulation, supervision and enforcement and 
examination practice have created a regulatory 
duty to be borne by the bank 
management that is of the same open-ended and open-textured nature as 
the fiduciary 
211 OCC, Final Interpretative Rulings, 61 FR 4849-03,1996 WL 50254 (F. R. ) (codified 
in 12 C. F. R. 
Part. 7, Subpart A., § 7.2000) 
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duty under state corporate law, both directing to the core of key commercial business 
decisions and regulating their ensuing risks. It will further expose the acute clashes in 
the course of these two sets of conduct standards confronting each other over regulating 
conduct of the bank management under their bifurcated regulatory objectives. 
B. Atherton's Attendant Effects on Delaware Fiduciary Law 
1. Applicability of Business Judgment Rule 
Before Atherton, of the fiercest debated topics associated with the bank management's 
due care standards under state corporate law was the latitude to be given to the bank 
management during the court's review over due care breach claims, not least the 
warranted lengths of the operation of the business judgment rule. While some 
commentators echoed the banking regulator's view and argued for the need of 
contracting the application of the defer-to-management business judgment rule during a 
court review that the judicial review should be extended to the substance of a business 
decision made or authorized by the bank management when the depositor's interests 
were at stake, 212 the majority viewed this enhanced standard as unnecessary. 213 The 
majority commentators' view, as shared by ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance, 
generally indicated that modem corporate law does not need to set an exception for the 
banking industry as the business boundary between the banking and non-banking has 
become blurred and any sensible distinctions can now hardly drawn from these two. 
214 
With the decision of Atherton, although the court did not directly and explicitly 
212 See e. g., Patricia A. Coy, The Notional Business Judgment Rule in Banking, 
44 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1031 
(1995). 
213 See Id. note 1(citing, inter alia, 3A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 1035, at 
30 (rev. ed. 1994); Michael P. 
Malloy, The Corporate Law of Banks § 3.2.6, at 230-31 & n. 1 (1988); John K. 
Villa, Bank Directors' 
Officers' and Lawyers' Civil Liabilities 1-52 to 1-55 (Supp. 1995); 
D. Franklin Arey III, Bank Directors' 
Duties Under the Common Law ofArkansas, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L. J. 629,637-38 
(1988-1989)) 
214 See AIL, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Analysis and Recommendations 
4.01 (a), 
Reporter's Note 18 ("In general, today banks and other financial institutions are often complex economic 
entities with activities far wider than the holding of 
deposits. Industrial Corporations often are, at least in 
part, financial institutions. No sensible distinctions can 
be drawn solely on the basis of the label `financial' 
as opposed to `industrial' corporation". ); also see Heidi 
Schooner, Fiduciary Duties Demanding Cousin: 
Bank Director Liability For Unsafe Or Unsound Banking Practices, 63 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 175,186-7 
(1995); Banking Briefs, FDIC's Simple Negligence Claims Against Former 
Bank Directors Were 
Precluded By The Texas Business Judgment Rule, 112 Banking L. 
J. 702,702 (1995) (citing FDIC v. 
Benson, 867 F. SUPP. 512 (SD TEX. 1994) [BLJD § 23.06], the 
FDIC's claims for simple negligence 
against a failed bank's former directors were precluded 
by the business judgment rule. ) 
153 
address whether the Delaware's "process due care" fashion of court review would 
correspond to the gross negligence floor standard of conduct, given the U. S. Supreme 
Court's clear direction that corporate governance standards enshrined under the state 
corporate law should remain an exclusive source of law governing conduct of the bank 
management, it is more than likely the Delaware's procedure-centred mode of fiduciary 
duty review will prevail in the banking context. 
2. Bank Safety and Soundness Consideration as Topic of Compliance 
As informed by the Delaware corporate law regime, rather than itself a corporate 
objective, the regulator's concern for safe and sound banking as a class of stakeholder 
considerations can only seek protection by posing as a topic of compliance in the realm 
of corporate law. As far as the bank management is concerned, in their daily course of 
managing the bank, achieving or maintaining bank safety and soundness therefore could 
either be a passive duty to refrain from knowingly violating regulatory orders or 
pronunciations, or, a relaxed requirement that only "an utter failure to attempt to assure 
a reasonable information and reporting system ... establish[ing] the 
lack of good 
faith"215could give rise to managerial liability. 
Even though the passage of Section 1821 (k), with its floor, gross negligence, and 
national liability imposition, has ostensibly raised the bar concerning required prudence, 
its practical effectiveness on promoting bank safety and soundness through prudent risk 
taking is likely to be limited. As argued previously, this is primarily because, given 
Atherton 's dictum, the high probability that the Delaware's business judgement rule and 
its deriving process due care review standard will correspond to the gross negligence 
floor of standard of conduct. As a result, whenever there is a 
bank management made 
or authorized disinterested and good-faith risk taking 
decision, including one deciding 
on certain amount of bank resources to be put towards establishing or maintaining 
the 
bank's internal mechanisms for bank safety and soundness causes, the operation of 
the 
business judgment rule would bar the court from substantively reviewing 
the substance 
of such decision. Instead, only after the plaintiff 
in a derivative suit had rebutted the 
215 See Caremark, supra note 1, at 966. 
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business judgment rule's connected well-informed presumption by establishing in 
reaching such decision, procedurally the bank management's failing to take in necessary 
information (i. e., being ill-informed) came out of gross negligence or worse could any 
monetary damage be imposed on them. As a result, the ostensibly higher due care 
standards required of the bank management under the 1821 (k) might well be 
understood as yet another set of aspirational standards of conduct as opposed to concrete 
standards of review. 216 
Beyond the legal requirements that have informed an implicit functional divide of 
corporate law addressed to the residual claimer's interests and external regulations to 
stakeholder protection, also for some practical reasons, the bank safety and soundness 
regulatory objective may remain an area hardly fuelling the bank executive's passion but 
rather they would tend to feel alienated to. As a matter of business, bank safety and 
soundness and other compliance topics that largely concern public interests are basically 
irrelevant to the parameters that have been set by private ordering and those monitors of 
objectivity against which the bank management's performance is being judged. On a 
practical note, a bank executive who has done an excellent job can therefore only be one 
not only achieving but surpassing the institution's annual profitability target, a task 
going well beyond simply sustaining the bank and steering it in a "safe" course. 
216 Arguably, only in two areas could the 1821 (k)'s gross negligence due-care standard make a 
difference 
in the banking context. First, as noted previously, the floor standard idea 
has literally invalidated the state 
corporate law's exculpatory statutory which made available corporate management 
being shielded from 
any due care violation. 
The second area that can be conceived involves those unconsidered 
inactions, which fall outside the 
application of the business judgement rule since there is no 
"decision" involved. Comparing with the 
quasi-bad faith standard of review applying to the non-banking context, arguably 
the bank management 
would be held personably liable for any unconsidered 
inaction connecting to their managerial functions 
that was considered came out of gross negligence or worse. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - 
Regulatory Requirements for Managerial Safety and Soundness and 
Their Sweeping Implications on Shareholder Governance Model over 
US Banking Organizations 
In early 1990s when the US society was still reeling from the sheer magnitude of losses 
caused by the country's banking crises, one of the hottest contested issues of the banking 
sector reform concerned whether there was a need to bring the banking regulator's 
safety and soundness agenda into the composition of the corporate law fiduciary duty 
owed by bank management to banks. As discussed in chapter three, the US Supreme 
Court in 1997 ended this debate with the Atherton decision positioning the bank 
management, as their industrial counterparts, on the traditional track of the shareholder 
model of corporate governance. Atherton considers state corporate law based enabling 
rules, predicated on the supremacy of maximizing shareholders' wealth, the general 
exclusion of stakeholders and judicial abstention over reviewing bank managements' 
disinterested and good-faith decisions, as in general an exclusive source of corporate 
governance standards regulating managerial conduct and the bank's internal affairs; 
whereas the banking regulator's consideration for the safety and soundness status of the 
institution, including the adequate managerial quality concerning risk taking, is pursued 
(and should remain so) under such external rules as banking statutes, their derived 
regulations and the agency's other rule-making works. One natural extension of this 
mode is the bank safety and soundness consideration, as a class of non-shareholder or 
stakeholder interests, was assumed largely irrelevant to the banking organization's profit 
maximization corporate objective and could only appear as a blackletter compliance 
topic and find its marginalized place under the shareholder model of corporate 
governance. This division of responsibilities, as argued in chapter three, can only 
sustain on an assumption - that the extent to which the stakeholder considerations 
and 
its derived external regulations can be duly specified, and therefore can act as a specific 
strand of constraints against the set of general rules conducive 
to profit maximization. 
This chapter attempts to demonstrate this assumption 
does not hold true in the banking 
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context. 
Primarily drawing on banking regulators' safety and soundness pronunciations 
publicized post-Atherton that were contained in enforcement orders and examination 
material and various regulatory and supervisory directives, the author demonstrates in 
section one the ubiquitous presence of the concept of unsafe and unsound bank 
management by indicating a number of its result-oriented and defer-to-regulator 
attributes. They range from those "deemed" unsafe and unsound practices resulting 
from banks or bank managements' unsatisfactory performances identified in supervisory 
reports, to those relating to restricted or prohibited risk appetites, prescribed often 
disregarding the institution's general financial and managerial strength, further to those 
simply "unlawful" activities, traditionally categorized as compliance now moving into 
safety and soundness topics. These regulatory pronunciations' repercussions on 
managerial mindsets are enormous. The resultant instillation of an objective 
reasonableness standard or the industry standard, which is a step further than even the 
hypothetical "reasonable person" one that was dismissed by the Delaware Chancery 
Court in its due care review as being too strict to sustain the corporate management's 
risk-taking enthusiasm, as argued in the same section, has injected a general loss 
avoidance psychology on the bank management. It is more so when one considers 
those formidable enforcement measures that could impose liabilities and force through 
corrections against even innocent safety and soundness violations. 
As will be shown in Section two, the consideration for banks' (or bank subsidiaries') 
safe and sound management also implicates with bank holding companies which, under 
the operation of the source of strength doctrine and other regulatory principles as 
discussed in section two, are obligated to serve as the ultimate financial and managerial 
source for their banking subsidiaries. This represents a major deviation from the state 
corporate law's attitude towards parent-subsidiary relationships, as reflected 
by the 
limited liability privilege enjoyed by corporate shareholders and the 
insistence on 
corporate separateness, where corporate subsidiaries doing parents' 
bidding is 
considered the norm of business. 
On a comparative note, section three delineates the concept of managerial safety 
and soundness in relation to fiduciary duties in general and also 
in their respective 
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applications in change-of-control, insolvency and intra-group contexts. Section four 
then focus on a broader governance dimension, articulating the sweeping impacts of the 
regulatory pursuit for managerial safety and soundness on the primary governance 
mechanisms supporting the state corporate law based shareholder model of corporate 
governance. 
Section five offers the chapter's concluding remarks and comments. 
I. Managerial Aspect of Bank Safety and Soundness Concept: Substance and 
Enforcement 
This section explores the bank safety and soundness concept as reflected on the 
managerial front from two dimensions: substance and enforcement. The federal 
banking regulators through general rule-making, specific enforcement rulings and 
examination processes have given content to this concept by mandating firm-wide 
risk-management policies and procedures to be devised and implemented prudently, by 
requiring the bank management to restricting from certain specific transactions 
considered as overly risky, and by equating duty of loyalty breaches with unsafe and 
unsound practices. The recent trends also suggest the bank regulator's inclination of 
incorporating certain compliance issues into their safety and soundness agenda. 
Three enforcement aspects addressing the above-listed topics will also be covered 
in this section. They are, first, non-culpability unsafe and unsound banking practice as 
triggering event for regulatory interventions; second, culpable unsafe and unsound 
banking practice and resultant regulatory liabilities; and, finally, the preservation of 
enforcement authority. 
The overall impact of the regulatory pursuit for managerial safety and soundness 
can be twofold. First, there is an enhanced demand for the bank management's 
integrity, where self-interest loyalty breaches are not only addressed by the state 
fiduciary law but have been incorporated into the bank regulator's unsafe and unsound 
categorization. In this respect, the regulatory safety and soundness pursuit serves the 
interests of both the shareholder and the creditor, including the 
depositor. Second, 
safety and soundness enforcement mechanisms, with their formidable 
deterrence effects 
being exerted on the banking institution as well as their management, 
have instilled a 
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distinctively "prudent" managerial psychology in the bank management during the 
bank's ordinary course of business generally while the institution's insolvency risk is 
still rather remote. 
A. Attributes of Managerial Bank Safety and Soundness 
Making an exhaustive account categorizing safe and sound (or unsafe and unsound) 
banking practices is unattainable a task. This is because, as the concept of fiduciary 
duties under state corporate law, the bank safety and soundness concept is by design an 
open-ended and open-textured concept based on progressive recognition primarily 
through the banking agency's regulatory and supervisory prescriptions. An unsafe and 
unsound banking practice is referred commonly by banking regulators and courts as 
"[a]ny conduct that is contrary to generally accepted standards for prudent bank 
operations and that, if continued, might result in abnormal risk or loss or damage to the 
bank ". 1 Consequently, "[w]hile there are guidelines, there are also gray areas allowing 
discretion". 2 For example, while adequate risk management, generally indicated by 
quality internal-control policies and processes and implementation thereof over 
risk-taking, has now emerged as the core of the safety and soundness concept on the 
managerial front, the regulator only notes functionally that such internal processes 
should properly correspond to the size of the bank and the degree of complexity of the 
product or service offered. 3 Against this restraint, the existing regulatory 
pronunciations to which the sub-section will turn are however still instrumental in terms 
of delineating the conceptualization of this concept and its projected desirable patterns 
of managerial conduct. 
1 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, THE DIRECTOR'S BOOK, THE ROLE 
OF A NATIONAL BANK DIRECTOR 64 (1987). A number of cases stated to the same effect, "conduct 
deemed contrary to accepted standards of banking operations which might result 
in abnormal risk or loss 
to a banking institution or shareholder". see e. g., Comptroller of the Currency. 
Fist Nat'l Bank of Eden v. 
Department of the Treasure, 568 F. 2d 610,611 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1978) 
(per curiam); Northwest Nat'l Bank v. 
United States, 917 F. 2d 1111,1115 (8th Cir. 1990). 
2 Laura Pringle, Safety And Soundness Standards and Bank Officer And Director Responsibility, 
27 
Oklahoma City University Law Review, 1017,1020 (2002). 
3 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (O. C. C. ), Risk 
Management Of New, Expanded, Or 
Modified Bank Products And Services, OCC Bulletin 2004-20, (10 May 2004) 
(2004 WL 1081959 
(O. C. C. )). 
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1. Adequate Level of Prudence in Devising and Implementing Risk-management 
Policies and Procedures; Restricted Risk Appetites 
The managerial aspect of the concept of bank safety and soundness is largely 
result-orientated, so is the review standard thereof. Consequential standards are 
frequently required of both banking organizations and their management, whose 
sub-standard practices ranging from non-culpability activities to deliberate violations, 
would lead to regulatory consequences and liabilities varying in intensity. The 
result-oriented nature of this concept is further enhanced by the broad latitude accorded 
to banking agencies by court when reviewing agency-made safety and soundness 
prescriptions - "the-regulators-know-it-when-they-see-it" test, 4 as put rather vividly 
by one commentator. 
By drawing on sources of statutes, regulator-made general rules, private rulings, as 
well as regulatory pronunciations in examinations and enforcement procedures, the 
following explore the managerial side of this consequential concept of safety and 
soundness in practice. The findings reveal two attributes of managerial safety and 
soundness: affirmatively, it points to adequacy of the bank's internal controls, systems, 
procedures and policies as through the regulator's lens; it further, regardless of the 
institution's managerial strength, forestalls certain practices and earmarks them as 
unsafe and unsound for the risk appetites displayed were considered by the regulator as 
overly aggressive or excessive. 
a. Managerial Safety and Soundness as institution's Adequate Device and 
Implementation of Internal Controls, Systems, Procedures and Policies as 
Verified by Regulator; "Deemed" Unsafe and Unsound Banking Practices 
The banking agency is by law allowed to automatically deem a banking institution as 
engaging in unsafe and unsound banking practices upon the institution's receipt of a less 
than satisfactory rating in its most recent report of on-site examination for asset quality, 
management, earnings, or liquidity. 5 Although a deemed unsafe and unsound practice 
4 Thomas Holzman, Unsafe Or Unsound Practices: Is The Current Judicial Interpretation Of The 
Term 
Unsafe Or Unsound?, 19 Annual Review Of Banking Law, 425,426 (2000). 
5 12 U. S. C. sec 1818 (b)(8). 
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is directly predicated on the bank's practice or condition, a bank director can be 
indirectly implicated with such practice upon failing to complying with enforcement 
orders issued against the institution. 6 
Before assigning a satisfactory rating to the management factor, the following will 
have to be established by the banking regulator - active oversight by the board and 
management; competent personnel; maintenance of appropriate audit program and 
internal control environment; and effective risk monitoring and management 
information systems. 7 -a batch of managerial functions focusing on establishing 
effective controls, systems, procedures and policies covered already by the state 
corporate law's standards of conduct and subjected to the state court's review, only in 
banking the extent to which they exist would be further periodically assessed by the 
banking examiner during bank safety and soundness examinations 
Bank examiners review managerial conduct differently from the state court. 
Whereas the state court's fiduciary duty review over managerial decisions or the 
institution's strength on internal controls and procedures is conducted primarily upon 
institution of law suits, bank examiners periodically assess managerial functions through 
portfolio-level reviews and transaction-level testing. A rating 3, the starting point of a 
less-than-satisfactory rating, points unsafe and unsound management at, in general, 
underperformance of the design of the institution's internal monitoring, information and 
control systems - as a result of a portfolio-level review - or, at 
individual 
transactions' inadequately applying the institution's existing systems (in the banking 
context, including underwriting, loan administration procedures as well as internal 
allowance and capital policies) - as a result of sampling of a transaction-level 
testing - or both. 
8 
The above suggests the institution's adequate procedural arrangements, 
both in 
6 See Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Fiduciary Duties' Demanding Cousin: Bank Director 
Liability For 
Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices, 63 GWL. Rev. 175,206 
(1995) (noting a cease and desist order 
whose respondent is the institution as opposed to an individual 
bank officer is binding on the bank and all 
institution-affiliated parties). 
Board of Governors of The Federal Reserve System, 
Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, 
Attachment 1, para. 26, SR 96-38 (SUP) (27 Dec. 1996). 
8 See Federal Reserve Board, Subprime Lending, SR 01-4 (Gen), Attachment: 
Interagency Expanded 
Guidance For Subprime Lending Programs, 1,7-8 (31 Jan. 2001). 
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terms of design and implementation, one able to deliver prudent risk-taking decisions, is 
an essential component of safe and sound banking. In this regard, managerial safety 
and soundness means a resultant situation of procedural prudence pertaining to the 
required adequate risk management as verified through substantive regulatory reviews. 
This observation is coherent with federal banking agencies' pronunciations in the 
Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safety and Soundness, one of their 
major safety and soundness rule-making works effective in August 1995. Over the past 
ten 10 years or so, this result-oriented, procedural prudence approach was repeatedly 
adopted by the banking regulator in setting standards for more specific safety and 
soundness topics such as real estate loan, 9 purchase of securities with high-yielding but 
low investment grade rating, 10and subprime lending. " 
Apart from periodical review through on-site banking examinations, the bank 
regulator may also on an ad hoc basis conduct special examinations reviewing the 
bank's managerial strength using the same result-oriented approach. 12 
9 One example is the 1992 real estate loan guidelines (a set of uniform standards prescribed by federal 
banking regulators under the direction of FDICIA, applied to federally insured depositories across the 
board). See 12 U. S. C. § 1828 (o). Apart from the imposition of loan-to-value ceilings of 65 to 85, the 
final form of the guidelines heavily emphasized adequate monitoring and control functions that include 
loan underwriting procedures, appraisals standards, compliance monitoring, credit factors analyses, 
standards for the use of pre-funded interest, and procedures for loan administration, loan extensions, and 
loan forbearance. For background information and more detailed discussion, see generally, Gary 
Goodman, The New Real Estate Lending Standards for Banks, 111 Banking L. J., 136 (1994). 
10 The OCC considers not inherently an unsafe and unsound practice by purchasing high-yielding 
securities that fall at the low end of the investment grade rating scale. However, when banks change their 
investing practices or strategies by taking on more credit risk as acquiring high-yielding and low 
investment-grade securities without appropriate credit due diligence, limits, and guidelines, such practices 
become unsafe and unsound. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Unsafe And Unsound 
Investment Portfolio Practices Supplemental Guidance, OCC Bulletin 2002-19,1,5 (22 May 2002) (2002 
WL 1162661 (O. C. C. )) 
11 As defined by the banking agency, the term "subprime" refers to individual borrowers' undesirable 
credit characteristics such as weakened credit histories as demonstrated by payment 
delinquencies, or 
reduced repayment capacity, measured by credit scores or debt-to-income ratios. See 
Federal Reserve 
Board, Subprime Lending, SR 01-4 (Gen), Attachment: Interagency Expanded Guidance For Subprime 
Lending Programs, 1,2-3 (31 Jan. 2001). 
When a bank's primary supervisor decides the risks associated with the subprime 
lending activity are not 
properly controlled by means of board-approved policies and procedures, as well as 
internal controls, the 
agency considers it an unduly high-risk activity that is unsafe and unsound. 
See Federal Reserve Board, 
Subprime Lending, SR 99-6 (Gen), Attachment: Interagency Guidance on Subprime Lending, 1,2 
(5 Mar. 
1999). 
12 For an ad hoc case, see e. g., Federal Reserve Board, In The 
Matter of Daiwa Bank, Ltd Osaka, Japan 
and Daiwa Bank, Ltd. New York Branch, New York, Notice of 
Charges and of Hearing, Docket No. 
95-028-B-FB, 95-028-B-FB, (2 Oct. 1995), 1995 WL 580439 (F. R. B. ) (noting 
"contrary to safe and 
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b. Managerial Safety and Soundness as Management's Adequate Implementation 
of Risk-management Policies and Procedures 
Similar to the review and control over the institution, a result-oriented approach applies 
also to the bank director and official, as institution-affiliated parties in the regulatory 
term, checking their specific risk-taking decisions and monitoring-function performance. 
In a 2003 safety and soundness personal cease and desist order, for instance, a bank 
official was considered engaging in unsafe and unsound banking practices connecting to 
her underwriting of a$ 13,000,000 asset-based line of credit when she failed to 
investigate the weaknesses identified in a pre-funding audit of the borrower, and also to 
her management of the line of credit when she failed to take the borrower's chronic 
overdraft position and collateral shortfall into account before facilitating the payment of 
a series of overdrafts and payments against uncollected funds on the borrower's 
account. 13 
This aspect of managerial safety and soundness, predicated on an industry standard 
concerning implementing or devising internal risk-management procedures that is 
reviewed through the industry-standard lens of the bank regulator, indicates a 
convergence of standards of conduct and of review. It presents a dramatic departure 
from the defer-to-management formula developed under Delaware corporate law and its 
prudent banking practices, Daiwa and the New York Branch did not adequately separate the trading 
function from the backroom operations, thereby permitting Iguchi to influence the performance of 
recordkeeping and internal controls over his own trades. "). 
13 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, In the Matter of Alina Cannon, Former Senior Vice 
President Hamilton Bank, N. A., Miami, Florida, Order for Personal Cease and Desist Issued Upon 
Consent, (24 Aug. 2003), 2003 WL 21275988 (0. C. C. ); see also Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, In the Matter of Mary Rebecca Summers, Former Executive Vice President And Cashier, The 
National State Bank Of Metropolis, Metropolis, Illinois, Order for Personal Cease and Desist Issued 
Upon Consent, (31 Mar. 2003), 2003 WL 21206972 (O. C. C. ) (cease and desist order issued on the safety 
and soundness ground asserting the Respondent's "lack of effective and adequate risk monitoring and 
control"); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, In the Matter of Asia-Europe-Americas Bank, Seattle, 
Washington (Insured State Nonmember Bank), Order for Cease and Desist Issued Upon Consent, 
FDIC-04-109B, DFI-04-01 (17 May 2004) (WL 1586515 (F. D. I. C. )) (cease and desist order alleging 
unsafe and unsound practices concerning the bank and its institution-affiliated parties 
for "(a) operating 
with management whose policies and practices are detrimental to the Bank and 
jeopardize the safety of its 
deposits; (b) operating with a board of directors which has failed to provide adequate supervision over 
and direction to the active management of the Bank; (c) operating with an 
inadequate loan valuation 
reserve; (d) operating with a large volume of poor quality loans; 
(e) engaging in unsatisfactory lending 
practices; (f) operating in such a manner as to produce low earnings". 
) 
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judiciary, which led to a divergence of standards of conduct and of review - predicated 
on an aspirational ordinary-person-effort standard, yet reviewed by deferring to the 
management's subjective lens of business judgment. 
c. Prohibited or Restricted Unsafe and Unsound Risk Appetites 
Rather than declaring unsafe and unsound banking practices along the above 
adequate-procedure line, federal banking regulators sometimes directly earmark certain 
business decisions as unsafe and unsound for their perceived risks considered overly 
high or complex or both. Contrasting to the trip-wire system of Prompt Corrective 
Action where restrictions would be imposed only after the institution's financial or 
managerial strength is considered unsatisfactory, these declarations pointing to the 
bank's day-to-day operation can apply across the board regardless of the institution's 
financial or managerial health. Whereas the adequate-procedure line of managerial 
safety and soundness concept focuses on the institution's quality of and compliance with 
internal risk-management procedures, policies and controls, this type of safety and 
soundness pronunciations directly address the risk appetite expected of the banking 
regulator on the bank management over specific transactions. 
For instance, in addressing lending's susceptibility to cyclical changes in economy, 
those lending decisions relying on "optimistic outlooks for borrowers and continued 
favorable economic and financial market conditions" were earmarked by the Federal 
Reserve Board as "departure from historically sound lending practices" that would have 
effected a downgrading of the institution's risk management if "this reliance 
has slowed 
the institution's recognition of loan problems". 
14 It is noticeable the above declaration 
was made in 1999, a year when American economy was robust and 
banking industry 
generally sound. 
Other federal banking regulators from time to time do just the same as the 
Federal 
Reserve Board. For example, the OCC, as the primary regulator of national 
banks, 
declared that purchasing or holding excessive bank-owned 
life insurance represents an 
unsafe and unsound banking practice, given 
heightened liquidity, credit and tax risks 
14 See Board of Governors of The Federal Reserve 
System, Recent Trends in Bank Lending Standards 
for 
Commercial Loans, para 2,6 & 17, SR 99-23 (SUP) (28 
Sep. 1999). 
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associated with such transactions. 15 Again, this declaration applies across the board, 
regardless of the institution's strength on risk management. 16 
In making these safety and soundness pronunciations, the federal banking 
regulators can go so discrete an aspect of a transaction so that a particular contractual 
clause, as opposed to the entire transaction, could be pronounced as unsafe and unsound. 
Whereas the OCC considers purchases and sales of loans and participations in loans as 
established banking practices, the absence of a "prudent" transfer arrangement in these 
transactions to the extent a purchaser's ability to obtain, assess, and maintain sufficient 
credit information might be compromised was pronounced as an unsafe or unsound 
banking practice. 17 
Moreover, the agency's safety-and-soundness views can be also held against 
transactions that are ostensibly of low risk. When transacting on the sale and purchase 
of US government guaranteed loans, for example, the OCC noted it is generally 
considered an unsafe and unsound banking practice for a bank to pay excessive purchase 
premiums that do not reasonably reflect the yield on a loan. Where the purchase 
premiums are not guaranteed and, if the loans are prepaid, are not paid by the 
guaranteeing of the government, the OCC hold concerns over excessive premiums could 
have distorted the bank's real financial standing with the bank's actual value of assets 
being significantly overstated by book value. I8. 
The regulator's safety and soundness considerations may also implicate with 
decisions adopted by the banks' ostensibly independent governance mechanisms, in 
particular when they are considered have substantial impacts on the bank's incentive 
structure. One prominent example concerns the management's compensation 
rs Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Unsafe And Unsound Investment Portfolio 
Practices 
Supplemental Guidance, OCC Bulletin 2002-19,1,7 (22 May 2002) (2002 WL 1162661 (O. C. C. )) (A 
bank-owned life insurance (BOLT) in this context is used for protecting against the loss of key employees 
or hedging employee compensation and benefit plans. The OCC noted the complex risks 
inherent in the 
BOLT policies as: "Although banks can surrender their BOLT policies 
for their cash surrender value, they 
typically would incur substantial losses to do so. Moreover, a determination that 
the policies do not satisfy 
insurable interest requirements may result in a forced cancellation, and/or 
jeopardize the tax-free status of 
the accumulation of cash surrender value, thereby negatively 
impacting the originally anticipated 
return. "). 
16 Id. 
17 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER"S 
HANDBOOK, 
ASSESTS, LOAN PROTFOLIO MANAGEMENT, APPEN. E. 2 (1998) (1998 
WL 161494 (O. C. C. )). 
18 Id., at, APPEN. E. 3. 
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arrangement, 19 which is typically decided by the bank's audit or compensation 
committees, with a view to align the interest of shareholders and that of corporate 
directors. The bank regulator has paid particular attentions to those compensation 
arrangements that likely give the bank management incentives to taking excessive risks. 
Implemented compensation practices that were denounced as unsafe and unsound 
include certain bonus provisions of employment contracts that were considered unduly 
tied to productivity indicators, and certain termination provisions that disabled the bank 
to terminate the employee's compensation however undesirable the employee's 
performance might be . 
2' Another example in this area concerns dividend payment. 
While dividend payment leading to breaching minimum capital requirements clearly 
constitutes an unsafe and unsound banking practice, the management's safety and 
soundness regulatory duty in this area does not end here. 21 As required by the OCC, 
bank examiners must ensure the dividend payment decision made by the management 
would not have "an adverse impact on long-term capital adequacy" after taking into 
account the bank's projections, capital plan and strategic plan. 22 
For a banking organization considered in a "troubled condition", 23 a defined term 
referred to certain unsatisfactory financial or managerial condition, the bank regulators 
would go even further. Under such troubled condition and from a bank safety and 
soundness perspective, the incentive effects flowing from compensation arrangements 
may become more relevant than otherwise - among others, the management may 
decide to steer the bank through such adversity or simply abandon the ship, depending 
on the composition of their compensation package. According to the FDIC regulations, 
"golden parachute" payment is generally prohibited from being made by a depository 
19 For a comprehensive and thorough analyses of regulators' reviews over compensation practices, see 
Heidi M. Schooner, Refocusing Regulatory Limitations On Banks' Compensation Practices, 37 B. C. L. 
Rev., (1996). 
20 Id, text accompanying note 65-71. 
21 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK FOR 
THE NATIONAL BANK EXAMINERS 8 (303.1), 1994 (1994 WL 908068). 
22 Id. 
23 Section 225.71 of Regulation Y defines a troubled condition 
for a state member bank or bank holding 
company as an institution that (i) has a composite rating of 4 or 5; 
(ii) is subject to a cease and desist order 
or formal written agreement that requires action to improve the 
institution's financial condition, unless 
otherwise informed in writing by the Federal Reserve; or (iii) 
is informed in writing by the Federal 
Reserve that it is in a troubled condition. See also supra note as to 
financial and managerial criteria as to 
assigning composite ratings. 
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institution and its holding company to directors and senior management and other 
affiliated-parties of the depository institution when the organization is in a troubled 
condition. 24 
A troubled condition would also give grounds to more stringent restraints on the 
bank's risk-taking decisions. For example, on one of trouble conditions when a bank is 
being subject to a cease and desist order on safety and soundness violation grounds, this 
otherwise well- capitalized bank will not be able to acquire another institution and will 
be restricted from engaging in activities that are "financial in nature" as provided under 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 25 
2. Equating Duty of Loyalty Breaches with Unsafe and Unsound Practices: 
Enhanced Requirement for Integrity 
Applying commonly to non-banking as well as to banking industries, the starting point 
of a duty of loyalty analysis is a conflict-of-interest examination, i. e., whether bank 
management "appear on both sides of a transaction", or they "derive any personal 
financial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing". 26 Nevertheless, there is a major 
24 Golden parachute payment restrictions (12 U. S. C. 1828 (k)) were added to the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act after enactment of the Crime Control Act of 1990. With the authorization of the law, the 
FDIC issued implementing regulations (12 C. F. R. Part 359). Under the FDIC's regulations, a "golden 
parachute" payment means any payment in the nature of compensation (or agreement to make such a 
payment) for the benefit of any current or former institution-affiliated party of a depository institution or 
its holding company that meets three criteria. First, the payment or agreement must be contingent upon the 
termination of the institution-affiliated party's employment or association. Second, the payment or 
agreement or agreement is received on or after, or made in contemplation of, among other things, a 
determination that the institution or holding company is in a "troubled condition". Finally, the payment or 
agreement must be payable to an institution-affiliated party who is terminated when the institution or 
holding company meets certain specific conditions, including being subject to a determination that it is in 
a troubled condition. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Guidance Regarding 
Restrictions on Institutions in Troubled Condition, para 4-6, (SR 03-6) (22 April 2003). 
The "golden parachute" payment restrictions are also applied to a payment made by a banking 
holding company that is not in a troubled condition to an institution-affiliated party of an 
insured 
depository institution subsidiary that is in a troubled condition. See Id., para 7. 
25 12 U. S. C. § 1831o (g)(1)(A); see also Carolyn Kelly, Examinations-Then And Now (The 
Stakes Are 
Higher), 58 Consumer Finance Law Quarterly Report 7,105 (2004). 
26 See e. g., In re Seidman, 37 F. 3d 911,934 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting In re 
Bush, OTS AP 91-16 at 11, 
15-16) ("The threshold inquiry in assessing whether a director violated his duty of 
loyalty is whether the 
director has a conflicting interest in the transaction. Directors are considered 
to be `interested' if they 
either appear on both sides of a transaction,... or expect to derive any personal 
financial benefit from it in 
the sense of self-dealing, as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or 
all stockholders 
generally. ") This is despite fiduciary duty claims in the banking context 
have acted as an extensive 
enforcement tool and the unsettled issue of fiduciary duty recipients with 
banking regulators' continuous 
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difference in the banking context which results in the elevated integrity required of the 
bank management. That is the federal banking agency's firm position that a loyalty 
duty breach alone would constitute an unsafe and unsound practice. 27 
At first glance, this proposition seems to be a departure from the statutory language 
where unsafe or unsound practices are grounds for cease-and-desist enforcement orders 
and fiduciary duty breaches (including loyalty duty breaches) are not. 28 Furthermore, 
some commentators have argued against this approach by pointing out the two concepts' 
differences in their compositions, not least the required actual damage to be proven by 
the plaintiff before a fiduciary duty breach can be made actionable, which contrasts the 
predictive nature of a safety and soundness violation where the "potential" of undue risk 
to the institution would suffice an enforcement action. 29 
In a 1997 final prohibition order of In Re: Charles R. Vickery, JR., First National 
Bank Of Bellaire, 30 the Federal Reserve Board demonstrated how the federal banking 
agency tried to overcome the above challenges to equate a loyalty duty breach, whose 
locus is the misconduct's impropriety and its resultant damages on the corporate entity 
or personal gains on the relevant management, with a safety and soundness violation, 
which is theoretically underpinned by the violation's posing risks to deposit insurance 
fund and to the institution's ongoing operation. 
Under the relevant statute provisions, a removal or prohibition order can only be 
issued by the federal banking regulators upon making three separate findings: 31 (1) 
misconduct: violation of law, unsafe or unsound practice, or breach of fiduciary duty; 
and (2) prescribed effects: financial gain to the respondent or financial loss or other 
efforts in formulating some form of loyalty duty running to depositors or to agencies themselves. 
See 
Chapter three 
27 See e. g., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (F. R. B. ), In Re: Charles 
R. Vickery, JR., 
First National Bank Of Bellaire, Bellaire, Texas, AA-OCC-EC-96-95,1,8 (14 Apr. 1997) (1997 WL 
178423 (F. R. B. )) ("[The Respondent's] `disregard for safety or soundness' is established because his 
self-dealing constituted an unsafe or unsound practice. ") 
28 Basis for a cease and desist order may be violation of law, rule or regulation, unsafe and unsound 
banking practice, or violation of a formal written agreement or condition 
imposed in writing in connection 
with an application submitted to the appropriate federal banking agency. 
12 U. S. C. § 1818 (b). 
29 Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Fiduciary Duties' Demanding Cousin: Bank Director Liability 
For Unsafe 
or Unsound Banking Practices, 63 G. W. L. Rev. 175,213-14 (1995). 
30 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(F. R. B. ), In Re: Charles R. Vickery, JR., First 
National Bank Of Bellaire, Bellaire, Texas, AA-OCC-EC-96-95. (14 Apr. 
1997) (1997 WL 178423 
(F. R. B. )) 
31 12 U. S. C. § 1818 (e)(1)(A)-(C). 
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damage to the institution; and (3) culpability: personal dishonesty or wilful or 
continuing disregard for the safety or soundness of the institution. In the Vickery case, 
the findings made by the regulator supported a text-book, self-interest loyalty duty 
breach claim. The respondent, Charles R. Vickery, as the former Chairman of the 
board of directors of a national bank, was found engaging in practices of collecting 
commissions (or "referral fees") from title insurance companies in return for referring 
borrowers to them. 32 The self-interest misconduct, in combination with the effect of 
personal gains and the culpability of personal dishonesty, clearly rendered the fiduciary 
ground to issue a prohibition order. The less clear was, however, if the findings also 
supported a prohibition order on the safety and soundness ground, as also sought by the 
regulator in the enforcement proceedings. The regulator articulated unsafe and 
unsound practices in that the personal financial stake in the loans would have resulted in 
the institution's substandard loan underwriting and credit-risk management. The 
articulation deftly pointed out, where personal interests "were directly served by 
ensuring that loans were made in any case, the bigger the better, so that [the respondent] 
would receive his referral fees from the title insurance company", 33 these personal 
interests were directly put on a collision course with that of the bank of every credit 
being prudently extended based on risk considerations. 
Loyalty duty breach cases are among the rare areas where the bank regulator is not 
able to always secure a judicial deference when their safety and soundness based 
enforcement orders are contested before court . 
34 But so far as these loyalty duty 
breach cases enforced on safety and soundness grounds have proven to some extent a 
success before court, it will promise the banking agency's continuous eagerness in 
employing safety-and-soundness enforcement actions (including cease and 
desist orders 
by treating fiduciary duty breaches as a sub-set of unsafe and unsound banking practice) 
32 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(F. R. B. ), In Re: Charles R. Vickery, JR., First 
National Bank Of Bellaire, Bellaire, Texas, AA-OCC-EC-96-95,1,1 (14 Apr. 
1997) (1997 WL 178423 
(F. R. B. )) 
33 Id. at 5. 
34 See e. g., PATRICIA A. McCOY, BANKING LAW 
MANUAL § 13.3 [4] (2nd ed., 2000) (comparing 
Kaplan v. OTS, 104 F. 3d 417,421 n. 2 (D. C.. 
Cir. 1997) ("a fiduciary breach can qualify as an unsafe 
and unsound practice (and thus be actionable under 
§ 1818 (b)(1))") with In re Seidman, 37 F. 2d 911, 
932 (3d Cir. 1994) (an unsafe and unsound practice is not necessarily a 
breach of fiduciary duty and vice 
versa)) 
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to address those practices where the bank management places their personal interests 
ahead of the institution entrusted to them. One net effect is, contrasting to their 
non-banking counterparts, bank management will continuously expose to this extra 
requirement for enhanced integrity as boosted by the bank regulator rather than the 
shareholder through their fully fledged regulation and enforcement actions triggered by 
safety and soundness violations. Commonly addressing the bank management's 
self-interested activities, the supervisory effort of issuing safety-and-soundness based 
enforcement orders addressed to depositor protection and public interests therefore 
complements the derivative claim under state corporate law addressed to upholding 
shareholder interests. 
3. Recent Trends: Incorporating Compliance Issues to Safety and Soundness 
Enforcements 
The recent trends of safety and soundness enforcement actions are noteworthy because 
they might represent yet another starting point of the banking agency's expansion of 
their enforcement authority in the name of managerial safety and soundness. Some 
recent enforcement actions embraced those violation-of-law compliance issues, such as 
fair lending compliance, that were already regulated under black-letter statutes and 
regulations and that were in the past outside the safety-and-soundness category 
concerning primarily risk-taking decisions. 35 From a theoretical standpoint, attributing 
these compliance-violation practices to the traditional safety and soundness articulation 
is difficult because, whereas they have adverse effects on the bank's certain 
constituencies, they in general do not endanger the going concern operation of the bank, 
nor do they pose any substantial threat to the well-being of the deposit insurance fund. 
While the period of 2001 to 2005 also saw compliance violations such as 
35 Traditionally, the three main areas where the banking agency is committed to promoting compliance 
are concerning federal consumer protection laws, fair lending statutes, and the 
Community Reinvestment 
Act. See FDIC, Financial Institution Letters, Revised Compliance Examination Procedures, FIL-52-2003 
(20 June 2003). See Pringle, supra note 2, at 1020 (noting differences 
between implementing 
safety-and-soundness and compliance examinations-the former 
is more flexible in fashioning safe and 
sound policies and procedures of each individual institution; the 
latter adopts a more standard approach 
addressing "virtually identical issues at all banks" with legal requirements concerning 
compliance issues 
tending to be explicit). 
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escheating regulation violation enforced on safety and soundness, 36 the two main 
strands of these cases involve unfair consumer practices and money laundering 
practices. 37 
a. Consumer Protection: Tying Practice and Predatory Lending 
In a combination order of cease and desist and assessment of civil money penalty (in the 
amount of $3 million) issued in 2003 against a bank's compliance violations of section 
106 of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, the Federal Reserve 
Board further alleged unsafe and unsound banking practices for failings of internal 
controls and internal procedures over the "tying" practice that extensions of credit to 
some corporate customers were conditioned upon their appointing the bank as a 
co-manager of syndicates underwriting future issues of debt securities. 38 This case 
represents the first time ever the Federal Reserve System resorts to a formal 
enforcement action on safety and soundness grounds against a banking organization 
based on consumer protection violations of section 106.39 Interestingly, in the same 
year of 2003, the OCC also brought its first unfair practice enforcement case concerning 
the violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act that involved abusive tax lien loans 
40 to subprime borrowers. 
36 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (F. R. B. ), In The Matter of Kenneth Goglia, 
A 
Former Officer And Institution-Affiliated Pary of Bankers Trust Company, New York, New York, Cease 
and Desist Order Issued Upon Consent, Docket No. 99-017-B-12 (19 July 2001) (2001 WL 
855081 
(F. R. B. )) (a former Managing Director was accused of participating in unsafe and unsound banking 
practices for leading the bank to "improperly account for and dispose of abandoned customer 
funds that 
were due to escheat to state authorities"). 
37 See Thomas Vartanian, Enforcement Trends: Criminal Charges And State Participation, American 
Banker, 9 (26 Mar. 2004) (noting unfair consumer practices and money laundering cases, 
in particular 
under the Bank Secrecy Act, as the recent banking enforcement trends). 
38 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (F. R. B. 
), In The Matter of WestLB AG Dusseldorf, 
Germany, WestLB AG New York Branch, Combination Order of Cease and Desist and 
Assessment of 
Civil Money Penalty, Docket Nos. 03-030-B-FB (27 Aug. 2003) (2003 WL 22035807 
(F. R. B. )). 
39 See Richard Kim, The Federal Reserve's Proposed Interpretation Regarding 
The Anti-tying 
Restrictions Of Section 106 of The Bank Holding Company Act 
Amendments Of 1970,8 North Carolina 
Banking Institute, 1,16 (2004). 
40 See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(0. C. C. ), Special Supervision And Enforcement 
Activities, 23 No. 1 OCC Q. J. 1,2 (2004) (WL 2360337 (0. C. C. )) In 
2003, the OCC was rather vigorous 
in instituting formal enforcement actions remedying safety and soundness 
concerns over consumer 
tion 
protection compliance. Other safety and soundness enforcement 
cFair 
Estate Settlement Procedures t, 
compliance involved consumer protection statutes such as 
Real 
Credit Reporting Act, Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and Truth 
in Lending Act. See Id. at 3. 
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In the area of consumer protection, predatory lending 41 has also attracted 
enormous amounts of safety and soundness attention recently. As an issue more akin 
to commercial morality, predatory lending could entail rather handsome returns to and 
little damages on the bank's financials, leaving aside reputational concerns. The 
federal banking agency nonetheless categorically declared predatory lending, i. e., "loans 
to borrowers who do not demonstrate the capacity to repay the loan... from sources other 
than the collateral pledged", as unsafe and unsound a banking practice. 42 In an 
enforcement order, the agency's predatory-lending related safety and soundness 
pronunciations extended to even cover the bank's failure to properly overseeing its 
outsourcing vendor's payday loan operation. 43 
b. Fighting International Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
With the USA Patriot Act signed into law on 26 October 2001, where the portions 
affecting banking organizations are generally set forth as amendments to the Bank 
Secrecy Act ("BSA"), fighting international money laundering and blocking terrorist 
access to the U. S. financial system reaches the forefront of bank compliance. 44 
Section 352 of the Patriot Act, for example, requires every bank to establish anti-money 
laundering program by 24 April 2002. The Federal Reserve Board's regulations also 
required each bank under its supervision to maintain a BSA compliance program that 
41 For the definition of predatory lending, see e. g., Kathleen Engel & Patricia McCoy, A Tale Of Three 
Markets: The Law And Economics Of Predatory Lending, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1255,1260 (2002) (defining a 
predatory lending as the practice consisting of at least one of the five following components: "(1) loans 
structured to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to borrowers, (2) harmful rent seeking, (3) 
loans involving fraud or deceptive practices, (4) other forms of lack of transparency in loans that are not 
actionable as fraud, and (5) loans that require borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress. ") 
42 See Federal Reserve Board, Subprime Lending, SR 01-4 (Gen), Attachment: Interagency Expanded 
Guidance For Subprime Lending Programs, 1,11, (31 Jan. 2001). 
43 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (O. C. C. ), In The Matter Of Peoples 
National Bank Paris, 
Texas, Consent Order, Enforcement Action No. 2003-2, (30 Jan. 2003) (2003 WL 21206999 (O. C. C. )) 
(unsafe or unsound banking practices related to the Bank's payday 
loans including the Bank's management 
of the vendor that provides services related to these payday loans) 
44 For an outline of additional due diligence and recordkeeping practices set 
forth under the BSA as 
amended by the USA Patriot Act that include, among other things, prohibition on 
US correspondent 
accounts with shell banks, availability of bank records to 
bank regulators and law enforcement authorities, 
and due diligence for private banking and correspondent accounts as applied 
to the US insured depository 
institutions as well as to the US branches and agencies of 
foreign banks, see Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, The USA Patriot Act and the International Money 
Laundering Abatement and 
Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001, SR 01-29 (26 Nov. 2001) 
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provides systemic treatments over internal controls and internal audits, as well as trained 
personnel, to ensure ongoing effective execution of anti money laundering compliance. 45 
Recently on 12 October 2004, the Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) launched its first publicly released enforcement action 
under the BSA following its amendment by the Patriot Act. 46 The FinCEN's 
enforcement action coincided with that of the Federal Reserve Board against the same 
bank under the same cause. In the Federal Reserve Board's combination order of cease 
and desist and assessment of a civil money penalty (in the amount of $ 10 million), the 
bank agency enumerated various breaches relating to complying with anti-money 
laundering regulations that included failings of establishing and maintaining reasonable 
BSA-compliance procedures and of filing Suspicious Activity Reports in an accurate, 
complete and timely manner. 47 In the Federal Reserve Board's order, failing to "have 
adequate systems in place to prevent, identify, and report criminal activity conducted 
through the bank, and failing to promptly and fully cooperate with law enforcement 
authorities in the review and investigation of such activity" were explicitly pronounced 
as unsafe and unsound practices, to almost the exact extent they provided the grounds 
for FinCEN's enforcement order. 48 
c. Interim Comments: Intermingling Compliance Together with Safety and 
Soundness Issues 
4s Thomas Crocker, Federal Regulators Step Up Bank Secrecy Act And Patriot Act Enforcement, 9 no. 6 
Electronic Banking Law and Commerce Report, 1 (Nov. 2004). 
46 Id. 
47 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, In The Matter 
Of Amsouth Bancorporation 
Birmingham, Alabama And Amsouth Bank Birmingham, Alabama, Docket Nos. 04-021-B-HC, 
04-02 1 -CMP-HC, 04-02 1 -CMP-SM, Combination 
Consent Order to Cease and Desist and of Assessment 
of a Civil Money Penalty, (12 Oct. 2004) (2004 WL 2327939 (F. R. 
B. )) 
48 Id. See also Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
In The Matter Of State Bank Of India 
Mumbai, India, ET AL, Combination Order to Cease and Desist and of Assessment of a 
Civil Money 
Penalty, (13 Nov. 2001) (2001 WL 1432046 (F. R. B. )) (the Bank's "failure[s] to establish and maintain 
procedures reasonably designed to assure and monitor compliance with 
the BSA and... to maintain correct 
and complete books and records" constitute unsafe and unsound 
banking practices. ); Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System (F. R. B. ), In The Matter of 
Nelly Kann De Gouverneur, a Former Employee 
and Institution-Affiliated Party, Banco Mercantil, S. 
A. C. A., NEW YORK, NEW YORK, Personal Cease and 
Desist Order, Docket No. 01-000-E-I1 (21 June 2001) (2001 WL 700614 
(F. R. B. )) (unsafe and unsound 
practices connecting to assisting private banking customers' 
deposits structuring that resulted in violations 
of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting 
Act (31 U. S. C. § 5311 et seq. )). 
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Compliance and safety-and-soundness are two different sets of regulatory concerns, 
which, in practice, are separately addressed by safety and soundness examinations and 
compliance examinations. Although the newly revised compliance-risk focused 
program has, in appearance, emerged to resembling the risk-focused safety and 
soundness program that both emphasize board oversight, policies and procedures and 
internal audit, 49 the two programs are originated from distinctive policy underpinnings. 
Compliance restraints typically specified by explicit legal rules are aimed at protecting 
such discrete stakeholders generally outside the realm of corporate law as the bank's 
neighbouring residents, the consumer, or even the nation's security. By contrast, safety 
and soundness regulation is meant to perform a gap-filler function in general terms 
towards the bank's commercial decisions so as to have the institution expose to only an 
acceptable level of credit, market and operational risks, as perceived by the banking 
regulator. Thus, bundling together these two intrinsically disparate regulatory concepts 
as did the banking regulator in their enforcement procedure is theoretically inadequate. 
Moreover, it also renders no practical utility. Under the FDI Act, violation-of-law is 
already a cause separate from the unsafe and unsound banking practice that can trigger 
full-fledge enforcement actions. 50 Attributing compliance violations to the concept of 
unsafe and unsound banking practices provides no extra protection. It simply confuses 
the bank management with exponential expansion on the regulator's safety and 
soundness agenda and places them on tremendous legal uncertainties. 
B. No-culpability Unsafe and Unsound Banking Practice as Triggering Event for 
Government Interventions and Potential Source of Liability 
One essential aspect of safety-and-soundness based regulatory interventions in relation 
49 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Revised Compliance Examination Process, FIL-52-2003 (20 
June 2003) (outlining the revised compliance examination process, which 
focused increasing attention on 
the institution's compliance management system, for determining the 
depository institution's compliance 
with consumer protection laws and regulations. ); see also John Jackwood, 
Compliance Examinations: A 
Change in Focus, available at http: //www. fdic. gov/examinations/supervisory/insights/compliance. 
htm] 
(visited: Jan. 2005) (noting the evolution of FDIC's compliance examinations, 
the process from 
predominantly relying on reviewing actual banking transactions to 
incorporating an in-depth evaluation of 
a bank's compliance management system into the examination. 
) 
so A violation of a law, rule or regulation can serve the grounds 
for a cease-and-desist order (12 U. S. C. § 
1818 (b)(1) ). 
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to the bank's operation rests with the banking agency's legal mandate of proactive 
interventions and their extremely forceful powers in enforcement. Both of which need 
no culpability to be attached. As discussed in chapter, unsafe and unsound banking 
practices are not confined to those inflicting direct, substantial financial losses on the 
institution, but also include sub-standard practices posing potentially undue risk to the 
institution in the future. Regulatory interventions on safety and soundness grounds 
therefore are not only aimed at addressing the banking institution's problems related to 
capital shortages or insolvency risk that is imminent, but also at controlling the 
institution's credit, market, operational and other risks in more general terms during its 
ordinary course of operation to hold it as a going concern. 
1. Prompt Corrective Action 
Under the Prompt Corrective Action ("PCA") regime, following an undesirable result of 
banking examination that exposes the bank's weaknesses either in terms of 
capitalization or managerial strength or both, which usually equates with a deemed 
unsafe and unsound practice, the banking regulator is mandated to make 
entrepreneurial-type decisions overturning those previously adopted by the institution's 
own management. ' s 
2. Government Interventions by Informal Enforcement Actions: Supervisory 
Written Agreements 
Besides the PCA regime, a much more far-reaching type of regulatory interventions 
comes from the bank regulator's informal and formal safety and soundness enforcement 
actions, particularly the informal written agreement (such as supervisory agreements and 
the memorandums of understanding, MOUs52) and the formal cease-and-desist order. 
51 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 ("FDICIA"), 12 U. S. C. A. § 1831o 
(West Supp. 1992). The PCA. based interventions can take place well before an institution is technically 
insolvent and subject to conservatorship or receivership. They take the 
form of a variety of such 
entrepreneurial-type decisions as the displacement of the bank's management, the 
imposition of a cap on 
the interest rate the bank may pay on deposits, the compulsory new stock 
issues, the divesture requirement 
for the bank of its subsidiaries, and the ultimate of receivership when the capital 
level of the bank falls in 
the solvent yet critically undercapitalized position. See also chapter two. 
52 Supervisory agreements are functionally equivalent to MOUs where 
the former were commonly used 
by thrift regulators and the latter in the commercial banking 
industry. See Banking Law Manual § 13.02. 
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As a class of informal enforcement actions, i. e., enforcement methods not formally 
authorized by statute, 53 a written agreement entered into by and between the regulator 
and the institution can be not so much a conciliatory result of bilateral negotiations as a 
unilateral supervisory directive reduced to the form of agreement. For those bank 
directors with institutions entrusted to them being in troubles, more than often they can 
have no choice but accept regulator-drafted "agreements" in their entirety in exchange 
for the regulator forbearing from initiating formal enforcement proceedings or other 
aggressive supervisory actions. 
Moreover, such agreements, as pointed out by one commentator, typically "contain 
sweeping, outcome-oriented language focused on requiring the institution's board of 
directors to accomplish or `ensure' the accomplishment of specified objectives, such as 
require[ing] the board to `ensure' the adoption and implementation of an effective loan 
review program, ... 
[, or] to take steps to cure loans criticized for lack of 
documentation... "54 All these sweeping elements are added by the serious legal 
consequences that even innocent violation of the agreement will subject both the 
institution and the bank director to the full array of formal enforcement punishments. 55 
3. Government Interventions by Formal Enforcement Actions: Cease and Desist 
Orders 
Cease-and-desist orders represent among the most intrusive form of government 
interventions that are explicitly authorized by bank statutes. They are issued under the 
discretion of the appropriate federal banking agency, often based on a resultant situation, 
and subject to the court's ex post deferential review, both in terms of findings of 
fact and 
of interpretations of law (such as defining an unsafe and unsound practice). 
A 
cease-and-desist order can be directed against both institutions 
(the bank and its 
affiliated entire corporate family) and individuals (the institution-affiliated parties 
that 
53 The differences between the terms "formal" and "informal" primarily rest with whether or not 
the 
enforcement methods are formally authorized by statute. Id. 
sa John Byrne et al., Examining the Increase in Federal 
Regulatory Requirements and Penalties: Is 
Banking Facing Another Troubled Decade? 24 Cap. U. L. Rev. 1,4 n. 10 
(1995). 
ss See 12 U. S. C. § 1818 (a)(2) (termination of deposit insurance), 
(b)(1) (cease-and-desist order), 
(e)(1)(A) (removal and prohibition), and (i)(2)(A) (civil money penalties). 
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include bank executives and outside directors), 56 who can have no culpability 
whatsoever. 
Whereas generally considered remedial rather than punitive in nature, 
cease-and-desist orders have the potential deriving serious legal consequences that an 
innocent violation of a final cease-and-desist order alone could result in a maximum $ 
5,500 of civil money penalties per day. 57 
A typical cease and desist order is for remedial purposes, i. e., commanding 
depository institutions or their affiliates or institution-affiliated parties to refraining from 
unsafe and unsound practices or mandating affirmative relief by requiring them to take 
corrective actions such as growth restrictions, loan disposal, contract rescission and 
employment of qualified officers. 58 In many cases, however, cease and desist orders, 
as authorized by statute, could be instituted for past violations that have been 
corrected. 59 In other words, even after a safety and soundness violation has been 
corrected, some forms of preventive measures can be still imposed upon the institution, 
the bank directors and other institution-affiliated parties to ensure their future 
compliance. As far as a bank director or officer's professional reputation is concerned, 
these precautious measures could be not less detrimental as punitive measures. 
In a 2003 personal cease and desist order issued upon consent, for example, the 
OCC accused the Respondent, a former bank executive vice president, of engaging in 
unsafe and unsound banking practice for she "should have known that the Bank's 
merchant processing operations did not adequately monitor and control the various risks 
56 "Institution-affiliated party" is defined by statute as "any director, officer, employee, or controlling 
stockholder (other than a bank holding company) of, or agent for, an insured depository institution. " 12 
U. S. C. § 1813(u) (emphasis added). 
Proceedings instituted under Sections 8(b) (cease and desist order) and 8(i) (civil money penalties) of the 
FDI Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ 1818(b), 1818(i), are applicable with respect to bank holding companies by 
operation of 12 U. S. C. § 1818(b)(3), which provides that 12 U. S. C. § 1818(b)-(s) and 12 U. S. C. § 1818(u) 
"shall apply to any bank holding company, ... 
in the same manner as they apply to a State member 
insured depository institution. " 
57 See generally McCOY, supra note 34, at § 13.03 [6]. 
58 12 U. S. C. § 1818 (b) (6)(B)-(E) (Supp. 1I 1990). 
59 Section 8(b) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act provides that the 
federal banking agency may issue 
and serve a notice of charges to determine whether a cease and 
desist order should issue if, "in its 
opinion", the bank or institution-affiliated party has engaged 
in an unsafe and unsound banking practice. 
12 U. S. C. § 1818(b)(1). 
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associated with such an endeavour". 60 More strikingly, whereas no punitive measures 
were imposed with the cease and desist order, conditions for her future employment 
were imposed that "prior to accepting any new position that causes her to become an 
`institution-affiliated party', Respondent shall provide the chief executive officer of the 
institution or agency with a copy of this [Cease and Desist] Order". 61 Similar 
preventive measures such as the requirement of obtaining the agency's written approval 
prior to any perspective employment as an institution-affiliated party can also be seen. 62 
C. Culpable Unsafe and Unsound Banking Practice and Resultant Regulatory 
Liabilities 
Upon the banking regulator's findings of the required culpability, the bank director who 
engaged or participated in any unsafe and unsound banking practice could be subjected 
to regulatory liabilities by means of, for example, the imposition of a restitution order or 
civil penalties. 63 Where there is personal dishonesty involved or the misconduct 
demonstrates the respondent's willful or continuing disregard of the bank's safety and 
soundness, a bank director's unsafe and unsound practice could subject him to removal 
and prohibition. 64 These regulatory liabilities or treatments can entail disastrous 
financial consequences for bank directors as fines or other money payments assessed by 
agencies' orders are normally outside the coverage of director-and-officer policies. 65 
D. Preservation of Bank Agencies' Safety-and-soundness Authority 
While an attempt to hinder the banking agency's investigation triggered by its safety and 
60 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, In the Matter of Mary Rebecca Summers, Former Executive 
Vice President And Cashier, The National State Bank Of Metropolis, Metropolis, Illinois, Order for 
Personal Cease and Desist Issued Upon Consent, (31 Mar. 2003) (2003 WL 21206972 (O. C. C. )) 
61 Id. at Art. III (3). 
62 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, In the Matter of Kenneth Goglia, 
Former Officer, 
Bankers Trust Company, New York, New York, Docket No. 99-017-B-12, (19 July 2001), (2001 WL 
855081 (F. R. B. )). 
63 Issuing a restitution order must be predicated on the finding of either the respondent's unjust 
enrichment or reckless disregard for law or any applicable regulation or the agency's prior order. 
12 U. S. 
C. 1818 (b)(6)(A). For imposing second or third tier civil penalties (penalties up to 
$ 27500 and $ 1.1 
million respectively), the "reckless" or "knowingly" manner of engaging or participating 
in unsafe and 
unsound practices must be found. See 12 U. S. C. 1818 (i)(2)(B)(i) 
& (C)(i). 
64 12 U. S. C. 1818 (e)(1)(A). 
65 See Joseph Monteleone & Nicholas Conca, Directors and Officers Indemnification and 
Liability 
Insurance: An Overview of Legal and Practical Issues, 51 Bus. Law. 573,598-99 
(1996). 
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soundness concern is by itself an unsafe and unsound practice, 66 banking agencies also 
restrict certain banking practices in order to more proactively preserve their authority. 
For example, in terms of the "indemnification payment" arrangement, an 
indemnification payment by the bank to its management could be prohibited to the 
extent such payment would have paid or reimbursed an institution-affiliated party for 
legal expense associated with administrative enforcement proceedings brought by the 
banking agencies. 67 Besides, the Federal Reserve Board further expressed its 
discomfort "[fjrom a safety and soundness perspective"68 to those banks or bank 
holding companies adopting by-laws under the applicable state corporate laws to 
indemnify a bank director from his misconduct that "presumably violates the 
institution's policy of compliance with applicable law". 69 Whilst as yet there is no 
regulation explicitly addressing the extent to which the effect of this aspect of safety and 
soundness concerns implicates with the state law's exculpation statute, the stance taken 
by the Federal Reserve here is a strong hint that the exculpation statute relieving the 
bank management's fiduciary liabilities arising out of compliance breaches might not 
survive the regulator's challenge. 
A more specific example can be related to supervisory-linked covenants. Such 
covenant as "using adverse supervisory actions or the breach of supervisory thresholds 
as triggers for early amortization events or the transfer of servicing" in securitization 
transactions was straightforwardly denounced by the Federal Reserve Board as an 
unsafe and unsound practice. 7° 
II. Bank Safety and Soundness Applying to Group Structure: Source of Strength 
66 Seidman v. OTS 37 F. 3d 911,936-37 (3 rd Cir. 1994); see also Board of Governors of the 
Federal 
Reserve System, In the Matter of Postipankki Ltd., Helsinki, Finland; Postipankki Ltd., New York 
Branch, New York, New York, Order of Assessment of a Civil Money Penalty Issued Upon Consent, 
Docket Nos. 97-006-CMP-FB, 97-006-CMP-FBR (July 11,1997) (1997 WL 391979 (F. R. B. )) (asserting 
unsafe and unsound practices related to misrepresentations to bank supervisory officials concerning 
trading losses, and for the Branch's filing of allegedly false and misleading regulatory reports). 
67 12 C. F. R. Part 359 
68 See Board of Governors of The Federal Reserve System, 
Guidance Regarding Indemnification 
Agreements and Payments, para. SR 02-17 (SUP) (8 July 2002). 
69 Id. (A bank or bank holding company "should not divert its assets to pay a 
fine or other final judgment 
issued against an institution-affiliated party" for such misconduct. 
). 
70 See Board of Governors of The Federal Reserve System, 
Covenants in Securitization Documents 
Linked to Supervisory Actions or Thresholds, Para 1, SR 02-14 (SUP) 
(23 May 2002). 
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and Similar Regulatory Doctrines 
The previous section discusses the enhanced regulatory requirements for bank safety 
and soundness through 1990s to the early 2000s characterized by increased activity 
limitations stretching from restricted risky to unlawful activities that were directly 
imposed upon stand-alone banks and their management. On a group-based structure, 
these restrictions directing toward stand-alone banks' risk-taking strategies equally 
apply to bank subsidiaries of holding companies. 
In addition, bank safety and soundness safeguards applying particularly to a group 
structure can also be identified. Whereas those regulating transactions between banks 
and their affiliate and those pinpointing the permissible corporate structures for 
expanded bank activities are self explanatory and will not to be dealt with here, this 
section focuses on those addressing the bank parent's (as a sole or controlling 
shareholder) expanded obligations for its bank subsidiary, in particular those developed 
under the "source of strength" regulatory doctrine. 
A. Precursor: Net Worth Maintenance as Condition for Thrift Holding Company's 
Acquisition Approval 
From the mid-1970s, as a condition for agency approval of thrift acquisitions, the 
federal thrift regulator started to requiring savings and loan holding companies to ensure 
the solvency of the thrifts they acquired. 7' By requiring capital infusion from the 
parent company prior to the use of insurance funds, the regulator attempted to deter the 
parent from potential abuse over its subsidiary S&L through dominant ownership and 
encourage prudent management of the insured institution. Whilst the regulatory 
practice of demanding so called "net worth maintenance agreements" or "capital 
maintenance commitments" subsided over time due partly to the concern of deterring 
acquirers, 72 this kind of regulatory principle was later succeeded by a full-fledged 
71 See generally McCoy, supra note 34, at § 4.05. 
72 In 1990, OTS set the maximum liability for an acquiror under a 
limited net worth maintenance 
agreement as the difference between the institution's capital immediately 
following the transaction and the 
institution's fully phased-in capital requirements as of the same date. Furthermore, 
OTS modified its 
policy again in 1991 on net worth maintenance agreements. 
The new policy required a capital 
maintenance agreement only if the acquired thrift had failed to meet 
its fully phased-in regulatory capital 
requirements. It also required that persons or companies subject to capital maintenance obligations 
notify 
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proposition, i. e., the "source of strength" doctrine, applying to national banks and their 
holding parents. 
B. Bank Holding Company's Expanded Obligation to Bank Subsidiaries under 
Source of Strength Doctrine 
As a re-confirmation of the Federal Reserve System's long-standing policy, the 
regulatory term "source of strength" contained in the Regulation Y is defined as the 
bank holding company's general obligation of "... serv[ing] as a source of financial and 
managerial strength to [their] subsidiary banks and shall not conduct [their] operations 
in an unsafe and unsound manner. , 73 
The doctrine, despite in nature as a subset of bank safety and soundness principle 
and in function both serve for the purpose of distilling prudence into banking 
organizations' decision-making processes, goes towards a distinct direction. Whereas 
the bank safety and soundness requirements, with its entity-specific reach, are meant to 
effect prudent management of the bank itself, the vertical coverage of the 
source-of-strength doctrine has direct implications on the corporate shareholder's 
limited liability privilege and the concept of entity separateness. 
1. Financial Element of Source of Strength Doctrine: Bank Holding Company's 
Solvency Assurance Obligation for Bank Subsidiary 
In one sense, the source of strength doctrine functions for solvency assurance similarly 
to the net worth maintenance arrangement in that bank holding companies are under the 
regulatory obligation to assisting their subsidiary banks by "standing ready to use 
available resources to provide adequate capital funds to subsidiary banks during periods 
of financial stress or adversity. , 74 Up until now, a bank hold company's capability of 
OTS before divesting control. Cassandra Jones Havard, Back To The Parent: 
Holding Company Liability 
For Subsidiary Banks -A Discussion Of The 
Net Worth Maintenance Agreement, The Source Of Strength 
Doctrine, And The Prompt Corrective Action Provision, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 2353,2374 
(1995) ( citing 
Office of Regulatory Activities, Thrift Bull. No. 5a, at 
1 (Apr. 1990); and Office of Thrift Supervision, 
Thrift Bull. No. 38 -3a (19 Nov. 1991)) 
73 12 C. F. R. § 225.4 (a)(1); see also McCoy, supra note 71. 
74 Federal Reserve Board, Policy Statement on Responsibility of Bank 
Holding Companies to Act as 
Sources of Strength to Their Subsidiary Banks, 52 Fed. 
Reg. 15,707,15,707 (1987) (WL 133897 (F. R. )). 
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financially serving as a source of strength continuously remains the precondition for the 
Federal Reserve Bank's approval of such company's prospective acquisition of a bank 
subsidiary. 7s 
The source of strength doctrine has, however, proven even in this financial sense 
much more far-reaching than the net worth maintenance commitment. Going well 
beyond merely an acquisition condition, a bank holding company is now under an 
ongoing obligation to provide financial supports throughout the company's life for its 
subsidiary banks in financial distress. This duty has been enforced with the Federal 
Reserve's vigor and willingness to resorting to formal enforcement actions on the parent 
level and on safety and soundness grounds for those bank holding companies failing to 
assist troubled subsidiary banks. 76 Business decisions that might impair the bank 
parent's capital strength so as to endanger its capability of standing ready to assist its 
troubled bank subsidiaries are also subjected to various regulatory restraints. 77 In view 
of the parent company's standby regulatory duty to supporting its subsidiary banks, 
some commentators regarded, financially at least, this regulatory regime represents a 
compulsory vertical consolidation of depository institution subsidiaries with their parent 
bank holding companies, 78 albeit it remains unclear whether this standby obligation to 
supply capital is in all circumstances unlimited in amount. 
75 See Federal Reserve Board, Policy Statement on Assessment of Financial and Managerial Factors, 69 
FR 68236 (1997), codified in 12 C. F. R. Pt. 225, App. C. (As applied to small bank holding companies 
with pro forma consolidated assets of less than $ 150 million (and large bank holding companies are 
subjected to even more stricter requirements), the Federal Reserve Board stated its reserve for their 
acquiring additional banks by incurring acquisition debts. Thus, approvals of acquisitions on debt were 
stated on the condition that "bank holding companies demonstrate the ability to service acquisition debt 
without straining the capital of their subsidiary banks and, further, that such companies restore their ability 
to serve as a source of strength for their subsidiary banks within short period of time. ") 
76 See Supra 88 at 15708 ("A bank holding company's failure to meet its obligation to serve as a source 
of strength to its subsidiary bank(s), including an unwillingness to provide appropriate assistance to 
troubled or failing bank, will generally be considered an unsafe and unsound banking practice or a 
violation of regulation Y, or both... Consequently, such a failure will generally result in the issuance of a 
cease-and-desist order or other enforcement action... ") 
77 For example, except for those companies whose well-capitalized and will-managed status has been 
vindicated, obtaining Federal Reserve Board's prior approvals is a prerequisite for a bank holding 
company's redemption or purchase of its equity securities. 12 C. F. R. § 225.4 (b)(6). 
78 BANKING LAW MANUAL 4.05; John Deal et al., Capital Punishment: The Death Of Limited 
Liability for Shareholders of Federally Regulated Financial Institutions, 24 Cap. U. L. Rev. 67,85-95, 
100-04 (1995); see also Lissa Broome, Redistributing Bank Insolvency Risks: Challenges 
To Limited 
Liability In The Bank Holding Company Structure, U. C. Davis Law Review, 935 , 
984-87 (1993) 
(arguing the need to break the corporate separateness treatment applying to 
bank holding companies and 
their bank subsidiaries for they being placed on a unique regulatory ground. ) 
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It is nevertheless difficult to associate this aspect of consolidation with such 
corporate law thinking as the "enterprise liability" or the "piercing the corporate veil" 
idea - two major exceptions out of the generally entity based corporate law rules. In 
terms of applicability, under the state corporate law, the parent corporation's unduly 
exercising dominant control over its subsidiaries could only under certain extreme 
circumstances result in the breakdown of entity boundary and thus compromise the 
limited liability privilege enjoyed by the corporate parent, by contrast, the source of 
strength doctrine stands as a general principle to which exceptions exist only on 
"unusual and limited circumstances" grounds as identified by the Federal Reserve Board, 
applicable regardless the actual control being exercised by the bank parent corporate 
over the bank subsidiary. 79 Functionally speaking, the source of strength is thus aimed 
for reversing the idea of shareholder supremacy and to mandate a compulsory 
internalization of the group's resources to the favor of its banking component's ongoing 
operation. 
As explicitly stated by the Federal Reserve Board, the public policy interest 
associated with this regulatory prioritization for a group-based operation is precisely the 
same as the one stressing bank safety and soundness for a stand-alone bank. 80 What is 
fundamentally different between these two is bank agencies have never sought to 
broaden shareholders' expanded liabilities based on the source of strength doctrine to 
individual owners of banks. 8' Since failing to act as the source of strength will 
constitute an unsafe and unsound banking practice and such practice will subject both 
the bank holding company and its management to the full blunt of bank safety and 
soundness based enforcement actions, 82 one of the most startling regulatory 
79 Federal Reserve Board, Policy Statement on Responsibility of Bank Holding Companies to Act as 
Sources of Strength to Their Subsidiary Banks, 52 Fed. Reg. 15,707,15,708 (1987) (WL 133897 (F. R. )). 
80 Federal Reserve Board, Policy Statement; Responsibility of Bank Holding Companies to Act as Sources 
of Strength to Their Subsidiary Banks, 52 Fed. Reg. 15,707,15,708 (1987) (WL 133897 (F. R. )) (giving 
justifications to the source of strength doctrine by implying the concern of the bank group's risk-prone 
mentality due to advantages arisen from government subsidy on its banking component, and by noting the 
"critical fiduciary responsibilities of depository institutions as custodians of depositors' 
funds and their 
strategic role within [the] economy as operators of the payment system and impartial providers of credit. 
") 
81 John Deal et al., Capital Punishment: The Death Of Limited Liability for Shareholders of 
Federally 
Regulated Financial Institutions, 24 Cap. U. L. Rev. 67,84 (1995). 
82 Except for termination of federal deposit insurance, all of the enforcement mechanisms and sanctions 
as applied to a stand-alone bank and its institution-affiliated parties apply to 
bank holding companies and 
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consequences may therefore be the bank holding company as a corporate shareholder is 
at no liberty, which the individual shareholder of a bank has, to simply sustaining the 
losses up to the limit of injected capital, but has to meet its obligation of injecting 
arguably unlimited capital to its financially distressed bank subsidiary, and to bear even 
higher losses as a potential consequence. By so doing, whereas the bank holding 
company's management has met the regulatory duty to do their best to keep the bank 
subsidiary as a going concern, they would probably fail the profit-making expectation of 
the holding company's owner. The acute clash presented here has as yet attracted 
limited attentions concerning what has been brought about with the federal regulator 
going so far as to tinker with shareholder limited liability. 
2. Managerial Element of Source of Strength Doctrine: Bank Safety and 
Soundness Centered Risk Policy and Procedure Formulation Applying to Bank 
Groups 
Although the general association of the source of strength doctrine with its financial 
implications, the doctrine sometimes derives a unique, non-financial regulatory 
requirement that a bank holding company's management has to self-refrain from the 
group's certain managerial decisions, but the final responsibility of such affairs rests 
with the management of its subsidiary bank. This is particularly true when the group's 
portfolio entails potentially high risk exposure to its subsidiary bank. 
For example, in addressing the Federal Reserve Board's concern over bank holding 
companies' engaging in such financial contracts as futures, forward and options 
contracts and money market instruments, the agency articulated the source of strength 
doctrine83 by stating: 
"In formulating its policies and procedures [over financial contracts], the parent 
holding 
company may consider the interest rate exposure of its nonbank subsidiaries, 
but not that 
of its bank subsidiaries. As a matter of policy, the Board 
believes that any financial 
contracts executed to reduce the interest rate exposure of a 
bank affiliate of a holding 
their non-bank subsidiaries. 12 U. S. C. § 1818 (b)(3); see also 
McCoy, supra note 34, at § 13.03 [1]. 
83 12 C. F. R. § 225.142 (a). 
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company should be reflected on the books and records of the bank affiliate (to the extent 
required by the bank policy statements), rather than on the books and records of the parent 
company. If a bank has an interest rate exposure that management believes requires 
hedging with financial contracts, the bank should be the direct beneficiary of any effort to 
reduce that exposure. The Board also believes that final responsibility for financial 
contract transactions for the account of each affiliated bank should reside with the 
management of that bank. "84 (Emphases added) 
Although it remains unclear to what specific extent and by what specific standards the 
Federal Reserve Board has been articulating its source of strength doctrine into 
formulating, the group as a whole, internal risk-taking policies and procedures to protect 
bank subsidiaries, the increasing asset concentration and complex activities of bank 
groups will guarantee the Board's continuous pronunciations at this direction. The 
recently adopted RFI/C(D) rating system applying to bank holding companies, whose 
indicators include "... an explicit determination as to the likelihood that the BHC and its 
nondepository subsidiaries ([collectively, ] nondepository entities) will have a significant 
negative impact on the depository subsidiaries, considering the effectiveness of risk 
management systems and the financial strength of the nondepository entities", 
85 
provides a good reference point to this prediction. 
C. Difficulties of Grafting Regulatory Safety and Soundness Pursuit onto 
Corporate-law Line of Legal Reasoning Concerning Bank Group Operation: 
MCorp86 decision 
In late 1988, MCorp, then a large Texas bank holding company, began encountering 
84 Id. at (c). 
85 See Federal Reserve System, Bank Holding Company Rating System, Docket No. OP-1207,43,996, 
43,997,69 FR 43996-01 (23 July 2004) (WL 1634413 (F. R. )) The new bank holding company rating 
system, i. e., RFI/C (D), which took effect since January 205, consists of 
five elements: Risk management 
and controls of the banking organization; Financial strength of the consolidated 
banking organization; 
Impact of the nondepository entities on the subsidiary 
depository institution(s); the overall Composite 
assessment of the organization; and Depository institutions' composite 
CAMELS ratings. See Id. at 
43,998-44,000. For an overview of the new supervisory rating system, see 
Satish Kini, New Bank Holding 
Company Rating System Revises The Focus of the Federal Reserve's Supervisory 
Practices, 121 Banking 
L. J. 784 (2004) 
86 MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Board of Governors, 900 F. 2d 852 
(5`h Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 502 U. S. 
32 (1991). 
185 
considerable difficulties for many of its twenty-five subsidiary banks failing to meet the 
minimum regulatory capital requirements even though at the same time the parent 
holding company had considerable assets at its disposal. 87 Following insolvency and 
subsequent close-down of twenty of Mcorp's twenty-five subsidiary banks, the Federal 
Reserve Board pursued enforcement actions against MCorp based on safety and 
soundness grounds alleging the MCorp's failure to act as a source of strength for its 
subsidiary banks. 
Upon a federal district court ruling against the Federal Reserve Board's case 
primarily on the procedural ground, the Board appealed to the U. S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Court. On appeals, the major substantive issue was whether the Federal 
Reserve Board's source of strength regulation was under an explicit statutory 
authorization or, absent an explicit source, reasonably derived from its broad bank safety 
and soundness mandate. For the first part, the appeals court ruled the Banking Holding 
Company Act (BHCA) "does not grant the Board authority to consider financial and 
managerial soundness of... subsidiary banks.... ", although it admitted the BHCA did 
grant the Board the power to exercise supervisory control over the structure and 
operation of bank holding companies and their non-bank subsidiaries, and the power to 
approve bank acquisitions. 88 The court further rejected arguments pursued by the 
Board that under the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act the explicit statutory 
authorization of regulating unsafe and unsound banking practices had mandated an 
overboard source of strength obligation on the part of the bank holding company. 89 
The appeals court therefore found the Board exceeded its statutory authorization and 
upheld the district court's ruling. 
Whilst ultimately the appeals court's ruling was reversed in the Supreme Court on 
an unrelated jurisdictional issue, the Fifth Court's legal reasoning against the Federal 
Reserve Board's arguments is instrumental. It reveals the fundamental difficulty of 
grafting the particular bank safety and soundness regulatory objective concerning a bank 
group onto the corporate-law line of legal reasoning. The Fifth Court noted: 
87 See Leonard Bierman & Donald Fraser, MCorp and The Future of The Source of Strength Doctrine, 
110 Banking Law Journal, 145,146 (1993) 
88 900 F. 2d at 861. 
89 Id. at 863. 
186 
"Enforcement of the Board's source of strength regulation requiring MCorp to transfer 
MCorp's funds to the troubled subsidiary banks can hardly be considered `generally 
accepted standard of prudent operation. ' Such a transfer of funds would require MCorp 
to disregard its own company's separate status; it would amount to a wasting of the holding 
company's assets in violation of its duty to the shareholders. "90 
With the benefit of hindsight, the U. S. Supreme Court's failure to end a definitive 
note on the legality issue of the source of strength doctrine has not proven a major 
hindrance in regards to the Federal Reserve Board's implementing source of strength 
authority. After the MCorp, The Federal Reserve Board continuously went back to the 
parent to restore the bank subsidiary to the adequate capitalization status by means of 
issuing mandatory capital directives based upon the doctrine. 9' 
D. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act's Statutory Confirmation on Financial Aspect of 
Source of Strength Doctrine 
Some regulatory and legislative developments in 1990s were sometimes listed by 
commentators alongside the source of strength doctrine. 92 In the good parts of 1990s 
9' Id. 
91 See Leonard Bierman & Donald Fraser, MCorp and The Future of The Source of Strength Doctrine, 
110 Banking Law Journal, 145,155 (1993) (in the post-MCorp era, the source of strength doctrine 
continued to be rather "alive", as noted by the authors). For example, the regulator articulated the doctrine 
in a written agreement when approving an acquisition bid that, apart from the acquirer's initial investment, 
it would be required "to use its assets, including its cash and other short-term, liquid, investment grade 
assets, to provide whatever additional capital support" to the acquired subsidiary bank as may be required 
by the Federal Reserve. See Id. at 154-55, citing Written Agreement, by and among Baltimore Bancorp, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Rechmond and Bank Commissioner State of Maryland, Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, No. 92-051-WARB-HC (5 Aug. 1992). 
92 The two often cited regulatory and legislative examples respectively are FDIC's closure policies 
concerning abusive inter-bank loans extended within the bank group and the cross-guarantee provisions 
under the FIRREA applying also to bank failures. Although the logics of these two sets of arrangements 
are along the line of the source of strength doctrine that some extent of financial consolidation would 
have 
been effected-- solvent insured depository institutions would have borne the 
losses sustained on the 
deposit insurance fund owing to its affiliate banks' failures--, the breath of them as applying only 
to 
failure scenarios is nowhere near the ongoing nature of the supporting 
duty developed under the source of 
strength doctrine. These two arrangements are more to do with the FDIC's 
loss recovering than distilling 
prudence in a general term. see BANKING LAW MANUAL 
§ 4.02 (discussing the "horizontal 
integration" changes made to the FDIC's closure policies in 
late 1980s reacting to certain "captive 
funding" practices of bank holding companies pooling together 
deposits taken by various subsidiary banks 
and funnelling them to certain lead subsidiary banks. ); see also 
JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL, 
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the source of strength doctrine, however, remained a product of the Federal Reserve 
Board's broad rule-making function under its general mandate for ensuring bank (or 
bank subsidiary) safety and soundness. It was not until 1999 with the passage of the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act that the doctrine was directly addressed by statute. The 
passage of the GLBA Act therefore gives its impact to the doctrine by standing it on a 
statutory ground which to some extent settled the doubt as raised in the MCorp 
concerning the legality of the Federal Reserve Board's interfering into managerial 
functions on the holding company as opposed to the bank subsidiary level. 
Under the title "Clarification of Source of Strength Doctrine", Section 370 of the 
GLBA Act in general bans any suit brought against federal banking agencies based on 
their exercising the doctrine-deriving powers and, therefore, indirectly confirms the 
legality of the doctrine, as a legitimate expansion of the bank safety and soundness 
principle to the parent level. Whether or not the banking regulator being in an ordinary 
regulatory capacity or as conservators or receivers exercising such powers, no person 
may bring a claim against any Federal banking agency for assets return or for monetary 
damages or other legal or equitable relief based on an insured depository institution's 
affiliate or controlling shareholder transferring assets to such institution, if, at the time 
of transfer, the bank was undercapitalized and the institution was subjected to a capital 
directive and appropriate procedures have been followed. 93 
Under Section 112 of the GLBA Act the law appears to have restricted the doctrine 
to basically a vertical parent vis-a-vis bank subsidiary application. The Federal 
Reserve Board may not require a holding company to diverting funds or assets of its 
other financial subsidiaries (e. g., insurance company, securities firm, investment 
company or investment adviser) towards injecting capital into its bank subsidiary 
if by 
so doing would have caused a material effect on the financial affiliate's 
financial 
BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 754 (3d ed. 2001) (criticizing the FDIC closure policies 
for the 
potentially disastrous results of the failure of all banks in the 
holding company. ) For depository 
institutions' cross-guarantee duty, see 12 § U. S. C. 1815 (e) (any 
insured depository institution "shall be 
liable for any loss incurred by the [FDIC], or any loss which the 
[FDIC] reasonably anticipates incurring" 
associating with the default of a commonly controlled insured 
depository institution, or any assistance 
provided by the FDIC to a commonly controlled depository institution 
in danger of default. ) 
93 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 730 (amending 12 U. S. C. 
§ 1823), 113 Stat. 1338, 
1476-77 (1999). 
188 
condition. 94 
However, the bank regulator still commands considerable implicit authority that the 
holding company may voluntarily at the subsidiary level engage in horizontal financial 
integration. This is because, to the extent the distressed bank subsidiary's 
unsatisfactory financial condition can not be improved by capital injections from its 
parent or affiliates, the Federal Reserve Board may either require the holding company 
to divest the troubled bank subsidiary within 180 days with operation restrictions 
imposed before such divesture, 95 or the agency may opt for alternative measures such as 
imposing acquisition bans or/and other financial activity restrictions on the holding 
company's future operation. 96 
Whereas the passage of the GLB Act has cleared the way for the Federal Reserve 
Board imposing capital directives on the bank's parent company, it is worthy paying the 
same attention to the GLB Act's failing to address the extent to which the Federal 
Reserve Board should be allowed to mandate group-wide risk policies under the source 
of strength doctrine for promoting the bank subsidiary's safety and soundness status. 
As a result, the permissible depth and width of the managerial aspect of the source of 
strength doctrine will continuously remain unclear and will be destined to spur 
controversies between the regulator and the management of the affected bank holding 
companies in the future. 
III. Implications on Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance from Enhanced 
Review Standards under Managerial Safety and Soundness Requirements 
As two sets of open-ended and open-textured rules controlling the bank management's 
decision-making and oversight function, the bank safety and soundness principle 
co-relates with the corporate law concept of fiduciary duties (duties of 
loyalty, good 
94 Id. (codified at 12 U. S. C. § 1844 (g)(1)), 112 (b), amending the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act to add 
new §§ 45 (a), (c)), 113 Stat. 1338,1366-77 (1999). 
95 Id. 
96 65 Fed. Reg. 3,785,3,787,3,792 (2000) (codified at 12 C. F. R. §§ 225.82 
(d)); see also McCoy, supra 
note 34, at § 4.05 (noting the GLB Act's legislative enactments 
have not really superseded the source of 
strength doctrine but only complemented it, and the open-ended 
doctrine will remain the regulator's 
ultimate weapon forcing holding companies to make capital 
infusions to troubled banks when other 
regulatory tools proven inadequate). 
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faith and due care) with great dynamics. Bank safety and soundness enforcement 
actions complement loyalty and good faith violation derivative litigations by adding 
civil penalties and other sanctions (such as an industry-wide prohibition order) to 
court-imposed personal damages, exerting deterrence over the bank management's 
self-interested conduct or intentional dereliction. 
However, for disinterested, good-faith managerial conduct, the managerial safety 
and soundness requirements may clash with the due care requirements with diverging 
review standards. This conflict is squarely presented by FDIC v. Stahl, 97 a suit 
brought by the FDIC against two officers and two outside directors of a failed savings 
and loan association for due care breaches based on violating a safety-and-soundness 
supervisory agreement. 
A. FDIC v. Stahl: Diverging Review Standards over Disinterested and Good-faith 
Managerial Conduct 
Absent deriving personal gains as usually seen in fiduciary duty violation cases, in Stahl, 
the alleged breaches of due care were associated with the defendant directors and 
officials' making of seven loans that allegedly violated an FHLBB-drafted Supervisory 
Agreement ("Agreement"), which contents consisted of the FHLBB's safety and 
soundness guidelines. 98 In order to exchange for the regulator's refraining from 
instituting formal enforcement proceedings, the Broward Federal entered into the 
Agreement, agreeing to comply with certain underwriting guidelines established by the 
FHLBB and to adhere to specific loan and investment procedures. 
99 As it transpired, the 
defendant directors and officers failed to abide by the FHLBB guidelines and other 
procedural requirements under the Agreement when making seven loans subsequent to 
the execution of the Agreement. The delinquencies include, among other 
things, 
inadequacy of appraisals, no written personal guarantee and no sales 
history, and a lack 
of feasibility studies. '00 
Against the FHLBB's attempt to equate the corporate-law 
due care standard with 
97 FDIC v. Stahl, 854 F. Supp. 1565 (S. D. Fla., 1994) 
98 Id. at 1567. 
99 Id. at 1567, n. 3. 
100 Id. at 1568. 
190 
the regulatory standard of prudence "as measured by industry standards", 10' the Court 
pointed out the differences between the two. 
The Court ruled, whereas the "sub-standard unsafe and unsound practice" of this 
case could support various supervisory actions including the removal of officers, the 
regulator, although based on the same fact, chose instead to sue individual directors and 
officers for due care breaches. ' 02 By so doing, the regulator's legal burden was "the 
same as that of private corporations", 103 and the defendant directors were therefore 
protected by the business judgment rule and shielded from liability as there was no fraud, 
bad faith or an abuse of discretion involved. 104 
Derived from the Stahl, some immediate results of comparison, both similarities 
and disparities, between the managerial safety and soundness principle and the due care 
duty can be presented as below. 
B. Nature of Review, Enforcement Techniques, and Monitored Subjects 
The managerial safety and soundness principle and the due care duty are similar to the 
extent both, with their gap-filler functions and open-ended textures, set standards for 
every aspect of bank directors and officials' decision-making and monitoring 
performance. The required standards are commonly enforced through liability 
impositions and certain forms of governmental interventions. The bank's internal 
procedure, control, system and policy'05 are among the primary subject matters to be 
101 Id. (cited by the court from the statement of Roslyn Hess, who was an FHLB examiner and, 
in this 
case, an expert witness). 
102 Id. at 1572 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 1569-70. 
105 The internal control fundamentals established by the report of the 
Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations (COSO) in 1992 entitled Internal Control-Integrated Framework are useful reference 
points both look at. Internal control was defined by the COSO Report as 
"a process, effected by an entity's 
board of directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding 
the achievement of objectives", and divided into three categories: 
"effectiveness and efficiency of 
operations, reliability of financial reporting, and compliance with applicable 
laws and regulations. " See 
COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION, 
ALCPA, 
INTERNAL CONTROL-INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 9 (1992). 
From the regulator's viewpoint, "[t]he COSO model served as the 
basis for the internal control assessment 
and reporting requirements that have applied to depository 
institutions as part of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act since 1991. " See Susan Schmidt 
Bies, Effective Corporate 
Governance and The Role of Counsel, remarks at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Bar Association, 
San Francisco, California, (10 Aug. 2003) 
(transcript available on 
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reviewed under both safety-and-soundness enforcement proceedings and due care 
violation derivative litigations. 
C. Enhanced Governmental Interventions and Liability Impositions Based on 
Managerial Safety and Soundness Requirements 
These two, however, can also starkly contradict with one another. Under the safety and 
soundness regime, government interventions are convenient that simply an innocent 
sub-industry standard activity would suffice the statutory requirement for issuing a cease 
and desist order, which is usually backed by the court if challenged. On the contrary, 
the court will normally defer to business judgments made by the management and will 
not rescind or enjoin a transaction decided by them when conducting due care review 
unless the egregious culpability of these decisions could be substantiated to the extent 
they actually derived from gross negligence or knowingly violating positive laws and 
regulations. 106 
In terms of liability imposition, the passage of 1821 (k) laid down a gross 
negligence, floor liability pre-empting the state corporate law's exculpatory statute. 
The gross negligence floor standard may correspond to certain culpability requirements 
under the institution-affiliated party regime of safety and soundness enforcement actions. 
However, the fact without any finding of culpability an institution-affiliated party's 
(including a bank director's) innocent violation of a cease and desist order can be the 
ground for assessing first-tier civil money penalty means, a bank director may expose to 
much more severe liability under the safety and soundness enforcement regime than 
h! Ltp: //www. federalreserve. goviboarddocs/speeches/2003/200308 10/default. htm) 
From the perspective of board functions, designing and administrating the bank-wide internal control 
structure is inextricably connected to bank directors' fulfilling the due care duty. See e. g., 
Melvin 
Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal Control, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 237,250-55 
(1997). 
los Once a finding "in nature" of such an egregious act was established to constituting a 
due care 
violation, more than often the federal regulator would also launch formal enforcement actions against 
the 
perpetrator and disregard "in degree" such misconduct's insubstantial financial 
impact on the institution. 
See e. g., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (O. C. C. ), In The Matter 
Of Gary W. Flanders, 
Director And Former Chief Executive Officer, Metrobank, N. A. Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Personal 
Monetary Penalty Assessment Order, Enforcement Decision No. 2001-120, (30 Nov. 2001) (2001 
WL 
1789420 (O. C. C. )) (assessing monetary penalty against a bank CEO/director 
based upon both the due 
care and safety and soundness violations for abdication where the respondent was 
found to have failed to 
take any action to prevent his fellow director from making illegal overdrafts 
in the modest amount of 
$29,000 on his demand deposit account at the bank for a 20-month stretch of 
time. ) 
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under the due care regime. 
One may therefore conclude whereas how much risk a bank is prepared to take for 
a particular transaction is off-limits to even an ex post due care review, it has proven to 
be a recurring theme reviewed by the bank regulator on bank safety and soundness 
grounds, with a view to exert ex ante control over such disinterested conduct or 
decisions. ' 07 
D. Selective Review Areas: Change-of-control Transactions, Bank Insolvency and 
Intra-group Relationships 
The ex ante and result-oriented nature of managerial safety and soundness prescriptions 
and reviews also brings with it substantial impacts on some event-triggered fiduciary 
duty reviews. 
In those difficult areas facing corporate lawyers such as change-of-control 
transactions and corporate insolvency - the former may necessitate a re-construction of 
the ordinarily defer-to-management review formula for preserving the market's 
disciplinary utility and, at the same time, for dealing with the corporate management's 
often intrinsic conflict of interests deriving from their entrenched managerial position; 
the latter may require a demarcation point as to from which stage the corporate 
management should pledge loyalty to creditors rather than shareholders - bank lawyers 
would be comparatively at ease in dealing with them. 
In the change-of-control situation, managerial safety and soundness requirements 
together with the "fit and proper" rule, as its sub-doctrine, would be useful in addressing 
both the competence and the integrity concerns raised against the incumbent as well as 
the prospective bank management. '08 Similarly, in bank insolvency, the banking 
regulator's early step-in mandate under the Prompt Corrective Action regime that 
derives also from the bank safety and soundness concern putting the 
interests of 
107 David Skeel, The Market Revolution In Bank And Insurance Firm Governance: It's Logic 
And Limits, 
77 Wash. U. L. Q. 433,442 (1999) (directing to banking regulators' ex ante monitoring status 
from a 
different angle of they being relational monitors, which hold the same nature as 
that of the private 
relational monitors of German and Japanese corporations. ) 
108 For the approval or/and prior notice requirements connecting to change 
in bank control procedures, 
see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Guidance on 
Change in Bank Control Procedures, 
SR 03-19 (19 Nov. 2003); see also 12 C. F. R. § 225.41-44 (2005). 
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depositors, as a class of creditors, ahead of that of bank shareholders, would pre-empt 
the dilemma concerning dividing loyalty facing the fiduciary duty regime dealing with a 
bank approaching insolvency. 
In terms of intra-group relationships, for a banking organization operating as a 
subsidiary of a holding company, the source of strength doctrine gives rise to a 
regulatory duty on the part of the holding parent, mandating the parent to act as the 
bank's ultimate financial and managerial source. This is virtually a reversal of a 
corporate parent relating to particularly its wholly-owned subsidiary under the 
shareholder model of corporate governance, where the subsidiary's management was 
considered by the Delaware Supreme Court "obliged only to manage the affairs of the 
subsidiary in the best interests of the parent and its shareholders. " 109 
IV. Implications on Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance from Other 
Dimensions of Managerial Safety and Soundness Requirements 
The section explores four broader bank governance dimensions relevant to the concept 
of managerial safety and soundness interacting with the shareholder model of corporate 
governance. 
A. Reversal of Corporate Law's Interest Hierarchy and Breakdown of 
Contracterian Model 
As discussed in chapter three, predicated on the pursuit for allocation efficiency and as 
its sub-agenda for encouraging risk-taking, corporate law assigns the shareholder as the 
ultimate and sole beneficiary of managerial conduct, which in turn generally 
leaves 
creditors and other corporate stakeholders outside the protection of corporate 
law. 
Under corporate law, the shareholder is therefore the very class topping 
the interest 
hierarchy. This interest status is reflected in the corporate 
law governance system's 
duty construct and its preference for yield-focused extrajudicial solutions 
so as to align 
the management's interest to that of the shareholder. 
In the banking context, although the passage of 
1821 (k) has qualified the lenient 
109 Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle Eastern Corp. 
545 A. 2d 1171,1174 (1988). 
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common-law due care review standard to the gross-negligence floor, the state corporate 
law's governance framework remains largely intact. Under the state corporate law 
framework, therefore, the classic problem of wealth transfer, for example, from creditors 
that include depositors to shareholders, would then occur in banking as much as in 
non-banking corporate entities. With the bank shareholder's commanding position in 
the corporate interest hierarchy, the bank management ought to adopt generally 
aggressive risk appetites the shareholder prefers to those the creditor does when making 
business decisions. ' 10 
It is against the above-summarized governance order of state corporate law, the 
banking regulator's managerial safety and soundness mandate functions to a different 
direction. 
The fact the banking regulator is required by law not to defer their interventions to 
the late point when the institution is in danger of becoming insolvent and the wealth 
transfer propensity becomes imminent means the regulator are mandated to take away 
from the bank management certain managerial autonomy, and superimpose a set of 
objective, industry-wide, "generally accepted" risk taking and risk management 
standards to effect the institution's more conservative operation to meet the agency's 
policy ends. This function is backed by formidable enforcement actions to the extent 
these standard-setting requirements "have pushed the banking agencies to reach deep 
into traditional preserves of bank management and ownership"-"' Consequently, the 
new order is not any more a contractual result, but features a set of mandatory, general, 
ongoing, conservative requirements for risk taking and risk management permeating 
throughout the bank's life. 
110 As generally recognized, this wealth transfer tendency, or, the management's 
aggressive, risk-prone 
manner, is made even more escalating in banking with the presence of an array 
of government subsidy 
(such as the deposit insurance scheme, bank-rescue packages and 
the invisible but nonetheless often 
inevitable "to big to fail" mentality), and with the bank's unique capital composition, 
which consists 
primarily of debts (made up of deposits most of them) as opposed 
to equity. 
111 Lawrence Baxter, The Rule Of Too Much Law? The New Safety/Soundness 
Rulemaking 
Responsibilities Of The Federal Banking Agencies, 47 Consumer Finance 
Law Quarterly Report, 210, 
210 (1993). 
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B. Bank Regulator as Monitor of Comparative Objectivity and Proximity 
In one sense, the banking agency's stakeholder status as reflected in their bank safety 
and soundness authority resembles that of the lender, as a class of fixed claimers, in that 
both exercise some level of "negative control" over the bank executive's commercial 
decisions. As typically contained in a loan agreement or a subscription agreement 
associated with a bond issue, 112 various covenants effecting such constraints as asset 
growth limits upon certain risk events' occurring work similarly to the bank regulator 
imposing restraints on the bank's asset expansion upon detecting the bank's financial 
resources or/and management capability could not sustain such expansion. 
The differences between these two are nonetheless obvious. Whereas the 
lender/creditor focuses primarily on the insolvency risk to ensure repayment, by means 
of the safety and soundness authority as granted by law, the banking agency is legally 
required to extending its attention to the ongoing financial as well as managerial health 
of the institution well ahead of the bank drawing to the brink of insolvency. ' 13 As a 
matter of regulatory and supervisory practice, enormous amount of safety and soundness 
guidelines, policy declarations, supervisory letters, advisories, or others directives 
articulating restricted or prohibited risky practices point at banks whose financial 
standings are relatively sound. Moreover, the method of control deployed by the bank 
agency is as mush "positive" as "negative". Banking organizations and their 
management are subjected to periodical safety and soundness examinations (or, indeed, 
second-guessing) concerning quality of their managerial strength by which the 
institution's risk management performance is demanded to be at least on par to the 
industry standard and unsatisfactory performance of it is a "deemed unsafe and unsound 
practice". 
And even more interestingly, the contents of supervisory reports generated as a 
result of these examinations are not even allowed to be disclosed to 
banks' shareholders 
112 PHILIP WOOD, INTERNATIONAL LOANS, BONDS AND SECURITIES 
REGULATION 3-6, 
32-33 (1995, Sweet & Maxwell). 
113 See Thomas Vartanian, Have 15 Years Really Made FDIC Insurance Funds 
Safer? American Banker 
(12 Mar. 2004) (noting "[p]rior ro FIRREA and FDICIA, federal 
banking regulators were generally 
prohibited by law from seizing an insured institution and putting 
it in receivership until its capital was 
zero or negative", and after the passage of them, federal 
banking regulators are statutorily authorized to 
close those solvent but problematic banks who failed to change 
their unsafe and unsound operations. 
) 
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because the examiner's mandate is irrelevant to protecting investors' interests. 114 Even 
under restricted circumstances and subject to the prior written permission of the 
appropriate federal banking agencies, these nonpublic supervisory information could be 
released, as opposed to the bank's parent holding company and its directors and officers, 
shareholders are still generally precluded from accessing them. ' 15 
In an OCC document containing certain passages of a report of examination (ROE) 
associated with the appeals process over the ROE's loss classification of a bank's trust 
investment, one might catch a glimpse how the banking agency in practice exercises as a 
monitor through bank examinations. "6 The conclusion that the bank's investment in 
the trust was a classified loss was based on, among other things, credit risk being overly 
high. The examiners went deep into typically a thorough credit risk analysis, 17 before 
drawing this conclusion with the following passage stated in the ROE: 
"The bank's investment in the trust was imprudent and reflects unsafe and unsound 
investment practices. Management and the board did not perform adequate due diligence 
prior to purchasing this asset. Management's pre-purchase analysis did not adequately 
address the significant inherent risks in the investment. "' 18 (Emphases added) 
On appeals review, the ombudsman ultimately overturned this ROE conclusion and 
raised the rating of the trust business at issue from a loss to a substandard classification 
level upon conducting an even more detailed and technical risk analyses than did the 
114 Roy Schotland, Re-examining The Freedom Of Information Act's Exemption 8: Does It Give AN 
Unduly "Full Service" Exemption For Bank Examination Reports And Related Material? 9 Admin. L. J. 
Am. U. 43,50 (1995). 
115 See 12 CFR 4.37 (b)(2) (OCC exceptions); 12 CFR 309.6 (b) (FDIC exceptions); 
12 USC 326,12 
CFR 26120 (b) (FRB exceptions); and 12 CFR 510.5 (c)(4) (OTS exemptions); see also 
FDIC, 
Interagency Advisory On Confidentiality Of CAMELS Ratings And Other Non-public Supervisory 
Information, FIL-13-2005 (28 Feb. 2005), Attach.: Supervisory Interagency Advisory 
On The 
Confidentiality Of The Supervisory Rating And Other Nonpublic Supervisory Information. 
116 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Appeal 4 -Appeal 
Of A Loan Classification And The 
Earnings And Management Component Ratings, 19 No. 4 OCC Q. J. 29,1 (2000) 
(WL 33173080 
(O. C. C. )) 
117 The ROE drew on the following reasons for its judgment: 
"[t]he trust is a new entity with no 
established operating history; [p]epayment period is protracted; 
[t]iming and amount of payments are 
uncertain; [t]he beneficial interest is last in priority of payments; and 
[u]ltimate residual value is 
unpredictable. " Id. at 1 
118 Id. 
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ROE and identified the following weaknesses of this investment: 
"The repayment period is protracted. Residual proceeds (principal repayment) will not be 
received until 2016 at the earliest, and potentially not until 2024. Although the bank will 
receive tax benefits in 1999 and 2000, it is not repayment if principal. Reinvestment of this 
tax benefit will still result in an extended period for principal recovery. The timing and 
amount of payments are uncertain. The bank's beneficial interest in the transaction is in last 
position for the priority of payments. There are five classes of debt that take priority over the 
residual interests. The ultimate residual value is unpredictable. There are variables that could 
affect the adequacy of cash flow through the life of the transaction, such as change in 
interest rates and events that could diminish the value of the equipment. Residual interest is 
below investment grade quality. ""9 
Two sets of observations might be drawn from the above example. First, it reveals 
yet again a classic should-have-known manner by which banking organizations and their 
management are periodically second-guessed and monitored by banking agencies under 
the standard of objective reasonableness. 
Second, it suggests a unique position at which the banking agency stands as a 
monitor. It was suggested by some leading commentators two types of monitors 
existing in a corporate governance system - monitors of proximity (including such 
corporate institutions as independent directors, the board in its monitoring capacity, and 
large shareholders); and monitors of objectivity (including such market-based 
mechanisms as supported by credit rating agencies, stock market analysts, takeover 
consultants, outside lenders and other participants). 
120 It was further indicated, 
although the optimal monitor is the one being well-informed as well as 
being objective, 
corporate monitors for the purposes of monitoring and disciplining management can not 
exhibit both proximity and objectivity since an intrinsic tradeoff exists 
between them: 
"The objectivity necessary for ... timely corrections 
require sufficient distance between 
management and monitor, but being well informed requires close and 
intrusive 
119 Id., at 2. 
120 For a theoretical framework of this differentiation, see 
Boot & Macey, supra 120,366-75. 
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contact. "121 In other words, monitors of proximity and of objectivity hold mutually 
exclusive advantages and, more importantly, disadvantages when monitoring and 
disciplining bank management, and therefore the ensuing shortage or insufficiency. 122 
Applying this theory in the banking context, however, the banking regulator's 
monitoring status can hardly fit into either of the class of monitors. Banking 
regulators' access to proprietary and other "soft" information concerning institutional 
and managerial performance in general and specific transactional details in particular as 
illustrated in the above-cited passages of ROE, combined with their power to enforce 
such access, and the confidentiality requirement concerning contents of supervisory 
reports (results of bank safety-and-soundness examinations) make them functionally 
resemble those well-informed monitors of proximity on one hand. On the other hand, 
banking regulators, having no direct and personal financial interests and entrenched 
positional interests as typically held by such monitors as large shareholders and board 
members, are comparatively distant from bank executives and therefore comparatively 
well-equipped to be objective. And more importantly, the duty for bank regulators to 
refrain from forbearance and to timely correcting problems found in the bank's 
operation further mandate effective and efficient measures being adopted, which might 
not be the case for an ordinary monitor of objectivity. 
In short, in the field of banking, as a class of monitors, banking regulators as 
mandated by law and backed by a forceful enforcement regime comparatively hold the 
merits of monitors of proximity and of objectivity, whilst avoiding their shortcomings. 
One of the ensuing consequences flowing from these analyses is banking regulators are 
better equipped in performing monitoring functions effectively than are the typical other 
two types of monitors. 
C. Dampening Effects on Market-based Interest Alignment Mechanism 
The above observations concerning comparative effectiveness of monitoring 
functions 
1211d., at 368. 
122 See Macey, supra note 122, at 403-04 (discussing the failures of 
Enron's Board (as monitor of 
proximity) in its misplaced trust over self-dealing transactions between top managers and 
the corporation, 
and of market analysts, credit rating agencies and others (as monitors of objectivity) 
in their inability to 
adequately assess Enron's impenetrable financial statements because of 
information disadvantages in the 
build-up to Enron's collapse. ) 
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performed by banking regulators is crucial and instrumental in that banking regulators 
and the other two types of monitors may pursue their respective agendas differently, and 
in some cases, may even mutually exclusive. This is particularly true for those 
monitors whose stakes are connected to the banking organizations' equity, 123 as opposed 
to debt. 124 
As discussed previously in this chapter, banking regulators' pursuit for bank safety 
and soundness means they have an incentive to discourage even beneficial risk taking 
which from the shareholder's perspective might well be risk worth taking, 125 if, in their 
opinions, such risk taking decisions would have an unacceptable impact on the 
well-being of depositors and of ongoing banking. They would then place negative 
123 See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, STAFF STUDY 173, 
IMPROVING PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IN BANKING 2 (2000) (noting "... shareholders want a firm to 
attain an appropriate risk-return tradeoff, not to limit risk per se. Indeed, for a leveraged firm, an increase 
in risk has the effect of transferring wealth from debt holders to shareholders. This problem of 
private-market moral hazard makes the discipline from debt holders imperative for an unregulated firm". ) 
124 Whereas it is outside the scope of this work, which focuses on the correlations between the 
shareholder model of corporate governance primarily established under the state corporate law and the 
regulatory and supervisory arrangements for bank safety and soundness, debtholders, in particular 
sub-debtholders, and their functioning as a complement to the regulatory safety and soundness efforts 
have increasingly been explored in recent years. The perceived complementary function exercised by this 
particular class of bank stakeholders, in their capacities as fixed and contract-based claimers, having a 
reward-loss scenario and risk-averted incentives aligning most to the banking supervisors, has actually 
been factored into the comprehensive process of banking supervision. For example, under the GLBA, 
subordinated debt is statutorily adopted as a supervisory complement in securing prudential risk-taking of 
large insured depository institutions. § 108 (a) (1), GLB Act (codified in 12 U. S. C. § 4801) reads: "... The 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Secretary of the Treasure shall conduct a study 
of (1) the feasibility and appropriateness of establishing a requirement that, with respect to 
large insured 
depository institutions and depository institution holding companies the failure of which could 
have 
serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability, such 
institutions and holding 
companies maintain some portion of their capital in the form of subordinated 
debt in order to bring market 
forces and market discipline to bear on the operation of, and the assessment of the viability of, such 
institutions and companies and reduce the risk to economic conditions, 
financial stability, and any deposit 
insurance fund. " For more information of sub-debtholders' complementary 
function, see e. g., Joseph G. 
Haubrich, Subordinated Debt, 1 The Journal of International Banking Regulation, 
62 (1999); also see 
Douglas D. Evanoff and Larry D. Wall, Subordinated Debt and 
Bank Capital Reform, in BANK 
FRAGILITY AND REGULATION: EVIDENCE FROM DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 
53-119 (George G. 
Kaufman ed., 2000). 
With the ongoing exploration on the debtholders' complementary 
function being well underway, one 
caution should be warranted. That is market discipline exercised 
by debtholders will inherently suffer 
from information asymmetry, and also from the shortage of enforceability 
to reduce such information 
disadvantages, which collectively will make them inferior to 
banking regulators in their ability to 
force 
through disciplinary weight against bank management. 
125 See McCoy, supra note 34, at § 13.03 [3] (noting unsafe and unsound 
banking practices are not 
inherently unprofitable but quite to the opposite that under proper circumstances 
can be rather rewarding 
financially. ); 
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restrictions as well as take or mandate positive actions for these regulatory purposes at 
the cost of the potential surge of share prices should the risk have been allowed. At the 
same time, both private-sector monitors of proximity and objectivity of a publicly traded 
banking organization pursue profit maximization, which is largely translated to optimal 
performance of share prices. The safety and soundness based restrictions on dividend 
payments and on profit-centered pay packages may be at add with the desire of the 
private-sector monitors are obvious. 
The bank regulator's agenda may therefore have some more profound and 
structural dimension of implications on the US shareholder model of corporate 
governance -a system pressing monitors of objectivity over proximity (the market for 
corporate control being "the cornerstone of U. S. governance") . 
126 The market for 
corporate control works primarily through forceful disciplinary pressure exerted by the 
market for corporate control on underperforming bank management in that share prices 
lagging in banking organizations with incompetent or corrupt management will attract 
raiders taking over control from such management. 127 The agenda conflicting 
presented here, as a loss-avoidance versus risk-taking struggling, therefore, stands at the 
core with ensuing disparate monitoring results expected by banking regulators and other 
two classes of private-sector monitors with equity-connected stakes. 
128 
The substantial offsetting effect of the safety and soundness concern on the utility 
of the market for corporate control for banking organizations can be also observed 
from 
some concrete regulatory and supervisory arrangements. In the US, safety and 
soundness based restrictions on the corporate control mechanism in banks are of 
long 
pedigree. Even after the phase-off and ultimate abolition of geographic restrictions 
(including state branching restrictions on state-chartered 
banks and geographic 
expansion restrictions on bank holding companies), 
129 the GLB Act of 1999 still 
126 See Macey, supra note 122, at 407. 
127 Id. at 406-07. 
128 See David Skeel, The Market Revolution In Bank And Insurance Firm 
Governance: It's Logic And 
Limits, 77 Wash. U. L. Q. 433,441-42 (1999) " C[Bank] [r]egulators 
focus on `safety and soundness', 
whereas private relational investors seek to maximize profitability". 
) 
129 See MACEY ET AL, supra note 92, at 349-378. (noting restrictions on 
intrastate branching raises legal 
issue of competitive equality enshrined under the 
McFadden Act of 1927). Since 1980, 
by means of 
cross-state reciprocal treatments, the gradual removal of state 
and federal restrictions on geographic 
expansion in banking is noticeable. Liberalization on banking consolidation 
culminated with the passage 
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imposed general restrictions on acquiring ownership of banks by non-bank firms or 
firms without being affiliated with banks (the latter referring to firms other than bank 
holding companies or financial holding companies) - that is, mergers between 
non-bank/non-bank-affiliated firms and commercial banks remain prohibited. ' 30 In 
addition, lengthy approval processes involving including banking regulators multiple 
authorities in bank hostile takeover transactions make such transactions more time 
consuming and expensive and thus less attractive than bidders targeting non-bank 
corporations. 1 31 Moreover, banking regulators' involvements in practice in a hostile 
takeover transaction could extend well beyond a closing role (the approval requirement) 
to such earlier stages as the targeted banking organization is required to obtain a 
supervisory "no-objection letter" to clear the supervisor's safety and soundness concern 
over the bank's proposed defensive measures. 132 
Superiorly holding a forceful monitoring capacity and capability over their 
of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, which allowed nationwide 
interstate banking through the holding company structure in June 1995 and on 30 September 1997 
extending to interstate branching banking. See, e. g., STEPHEN A. RHOADES, BANK MERGERS AND 
BANKING STRUCTURE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980-98, STAFF STUDIES, 174,1-2 (BOARD 
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, AUG. 2000). 
130 See Macey ET AL, supra note 92, at Ch. 6 (discussing affiliation restrictions among banks, non-bank 
financial firms and non-financial firms pre-and-after the GLB Act). Even after the passage of the GLB Act, 
which in general permits an FHC engaging or acquiring the shares of a company engaged in financial 
activities, the FHC (or BHC's) depository institution's safety and soundness status before and after 
activity expansions remains either as a prerequisite or a condition sustaining the continuation of such 
expansion power. For further discussion on mergers and acquisitions among bank (financial) holding 
companies in the post-GLB Act era in the US that are predicated on both financial and managerial safety 
and soundness of their banking components, see Joseph J. Nort on, Global Cross-border Bank 
Mergers 
And Acquisitions-US Regulatory And Supervisory Considerations, in CROSS-BORDER MERGERS 
AND ACQUISITIONS AND THE LAW, 29-57 (N. Horn ed., 2001). 
131 In the USA, bank takeovers need prior approval from federal and state bank regulators. 
After approval 
is granted a thirty-day waiting is required for the Justice of Department scrutinizing the takeover attempt. 
In total, the takeover process can last four months or longer. See Stephen Prowse, 
Corporate Control in 
Commercial Banks, 10 The Journal of Financial Research, 509,511-512 (1997); 
but see MACEY ET AL, 
supra note 92, at 349-378. 
'32 The OCC's regulation provides a national bank may elect to 
follow the corporate governance 
procedures of the law of the state in which the main office of the 
bank is located to the extent those 
procedures are not inconsistent with the applicable Federal banking statutes or regulations 
or "bank safety 
and soundness". 12 C. F. R. § 7.2000. Based on this regulation, 
in a no-objection letter for example the 
OCC expressed its no objection to a targeted bank's proposition to adopt a rights 
plan only after, among 
other things, the finding that even if the bank redeemed the rights, 
its capital strength would not have 
been 
impaired accordingly. See Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, No-objection To A Bank's Proposal 
To Adopt, In Accordance With 12 C. F R. 7.2000, A Shareholder Rights 
(Anti-takeover) Plan That Is 
Permitted Under State Law And Not Inconsistent With Federal Banking 
Statutes And Regulation, OCC 
No-objection Letter 97-01,1,2 (31 Dec. 1996) (1996 WL 798846 (0. 
C. C. )). 
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counterpart, private-sector monitors, empirical studies show that banking regulators' 
safety and soundness pursuit has indeed offset the market-based disciplinary utility 
aimed at aligning shareholder interests with that of bank management, 133and, as a result, 
imbalances the state-law based corporate governance structure emphasizing extrajudicial 
and market-based solutions whilst relaxing judicial interventions, not least the court's 
fiduciary duty reviews. One net effect that can be extracted from this imbalance is to 
the extent under the state corporate law regime extrajudicial solutions remain the 
133 One major empirical study investigating the corporate control mechanism that operates in commercial 
banks supports this conclusion. Sampling operations of five corporate control mechanisms (hostile 
takeover, friendly acquisition, removal of top management by the board of directors, intervention by 
regulators and no control change) on US commercial bank holding companies (BHCs) from 1987 to 1992, 
and tying them to data on the ownership structure of the sampled BHCs (including the equity stakes of 
insiders and outsiders on the board of directors, other characteristics of the top management structure of 
the bank, and measures of bank performance), the study found: 
(i) the most frequently deployed mechanism in the sample period was regulatory intervention (19.2 
percent of the sampled underwent regulatory intervention as against the second most frequent- friendly 
merger which stood at 10.7 percent); 
(ii) hostile takeovers did not play an important role in disciplining BHC management (only 1.7 and 10.3 
percent of the sampled underwent a hostile takeover and a management turnover, as contrast to respective 
8.8 and 20.5 percent of manufacturing firms in the same time spectrum); 
(iii) friendly takeovers primarily took place between profitable BHCs and were motivated by reasons 
other than disciplining underperforming management; and 
(iv) other than regulatory interventions, the primary mechanism for disciplining managers at BHCs was 
intervention by the board of directors. BHC boards, however, were less assertive in replacing or otherwise 
disciplining managers for underperformance than were their industrial counterparts. 
See Stephen Prowse, Corporate Control in Commercial Banks, 10 The Journal of Financial Research, 509, 
517-25 (1997). 
The following remarks made by the former Governor of the Bank of England, who used to be the head of 
the UK's primary banking agency that was succeeded by the Financial Service Authority for the 
Bank's 
prudential regulation and supervision mandate, represent the scepticism commonly 
held by banking 
regulators towards mergers and acquisitions, particularly those involving overseas participation, 
in the 
banking sector: "We do not look favourably on acquisitions of stakes designed to put 
banks `into play'. 
Neither do we welcome bids whose purpose is... that a bank may be broken up 
in ways that may be 
detrimental to depositors' interests ... 
As a general rule we would not wish to stand 
in the way... of 
overseas participation in a British bank or financial institution. But it runs counter 
to commonsense to 
argue that the openness of the London market must be carried to the point where control of 
the core of our 
financial system may pass into the hands of institutions whose 
business aims and national interests lie 
elsewhere. " See Ownership and Control of UK Banks, Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin, 525,525 
(Nov., 1987). 
See also Michael Wolgast, M& As in The Financial Industry: A Matter of 
Concern for Bank Supervisors? 
9 Journal Of Financial Regulation And Compliance, 225,227-31 (2001) (noting 
bank supervisors have 
been sceptical about financial sector restructuring through mergers and acquisitions 
with the concerns for 
the perspective economies of scale and scope being substantially overstated 
while the negative impacts on 
the financial system's stability and on liquidity in 
interbank markets being understated. 
); For a 
comprehensive study on this subject matter, see GROUP 
OF TEN, REPORT ON COPNSOLIDATION 
IN 
THE FINANCIAL SECTOR (2001), available at www. bis. or, , www. 
imf. org, and www"oecd. gig . 
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primary means to enhance pubic held corporations including banking organizations' 
efficiency, i. e., profitability, the demand for bank safety and soundness might inevitably 
dampen their utility on this efficiency objective. 
D. Implications on Limited Liability and Corporate Separateness Applying to 
Bank Groups 
As discussed in chapter three, courts honor the triad of traditional notions of state 
corporate law, i. e., shareholder-interest primacy, limited liability and corporate 
separateness, which generally directs to the law's primary policy underpinning of 
promoting risk-taking, when reviewing transactions that involve parent corporations and 
their subsidiaries. The triad has been honored as far as a transaction between a parent 
and its subsidiary is not consummated with the parent (as the controlling or the sole 
shareholder) exerting so absolute a dominance over its subsidiary (or "standing on the 
two sides of a transaction") as to bring about unacceptable prejudice to the subsidiary's 
minority shareholder. The court normally refrains from second-guessing the 
intra-group business decision entailing two or multiple corporations separate in law but 
might be integrated in operation under the parent's group-wide or simply parent-oriented 
business consideration. 
Following this vein, in at least one case where the case to be reviewed entailed a 
transaction between the parent corporation (the sole shareholder) and its wholly-owned 
subsidiary, the supreme court of Delaware ruled the subsidiary's directors owed 
fiduciary duty only to the subsidiary's sole shareholder as opposed to the subsidiary 
itself. After the US Supreme Court's confirmation in the Atherton decision that the 
corporate governance order established under the state corporate law should equally 
apply to banking organizations and bank management, theoretically at 
least, the similar 
fiduciary-duty review criteria can be expected when an intra-group transaction 
involving 
a bank and its affiliate was challenged before state courts. 
It is also crystal clear, in the banking and regulatory context, 
the pattern of 
stakeholder protection advancements evolving around the 
bank safety-and-soundness 
idea over the past three decades in the general direction of expanded 
holding company 
obligation. These unique regulatory arrangements have proven 
the concern for bank 
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safety and soundness has transcended the entity boundary and found its place in the 
group-based operation, the dominant business pattern of bank operation in today's 
America. In particular, the regulatory rules and supervisory practice evolved under the 
source of strength doctrine, together with the resultant if unintended effects of 
bank-centered vertical and horizontal intra-group integrations, are a sharp contrast to the 
state court's long-standing insistence on the limited liability privilege accorded to 
corporate shareholders (parent corporations) and reluctance to piece the corporate veil 
for avoiding risk aversion. 
The conclusion the bank safety and soundness consideration has substantially 
eroded into the state corporate-group law's three-prong foundation is therefore not an 
overstatement. Whereas academic works on these bank holding companies' expanded 
obligations primarily focused on their complementary effects on the safety and 
soundness regulatory objective, the extensive extent to which the doctrine actually had 
altered the broader corporate-governance order established under state corporate law has 
as yet not been fully exposed. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
Almost 10 years on since the Atherton decision, the author argues, the expanding, 
ubiquitous presence of the regulatory requirements for bank safety and soundness has 
proven inadequate the foundation of Atherton statement. That neither banking statutes 
nor regulations nor other rule-making works promulgated under them had set forth 
corporate governance standards of a general nature for the bank management, as 
assumed by the Atherton court, is inconsistent with the current state of legal order 
applying among bank shareholders, management and banking regulators. The Atherton 
assumption is an inaccurate one. The issue now is not so much whether the state 
corporate law should accommodate the banking regulator's safety and soundness 
consideration and extend it beyond compliance as how the law as a whole should react 
to the new order established, as duly authorized by Congress and recognized 
by court, 
by the bank regulator's open-ended and open-textured consideration for safe and sound 
management that has pushed the banking agencies to reach deep 
into traditional 
preserves of bank management and ownership - with a full-blown agenda other 
than 
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maximizing shareholder profits. 
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CHAPTER FIVE - 
Concluding Observations and Modest suggestions 
On this text's subject matter - the bifurcated governance standards over managerial 
conduct of the US banking organizations as enshrined under the bank regulatory 
stakeholder governance model and the state corporate law's shareholder governance 
model - this chapter concludes with three final points, addressing first, the tension 
embedding the current overall governance order; second, some possible approaches to 
governance standard reconciliation; and, finally, the desirability of establishing in the 
US banking sector an industry-specific corporate governance system. 
As opposed to the traditional perspective which wrongfully pre-supposed corporate 
governance standards being an exclusive domain of state corporate law, the author offers 
a new perspective, by examining governance standards under state corporate law 
together with the "shadow corporate law" created under bank safety and soundness 
regulation and supervision, and enforcement as well examination practice, in order to 
more fully expose how the bank management is being directed and controlled. This 
exercise reveals that banks are in reality being directed to achieve dual corporate 
objectives, the one of stability and of profitability. The immediate task of corporate 
governance in banks is therefore to establish clearer criteria for bank management 
concerning balancing or prioritizing these two. To this end, the author puts forward 
some modest suggestions in section two of this chapter, including the need to direct the 
face of bank safety and soundness regulation to a phase-by-phase treatment predicated 
on the result of the supervisory report. As a starting point to this effort, banking 
agencies may consider restricting those existing prohibitive or restrictive instructions 
concerning specific unsafe and unsound transactions to applying only to those 
institutions which performances on management are rated unsatisfactory or worse. 
On a broader policy term, the final section of this chapter notes the much needed, 
full-scale reconstruction concerning corporate governance standards 
in banks. This 
process should put an end to the existing bifurcated approach 
by establishing a set of 
uniform, national corporate governance standards that can truly reconcile 
the banking 
207 
institution's desired operating strategies of profit maximization and loss avoidance - 
that is, a set of industry specific corporate governance standards. 
I. Managerial Safety and Soundness Banking Rules as Shadow Corporate Law 
As discussed in chapter four, where there exist managerial abuses taking either the 
conflict-of-interest form or that of outright fraud, the banking regulator's safety and 
soundness agenda converges with that of the state corporate law addressing agency-cost 
related problems to the bank shareholder's interest, and so does the regulator's 
prudential pursuit enhance the policy value to be promoted under the shareholder 
governance model. 
But in the absence of such insider abuses, the regulatory consideration for safe and 
sound management and the general loss avoidance psychology it has injected on bank 
management as supported by vigorous regulatory monitoring and formidable 
enforcements is not only directly competing with the policy value of promoting 
managerial risk-taking zeal under state corporate laws, but also has installed a new 
internal interest hierarchy with the well-being of the bank depositor or the US deposit 
insurance system and the ongoing operation of the US banks topping the interest ladder. 
The status quo is that the safety-and-soundness based open-ended regulatory reach, as 
reflected in banking statutes, regulation, banking agencies' rule-making works, private 
rulings, as well as enforcement and examination practice, has already attained a 
"shallow corporate law" status and moved well beyond an area of black-letter 
compliance, eroding into the core of the state corporate law's policy value which 
holds 
"enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain"' as an overall, single corporate 
objective. 
The US bank management is actually being governed 
by two disparate strands of 
standards of conduct and review instructing often conflicting risk appetites 
over even 
benevolent risk-taking decisions, whereby the banking 
institutions they attend to are 
expected to achieve both, through the bank shareholder's 
lens, profitability and, through 
those of the banking agency, stability -a dual corporate goal co-existing 
and running 
1 THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS sec. 2.01(a) (1994). 
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through the banking organization's ordinary course of business. 2 This status has posed 
a genuine governance problem pointing at within the overall bank governance 
framework a considerable level of confusion and inconsistencies. 
II. Reconciliation of Managerial Standards of US Banking Organizations 
The first compelling question one has to raise is therefore whether raising the prudential 
regulatory pursuit - in particular its risk-controlling approaches - to such a height can 
be justified. 
To start with, it has been proven that the banking sector's risk-prone propensity as a 
genuine existence is able to translate into a full-blown banking crisis. 3 Weighing in the 
various public-interest attributes explored previously in this text (particularly in chapter 
one and two) that as generally acknowledged have contributed to the banking industry's 
quasi-public nature, the need for certain regulatory interventions to hold the banking 
organization as a going concern could thus be established. But would stopping at the 
institution's border rather than reaching deep into its managerial core by imposing for 
example enhanced risk-based capital requirements alone be, as argued by some 
commentators, 4 sufficient enough to safeguard against the occurring of banking crises 
2 Even from the regulatory side, one should not lose sight of the importance of maintaining the banking 
industry's competitive capacity to achieve a reasonable level of profitability. Putting into the policy 
background behind the liberalization of financial institution powers connecting to the GLB Act relaxing 
cross-sector organizational integration, one would readily detect the policy-maker's desire to reverse the 
decline in the profitability of financial intermediaries, in particular depository institutions. See, in general, 
JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 511-86 (3d ed. 2001); see also 
Allan Greenspan, remarks made at the Conference of State Banking Supervisors, Traverse City, Michigan, 
18 May 2001 (noting the broad policy objective of bank supervisors and regulators as: "[t]o promote 
safety and soundness while allowing banking institutions to innovate and compete") 
3 Despite the considerable amount of insider abuses, dishonesty was a contributing 
factor to only a 
minority of widespread failures during the US banking sector crisis of 1980s and early 
1990s. See Harris 
Weinstein, Advising Corporate Directors After The Saving And Loan Disaster, 48 Bus. Law., 1499,1501, 
note 10 and accompanying text (1993) ("Estimates of the losses due to 
fraud and misconduct have 
stretched from a low of 3% to a high of 33% of the net losses the taxpayers 
have suffered as a result of the 
savings and loan debacle. ", citing NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION 
REFORM, RECOVERY AND ENFORCEMENT, ORIGINS AND CAUSES OF THE S&L 
DEBACLE: 
A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 70-71 (July 1993)); see also KENNETH SPONG 
BANKING 
REGULATION-ITS PURPOSES, IMPLEMENTAITON AND EFFECTS 81 (5`h ed. 
2000) ("... insider 
problems... representing one of the major reasons for failure in 
26 percent of the banks. ", citing 
U. S. 
General Accounting Office, Bank Insider Activities: Insider Activities: Insider Problems and 
Violations 
Indicate Broader Management Deficiencies, GAO/GGD-94-88,30 March 1994) 
4 See e. g., Eric Gouvin, Shareholder Enforced Market Discipline: 
How Much Is Too Much? 16 Ann. Rex. 
Banking L. 311,350 (1997) ("The only change necessary was to make the capital 
requirements of banks 
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by providing equity holders with economic incentive to monitor the management's 
risk-taking and also a financial buffer to cover losses should risks be realized? As 
explored in detail in chapter two, the history has indicated this may not be the case, 
considering prudential concerns being generally outside the agenda to be fostered under 
the shareholder governance model and the shortage of the capital adequacy regime on 
addressing the managerial root cause leading to bank failures. 5 To some extent 
regulatory control over managerial risk-taking conduct should thus be recognized as a 
necessity. 
The remaining problem is then how to develop within the US banking sector a 
coherent formula reconciling the above-discussed bifurcated strands of standards of 
conduct and of review over the bank management. 
Efforts along this line have been made by an attempt to revamping the 
composition of the state law based fiduciary duty in the past. The proposition of 
adding the banking regulator alongside the bank shareholder as beneficiary recipients of 
fiduciary duty owed by bank management to the bank corporate entity has sparkled 
fierce debates in early 1990s. 6 At the heart of this proposal is an affirmative, 
open-ended mediation role and function to be assumed and performed by the bank 
significant enough to prevent the temptation to over-leverage, and to provide a cushion for the risks of the 
banking business. ") 
5 As discussed in chapter two, the reasons against this thought include the "lagging indicator" argument 
that insufficiency of capital is simply the symptom as opposed to mismanagement as the root cause 
leading to the institution's ultimate failure; the explicit Congressional mandate and judicial differences for 
banking agencies reaching deep into regulating risky activities and inadequate risk-management practices; 
and the deep-rooted clash between shareholders and depositors in their risk perspectives. 
6 For the federal banking regulators' advocacy that a general fiduciary duty should be owed by 
bank 
management to the primary federal banking regulator and the FDIC, see Lawrence Baxter, Fiduciary 
Issues in Federal Banking Regulation, 56 Law And Contemporary Problems, 7,14, note 43. (citing Harris 
Weinstein, Address at Southern Methodist University in Dallas, Texas (Sept. 13,1990), 
in Speech by OTS 
Chief Counsel Weinstein on Duties of Depository Institution Fiduciaries, 55 BNA Banking 
Rep. 508,510 
(1990); see also Bank, Thrift Attorneys React to Duties Outlined by OTS Chief 
Counsel Weinstein, 55 
BNA Banking Rep. 547 (1990); Advice on How to Exploit Loopholes May Be Unethical, 
OTS' Weinstein 
Says, 56 BNA Banking Rep. 616 (1991); Ohio, Louisiana Draft Bills Would Limit Liability of Bank and 
Thrift Attorneys, 56 BNA Banking Rep. 765 (1991). Cf. FDIC Will Target Attorney Malpractice, 
Agency 
Counsel Cautions Banking Lawyers, 54 BNA Banking Rep. 545 (1990) (reporting remarks 
by an 
associate general counsel of the FDIC)). 
For arguments against the above approach, see Id. at 23 ("Unlike a 
duty based on fiduciary principles, 
however, the duty not to engage in unsafe and unsound conduct is 
determined not by reference to general 
principles of equity, but by reference to the intention and policies of 
Congress. "); see also Andrew 
Nussbaum, Like Money In The Bank? An Economic Analysis Of Fiduciary Duties 
To Protect The S&L 
Deposit Insurance Fund, 44 Admin. L. Rev. 355 (1992). 
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management, whereby they were to mediate the interest of the bank shareholder and that 
of the bank regulator when making risk-taking decisions. The fundamental 
predicament entailing the feasibility of this approach however rests with its inherent 
dividing loyalty problem. 7 One would also have a strong case arguing against this 
proposition based on the doubt over the need for banking regulators seeking to have 
their safety and soundness agenda protected under corporate law, given the regulator's 
prudential pursuit has to some extent already overridden the state corporate law's 
defer-to-management approach over managerial risk-taking decisions. 8 
Alternatively, standard reconciliation from the regulatory end might pose as a less 
onerous possibility. There might be a genuine need to direct prudential intrusion into 
managerial risk-taking autonomy towards, based on the individual institution's 
risk-management strength, generally a phase-by-phase treatment, 9 if clearer criteria 
concerning balancing or prioritizing profitability and stability and their projected 
risk-taking manners expected of the bank management are to be established. This 
approach will cut back on the currently full-blown, indiscriminate regulatory intrusion 
into specific risk-taking decisions permeating throughout the bank' life, and serve as a 
timely reaction to halt the trend of exponentially expanding the regulatory, supervisory 
and enforcement scope projected under managerial safety and soundness 
conceptualization, one that might compromise the desired support for a vibrant, 
innovative banking system. 
On this point, the current regulatory status does not indicate a coherent policy. 
The Prompt Correction Regime, on one hand, takes a phase-by-phase approach to 
control an individual institution risks, the intensity of interventions in and restrictions 
See chapter three for arguments raised against the Delaware Chancery Court's 
decision of Credit 
Lyonnais. 
8 See Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 392-96 (arguing a fiduciary duty running to the 
banking regulator or the 
deposit insurance fund would not render extra protection for the purpose of 
limiting risk, but could only 
partly mirror control devices already granted to agencies by statute. ) 
9 On the supervisory side, a two-tiered supervisory program, which 
is similar to the proposed 
phase-by-phase regulatory regime, applying to community banks was 
installed by the FDIC in January 
2004. For the purpose of deciding the applicability of streamlined on-site examinations, 
the program 
separates those well-capitalized and well-managed banks and thrifts that meet 
basic safety-and-soundness 
criteria from those not. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
Remarks By FDIC Chairman Don 
Powell ABA Annual Convention New York, New York, FDIC PR- 101-04, (4 
Oct. 2004) (2004 \V l_ 
2231523 (F. D. I. C. )) 
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over the management's autonomy increasing as the bank's financial or managerial 
strength, or both, deteriorating. On the other hand, safety-and-soundness regulatory 
pronunciations contained in the banking agency's policy statements and individual 
enforcement orders, which meticulously instruct the bank management's desired 
risk-taking decisions, often indiscriminately apply to banking organizations displaying 
disparate conditions of financial or managerial strength. 
This phase-by-phase approach might work for one practical reason which concerns 
the US federal banking regulator's incentive and monitoring capability. As monitor of 
comparative objectivity and proximity, they are by law mandated to engaging in 
proactive monitoring and hold superior monitoring capability than other classes of 
monitors in exposing the banking institution's genuine managerial strength through 
periodical on-site examinations and off-site reporting requirements. 10 Consequently, a 
"deemed" unsafe and unsound banking practice, which denotes the institution's receipt 
of a less than satisfactory rating in its most recent report of examination for including 
management and/or other indicators, provides not only a concrete but comparatively 
also a reliable evidence that the institution needs to cut back on its risk-taking appetites 
and step up its risk-management strength. More specifically, the starting point might 
be restricting the currently indiscriminate application of those prohibitive or restrictive 
instructions concerning unsafe and unsound risk-taking practice to only those 
institutions whose managerial quality is rated unsatisfactory or worse. 
III. Industry-specific Construct of Corporate Governance 
On a broader policy note, the reconciliation process on bifurcated standards of 
managerial conduct should serve as a stepping stone to a set of nation-wide, uniform 
corporate governance standards that can duly reflect the bank regulator's overall 
10 This is despite the functional incompleteness correctly associating with periodical 
bank 
safety-and-soundness examinations by some commentators. See e. g., 
Richard Kim, The Federal Reserve's 
Proposed Interpretation Regarding The Anti-tying Restrictions Of Section 106 of 
The Bank Holding 
Company Act Amendments Of 1970,8 North Carolina Banking Institute, 1,17 (2004) 
(noting "[a]t best, 
bank examiners would be able to analyze a handful of transactions 
during the course of an examination 
and, even then, would have great difficulty in assessing some of these 
factors, such as conversations 
between the bank and the customer and the customer's course of 
dealing with the bank and other financial 
institutions. Such a fact-intensive approach runs the risk of eventually collapsing 
under its own weight. ") 
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justifiable status as a key stakeholder. 
In relation to corporate governance over the US banking organizations, as a key 
stakeholder, the bank regulator's safety and soundness pursuit manifests itself at least on 
four fronts. 
First, on an ongoing basis and in pursuing its bank safety and soundness agenda, 
the bank regulator has reached deep into the traditional preserve of ownership and 
management by imposing negative restraints and mandating positive corrective actions 
over the bank management's risk-taking decisions. " 
Second, various bank regulatory hurdles and the bank regulator's reluctance to put 
banks into play have to some extent dampened the market-based disciplinary utility 
aimed at aligning shareholder interests with that of bank management, and, as a result, 
may have imbalanced the state-law based corporate governance structure emphasizing 
extrajudicial and market-based solutions whilst relaxing judicial interventions. 12 
Third, in certain review areas such as change-of-control and insolvency where 
non-banking management witnesses enhanced judicial review, for bank management it 
is the bank regulator's bank safety and soundness measures posing as the most 
dominating control force. 13 
Finally, in terms of the banking industry's group-based operation, source of 
strength and other related bank regulatory principles mandating the bank holding 
company to serve as the ultimate financial and managerial source of strength for its bank 
subsidiary have significantly compromised the corporate separateness and limited 
liability privilege rules enshrined under the traditional state-law based corporate 
governance order. '4 
Such uniform governance construct, addressing particularly the 
US banking 
sector's industrial particularities, their derived implications on the society as a whole 
and the regulator's (or the taxpayer's) stakeholder status, will represent 
not only a 
needed reconciliation of the bank regulatory stakeholder governance 
model and the 
shareholder governance model - of their corporate goals of stability 
and profitability; 
" Chapter 4, notes 4-34 and accompanying text. 
12 Id. notes 123-33 and accompanying text. 
13 Id. notes 108-09 and accompanying text. 
14 Id. notes 71-85 and accompanying text. 
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their policy values of public interests and ownership interests; and their instructions of 
commercial strategies of loss avoidance and profit pursuit - but also a far cry from the 
traditional economy specific design of corporate governance, indicating the possibility if 
not desirability of a corporate governance system that is industry-specific. 
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12 U. S. C. §1818 
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Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 
1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-325,108 Sta. 2160 (1994). 
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12 C. F. R. §§ 225.41-44 
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12 C. F. R. §225.142 (a) 
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12 C. F. R. §§. 225.170-6 
12 C. F. R. §225.170 (a) 
12 C. F. R. §303.200 (a)(2) 
12 C. F. R. §309.6 (b) 
12 C. F. R. §325.103 (a) 
12 C. F. R. §326.2 (k), (u), (w) 
12 C. F. R. §§337.2-337.6 
12 C. F. R. §§ 363.1-3 
12 C. F. R. §363.5 
12 C. F. R. §364.101 App. B 
12 C. F. R. §§. 371c, 371c-1 
12 C. F. R. §510.5 (c)(4) 
12 C. F. R. §565.2 (c), (h), (j) 
12 C. F. R. §565.4 (a) 
12 C. F. R. Part. 359 
17C. F. R. §§242&501 
17 C. F. R. Part. 205 
61 Fed. Reg. 67.021,67,024-29 (1996) 
62 Fed. Reg, 752 (1997). 
62 Fed. Reg. 3,779 (1997) 
63 Fed. Reg. 66,351 (1998) 
65 Fed. Reg. 3,785,3,787,3,792 (2000) (codified at 12 C. F. R. §§ 225.82 (d)) 
Board of Governors of The Federal Reserve System, Adoption of 
Regulation W 
Implementing Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, 
SR 03-2 (9 Jan. 2003). 
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Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Assessing Capital Adequacy in 
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02-20 (29 Oct., 2002). 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, The 
USA Patriot Act and the 
International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing 
Act of 2001, 
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Non-financial Equity Investments, SR 02-4, (4 March 2002). 
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Fed. Reg. 15,707,15,707 (1987) (WL 133897 (F. R. )). 
Board of governors of the Federal Reserve System, Rating the Adequacy of Risk 
Management Processes and Internal Controls at State Member Banks and Bank 
Holding 
Companies, Attachment SR 95-51 (SUP) (14 Nov. 1995). 
Board of governors of the Federal Reserve System, Risk focused Safety and 
Soundness 
Examinations and Inspections, SR 94-14 (SUP) (24 May 1996). 
Board of governors of the Federal Reserve System, The 
Federal Reserve System's 
Definition of a Full Scope, On-site Examination for 
Safety and Soundness, SR 94-12 
(FIS) (24 February 1994). 
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(31 Jan. 2001). 
Board of governors of the Federal Reserve System, Subprime Lending, SR 01-4 (Gen), 
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2001). 
Board of governors of the Federal Reserve System, Subprime Lending, SR 99-6 (Gen), 
Attachment: Interagency Guidance on Subprime Lending (5 Mar. 1999). 
FDIC, Corporate Governance, Audits And Reporting Requirements, FIL- 17-2003 (5 Mar. 
2003). 
FDIC, Interagency Advisory On Confidentiality Of CAMELS Ratings And Other 
Non-public Supervisory Information, FIL-13-2005 (28 Feb. 2005), Attach.: Supervisory 
Interagency Advisory On The Confidentiality Of The Supervisory Rating And Other 
Nonpublic Supervisory Information. 
FDIC, News Release, Remarks by Chairman Don Powell ABA Annual Convention New 
York, FDIC PR- 101-04,2004 (4 Oct. 2004) (WL 2231523 (F. D. I. C. )). 
FDIC, Revised Compliance Examination Process, FIL-52-2003 (20 June 2003). 
FDIC, Statement Concerning The Responsibilities Of Bank Directors And Officers 
(FDIC News Release PR-166-92,4 Dec. 1992). 
FDIC, Financial Institution Letters, Revised Compliance Examination 
Procedures, 
FIL-52-2003 (20 June 2003). 
FDIC, Unsafe and Unsound Banking Practices, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 23,933-01 (1992). 
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Management's Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Certification of 
Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,637 (18 June 18,2003). 
N. Y. Stock Exch., Corporate Governance Rule-Section 303 A. approved on 3 Nov. 2004 
N. Y. Stock Exch., Shareholder Approval of Equity Compensation Plan- Section 
303A. 08, approved on 30 June 2003. 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Appeal 4 -Appeal Of A Loan Classification 
And The Earnings And Management Component Ratings, 19 No. 4 OCC Q. J. 29,1 
(2000) (WL 33173080 (O. C. C. )). 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Final Interpretative Rulings, 61 FR 4849-03, 
1996 WL 50254 (F. R. ) (codified in 12 C. F. R. Part. 7, Subpart A., § 7.2000). 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, No-objection To A Bank's Proposal To Adopt, 
In Accordance With 12 C. F R. 7.2000, A Shareholder Rights (Anti-takeover) Plan That 
Is Permitted Under State Law And Not Inconsistent With Federal Banking Statutes And 
Regulation, OCC No-objection Letter 97-01 (31 Dec. 1996) (1996 WL 798846 (0. C. 
C. )). 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Risk Management Of New, Expanded, 
Or 
Modified Bank Products And Services, OCC Bulletin 2004-20 (10 May 2004) (2004 WL 
1081959 (O. C. C. )). 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Special Supervision 
And Enforcement 
Activities, 23 No. 1 OCC Q. J. (2004) (WL 2360337 (0. C. C. )). 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Unsafe And 
Unsound Investment Portfolio 
Practices Supplemental Guidance, OCC Bulletin 2002-19, (22 May 2002) 
(2002 WL 
1162661 (O. C. C. )). 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Unsafe 
And Unsound Investment Portfolio 
Practices Supplemental Guidance, OCC Bulletin 2002-19, (22 
May 2002) (2002 WL 
1162661 (O. C. C. )). 
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Alan Greespan, Testimony On H. R. 10 and Financial Modernization, Subcommittee on 
Finance and Hazardous Materials, Committee on Commerce, U. S. House of 
Representative, 28 April 1999. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Remarks By FDIC Chairman Don Powell ABA 
Annual Convention New York, New York, FDIC PR- 101-04, (4 Oct. 2004) (2004 WL 
2231523 (F. D. I. C. )). 
Financial Institutions Supervisory and Insurance Act of 1966: Hearing on S. 3158 and S. 
3695 Before the House Comm. On Banking and Currency, 89`h Cong., 2d Sess. 50 
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Gary Gensler, Testimony on Regulation of Merchant Banking Activities, Subcommittees 
on Securities and Financial Institutions, U. S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs (13 June 2000). 
2. Secondary Sources 
2.1. Books 
American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and 
Recommendations (1994). 
Auerbach, Alan J. ed., Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences 
(1988) 
Attanasio, J. B. & Norton, J. J. eds., New International Financial Architecture: 
A Viable 
Approach? (2001). 
Bank of England, Financial Stability and Central Banks: 
Selected Issues for Financial 
Safety Nets and Market Discipline (May 2000). 
Baums, Theodor ed., Corporations, Capital Markets, and 
Business in the Law (2000). 
Benston, George J., Regulating Financial Markets: A 
(1998). 
Critique and Some Proposals 
233 
Berle, Adolph & Means, Gardiner, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
(Macmillan, New York, 1932). 
Blair, M. & Walker, G. ET AL, Guide to Financial Services and Markets Act (2000). 
Blair, W. & Walker, G. ET AL, Financial Regulation (1998). 
Blumberg, Phillip I., The Law of Corporate Groups: Tort, Contract, and Other Common 
Law Problems in The Substantive Law of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations (Little, 
Brown and Company 1987). 
Cranston, Ross, Principles of Banking Law (2nd ed., 2002). 
Dale, Richard, Risk and Regulation in Global Securities Markets (1996). 
Davies, Paul, Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 
1997). 
Eatwell, John et al, The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics (1987). 
Easterbrook & Fischei, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (1991). 
Eisenberg, Melvin, Corporations and Other Business Organizations: Cases and 
Materials (8TH ED. 2000). 
Ellinger, E. P. ET AL, Modern Banking Law (3rd., 2002). 
Freeman, GA., The Problems ofAdequate Bank Capital (1952). 
Goodhart, Charles ET AL, Financial Regulation: Why, How and Where Now (1998). 
Horn, N. ed., Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions and The Law (2001). 
Keasey, Kevin & Thompson, Steve eds., Corporate Governance (Oxford U. 
Press, 
1997). 
Lastra, Rosa Maria, Central Banking and Banking Regulation (1996). 
McCahery, Joseph et al ed., Corporate Control and Accountability 
(Oxford U. Press, 
1993). 
McCahery, Joseph ed., Corporate Control and Accountability 
(Oxford U. Press, 1994) 
234 
McCoy, Patricia A., Banking Law Manual (2"d ed., 2000). 
Monks, Robert A. G. & Minow, Nell, Corporate Governance (1995). 
Norton, Joseph, Financial Sector Law Reform in Emerging Economies (2000). 
Norton, Joseph J., Devising International Bank Supervisory Standards (1995). 
Norton, Joseph J. et al ed., The Changing World of International Law in the Twenty-first 
Century: A Tribute to The Late Kenneth R. Simmonds (1998). 
Norton, Joseph. J. et al. eds., International Banking Regulation and Supervision: 
Change and Transformation in the 1990 (1994). 
Office of the Comptroller of The Currency, Comptroller's Handbook, Assets, LOAN 
Portfolio Management (1998). 
Office of the Comptroller of The Currency, The Directors Book, The Role of A National 
Bank Director (1987). 
Ong, Michael K., Internal Credit Risk Model - Capital Allocation and Performance 
Measure (1999). 
Patfield, Fiona Macmillan ed., Perspectives on Company Law: 1 (IALS, 1995). 
Patfield, Fiona Macmillan ed., Perspective on Company Law: 2 (1997). 
Parkinson, John, Corporate Power and Responsibility-Issues in the Theory of 
Company Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994). 
Rider, Barry ed., The Realm of Company Law 2 (Kluwer Law international 1998). 
SEALY, L. S., Cases and Materials in Company Law (Read Elsevier, 2001). 
Scott, Hal S., International Finance: Law and Regulation (2004). 
Spong, Kenneth, Banking regulation - Its Purposes, Implementation and 
Effects (5th ed., 
2000). 
Schuster, Leo ed., Shareholder Value Management in Banks (2000). 
Twining Ed., Legal Theory and Company Law (1986). 
235 
Vojto, G. S., Bank Capital Adequacy (1973). 
Walker, George A., International Banking Regulation-Law, Policy and Practice (2001) 
Werin, Lars & Wijkander, Hans eds., Contract Economics (1992). 
Wood, Philip, International Loans, Bonds and Securities Regulation (1995, Sweet & 
Maxwell). 
Wang, Wen Yui ET AL., Studies on Cross-sector Businesses of Banks (2000) (in 
Chinese). 
Wang, Wen Yui, Holding Company and Financial Holding Company (2001) (in 
Chinese). 
2.2. Articles 
Adams, Edward & Matheson, John, "A Statutory Model for Corporate Constituency 
Concerns", Emory Law Journal, 1085 (2000). 
Adams, Edward & Matheson, John, "A Statutory Model for Corporate Constituency 
Concerns, Emory Law Journal", 1085 (2000). 
Allen, William, "Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law ", 50 Wash. & Lee L. 
Rev., 1395, (1993). 
Allen, William et. al., "Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in 
Delaware Corporate Law ", 56 Business Lawyer 1287 (2001). 
Allen, William, "Independent Directors in MBO Transactions: Are They Fact or 
Fantasy", 45 Bus. Law. 2055 (1990). 
Allen, William T. et al, "Realigning the Standard of Review of Director 
Due Care With 
Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny as a 
Standard of 
Review Problem ", 96 Nw. U. L. Rev., 449 (2002). 
Austin, Douglas & Weinstein, Sidney, "Bank Officer and Director 
Liability under 
FIRREA: The Need for A National Standard of Gross Negligence", 
111 Banking L. J. 67 
236 
(1994). 
Bainbridge, Stephen, "The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine ", 57 Vand. 
L. Rev. 83,89 (2004). 
Baird & Jackson, "Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain ", 38 Vand. L. 
Rev. 829 (1985). 
Bank Brief, "Enforcement of FDIC's Subpoenas against Former Bank Directors FaI71111' 
Members Upheld by Ninth Circuit ", 115 Banking L. J. 295 (1998). 
Banking Briefs, "FDIC's Simple Negligence Claims against Former Bank Directors 
Were Precluded by the Texas Business Judgment Rule ", 112 Banking L. J. 702 (1995) 
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, "Ownership and Control of UK Banks", 525 (Nov., 
1987). 
Baxter, Lawrence G, "Administrative and Judicial Review of Prompt Corrective Action 
Decisions by Federal Banking Regulators ", 7 Administrative Law Journal of the 
American University, 505 (1993). 
Baxter, Lawrence G., "Fiduciary Issues in Federal Banking Regulation ", 56 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 7 (1993). 
Baxter, Lawrence G., "The Rule of Too Much Law? The New Safety/Soundness 
Rulemaking Responsibilities of the Federal Banking Agencies ", 47 Consumer Finance 
Law Quarterly Report, 210 (1993). 
Baxter, Lawrence G., "The Rule of Too Much Law? The New Safety/Soundness 
Rulemaking Responsibilities of the Berle, A. A., Jr., "Corporate Powers as 
Powers in 
Trus"t, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 (1931). 
Bierman, Leonard & Fraser, Donald, "MCorp and The Future of The Source of 
Strength 
Doctrine", 110 Banking Law Journal, 145 (1993). 
Boot, Arnoud W. A. & Macey, Jonathan R., "Monitoring Corporate 
Performance: The 
Role of Objectivity, Proximity and Adaptability in 
Corporate Governance", 89 Cornell L. 
Rev. 356 (2004). 
237 
Bradley, Michael et al., "The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation In 
Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at. a Crossroads ", 62 Law and 
Contemporary Problems, 10 (1999). 
Bratton, Jr., "The `Nexus of Contracts' Corporation: A Critical Appraisal-, 74 Cornell 
L. Rev. 407 (1989). 
Bratton, William J., Jr., "The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives 
from History", 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1989). 
Broome, Lisa, "Redistributing Bank Insolvency Risks: Challenges to Limited Liability in 
the Bank Holding Company Structure, U. C. Davis Law Review ", 935 (1993). 
Federal Banking Agencies ", 47 Consumer Finance Law Quarterly Report, 210 (1993). 
Byrne, John et al., "Examining the Increase in Federal Regulatory Requirements and 
Penalties: Is Banking Facing Another Troubled Decade? " 24 Cap. U. L. Rev. 1 (1995). 
Calomiris, Charles W. & Mason, Joseph R., 87 "Contagion and Bank Failures During 
the Great Depression: The June 1932 Chicago Bank Panic ", American Economic 
Review, 863-83 (1997). 
Calomiris, C. W. and Wilson, B., "Bank Capital and Portfolio Management: The 1930s 
Capital Crunch and Scramble to Shed Risk", Working Paper No 6649, NBER, 
Cambridge, MA (1998). 
Carletti, Elena and Hartmann, Philipp, "Competition and Stability: What's Special About 
Banking? " Special Paper No. 140 (LSE Financial Market Group, 2002). 
Camell, Richard Scott, "A Partial Antidote To Perverse Incentives: The FDIC 
Improvement Act of 1991 ", 12 Annual Review of Banking Law, 317 (1993). 
Camell, Richard Scott, "Straining Out Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The Question of 
Subsidy to Subsidiaries of Banks ", 35 Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago Annual 
Conference on Bank Structure and Competition 561 (1999). 
Cecchetti, Stephen C:, "The future of Financial Intermediation and 
Regulation: An 
Overview ", 5 Current Issues in Economy and Finance 1 (Federal Reserve 
Bank of New 
238 
York, 1999). 
Chandler, William III & Strine, Leo, Jr., "The New Federalism of The American 
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small 
State", 152 Pa. L. Rev. 953 (2003). 
Chen, Jun jen, "Studies on the Banks' Trust Departments" (Financial Research Group 
eds, 1984) (in Chinese). 
Coase, Ronald, "The Nature of the Firm ", 4 Economica 386 (1937). 
Coffee, John, "Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid"", 57 
Business Lawyer, 1403 (2002). 
Conaway, Ann E., "Re-examining the Fiduciary Paradigm at Corporate Insolvency and 
Dissolution: Defining Directors 'Duties to Creditors ", 20 Del. J. Corp. L. 1 (1995). 
Crocker, Thomas, "Federal Regulators Step Up Bank Secrecy Act and Patriot Act 
Enforcement", 9 no. 6 Electronic Banking Law and Commerce Report, 1 (Nov. 2004). 
Cunningham, Lawrence, "Compilation, The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for 
Corporate America ", 19 Cardozo Rew. 1 (1997). 
Dale, Richard, "Regulating Investment Business in the Single Market ", Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin, 333 (1994). 
Dale, Richard and Wolfe, Simon, "The Structure of Financial Regulation ", 6 Journal of 
Financial Regulation and Compliance, 326 (1998). 
Daniels, Ronald, "Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can Contractarianism Be 
Compassionate? ", 43 U. Toronto L. J. 315 (1993). 
Deakin, Simon, "Squaring The Circle? Shareholder Value and Corporate Social 
Responsibility in the UK", 70 George Washington Law Review, 976 (2002). 
Deal, John et al., "Capital Punishment: The Death of Limited Liability 
for Shareholders 
of Federally Regulated Financial Institutions", 24 Cap. U. L. Rev. 
67 (1995). 
Deferrari, Lisa M. & Palmer, David E., "Supervision of Large 
Complex Banking 
Organizations ", Federal Reserve Bulletin, 47 (February 2001). 
239 
Demott, Deborah, "Beyond Methphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation ", Duke Law 
Review, 879 (1988). 
Dodd, E. Merrick, "For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees? ", 45 Harv. L. Rev. 
1145 (1932). 
Dunne, Gerald, "Bank Director Liability: Complexity Compounded", 114 Banking L. j. 
593 (1997). 
Eisenberg, Melvin, "The Board of Directors and Internal Control ", 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 
237 (1997). 
Eisenberg, Melvin, "The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review 
in Corporate Law ", 62 Fordham L. Rev. 437 (1993). 
Elson, Charles & Thompson, Robert, "Van Gorkom s Legacy: The Limits of Judicially 
Enforced Constraints And The Promise Of Proprietary Incentives ", 96 Nw. U. L. rev. 
579 (2002). 
Engel, Kathleen & McCoy, Patricia, "A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics 
Of Predatory Lending", 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1255 (2002). 
Enriquez, Emma, "Honor Thy Shareholders at All Costs? Towards A Better 
Understanding of The Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries ", 32 
Sw. U. L. Rev. 97 (2003). 
Esen, Rita, "Managing and Monitoring: The Dual Role of Non-executive Directors on 
U. K. And U. S. Boards ", 11 International Company & Commercial L. Rev. 202 (2000). 
Fischel, Daniel, "The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 Vanderbilt Law Review ", 
1259 (1982). 
Fischei, Daniel R. et al., "The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding 
Companies ", 73 
Vanderbilt Law Review, 301 (1987). 
Giovanoli, Mario, "Reflections on International Financial Standards as 
"Soft Law" 
No. 37, Essays In International Financial & Economic Law, London 
(The London 
Institute of International Banking, Finance and Development 
Law) (2002). 
240 
Goldenberg, Philip, "TALS Company Law Lecture-Shareholders 
v stakeholders: the 
Bogus Argument", 19 The Company Lawyer, 34 (1998). 
Goodman, Gary, "The New Real Estate Lending Standards for Banks ", 111 Banking L. J., 
136 (1994). 
Gouvin, Eric, "Resolving the Subsidiary Director's Dilemma ", 47 Hastings L. J. 287 
(1996). 
Gouvin, Eric, "Shareholder Enforced Market Discipline: How Much Is Too Much? " 16 
Ann. Rev. Banking L. 311 (1997). 
Griggs, Linda, "Audits of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting: What Do They 
Mean? " 18 No. 4 Insights 2 (2004). 
Gruson, Michael, "Foreign Banks and the Regulation of Financial Holding Companies ", 
n 12 & accompanying texts (2002) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author). 
Gruson, Michael, "Supervision of Financial Holding Companies in Europe: The 
Proposed EU Directive on Supplementary Supervision of Financial Conglomerates ", 
No. 42, Essays In International Financial & Economic Law (The London Institute of 
International Banking, Finance and Development Law Ltd. ) (2002). 
Hamermesh, Lawrence A., "Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director's 
Fiduciary Duty df Disclosure ", 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1087 (1996). 
Hamermesh, Lawrence A., "Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom ", 34 Ga. L. Rev. 477 
(1999). 
Hammond, Craig, "Limited Directors'Duty of Care Liability: An Analysis of Delaware's 
Charter Amendment Approach ", 20 U. Mich. J. L., 543 (1987). 
Hansen, Charles, "The Duty of Care, the Business Judgment Rule, and 
the American 
Law Institute Corporate Governance Project ", 48 Business Lawyer 1355 
(1993). 
Hansmarm, Henry & Kraakman, Reinier, "Toward Unlimited Shareholder 
Liability for 
Corporate Torts ", 100 Yale L. J. 1879 (1991). 
Haubrich, Joseph G., "Subordinated Debt", 1 The Journal of 
International Banking 
241 
Regulation, 62 (1999). 
Havard, Cassandra Jones, "Back To the Parent: Holding Company Liability for 
Subsidiary Banks -A Discussion of the Net Worth Maintenance Agreement" 
, The Source 
Of Strength Doctrine, And The Prompt Corrective Action Provision, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 
2353 (1995). 
Hawkersby, Christian, "New Zealand's Approach to Banking Supervision: An Emphasis 
on Market Incentives and Accountability ", Paper for the conference on "Rule, 
Incentives and Sanctions: Enforcement in Financial Regulation", London School of 
Economics (26 May 2000) (Unpublished manuscript on file with the author). 
Hazard, Geoffrey, Jr. & Rock, Edward, "A New Player in the Boardroom: The 
Emergence of the Independent Directors' Counsel ", 59 Bus. Law. 1389 (2004). 
Hazard, Geoffrey, Jr. & Rock, Edward, "A New Player in the Boardroom: The 
Emergence of the Independent Directors' Counsel ", 59 Bus. Law. 1389 (2004). 
Hoenig, Thomas M., "Financial Modernization: Implications for the Safety Net", 49 
Mercer Law Review, 787 (1998). 
Holmström, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, "Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring ", 
101 J. Pol. Econ. 678 (1993). 
Holzman, Thomas, "Unsafe Or Unsound Practices: Is The Current Judicial 
Interpretation of The Term Unsafe Or Unsound? ", 19 Annual Review Of Banking 
Law, 
425 (2000). 
In, Nai-Pin, "Examinations and Suggestions of Financial regulation System 
", 27 Taipei 
Bank Monthly, 2 (1997) (in Chinese). 
Jackson, Howell E., "Reflections on Kaye, Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers to 
Improve the 
Regulation of Financial Institutions ", 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
1019 (1993). 
Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., "Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure", 3 J. Fin. Econ. 
305 (1976). 
Jensen, Michael C. & Ruback, Richard S., "The Market for 
Corporate Control: The 
242 
Scientific Evidence ", 11 J. Fin. Econ. 5 (1983). 
John, Kose et al., "Cross-Border Liability of Multinational Enterprises, Border Taxes, 
and Capital Structure", Fin. Mgmt. 56 (winter 1991). 
Katz, Eugene, "Securities Activities, Merchant Banking and Functional Regulation 
Under The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ", 56 Consummer Fin. L. Q. Rep. 182 (2002). 
Kaufman, George G., "Bank Contagion: A Review of the Theory and Evidence ", 8 
Journal of Financial Service Research. 
Kelly, Carolyn, "Examinations-Then And Now (The Stakes Are Higher) ", 58 
Consumer Finance Law Quarterly Report 7 (2004). 
Kern, Stacey, "Atherton v. FDIC: The Final Word on Bank Officer and Director 
Liability? "2 North Carolina Banking Institute, 149 (1998). 
Kim, Richard, "The Federal Reserve's Proposed Interpretation Regarding the Anti-tying 
Restrictions of Section 106 of The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments Of 1970 ", 8 
North Carolina Banking Institute, 1 (2004). 
Kini, Satish, "New Bank Holding Company Rating System Revises the Focus of the 
Federal Reserve's Supervisory Practices ", 121 Banking L. J. 784 (2004). 
Langevoort, Donald C., "The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Laws, Norms and 
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability ", 89 Geo. L. J. 797 
(2000). 
Lawrence Baxter, "Fiduciary Issues in Federal Banking Regulation ", 56 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 7. 
Lou, Da-In, "The Evolution of Banking Laws-The important agendas of the 
Banking 
Law Amendments ", 66 Taiwan Law Review, 75 (Dec. 2000) (in Chinese). 
Lester, Tim and Asaria, Mohammed, "Securitization: 
Korea and Taiwan Follow 
Japanese Lead", International Financial Law Review, 22 (October 
2002). 
Lin, Laura, "Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate 
Insolvency: Proper Scope of 
Directors'Duty to Creditors ", 46 Vand. L. Rev., 1485 (1993). 
243 
Lipton, Martin A. & Lorsch, Jay W., "A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate 
Governance", 48 Bus. Law. 59 (1992). 
Lowy, Martin & Lowy, Peter, "Needed: A Standard of Care for Bank, Thrift Officers and 
Directors", 15 Banking Policy Report, 1 (1996). 
Lublin, Joann, "NYSE Considers Rules to Boost Power of Boards: Fostering the 
Independence of Directors Could Improve Governance ", Advisers Say, Wall St. J., June 
3,2002. 
Macey, Jonathan, "An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making the 
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties ", 21 Stetsen 
Law Review. 
Macey, Jonathan, "Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: A Contractual 
Perspective", 18 Journal of Corporation Law 185 (1993). 
Macey, Jonathan, "Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure and Enron", 89 
Cornell L. Rev. 394 (2004). 
Macey, Jonathan, "The Business of Banking: Before and After Gramm-Leach-Bliey, 25 
Journal of Corporate Law " 691 (2000). 
Macey, Jonathan & Miller, Geoffrey, "Deposit Insurance, the implicate Regulatory 
Contract, and the Mismatch in the Term Structure of Banks'Assets and Liabilities 
", 12 
Yale Journal on Regulation 1 (1995). 
Marsh, Gary, "The Many Faces of Directors'Fiduciary Duties, 22 American Bankruptcy 
Institute Journal 14 ", 16 (2003). 
Matheson, John, "Corporate Governance at The Millennium: The Decline of 
The Poison 
Pill Anti-takeover Defence ", 22 Hamline Law Review, 703 (1999). 
Maxwell, Robin and Paulsen, Margaret, "Equity Investments 
by Financial Holding 
Companies ", 16 Journal of International Banking Law, 
131 (2001). 
McCoy, Patricia A., "A Political Economy of the Business 
Judgement Rule in Banking: 
Implications for Corporate Law ", 47 Case Western Reserve 
Law Review. 
244 
McCoy, Patricia, "The Notional Business Judgment Rule in Banking", 44 Cath. U. L. 
Rev. 1031 (1995). 
McDonnell, Brett, "Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee Governance ", 30 
Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1227 (2004). 
Miles, Lilian, "Company Stakeholderss ", 24 The Company Lawyer 56 (2003) 
Mitchell, Lawrence E., "The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate 
Governance? " 48 Viii. L. Rev. 1189 (2003). 
Millner, Robert, "What Does It Mean for Directors of Financially Troubled 
Corporations to Have Fiduciary Duties to Creditors? " 9 Journal of Bankruptcy Law 
and Practice 201 (2000). 
Millstein, Ira M. & MacAvoy, Paul W., "The Active Board of Directors and 
Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation ", 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1283 
(1998). 
Mitchell, Lawrence, "A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enhancing Corporate 
Constituency Statutes ", 70 Tex. L. 579 (1992). 
Mitchell, Lawrence, "The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders ", 65 N. Y. U. L. 
Rev., 1165 (1990). 
Monks, Robert, Equity Culture at Risk: the threat to Anglo-American Prosperity ", 11 
corporate governance, 164 (2003). 
Monteleone, Joseph & Conca, Nicholas, "Directors and Officers Indemnification and 
Liability Insurance: An Overview of Legal and Practical Issues ", 51 Bus. 
Law. 573 
(1996). 
Morris, Robert, "Directors' Duties in Nearly Insolvent Corporations: 
A Comment on 
Credit Lyonnais ", 19 J. Corp. L. 61 (1993). 
Morse, Adriaen M., Jr., "Breaking The Circle: The Problem of 
Independent Directors 
Policing Public Company Financial Disclosure under the 
SEC's New Rules Governing 
Public Company Audit Committees ", 23 Ann. Rev. Banking 
& Fin. L. 673 (2004). 
245 
Norton, Joseph J., "Selective Bank Regulatory and Supervisory Trends upon Entering 
the 21st Century ", Essays in International Financial & Economic Law, No. 34 (The 
London Institute of International Banking, Finance and Development Law Ltd., 2001). 
Nussbaum, Andrew, "Like Money in the Bank? An Economic Analysis of Fiduciary 
Duties to Protect the S&L Deposit Insurance Fund", 44 Admin. L. Rev. 355 (1992). 
O'Keefe, John, "The Texas Banking Crisis: Causes and Consequences 1980-1989 ", 3 
FDIC Banking Rev. 2 (Winter 1990). 
Olson, John F., "How to Really Make Audit Committees More Effective ", 54 Bus. Law. 
1097 (1999). 
Phala, Raj, "Equilibrium Theory, the FICAS, and International Banking Law", 38 Harv. 
Int'l L. J. 1 (1997). 
Pilecki, Paul S., "A U. S. Legal Perspective on Global Consolidation in the Financial 
Services Industry ", Materials on the University of London Lecture, unpublished 
materials on file with the author (22 May 2001). 
Pitts, James & Bloom, Eric, "FDIC/RTC Suits Against Bank and Thrift Officers and 
Directors-Why Now, What's Left", 63 Fordham L. Rev. 2087 (1995). 
Pringle, Laura, "Safety and Soundness Standards and Bank Officer and Director 
Responsibility". 27 Oklahoma City University Law Review, 1017 (2002). 
Prowse, Stephen, "Corporate Control in Commercial Banks ", 10 The Journal of 
Financial Research, 509 (1997). 
Ramirez, Steven, "The Chaos Of 12 U. S. C. Section 1821 (k): Congressional 
Subsidizing Of negligent Bank Directors And Officers ", 65 Fordham L. Rev. 625. 
Reed, John & Neiderman, Matt, " "Good Faith " and the Ability of Directors to Assert 
§102 (B)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law as a Defense to 
Claims Alleging 
Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of Fiduciary 
Duty", 29 Del. J. 
Corp. L. 111 (2004). 
Rhoades, Stephen A., "Bank Mergers and Banking Structure in the 
United States ", 
246 
1980-1998, Staff Studies 174 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
August 2000). 
Salacuse, Jeswald W., "Corporate Governance in the New Century ", 25 Company 
Lawyer, 69 (2004). 
Schipani, Cindy, "Should Bank Directors Fear FIRREA: The FDIC's Enforcement Of 
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, 17 Journal of 
Corporate Law", 739 (1992). 
Schooner, Heidi M., "Fiduciary Duties'Demanding Cousin: Bank Director Liability for 
Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices", 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 175 (1995). 
Schooner, Heidi M., "Refocusing Regulatory Limitations on Banks' Compensation 
Practices", 37 B. C. L. Rev. (1996). 
Schooner, Heidi M. & Taylor, Michael, "Convergence and Competition: The Case of 
Bank Regulation in Britain and the United States ", 20 Michigan Journal of International 
Law, 596 (1999). 
Schooner, Heidi M. & Taylor, Michael, "United Kingdom and United States Responses 
to the Regulatory Challenges of Modern Financial Markets", 38 Tex. Int'l L. J. 317 
(2003). 
Schotland, Roy, "Re-examining the Freedom of Information Act's Exemption 8: Does It 
Give AN Unduly "Full Service" Exemption for Bank Examination Reports and Related 
Material? " 9 Admin. L. J. Am. U. 43 (1995). 
Schott, Paul A., "FDICIA-mandated Safety and Soundness Standards Pose Compliance 
Burden ", 16 Banking Policy Report 6 (1995). 
Shleifer, Andrei & Vishnu, Robert, "A Survey of Corporate Governance, LII The Journal 
of Finance. 
Sigfrid, Peter & Day, Judy, "Who Needs Merger Covenants? An 
Analysis of the Effects 
of Takeover Covenants within a Corporate 
Governance Perspective ", 16 Journal of 
International Banking Law, 12 (2001). 
247 
Skeel, David A., Jr., "The Law and Finance of Bank and Insurance Insolvency 
Regulation ", 76 Texas Law Review, 723 (1998). 
Skeet, David, "The Market Revolution in Bank and Insurance Firm Governance: It's 
Logic and Limits ", 77 Wash. U. L. Q. 433 (1999). 
Springer, Jonathan D., "Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False 
Fears ", 19 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 85 (1999). 
Stevens, Ronald & Nielson, Bruce, "The Standard of Care for Director and Officers of 
Federally Chartered Depository Institutions: It's Gross Negligence Regardless of 
Whether Section 1821 (lz) Preempts Federal Common Law ", 13 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 
169 (1994). 
Stilson, Ann, "Reexamining the Fiduciary Paradigm at Corporate Insolvency and 
Dissolution: Defining Directors'Duties to Creditors ", 20 Del. J. Corp. L. 1 (1995). 
Stout, Lynn A., "In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith 
v Van Gorkom ", 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 675 (2002). 
Sullivan, D. & Conlon, D., "Crisis and Transition in Corporate Governance Paradigms: 
The Role of The Chancery Court of Delaware ", 31 Law & Society Rev., 713 (1997). 
Tarbert, Heath Price, "Are International Capital Adequacy Rules Adequate? " 148 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1771 (2000). 
Taylor, Michael, "The Search for a New Regulatory Paradigm ", 49 Mercer Law Review 
(1998). 
Thompson, Robert, "Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State 
Law, and Federal Regulation ", 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 961 (2003). 
Thompson, Robert, "Piercing the Veil Within Corporate Groups: Corporate 
Shareholders as Mere Investors ", 13 Connecticut Journal of International 
Law, 3 79 
(1999). 
Thompson, Robert & Thomas, Randall, "The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: 
Acquisition-oriented Class Actions ", 57 Vand. L. Rev. 133 (2004). 
248 
Turner, Cammon, "Shareholders vs. the World: Revolon Duties and State Constituency 
Statutes ", 8 Business Law Today 32 (1999). 
Vartanian, Thomas, "Enforcement Trends: Criminal Charges and State Participation ", 
American Banker, 9 (26 Mar. 2004). 
Vartanian, Thomas, "Have 15 Years Really Made FDIC Insurance Funds Safer? " 
American Banker (12 Mar. 2004). 
Veasey, E. Norman, "Should Corporation Law Inform Aspirations for Good Corporate 
Governance Practices--or rice Versa? ", 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2179 (2001). 
Wallison, Peter J., "The Gramm-Leach-Bliey Act Eliminated The Separation of Banking 
And Commerce: How This Will Affect the Future of the Safety Net", 36 Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago Annual Conference On Banking Structure & Competition 34 (2000). 
Weinstein, Harris, "Advising Corporate Directors after the Savings and Loan Disaster ", 
48 Bus. Law, 1499 (1993). 
Weinstein, Harris, "Moral Hazard Deposit Insurance and Banking Regulation ", 77 
Cornell Law Review, 1099 (1992). 
Westlake, Melvyn, "Corporate Governance-Time to Clear Up ", The Banker, 16 (June 
2002). 
Wolgast, Michael, "M & As in The Financial Industry: A Matter of Concern for Bank 
Supervisors? "9 Journal of Financial Regulation And Compliance, 225 (2001) 
Zinski, Christopher & Pacioni, Mark, "The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: financial 
Institution Compliance", 120 Banking L. J. 191 (2003). 
2.3. Conference Paper and Speeches 
Greenspan, Alan, Speech Delivered at Lancaster House, London on 
25 September 2002, 
TIMES (London), 27 September 2002, at 30 2w. 
Weinstein, Harris, Address at Southern Methodist University 
in Dallas, Texas (Sept. 13, 
249 
1990), in Speech by OTS Chief Counsel Weinstein on Duties of Depository Institution 
Fiduciaries, 55 BNA Banking Rep. 508,510 (1990). 
2.4. Internet Sources 
Bies, Susan Schmidt, Effective Corporate Governance and the Role of Counsel, remarks 
at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, San Francisco, California, 
available on 
http: //www. federalreserve. gov/boarddocs/speeches/2003/20030810/default htm (Last 
visited: December 2003). 
Jackwood, John, Compliance Examinations: A Change in Focus, available on 
http: //www. fdic. aov/examinations/supervisor_y/insights/compliance. html (Last visited: 
January 2005). 
Olson, Mark, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and Corporate Misbehavior-Coincidence 
or Contributor?, remarks at the American Law Institute conference on the 
implementation of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Washington, D. C., available on 
http: //www federalreserve gov/boarddoes/speeches/2003/20030206/default. htm (Last 
visited: June 2003). 
250 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
BHCs bank holding companies 
BOPEC bank subsidiaries' condition; other subsidiaries' 
condition; parent company's condition; earnings on 
a consolidated basis; and Capital adequacy on a 
consolidated basis 
CAMELS capital adequacy; asset quality; management 
capability; earnings quality and quantity; liquidity; 
sensitivity to market risk 
DGCL Delaware General Corporation Law 
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
FDICIA Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act 
FFIEC Federal Financial Institutions Examinations Council 
FHCs financial holding companies 
FinCEN Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network 
FIRREA Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and 
Enforcement Act of 1989 
FISA Financial Institutions Supervisory and Insurance 
Act of 1966 
FRB Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
FSA Financial Services Authority 
FSMA Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
GLBA Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
LCBOs largest most complex banking organizations 
ILSA International Lending Supervision Act 
OCC Office of Comptroller of the Currency 
PCA Prompt Corrective Action 
UFIRS Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System 
ML 
LONDON 
UNM 
251 
